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This book is designed to be, primarily, a tool for learning. To this end, we have made 
a number of editing decisions that make the opinions—or portions of opinions—more 
readable and accessible. In editing cases, we have deleted parallel citations and also 
deleted many internal citations entirely. We also sometimes omitted concurrences or 
dissents without noting the omission. We have cut most footnotes; the ones we’ve kept 
have been inserted as block quotes inline with the text, in hopes of making the book more 
accessible for those who use screen readers. We have also sometimes omitted internal 
quotation marks where a case quotes another case. We added or otherwise modified some 
quotation marks where older writing conventions could be confusing. We have taken out 
editing marks added by courts, e.g., brackets where a court changes the capitalization in 
a quote. We have occasionally removed italics, changed capitalization, and made other 
formatting changes for the sake of uniformity and readability. In some cases, we’ve 
substituted low-resolution images from a court’s decision with higher-resolution versions 
of those images. We have also standardized the formatting of some case headings, 
including occasionally omitting text (or other matter) from the headings, to improve 
readability and uniformity. We also omitted headings entirely. We have generally used 
ellipses when we cut material from cases (other than citations, parenthetical matter, 
illustrations, headings or heading matter, and footnotes), except where the omissions 
come at the beginning of a case excerpt or at the start of a section. We also omitted some 
ellipses where a paragraph or more was omitted from the end of a case or section, where 
doing so seemed beneficial for readability or aesthetic reasons. Accordingly, this book 
should not be used as an authoritative source of case text. If you want to quote these cases, 
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This book is about patents. Patents can be important tools for governments, 
businesses, and individuals to achieve various goals. Their importance has ebbed and 
flowed over time; as we write this book, the impact of patents is at a relative high point in 
a range of social, business, and legal contexts. So you may already have heard activists, 
journalists, CEOs, lawyers, and politicians talking about why, in their view, patents are 
desirable or undesirable, what works in the patent system and what doesn’t. The purpose 
of this book is to lay the foundation for you to form your own ideas about how best to use 
patents, and then to put those ideas into practice. 
There are three types of U.S. patents. Utility patents, which have existed since 1790, 
are available for “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. Design patents, 
which have existed since 1842, are available for “any new, original and ornamental design 
for an article of manufacture.” 35 U.S.C. § 171. Plant patents, which have existed since 
1930, are available for “any distinct and new variety of plant, including cultivated sports, 
mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other than a tuber propagated plant or a 
plant found in an uncultivated state.” 35 U.S.C. § 161. But many people (including judges) 
use the word “patent” to mean only utility patents. Therefore, this book will do the same 
unless otherwise indicated. 
Patents are one type of legal right in a larger category that is often referred to as 
“intellectual property” or “IP.” Other rights frequently included in this category are 
copyrights (17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.), trademarks (15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.), and trade secrets, 
which are protected through a variety of laws. Although this book will focus on patents, 
it will also mention these other related areas of law because there are important legal, 
theoretical, and policy overlaps between them.  
A. The Patent Balance 
The Constitution allows Congress to promote progress in the useful arts by granting 
inventors exclusive, time-limited rights over their discoveries. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
The right granted by a patent is the “right to exclude others from making, using, offering 
for sale, or selling the invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1). How does this right to exclude 
encourage innovation? Limiting competition in the manufacture and sales of a product or 
the performance of a process gives a patent holder the opportunity to charge a premium 
price, the size of which will depend on demand for the invention and the availability of 
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noninfringing substitutes. An inventor can also use a patent to attract investment. An 
individual inventor might not have manufacturing capacity or might prefer to focus on 
inventing and not commercialization. A patent allows the inventor to protect their 
invention and seek investors, licensors, or purchasers of the technology. This is 
particularly desirable in an area of policy governing innovation, where ex ante 
government valuation is particularly difficult, rendering impractical tools like grants and 
prizes that depend on such valuation. In addition, patents serve a teaching function to the 
public and other innovators by requiring a detailed disclosure of the invention. Then, 
when the patent expires, the invention falls into the public domain and may be exploited 
by anyone.  
The patent grant is supposed to benefit society by spurring innovation that would not 
have occurred—or would have occurred later—but for the IP incentive. However, there 
are costs, too, especially including diminished public access to patented inventions during 
the patent term. This diminished access occurs in three ways. First, higher prices can be 
extracted from consumers because of the lack of competition in the manufacture and sale 
of the described invention. In economic terms, patents impose artificial scarcity and result 
in a deadweight loss to society by increasing consumer costs and decreasing access. See, 
e.g., Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 
J.L. & ECON. 525, 529 (2001); Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond 
Intellectual Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 974 (2012). Thomas Jefferson 
famously recognized this cost in explaining that patents should be granted only for “the 
things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent.” Letter 
from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 326, 333-35 (Andrew A. Lipscomb et al. eds., 1905). Second, improvements to—
or other innovations that build on—the patented invention may be delayed or not occur, 
thus depriving future innovators of the ability to innovate and the public of access to that 
future innovation. And third, a patent holder may choose not to bring an invention to 
market at all. The patent grant accordingly must balance the incentives to invent with the 
interest in access. 
The patent system achieves this balance by imposing a series of requirements to obtain 
a patent and limitations in their scope and enforcement. An invention must be new, 
useful, and nonobvious in order to merit a patent. It must also claim only eligible subject 
matter. Moreover, disclosure requirements ensure that the patent will teach other artisans 
how to use the invention and provide notice of the scope of the patent right. These 
disclosure rules, along with related rules regarding patent scope, also serve the purposes 
of giving adequate notice and certainty to consumers and other innovators. Still other 
doctrines constrain enforcement so that the exclusive rights that patents grant aren’t 
stretched beyond their limits—for example, patentees cannot expand exclusivity beyond 
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the term of the patent or improperly tie sales of a patented good to other products. 
Conversely, there are also statutory provisions and doctrines that expand patent 
enforcement in order to prevent competitors from avoiding the letter of the patent while 
still reaping the benefits of the invention.  
This book will explore these various doctrines in detail. To start, though, let’s explore 
a “non-patent” case that describes these tradeoffs and requirements in detail. Keep in 
mind the balance that the patent system is meant to strike as you read the following case. 
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 
489 U.S. 141 (1989) 
Justice O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We must decide today what limits the operation of the federal patent system places 
on the States’ ability to offer substantial protection to utilitarian and design ideas which 
the patent laws leave otherwise unprotected. . . . 
I 
In September 1976, petitioner Bonito Boats, Inc. (Bonito), a Florida corporation, 
developed a hull design for a fiberglass recreational boat which it marketed under the 
trade name Bonito Boat Model 5VBR. Designing the boat hull required substantial effort 
on the part of Bonito. A set of engineering drawings was prepared, from which a 
hardwood model was created. The hardwood model was then sprayed with fiberglass to 
create a mold, which then served to produce the finished fiberglass boats for sale. The 
5VBR was placed on the market sometime in September 1976. There is no indication in 
the record that a patent application was ever filed for protection of the utilitarian or design 
aspects of the hull, or for the process by which the hull was manufactured. The 5VBR was 
favorably received by the boating public, and “a broad interstate market” developed for 
its sale. 
In May 1983, after the Bonito 5VBR had been available to the public for over six years, 
the Florida Legislature enacted Fla. Stat. § 559.94 (1987). The statute makes “it unlawful 
for any person to use the direct molding process to duplicate for the purpose of sale any 
manufactured vessel hull or component part of a vessel made by another without the 
written permission of that other person.” § 559.94(2). The statute also makes it unlawful 
for a person to “knowingly sell a vessel hull or component part of a vessel duplicated in 
violation of subsection (2).” § 559.94(3). Damages, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees are 
made available to “any person who suffers injury or damage as the result of a violation” 
of the statute. § 559.94(4). The statute was made applicable to vessel hulls or component 
parts duplicated through the use of direct molding after July 1, 1983. § 559.94(5).  
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On December 21, 1984, Bonito filed this action in the Circuit Court of Orange County, 
Florida. The complaint alleged that respondent here, Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. (Thunder 
Craft), a Tennessee corporation, had violated the Florida statute by using the direct 
molding process to duplicate the Bonito 5VBR fiberglass hull, and had knowingly sold 
such duplicates in violation of the Florida statute. Bonito sought “a temporary and 
permanent injunction prohibiting Thunder Craft from continuing to unlawfully duplicate 
and sell Bonito Boat hulls or components,” as well as an accounting of profits, treble 
damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. . . . 
On appeal, a sharply divided Florida Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts’ 
conclusion that the Florida law impermissibly interfered with the scheme established by 
the federal patent laws. . . . 
II 
Article I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution gives Congress the power “to promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” The Patent 
Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the 
avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in 
the “Progress of Science and useful Arts.” As we have noted in the past, the Clause 
contains both a grant of power and certain limitations upon the exercise of that power. 
Congress may not create patent monopolies of unlimited duration, nor may it “authorize 
the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public 
domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.”  
From their inception, the federal patent laws have embodied a careful balance 
between the need to promote innovation and the recognition that imitation and 
refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood 
of a competitive economy. Soon after the adoption of the Constitution, the First Congress 
enacted the Patent Act of 1790, which allowed the grant of a limited monopoly of 14 years 
to any applicant that “hath invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, or device, 
or any improvement therein not before known or used.” In addition to novelty, the 1790 
Act required that the invention be “sufficiently useful and important” to merit the 14-year 
right of exclusion. Section 2 of the Act required that the patentee deposit with the 
Secretary of State, a specification and if possible a model of the new invention, “which 
specification shall be so particular, and said models so exact, as not only to distinguish the 
invention or discovery from other things before known and used, but also to enable a 
workman or other person skilled in the art or manufacture to make, construct, or use the 
same, to the end that the public may have the full benefit thereof, after the expiration of 
the patent term.” 
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The first Patent Act established an agency known by self-designation as the 
“Commissioners for the promotion of Useful Arts,” composed of the Secretary of State, 
the Secretary of the Department of War, and the Attorney General, any two of whom 
could grant a patent. Thomas Jefferson was the first Secretary of State, and the driving 
force behind early federal patent policy. For Jefferson, a central tenet of the patent system 
in a free market economy was that “a machine of which we were possessed, might be 
applied by every man to any use of which it is susceptible.” He viewed a grant of patent 
rights in an idea already disclosed to the public as akin to an ex post facto law, “obstructing 
others in the use of what they possessed before.” Jefferson also played a large role in the 
drafting of our Nation’s second Patent Act, which became law in 1793. The Patent Act of 
1793 carried over the requirement that the subject of a patent application be “not known 
or used before the application.” A defense to an infringement action was created where 
“the thing, thus secured by patent, was not originally discovered by the patentee, but had 
been in use, or had been described in some public work anterior to the supposed discovery 
of the patentee.” Thus, from the outset, federal patent law has been about the difficult 
business “of drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public the 
embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not.” 
Today’s patent statute is remarkably similar to the law as known to Jefferson in 1793. 
Protection is offered to “whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. Since 1842, Congress has also made protection available for “any 
new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture.” 35 U.S.C. § 171. To 
qualify for protection, a design must present an aesthetically pleasing appearance that is 
not dictated by function alone, and must satisfy the other criteria of patentability. The 
novelty requirement of patentability is presently expressed in 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) and (b), 
which provide: 
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-  
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or 
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention 
thereof by the applicant for patent, or 
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a 
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country more than one year prior 
to the date of application for patent in the United States. 
Sections 102(a) and (b) operate in tandem to exclude from consideration for patent 
protection knowledge that is already available to the public. They express a congressional 
determination that the creation of a monopoly in such information would not only serve 
no socially useful purpose, but would in fact injure the public by removing existing 
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knowledge from public use. From the Patent Act of 1790 to the present day, the public 
sale of an unpatented article has acted as a complete bar to federal protection of the idea 
embodied in the article thus placed in public commerce. 
In the case of Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1 (1829), Justice Story applied these principles 
under the patent law of 1800. The patentee had developed a new technique for the 
manufacture of rubber hose for the conveyance of air and fluids. The invention was 
reduced to practice in 1811, but letters patent were not sought and granted until 1818. In 
the interval, the patentee had licensed a third party to market the hose, and over 13,000 
feet of the new product had been sold in the city of Philadelphia alone. The Court 
concluded that the patent was invalid due to the prior public sale, indicating that, “if an 
inventor suffers the thing he invented to go into public use, or to be publicly sold for use” 
“his voluntary act or acquiescence in the public sale and use is an abandonment of his 
right.” The Court noted that under the common law of England, letters patent were 
unavailable for the protection of articles in public commerce at the time of the application, 
and that this same doctrine was immediately embodied in the first patent laws passed in 
this country. 
As the holding of Pennock makes clear, the federal patent scheme creates a limited 
opportunity to obtain a property right in an idea. Once an inventor has decided to lift the 
veil of secrecy from his work, he must choose the protection of a federal patent or the 
dedication of his idea to the public at large. As Judge Learned Hand once put it: “It is a 
condition upon the inventor's right to a patent that he shall not exploit his discovery 
competitively after it is ready for patenting; he must content himself with either secrecy 
or legal monopoly.” Metallizing Engineering Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 
516, 520 (2d Cir. 1946). 
In addition to the requirements of novelty and utility, the federal patent law has long 
required that an innovation not be anticipated by the prior art in the field. Even if a 
particular combination of elements is “novel” in the literal sense of the term, it will not 
qualify for federal patent protection if its contours are so traced by the existing technology 
in the field that the “improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the 
inventor.” Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 248, 267 (1851). In 1952, Congress codified this 
judicially developed requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 103, which refuses protection to new 
developments where “the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented 
and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at 
the time the invention was made to a person of ordinary skill in the art to which said 
subject matter pertains.” The nonobviousness requirement extends the field of 
unpatentable material beyond that which is known to the public under § 102, to include 
that which could readily be deduced from publicly available material by a person of 
ordinary skill in the pertinent field of endeavor. Taken together, the novelty and 
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nonobviousness requirements express a congressional determination that the purposes 
behind the Patent Clause are best served by free competition and exploitation of either 
that which is already available to the public or that which may be readily discerned from 
publicly available material.  
The applicant whose invention satisfies the requirements of novelty, nonobviousness, 
and utility, and who is willing to reveal to the public the substance of his discovery and 
“the best mode of carrying out his invention,” 35 U.S.C. § 112, is granted “the right to 
exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States,” 
for a period of 17 years. 35 U.S.C. § 154.  The federal patent system thus embodies a 
carefully crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and 
nonobvious advances in technology and design in return for the exclusive right to practice 
the invention for a period of years. “The inventor may keep his invention secret and reap 
its fruits indefinitely. In consideration of its disclosure and the consequent benefit to the 
community, the patent is granted. An exclusive enjoyment is guaranteed him for 
seventeen years, but upon expiration of that period, the knowledge of the invention inures 
to the people, who are thus enabled without restriction to practice it and profit by its use.”  
The attractiveness of such a bargain, and its effectiveness in inducing creative effort 
and disclosure of the results of that effort, depend almost entirely on a backdrop of free 
competition in the exploitation of unpatented designs and innovations. The novelty and 
nonobviousness requirements of patentability embody a congressional understanding, 
implicit in the Patent Clause itself, that free exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which 
the protection of a federal patent is the exception. Moreover, the ultimate goal of the 
patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public domain through 
disclosure. State law protection for techniques and designs whose disclosure has already 
been induced by market rewards may conflict with the very purpose of the patent laws 
by decreasing the range of ideas available as the building blocks of further innovation. 
The offer of federal protection from competitive exploitation of intellectual property 
would be rendered meaningless in a world where substantially similar state law 
protections were readily available. To a limited extent, the federal patent laws must 
determine not only what is protected, but also what is free for all to use.  
Thus our past decisions have made clear that state regulation of intellectual property 
must yield to the extent that it clashes with the balance struck by Congress in our patent 
laws. The tension between the desire to freely exploit the full potential of our inventive 
resources and the need to create an incentive to deploy those resources is constant. Where 
it is clear how the patent laws strike that balance in a particular circumstance, that is not 
a judgment the States may second-guess. We have long held that after the expiration of a 
federal patent, the subject matter of the patent passes to the free use of the public as a 
matter of federal law. Where the public has paid the congressionally mandated price for 
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disclosure, the States may not render the exchange fruitless by offering patent-like 
protection to the subject matter of the expired patent. “It is self-evident that on the 
expiration of a patent the monopoly created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the 
thing formerly covered by the patent becomes public property.” 
In our decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), and Compco 
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964), we found that publicly known design 
and utilitarian ideas which were unprotected by patent occupied much the same position 
as the subject matter of an expired patent. The Sears case involved a pole lamp originally 
designed by the plaintiff Stiffel, who had secured both design and mechanical patents on 
the lamp. Sears purchased unauthorized copies of the lamps, and was able to sell them at 
a retail price practically equivalent to the wholesale price of the original manufacturer. 
Stiffel brought an action against Sears in Federal District Court, alleging infringement of 
the two federal patents and unfair competition under Illinois law. The District Court 
found that Stiffel’s patents were invalid due to anticipation in the prior art, but 
nonetheless enjoined Sears from further sales of the duplicate lamps based on a finding of 
consumer confusion under the Illinois law of unfair competition. . . . 
This Court reversed, finding that the unlimited protection against copying which the 
Illinois law accorded an unpatentable item whose design had been fully disclosed through 
public sales conflicted with the federal policy embodied in the patent laws. . . . 
A similar conclusion was reached in Compco, where the District Court had extended 
the protection of Illinois’ unfair competition law to the functional aspects of an unpatented 
fluorescent lighting system. The injunction against copying of an unpatented article, freely 
available to the public, impermissibly “interfered with the federal policy, found in Art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of allowing free 
access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public 
domain.” 
. . . Read at their highest level of generality, the two decisions could be taken to stand 
for the proposition that the States are completely disabled from offering any form of 
protection to articles or processes which fall within the broad scope of patentable subject 
matter. Since the potentially patentable includes “anything under the sun that is made by 
man,” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980), the broadest reading of Sears 
would prohibit the States from regulating the deceptive simulation of trade dress or the 
tortious appropriation of private information. 
That the extrapolation of such a broad pre-emptive principle from Sears is 
inappropriate is clear from the balance struck in Sears itself. The Sears Court made it plain 
that the States “may protect businesses in the use of their trademarks, labels, or distinctive 
dress in the packaging of goods so as to prevent others, by imitating such markings, from 
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misleading purchasers as to the source of the goods.” Trade dress is, of course, potentially 
the subject matter of design patents. Yet our decision in Sears clearly indicates that the 
States may place limited regulations on the circumstances in which such designs are used 
in order to prevent consumer confusion as to source. Thus, while Sears speaks in absolutist 
terms, its conclusion that the States may place some conditions on the use of trade dress 
indicates an implicit recognition that all state regulation of potentially patentable but 
unpatented subject matter is not ipso facto pre-empted by the federal patent laws. 
 What was implicit in our decision in Sears, we have made explicit in our subsequent 
decisions concerning the scope of federal pre-emption of state regulation of the subject 
matter of patent. Thus, in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), we held that 
state protection of trade secrets did not operate to frustrate the achievement of the 
congressional objectives served by the patent laws. Despite the fact that state law 
protection was available for ideas which clearly fell within the subject matter of patent, 
the Court concluded that the nature and degree of state protection did not conflict with 
the federal policies of encouragement of patentable invention and the prompt disclosure 
of such innovations.  
Several factors were critical to this conclusion. First, because the public awareness of 
a trade secret is by definition limited, the Court noted that “the policy that matter once in 
the public domain must remain in the public domain is not incompatible with the 
existence of trade secret protection.” Second, the Kewanee Court emphasized that “trade 
secret law provides far weaker protection in many respects than the patent law.” This 
point was central to the Court’s conclusion that trade secret protection did not conflict 
with either the encouragement or disclosure policies of the federal patent law. The public 
at large remained free to discover and exploit the trade secret through reverse engineering 
of products in the public domain or by independent creation. Thus, the possibility that 
trade secret protection would divert inventors from the creative effort necessary to satisfy 
the rigorous demands of patent protection was remote indeed. Finally, certain aspects of 
trade secret law operated to protect non-economic interests outside the sphere of 
congressional concern in the patent laws. As the Court noted, “A most fundamental 
human right, that of privacy, is threatened when industrial espionage is condoned or is 
made profitable.” There was no indication that Congress had considered this interest in 
the balance struck by the patent laws, or that state protection for it would interfere with 
the policies behind the patent system.  
. . . 
At the heart of Sears and Compco is the conclusion that the efficient operation of the 
federal patent system depends upon substantially free trade in publicly known, 
unpatented design and utilitarian conceptions. In Sears, the state law offered “the 
equivalent of a patent monopoly,” in the functional aspects of a product which had been 
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placed in public commerce absent the protection of a valid patent. . . . [W]e believe that 
the Sears Court correctly concluded that the States may not offer patent-like protection to 
intellectual creations which would otherwise remain unprotected as a matter of federal 
law. Both the novelty and the nonobviousness requirements of federal patent law are 
grounded in the notion that concepts within the public grasp, or those so obvious that 
they readily could be, are the tools of creation available to all. They provide the baseline 
of free competition upon which the patent system’s incentive to creative effort depends. 
A state law that substantially interferes with the enjoyment of an unpatented utilitarian 
or design conception which has been freely disclosed by its author to the public at large 
impermissibly contravenes the ultimate goal of public disclosure and use which is the 
centerpiece of federal patent policy. Moreover, through the creation of patent-like rights, 
the States could essentially redirect inventive efforts away from the careful criteria of 
patentability developed by Congress over the last 200 years. We understand this to be the 
reasoning at the core of our decisions in Sears and Compco, and we reaffirm that reasoning 
today.  
III 
We believe that the Florida statute at issue in this case so substantially impedes the 
public use of the otherwise unprotected design and utilitarian ideas embodied in 
unpatented boat hulls as to run afoul of the teaching of our decisions in Sears and Compco. 
It is readily apparent that the Florida statute does not operate to prohibit “unfair 
competition” in the usual sense that the term is understood. The law of unfair competition 
has its roots in the common-law tort of deceit: its general concern is with protecting 
consumers from confusion as to source. While that concern may result in the creation of 
“quasi-property rights” in communicative symbols, the focus is on the protection of 
consumers, not the protection of producers as an incentive to product innovation. . . . 
 . . . 
In contrast to the operation of unfair competition law, the Florida statute is aimed 
directly at preventing the exploitation of the design and utilitarian conceptions embodied 
in the product itself. The sparse legislative history surrounding its enactment indicates 
that it was intended to create an inducement for the improvement of boat hull designs. 
See Tr. of Meeting of Transportation Committee, Florida House of Representatives, May 
3, 1983 (“There is no inducement for a quality boat manufacturer to improve these designs 
and secondly, if he does, it is immediately copied. This would prevent that and allow him 
recourse in circuit court”). To accomplish this goal, the Florida statute endows the original 
boat hull manufacturer with rights against the world, similar in scope and operation to 
the rights accorded a federal patentee. Like the patentee, the beneficiary of the Florida 
statute may prevent a competitor from “making” the product in what is evidently the 
most efficient manner available and from “selling” the product when it is produced in 
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that fashion. The Florida scheme offers this protection for an unlimited number of years 
to all boat hulls and their component parts, without regard to their ornamental or 
technological merit. Protection is available for subject matter for which patent protection 
has been denied or has expired, as well as for designs which have been freely revealed to 
the consuming public by their creators. 
In this case, the Bonito 5VBR fiberglass hull has been freely exposed to the public for 
a period in excess of six years. For purposes of federal law, it stands in the same stead as 
an item for which a patent has expired or been denied: it is unpatented and unpatentable. 
Whether because of a determination of unpatentability or other commercial concerns, 
petitioner chose to expose its hull design to the public in the marketplace, eschewing the 
bargain held out by the federal patent system of disclosure in exchange for exclusive use. 
Yet, the Florida statute allows petitioner to reassert a substantial property right in the idea, 
thereby constricting the spectrum of useful public knowledge. Moreover, it does so 
without the careful protections of high standards of innovation and limited monopoly 
contained in the federal scheme. We think it clear that such protection conflicts with the 
federal policy “that all ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the common good 
unless they are protected by a valid patent.” 
. . .  
Congress has considered extending various forms of limited protection to industrial 
design either through the copyright laws or by relaxing the restrictions on the availability 
of design patents. Congress explicitly refused to take this step in the copyright laws, and 
despite sustained criticism for a number of years, it has declined to alter the patent 
protections presently available for industrial design. It is for Congress to determine if the 
present system of design and utility patents is ineffectual in promoting the useful arts in 
the context of industrial design. By offering patent-like protection for ideas deemed 
unprotected under the present federal scheme, the Florida statute conflicts with the 
“strong federal policy favoring free competition in ideas which do not merit patent 
protection.” We therefore agree with the majority of the Florida Supreme Court that the 
Florida statute is preempted by the Supremacy Clause, and the judgment of that court is 
hereby affirmed. 
Context and Application 
1. In Bonito Boats, the Court describes patent law as embodying “a carefully crafted 
bargain.” Who are the parties to this bargain? What is given and what is gained by each? 
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2. Bonito Boats is not a patent infringement case. However, it describes the 
requirements of the patent system in detail. What are the requirements the Court 
discusses for getting a patent, and what are the purposes of each of these requirements? 
3. Patents are not the only way to encourage innovation. There are other 
mechanisms, such as grants, tax relief, and prizes that also serve to encourage innovation 
at various stages. We might ask whether patents are the best—or even a good—way to 
encourage innovation. This is a difficult question to measure empirically. British 
economist Edith Penrose concluded that “[i]f national patent laws did not exist, it would 
be difficult to make a conclusive case for introducing them; but the fact that they do exist 
shifts the burden of proof and it is equally difficult to make a really conclusive case for 
abolishing them.” EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
PATENT SYSTEM 40 (1951). Fritz Machlup echoed this sentiment in remarks he submitted 
to the Senate Judiciary Committee, stating that “[i]f we did not have a patent system, it 
would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its economic 
consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a 
long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend 
abolishing it.” Staff of Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks & Copyrights of the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., An Economic Review of the Patent System, Study No. 15, at 79-
80 (Comm. Print 1958). As you read the cases in this book, consider when the patent 
system seems to best work in encouraging innovation—is it for early-stage inventions or 
later-stage commercialization? Mechanical inventions, biotech, or software innovations? 
How do the various statutory provisions and doctrinal developments affect different-
sized innovators, and do these distinctions matter to the overarching goals of the system? 
B. The Origins of the Contemporary Patent System 
As Bonito Boats reveals, patent law didn’t suddenly appear fully formed, and it doesn’t 
exist in some abstract idealized space; instead, it has a rich history, is embedded in a deep 
social context, and is part of a larger legal regime. This section will provide a brief 
overview of this history and context, starting with the fact that patents are only one among 
several tools that governments have long employed to encourage technological 
innovation—prizes are one such example. In 1567, Phillip II of Spain offered a prize for 
finding a simple way to reliably determine a ship’s longitude at sea. While no one was 
able to claim that reward (or several subsequent similar prizes in Spain and the 
Netherlands), the English Parliament in 1714 enacted the Longitude Act, which 
established the Board of Longitude to administer prizes for the same purpose, and which 
ultimately produced some viable solutions. In the early 1800s, Napoleon offered a prize 
for technology that would help deliver food to distant military troops; this led to the 
development of canned food. And today, the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act 
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of 2010 has established broad authority for federal agencies to use prizes to stimulate 
advances in science and technology. Our study of the patent system should accordingly 
bear in mind how it compares to plausible alternatives, including not only prizes, but also 
trade secrets, contracts, grants, subsidies, and a range of other private and public 
mechanisms. See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism, 
128 YALE L.J. 544 (2019); cf. Alex Bell, Raj Chetty, Xavier Jaravel, Neviana Petkova, & John 
Van Reenen, Who Becomes an Inventor in America? The Importance of Exposure to Innovation, 
134 Q.J. ECON. 647 (2019) (demonstrating, from a dataset including 1.2 million inventors, 
that children “who grow up in a neighborhood or family with a high innovation rate in a 
specific technology class are more likely to patent in exactly the same class,” and that for 
girls, this effect depends on the concentration of women inventors, suggesting that role-
model and network effects are important mechanisms influencing the odds of becoming 
an inventor). 
The origins of something like the modern American patent system is typically traced 
to Renaissance Italy. See Max Frumkin, The Origins of Patents, 27 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 143 
(1945). In 1421, Filippo Bruneschelli, who built Il Duomo, received from the Florentine 
state three years of exclusivity for his device for transporting heavy loads on rivers; he 
remains today the earliest recorded patentee (that is, the first person to whom a 
government granted an exclusive right to use or sell some novel process or device they 
created). Venice then enacted the Venetian Patent Statute of 1474, which is now 
recognized as the first “general patent statute—namely, one covering more than a single 
grant.” See Ted Sichelman & Sean O’Connor, Patents as Promoters of Competition: The Guild 
Origins of Patent Law in the Venetian Republic, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1278 (2012); see also 
Stefani Fusco, Lessons from the Past: The Venetian Republic’s Tailoring of Patent Protection to 
the Characteristics of the Invention, 17 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 301 (2020) (describing 
the Venetian Senate’s continued practice of issuing tailored protection to individual 
inventions for centuries following the enactment of the general Venetian patent statute). 
The Venetian system incorporated several features that resemble our own, including the 
requirement that the subject matter of the patent be “new” and that the exclusive rights 
be limited in time. As Venetian artisans moved to other countries, they sought similar 
exclusive rights from governments throughout Europe in the 1500s. See Robert P. Merges, 
From Medieval Guilds to Open Source Software: Informal Norms, Appropriability Institutions, 
and Innovation, 11-13 (Feb. 2, 2005), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=661543 
(describing how guilds interacted with emerging patent systems during the Renaissance). 
One of those nations, of course, served as the primary source for the American legal 
system: England. Through much of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, English 
monarchs granted to the politically well-connected exclusive rights to engage in various 
kinds of commercial activities. These monopolies were awarded in official documents, 
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addressed and made open to the public; along with other grants made in such documents, 
they were referred to as letters patent (that is, litterae patentes, derived from the Latin 
“patere,” meaning “to be open”). Importantly, while some of these patents were patents 
of invention, there was no requirement that the subject of the monopoly be at all new; the 
monopolies could encompass any product or process, including well-known and long-
used ones. Over time, public opposition to these monopolies grew because of their 
perceived conflict with the Magna Carta’s guarantee that the crown could not withdraw 
public rights, including the right to engage in commerce, and because of the exorbitant 
prices that patentees charged. See MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS §§ 1:3-1:7.   
This public opposition culminated in Parliament’s passage of the Statute of 
Monopolies in 1623. See Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and 
Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States 
Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1994). The Statute of Monopolies declared that 
exclusive rights to buy, sell, make, or use “any thinge within this Realme” shall be void. 
21 Jam. 1, ch. 3, § 1 (1623). The statute’s general ban on monopolies contained a crucial 
exception: the monarch could award grants of exclusivity for no more than 14 years to 
“the sole working or makinge of any manner of new Manufactures within this Realme, to 
the true and first Inventor and Inventors of such Manufactures.” Id. § 6. The Statute of 
Monopolies is typically identified as the foundation for the American patent system, see 
MOY, supra,  § 1:6, although there is some debate about the extent to which the Statute of 
Monopolies represented a break with past practice or a continuation of it, compare OREN 
BRACHA, OWNING IDEAS, ch. 1 (2001) (arguing that the Statute of Monopolies should be 
understood as a continuation of the preexisting royal prerogative to award discretionary 
grants of exclusivity, simply in a more circumscribed area), with Adam Mossoff, 
Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History 1550-1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 
1255 (2001) (arguing that the Statute of Monopolies should be viewed as “the first 
definitive step toward the shift away from royal prerogative and privileges to common 
law and legal rights”). 
The American colonies engaged in something like the English practice. Colonial 
legislatures (rather than monarchs) issued one-off, discretionary privileges consisting of 
the exclusive right to engage in some kind of commerce. In the 1600s, some colonial bodies 
adopted provisions that resembled the Statute of Monopolies, limiting the permissible 
range of exclusivity to inventions. After the Revolutionary War, the states began to more 
frequently issue patents to rebuild the post-war economy. In 1784, South Carolina enacted 
the first American general patent law, providing that “Inventors of useful machines shall 
have the exclusive privilege of making or vending their machines for . . . terms of 14 
years.” This period also saw a shift from a concept of invention grounded in the 
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introduction of a new trade or business to one grounded in something like technological 
progress. See BRACHA, supra. 
The Constitutional Convention established the foundation for the current American 
patent system. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power 
“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Rights to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 
Even though some of the most prominent political figures of the founding era, like 
Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, were also prominent inventors themselves, this 
clause—now referred to by various names, including, among others, “the IP Clause” and 
“the Progress Clause”—was not the subject of much debate. However, James Madison’s 
notes indicate that an earlier version of the clause would have granted Congress the power 
to “establish public institutions, rewards and immunities for the promotion of agriculture, 
commerce, trades and manufactures” in addition to the power to “grant patents for useful 
inventions.” Those additional powers, however, did not make it into the Progress Clause 
(of course, there are other clauses in the Constitution; can you think of any that might 
grant Congress the power to do these things even if the Progress Clause doesn’t?). 
Despite the relative paucity of attention paid to the Progress Clause at the Convention, 
the first Congress acted quickly to exercise its powers, enacting the Patent Act of 1790 on 
April 10 of that year. The 1790 Patent Act permitted “any person” who “invented or 
discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement 
therein not before known or used” to apply to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, 
and the Attorney General for a patent. If two of those three deemed “the invention or 
discovery sufficiently useful and important,” they could issue a patent granting the 
inventor “for any term not exceeding fourteen years, the sole and exclusive right” to make, 
construct, use, or sell the invention. Today, we call this type of patent a “utility patent.” 
Pursuant to the 1790 Act, the inventor had to provide “a specification in writing, 
containing a description, accompanied with drafts or models, and explanations and 
models . . . of the thing . . . invented or discovered . . . ; which specification shall be so 
particular, and said models so exact, as not only to distinguish the invention or discovery 
from other things before known and used, but also to enable a workman or other person 
skilled in the art or manufacture, whereof it is a branch, or wherewith it may be nearest 
connected, to make, construct, or use the same, to the end that the public may have the 
full benefit thereof, after the expiration of the patent term.” The first patent under the 1790 
Act issued on July 31, 1790 to Samuel Hopkins for a new method of making potash, an 
important industrial chemical that had been used for centuries and continues to be used 
as fertilizer.  
The Constitution did not explicitly make this congressional authority exclusive of the 
states, and, indeed, states continued to issue their own patents following the Patent Act 
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of 1790. See Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patents in the Age of Laissez Faire, 28 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 45 (2013). This practice largely (though not entirely) came to a close with the Patent 
Act of 1793, which required that inventors “relinquish” rights obtained from states prior 
to the ratification of the Constitution before obtaining rights under the Patent Act. The 
statutory silence with respect to rights obtained from states following ratification might 
be understood to reflect an assumption that states could not issue state patents following 
ratification or a choice to permit states to continue issuing state patents. See Hrdy, id. at 
73. Either way, state patents soon fell out of favor and Supreme Court doctrine now 
preempts state patents. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thundercraft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
The 1793 Patent Act also launched a radical, though short-lived, transformation from 
an examination-based patent system to a registration-based one. Only fifty-seven patents 
had issued in the three years of the 1790 Act; Thomas Jefferson (Secretary of State), Henry 
Knox (Secretary of War), and Edmund Randolph (Attorney General) deemed the 
examination of applications for patents an oppressive distraction from their other, more 
important responsibilities. The 1793 Patent Act accordingly made the Executive Branch 
role ministerial—patents issued upon application, without examination of their 
compliance with the substantive requirements of patentability. This rendered the 
American patent system a registration rather than examination system, with an important 
collateral consequence: the courts became the primary enforcers of the patent statute’s 
substantive requirements. 
In this role, the American patent system took on a common law character, which has 
persisted to this day. Under the 1793 Patent Act, this manifested primarily in the 
requirement that patents be issued only for “useful” inventions, which became the locus 
for judicial consideration of whether patents served the public interest. Judges, much as 
English monarchs and colonial governments once did, engaged in a case-by-case 
assessment of the social impact of the invention covered by the patent. See BRACHA, supra. 
This broad inquiry faded in the wake of Justice Story’s 1817 opinion in Lowell v. Lewis, 
which sharply circumscribed the scope of the utility requirement. The Lowell view of 
utility asked only whether the invention was “mischevious” or “immoral,” like “a new 
invention to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to facilitate private 
assassination.” The only assessment of the invention’s value would come from the 
market—if an invention lacked utility, then it would be “of little or no profit to the 
inventor” and “will sink into utter neglect.” 
Congress soon reshaped the patent system again with the 1836 Patent Act, which 
established the entity that administers the current patent system: the Patent Office (now 
the Patent and Trademark Office, or PTO), staffed with professional patent examiners. 
The shift away from the registration system of the 1793 Act and back to an examination 
system (although one quite unlike the 1790 Act’s examination system) was part of a more 
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general reaction in the Jacksonian era against a conservative judiciary and against 
exclusive privileges secured by elites from the government. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The 
Emergence of Classical American Patent Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 263 (2016).  
Importantly, the Patent Office’s examination was intended to be a relatively strict and 
objective evaluation of whether the invention complied with a newly-elaborated statutory 
requirement of novelty, rather than the more discretionary and holistic assessment that 
occurred under the 1790 Act of whether the invention was useful. The 1790 and 1793 Acts 
had stated simply that the invention be “not before known or used.” The Patent Act of 
1836 expanded on that language, demanding now that the invention be “not known or 
used by others before his or their discovery or invention thereof, and not, at the time of 
his application for a patent, in public use or on sale, with his consent or allowance.” Under 
the 1793 Act, patent applicants had begun including language in their specifications that 
purported to “claim” the invention; this practice was made a statutory requirement under 
the 1836 Act, which required that the specification “particularly specify and point out the 
part, improvement, or combination, which he claims as his own invention or discovery.” 
Those claims would grow into essential elements of the patent system, as courts gradually 
began to focus their assessments of validity and infringement on the language in the 
claims. 
In the following decades, however, the Supreme Court asserted its role as the leading 
expositor of patent law. In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood 52 U.S. 248 (1850), the Court established 
the nonobviousness requirement, which demands that the invention be not merely new, 
but that it be meaningfully different from what existed before it. Soon after this, the Court 
decided Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852) and O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853), which 
have become the foundation for judicial exclusions to the scope of patentable subject 
matter. And Winans v. Denmead 56 U.S. 330 (1853) made clear that the scope of a patentee’s 
rights extended beyond the literal words of the claim to reach substantial equivalents of 
the claimed invention. 
Of course, Congress did not sit idle during this period.  The Patent Act of 1839 allowed 
disappointed applicants to seek judicial review of Patent Office determinations. It also 
added a novelty “grace period,” which gave inventors two years during which “purchase, 
sale, or use” of the invention that would otherwise bar an application would have no 
effect.  
Congress also established a new kind of patent—the design patent—in 1842. That 
statute permitted the issuance of patents to anyone who “invented or produced any new 
and original design for a manufacture, whether of metal or other material or materials, or 
any new and original design for the printing of woolen, silk, cotton, or other fabrics, or 
any new and original design for a bust, statue, or bas relief or composition in alto or basso 
relievo, or any new and original impression or ornament, or to be placed on any article of 
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manufacture, the same being formed in marble or other material, or any new and useful 
pattern, or print, or picture, to be either worked into or worked on, or printed or painted 
or cast or otherwise fixed on, any article of manufacture, or any new and original shape 
or configuration of any article of manufacture not known or used by others before his, 
her, or their invention or production thereof.”  
The Patent Act of 1870 consolidated these and other post-1836 enactments into a 
comprehensive provision. It also reaffirmed the Patent Office’s then-recent transition from 
central claiming to a peripheral claiming system, which treated the claim as setting the 
outermost boundaries of the patentee’s rights. 
The mid-1800s saw patents begin to attain a central social and economic role; 
applications and grants tripled over the course of the 1850s. The core conflicts of the Civil 
War era were also reflected in the development of patent law. In 1858, Jeremiah Black, 
who served as Attorney General under President James Buchanan, issued his opinion in 
Invention of a Slave in the wake of Dred Scott v. Sandford. In it, Black concluded that neither 
slaves nor their owners could obtain patents on inventions created by slaves; by extension, 
free African Americans were also barred from the patent system they had previously been 
able to use. Three years later, Edward Bates, Attorney General under President Abraham 
Lincoln (who, incidentally, was the only president to patent one of his inventions), 
concluded that “all natural-born Americans regardless of color or race were citizens,” 
contra Dred Scott. That conclusion, along with the Reconstruction Amendments and civil 
rights legislation abolishing slavery, made Invention of a Slave obsolete. The opinion 
nevertheless continued to play an important role in post-Civil War narratives of African 
American civil rights activists. See Kara W. Swanson, Race and Selective Legal Memory: 
Reflections on Invention of a Slave, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1077 (2020) (describing how, during 
the twentieth century, civil rights advocates relied on patents as evidence of inventive 
ability and independent thought, which justified equal voting rights for African-
Americans). 
Patents became essential elements of economic and technological development during 
the late nineteenth century. Joseph Glidden obtained a patent on his version of barbed 
wire, which went on to transform the American West. Alexander Graham Bell prevailed 
over Elisha Gray in an epic race—still the subject of much intrigue—to patent the 
telephone in 1876. Thomas Edison made patents core to his research and commercial 
strategy, both using disclosures to further his laboratory’s work and obtaining over 1000 
patents himself, on inventions ranging from the phonograph to the lightbulb. More 
humble products that are part of the everyday fabric of life, like the paper clip and the 
zipper, were also patented before 1900; a total of 600,000 patents issued between 1865 and 
1900. In this period, patents took on a more prominent international profile with the 
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creation of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, to which the 
United States acceded in 1887. 
This growth in patent issuance was reflected in the mass patent assertion campaigns 
of the second half of the nineteenth century. Thousands of lawsuits were filed annually; 
the Southern District of New York, for example, saw 381 infringement suits in 1880, which 
would have ranked it first in 2010 and third in 2014. These lawsuits involved inventions 
ranging from the aforementioned barbed wire and lightbulb to the process of making 
vulcanized rubber and a wide array of inventions important to the growing railroad 
industries. Some of these lawsuits also included features commonly decried today, 
including participation by non-practicing entities (i.e., entities that own patents but do not 
manufacture or sell anything) as plaintiffs and end-users as defendants. These 
enforcement campaigns also engendered grassroots and elite political opposition to the 
patent system, part of more general anti-monopoly sentiment towards the end of the 
nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. See Christopher 
Beauchamp, The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 125 YALE L.J. 848 (2016). 
In the first half of the twentieth century, patents continued to play the more prominent 
social and economic roles they attained by the close of the nineteenth century. Epic 
litigation battles were fought over Selden’s automobile patents, the Wright Brothers’ 
airplane patents, and Marconi’s radio patents. The trust-busting politics of the Progressive 
Era led to proposals to sharply limit the strength of patents; in contrast, the Supreme Court 
largely sided with patentees, at least until the 1940s, when, among other things, it 
articulated a more stringent nonobviousness requirement in Cuno Engineering Corp. v. 
Automatic Devices Corp and Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Co. 
Individual firms relied on patents to obtain and maintain a competitive edge. For 
example, Sarah Breedlove—later known as Madam C.J. Walker—became the first Black 
woman millionaire in the United States selling her patented hair-care products. Entire 
industries grew on the basis of patented technologies, forcing courts to deal with the 
tension between the exclusivity of patents and the pro-competition policy of the newly-
established federal antitrust regime; the film industry’s battles, for example, led to the 
Supreme Court’s landmark patent misuse case, Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film 
Manufacturing Co. 
In the post-World War II era, Congress undertook a wholesale recodification of the 
patent system, eventually enacting the 1952 Patent Act. Between 1870 and 1952, there had 
been sixty congressional acts related to patents, including amendments and new 
enactments. The 1952 Act replaced all these prior statutes with the new Title 35 of the U.S. 
Code. Title 35 continues to serve as the home for the statutory patent system; post-1952 
patent statutes have all been codified there. It’s worth taking a minute now to skim 
 CHAPTER 1  
36 
through the chapter and section headings of Title 35, so you can get a feel for how the 
patent system is structured.  
A core feature of the 1952 Patent Act was its consolidation in Section 102 of novelty 
and statutory bar doctrines. Novelty refers to an assessment of what was new at the time 
of the applicant’s invention; statutory bar refers to an assessment of what was new at the 
time of the applicant’s filing for a patent. Since its inception and continuing through the 
1952 Patent Act, the American patent system was a first-to-invent system. This meant that 
an individual who was the second to file for a patent on a given invention could 
nonetheless beat the first-to-file if she could demonstrate that she had invented before the 
first-to-file had invented. A complex set of rules governed what exactly it meant to invent, 
and what an inventor had to do in order to retain her priority over subsequent inventors 
who beat her to the patent office; these rules were also found in Section 102. The statutory 
bar provisions, meanwhile, forced inventors to submit their applications within a year of 
specified events (like the first public use of the invention) or lose their rights. As we’ll see, 
through passage of the America Invents Act in 2011, Congress has converted the patent 
system into a first-to-file system, with a simplified set of rules, though much of the caselaw 
developed under the first-to-invent system continues to be relevant under the new 
system. 
The 1952 Act also codified the nonobviousness doctrine that had developed in the 
courts, while rejecting the more stringent versions of that doctrine associated with Cuno 
Engineering. Statutory provisions regarding design patents and plant patents (which had 
been created in the Plant Patent Act of 1930) were consolidated in Title 35. Judicially-
developed infringement rules were largely codified in Section § 271, except for the rules 
regarding contributory infringement.  
The Courts of Appeals then took up the task of elaborating on the 1952 Act’s 
codifications with minimal (though not zero) oversight from the Supreme Court. Those 
courts were perceived as relatively hostile to patentees, perhaps again as part of their 
engagement with a burgeoning antitrust regime. This perception, combined with a desire 
for more doctrinal uniformity in patent law, led Congress to create the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit in 1982. The Federal Circuit is now the exclusive venue for appeals 
from the District Courts “in any civil action arising under, or in any civil action in which 
a party has asserted a compulsory counterclaim arising under, any Act of Congress 
relating to patents or plant variety protection.” 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a). It also hears appeals 
from the Patent and Trademark Office, the Court of Federal Claims, and final decisions of 
the Court of International Trade, among others. This experiment in developing 
specialized expertise in patent law has drawn significant scholarly attention and a fair 
deal of criticism. See, e.g., Diane P. Wood, Keynote Address: Is It Time to Abolish the Federal 
Circuit’s Exclusive Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (2013); 
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Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1 (1989). 
Developments outside the patent system also influenced the development of the 
patent system. Two in particular bear mentioning here. First, over the course of the 
twentieth century, research increasingly took place in formal corporate, academic, and 
government institutions. This research often produced patentable inventions or at least 
knowledge and information that could serve as the foundation for developing a 
patentable invention. In 1980, Congress enacted the Bayh-Dole Act, which made it easier 
for entities contracting with the federal government, including universities, to retain the 
patent rights to inventions produced with federal funding. This has transformed the 
university-industry relationship and the conduct of academic science itself. See Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 
177 (1987). Second, the rise of the software and biotechnology industries has challenged 
the justification for and structure of the patent system. Software engineers and companies 
have questioned whether patents help or hurt their industry and have developed 
alternative models for managing progress in their field. Biotechnology, meanwhile, forces 
the patent system to confront hard questions of distributive justice, among other doctrinal 
problems. 
There are, of course, additional developments since the 1980s. The Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Treaty (“TRIPS”) was signed in 1994. This 
has resulted in some changes to US Patent laws to bring them into conformity with other 
countries. For example, the patent term was changed to be twenty years from the date of 
filing instead of the previous term of seventeen years from the date of issuance. TRIPS 
and other international developments have also made it easier for American inventors 
and entities to file, receive, and enforce patents globally. In addition to these changes, the 
Supreme Court returned to a more active role in patent doctrine in the 2000s. The 2011 
America Invents Act (AIA) made the patent system a first-to-file system and created a 
series of administrative patent proceedings that streamlined the process for challenging 
issued patents. Patent law is a dynamic field with wide-ranging implications for 
technology, science, health, justice, economic growth, the distribution of wealth, and 
political conflicts. All of this makes practicing (and studying) patent law challenging, 
worthwhile, and, of course, fun! 
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C. Structure of the U.S. Patent System 
1. Getting a Patent 
To obtain a U.S. patent, an inventor must file an application with the U.S. Patent 
& Trademark Office (USPTO), an agency that is part of the Department of Commerce. 
After a patent application is filed, it is assigned to an examiner who has a degree (or 
equivalent experience) in the relevant subject area—for example, someone with a degree 
in mechanical engineering for mechanical applications or a degree in studio arts for design 
applications. The examiner will then perform a substantive review of the application. This 
includes searching for evidence of earlier inventions and other knowledge that might be 
relevant to the question of whether the invention meets the patentability criteria. These 
earlier inventions and other knowledge are called “the prior art.” 
The examiner’s review of the patent application is guided by the Manual of Patent 
Examining Procedure (MPEP). The MPEP is a publicly-available document in which 
USPTO lawyers have summarized various aspects of patent law and practice. 
Accordingly, the MPEP “reflects the presumptions under which the [USPTO] operates.” 
See Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 
1997). Therefore, the MPEP is a helpful reference for those who practice (and study) patent 
law. But the MPEP “does not have the force of law.” Id. See also Melissa F. Wasserman, The 
Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 
1968 (2013) (“[U]nlike most agencies, the PTO’s legal interpretations of its enabling act—
the Patent Act—are afforded no deference, much less strong judicial deference.”). 
If the examiner sees a problem with the application, they will issue what is called an 
“office action.” The applicant must respond to the office action in writing or the 
application will be deemed abandoned. If the office action contains a non-final rejection, 
the applicant can attempt to “traverse the rejection”—i.e., overcome the problem—or 
abandon the application. There may be multiple office actions for a single patent 
application. 
The documents exchanged between the examiner and the applicant are recorded in 
what is called the application’s “file wrapper” or “prosecution history.” This process of 
filing and defending a patent application is generally referred to as “patent prosecution.” 
A recent study found that, on average, a utility patent examiner “spends only eighteen 
hours reviewing an application,” including “reading the application, searching for prior 
art, comparing the prior art with the application, writing a rejection, responding to the 
patent applicant’s arguments, and often conducting an interview with the applicant’s 
attorney.” Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Irrational Ignorance at the Patent 
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Office, 72 VAND. L. REV. 975, 978 (2019). As you learn more about the various utility patent 
validity doctrines, query whether eighteen hours seems like enough time. 
To prosecute a patent for someone else, you have to be registered to practice before 
the USPTO. Lawyers who are registered to practice before the USPTO are often referred 
to as being members of “the patent bar.” Only individuals with certain scientific or 
technical backgrounds are allowed to take the “patent bar” entry exam. This is a relatively 
recent requirement. See William Hubbard, Razing the Patent Bar, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 383, 402, 
402 n.104 (2017) (noting “the public record does not disclose when or why the USPTO 
created the technical-education requirement” but that, as late as 1960, some members of 
the patent bar did not have technical degrees). See also The Honorable Giles Sutherland Rich 
Circuit Judge, United State Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 1 (1999) 
(noting that this famous patent judge had a “degree in history, government, and 
economics”). The technical background requirement applies to everyone who prosecutes 
patents—even design patents. For an argument that this requirement does not make 
sense, see Christopher Buccafusco & Jeanne C. Curtis, The Design Patent Bar: An 
Occupational Licensing Failure, 37 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 263 (2019). Note that the 
technical-background requirement only applies to practice before the USPTO; you don’t 
have to have a technical background to do other types of patent work, like litigation. 
Once issued, a utility patent term typically lasts 20 years from its effective filing date, 
subject to the payment of maintenance fees. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2); 37 C.F.R. § 1.362. A 
plant patent also lasts 20 years from its effective filing date but is not subject to 
maintenance fees. See U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(2), 161; 37 C.F.R. § 1.362(b). A design patent lasts 
for 15 years from its issue date and, like a plant patent, is not subject to maintenance fees. 
35 U.S.C. § 173; 37 C.F.R. § 1.362(b).   
2. Enforcing a Patent 
A patent gives its owner various legal rights. This section will provide an overview of 
how a patent owner can enforce those rights.  
a. Extrajudicial Enforcement 
Much—probably most—patent enforcement takes place extrajudicially. A patent 
owner can contact the person they think is infringing their patent, asking them to cease 
and desist. In some cases, a demand letter may be enough to get an infringer to stop 
infringing. When successful, this approach can be quick and inexpensive way to resolve 
the dispute. But this approach is not without risk to the patent owner. For example, a 
patent demand letter may trigger declaratory judgment jurisdiction, allowing the accused 
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infringer to file a lawsuit in the venue that they—not the patent owner—would prefer. See 
SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“We hold 
. . . that where a patentee asserts rights under a patent based on certain identified ongoing 
or planned activity of another party, and where that party contends that it has the right to 
engage in the accused activity without license, an Article III case or controversy will arise 
and the party need not risk a suit for infringement by engaging in the identified activity 
before seeking a declaration of its legal rights.”) (citing MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 
549 U.S. 118, 132  n.11 (2007)).  
Also, some states have begun policing patent demand letters. See Leah Chan Grinvald, 
Policing the Cease-and-Desist Letter, 49 U.S.F. L. REV. 411, 418 n.37 (2015) (noting that states 
have passed “legislation for ‘bad faith assertions of patent infringement’” and that some 
“state attorneys general actions [have taken action] against certain [parties] for sending 
abusive letters”). For an example of a state statute that prohibits certain types of patent 
demand letters, see Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 112(a). Why do you think a state would take 
these kinds of actions? Who do you think is lobbying for (and against) this kind of 
legislation? 
b. Federal Courts 
The federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction “over any claim for relief arising 
under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, or copyrights.” 28 
U.S.C. § 1338(a). What types of claims might involve patents but not “arise under” the 
Patent Act? See Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (2013). 
Today, the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction “in any civil action 
arising under, or in any civil action in which a party has asserted a compulsory 
counterclaim arising under, any Act of Congress relating to patents or plant variety 
protection.” 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). Let’s unpack that a bit. Note first that § 1295(a)(1), as 
opposed to § 1338(a), refers to the “civil action,” not the “claim.” Therefore, the Federal 
Circuit “has exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals in actions involving patent claims, 
including where . . . an appeal raises only non-patent issues.” Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google 
LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2018), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 141 S. Ct. 
1183 (2021). Why do you think Congress chose to frame the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction 
this way? What incentives or opportunities does it create for litigants? Note also that the 
phrase  “any Act of Congress relating to patents” in § 1295 is not limited in any way—it 
applies to all patents, not just utility patents. The Federal Circuit also has exclusive 
jurisdiction over appeals from the USPTO’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), 28 
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A), and over final decisions of the United States Court of International 
Trade (ITC), id. § § 1295(a)(5), in addition to a number of non-patent appeals. 
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has had exclusive jurisdiction over 
almost all patent appeals since it was created in 1982. In its first decision, the Federal 
Circuit adopted “the holdings of our predecessor courts, the United States Court of Claims 
and the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals” as “binding as precedent 
in” the Federal Circuit. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982). 
What does (or should) this mean for the precedential status of the old C.C.P.A. cases? For 
the patent cases decided by the regional circuits prior to 1982? 
In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken an increased interest in patent law. 
See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Supreme Court Bar at the Bar of Patents, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1233, 1234 (2020) (“After deciding less than one patent case per Term from 1982 . . . 
through 2004, the Court has since decided more than forty patent cases—an average of 
over three per Term.”). As you read through this book, consider what may have prompted 
the Court’s interest and whether the Court’s increased involvement in patent law is, on 
the whole, a good thing. 
c. The ITC 
Some patent owners can enforce their patents at the ITC. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2); id. 
§ 1337(3) (stating that this enforcement option is available “only if an industry in the 
United States, relating to the articles protected by the patent,  . . . concerned, exists or is in 
the process of being established”). As Sapna Kumar explains:  
The ITC is an independent agency whose governing statute is the Tariff Act of 
1930. Under § 337 of the Tariff Act, the ITC may issue exclusion orders blocking 
goods that infringe patents . . . from entering the United States; these orders are 
enforced by the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection in the Department of 
Homeland Security. 
Sapna Kumar, The Accidental Agency?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 229, 238–39 (2013). Proceedings at 
the ITC are termed “investigations,” and are presided over by administrative law judges. 
Once an administrative law judge has made a determination that Section 337 has been 
violated, the decision is reviewed by the Commission before becoming final. Appeals 
from the ITC, like other patent matters, are heard by the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit. 
In recent years, the ITC has become an increasingly popular venue for patent 
enforcement. ITC adjudications are generally quicker and less expensive than litigation. 
See Darrell G. Mottley, The Tools for Protecting Fashion Law Clients, ASPATORE, 2012 WL 
167353, at *8 (2012). See also Colleen V. Chien, Protecting Domestic Industries at the ITC, 28 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 169, 171–72 (2011) (“In an ITC proceeding, 
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there are no juries, no counterclaims, few stays for reexamination, and no damages. 
Complaints are likely to be resolved within eighteen months. This level of efficiency 
makes the ITC one of the world’s premier venues for resolving patent disputes.”) 
(footnotes omitted). Note that a patent owner can bring an enforcement action in both 
federal district court and in the ITC; they don’t have to choose just one forum. See Colleen 
V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at the International 
Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, 70 (2008) (noting that “65 percent of the ITC 
cases [she] studied had a district court counterpart”).  
The remedies available at the ITC differ from those available in federal district court. 
In the ITC, damages are not available. There is a form of injunctive relief, however. Upon 
a finding of infringement, the ITC may issue a limited exclusion order (LEO), associated 
with specific, infringing goods imported by specified entities. The ITC may also issue a 
general exclusion order, which prevents any party from importing goods that infringe the 
patent, as construed by the ITC. These orders are enforced by Customs. For more on the 
background and remedies available at the ITC, see Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Patents 
Absent Adversaries, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1073, 1075-76 (2016). For a critique that the ITC may 
appeal to non-practicing entities because of its remedial structure, see Colleen V. Chien & 
Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2012). 
3. Challenging a Patent 
What if the USPTO makes a mistake and grants a patent that should not have been 
granted? This section will provide an overview of ways a patent’s validity can be 
challenged. We have already discussed two of the places where patents can be challenged, 
federal district courts and the ITC. Most parties who are sued for infringement can 
challenge a patent’s validity as a defense or a counterclaim. An accused infringer can also 
file their own invalidity case against the patent owner pursuant to the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Patent validity can also be raised as a defense in the 
ITC. But note that, while “[f]ederal court decisions bind the ITC,” the ITC’s 
“determinations of patent issues are not given preclusive effect by federal courts.” Sapna 
Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC, 61 FLA. L. REV. 529, 
559 (2009). 
There is another option. Patent validity can be challenged in the USPTO. There have 
been different mechanisms for obtaining post grant review of issued patents for some 
time, but recent legislation has increased the availability and use of these post-grant 
proceedings. In 2011, Congress passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA). The 
AIA made a number of important changes to U.S. patent law and practice. One of those 
important changes was the creation of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) and the 
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creation of a handful of new administrative proceedings that allow third parties to 
challenge the validity of issued patents. These proceedings, which “were designed to 
create a cheaper, faster alternative to district court patent litigation,” have “proven 
immensely popular.” Christopher J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of 
Agency Adjudication, 107 CAL. L. REV. 141, 158, 160 (2019). The current system combines a 
blend of old and new proceedings; while the ex parte reexamination procedures that were 
introduced in 1980 remain available, the inter partes reexamination procedures added in 
1999 have been replaced by the AIA’s mechanisms. We will discuss these proceedings in 
more detail in Chapter 13. 
D. The Patent Document 
The anatomy of an issued patent varies depending on the type of patent. But all of the 
different types have a cover page and information about the invention. They also include 
a description of the invention, or “specification.” The specification includes one or more 
claims. Those claims form the basis for the scope of the patentee’s legal rights. The 
information required in the specification, as well as the form and number of claims varies 
depending on the type of patent at issue. Utility patents can (and usually do) have more 
than one claim; design and plant patents can have only one claim. The cover page of a 
patent provides a wide range of information, including the patent number, the date the 
patent was issued, the filing date, the title of the patent, the name of the human inventor 
(or inventors), and the assignee at issue (if any). You can tell what kind of patent 
something is just by looking at the header on the cover page. A utility patent has “United 
States Patent” written in the top left corner and includes a patent number that is just a 
plain number, as can be seen in U.S. Patent No. 8,371,044, entitled “Shoes”: 
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A design patent has “United States Design Patent” written on it and includes a patent 
number that starts with “D,” as can be seen in U.S. Patent No. D674,993, which claims a 
design for a “Dress”: 
 
A plant patent has “United States Plant Patent” written at the top, and includes a patent 
number that starts with “PP,” as can be seen in U.S. Patent No. PP30,683, which claims a 
“Phalaenopsis Orchid Plant Named ‘Butterfly Kisses.’” 
 
All design patents and many utility patents also include a representative drawing on 
the cover page. Here is the entire cover page of U.S. Patent No. 10,813,363, a utility patent 
entitled “Portable Cinnamon Roll and Method for Making” (“the ’363 patent”): 
 INTRODUCTION  
45 
 
The most important part of the patent document is the claim(s). We’ll learn more about 
plant and design patent claims in Chapters 11 and 12. For now, let’s focus on utility patent 
claims. In a utility patent, the claims are located at the end of the specification and they 
are numbered. The USPTO requires utility patent claims to be written in a single sentence. 
Sometimes those sentences are pretty long.  
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For example, Claim 1 of the ’363 patent reads as follows: 
The invention claimed is: 
1. A portable cinnamon roll, comprising:  
a section of dough, formed into a generally spherical shape, having an outer 
surface and a central pocket inside the outer surface and not exposed to the outer 
surface,  
said outer surface being of approximately 0.5 inches to approximately 2.5 inches 
in diameter,  
the central pocket including a different material than the outer surface,  
wherein the central pocket is isolated from the outer surface of the portable 
cinnamon roll, the central pocket having an encapsulated portion inside said 
central pocket with said different material therein, said different material formed 
of cinnamon, frosting and sugar, wherein the outer surface does not have said 
cinnamon, frosting and sugar. 
As you can see, this claim includes a preamble (“a portable cinnamon roll”), a transition 
phrase (“comprising”), and then a number of other phrases (the  “limitations”). 
This claim uses the transition “comprising.” According to the USPTO, “[t]he 
transitional term ‘comprising’ . . . is inclusive or open-ended and does not exclude 
additional, unrecited elements or method steps.” MPEP § 2111.03(I). So if a utility patent 
claimed an invention “comprising A, B, and C,” that claim would be infringed by a 
product with elements A, B, C, and D. But it would not be infringed by a product with 
only A, C, and D.  
There are other transition phrases. For example, “[t]he transitional phrase ‘consisting 
of’ excludes any element, step, or ingredient not specified in the claim.” MPEP 
§ 2111.03(II). So if a utility patent claimed an invention “consisting of A, B, and C,” it 
would not be infringed by a product that with elements A, B, C, and D. There are some 
nuances. See id. (discussing different rules for “[w]hen the phrase ‘consists of’ appears in 
a clause of the body of a claim, rather than immediately following the preamble” and for 
what are called “Markush claims”).  
One other transitional phrase you may see is “consisting essentially of.” This phrase 
“limits the scope of a claim to the specified materials or steps and those that do not 
materially affect the basic and novel characteristics of the claimed invention.” Id. 
§ 2111.03(III) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A ‘consisting essentially of’ claim 
occupies a middle ground between closed claims that are written in a ‘consisting of’ 
format and fully open claims that are drafted in a ‘comprising’ format.” Id. 
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2. THE INVENTION, THE PATENT, AND THE CLAIM 
Patent law is about inventions. The Constitution grants Congress the power to 
“promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.” U.S. Const., art. I, § 1, cl. 8. The patent statute 
defines “invention” as an “invention or discovery,” 35 U.S.C. § 100(a), and provides that 
“[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor.” 35 U.S.C. § 101; see also 35 U.S.C. § 161 (authorizing, with some exceptions, the 
issuance of patents to “[w]hoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any 
distinct and new variety of plant”); 35 U.S.C. § 171 (authorizing the issuance of patents to 
“[w]hoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for an article of 
manufacture”). But what exactly is an invention? Who is an inventor? What does it mean 
to invent something? These questions arise repeatedly across patent doctrines. 
What pops into your head when you read the word “invention”? That word has some 
connotation of novelty or advanced technology, so maybe you think of a new medicine or 
a humanoid robot or an electric car or a smartphone. But every commonplace object in 
our lives was new at some point in the past. Bicycles, steam engines, and paper clips were 
all once cutting-edge technology (and the subject of fascinating patents!), even if we are 
not likely to think of them as inventions today. 
In this Chapter, we will explore the relationship between the invention, the patent, 
and the claim. To simplify the discussion, our focus here is on utility patents (design and 
plant patents raise distinct issues with respect to the relationship between the invention, 
the patent, and the claim, and you may wish to revisit some of the questions raised here 
later). A first rough cut might go something like this: An invention is something new that 
a person has produced by thinking and experimenting and working with what already 
exists; it’s the thing in the world that the inventor has made. The patent then describes 
that thing and the claims set limits on the inventor’s exclusive rights to it. 
This rough cut is imperfect—nothing in it distinguishes an invention from other kinds 
of products of human intellect. It’s also worth noting that the Constitution speaks of rights 
to “Discoveries” and that the statutory language treats inventions and discoveries as 
equivalent. As you read this chapter, consider how we might make the definition of 
“invention” more precise. Many problems in patent law arise because it is not exactly clear 
what society is prepared to recognize as inventions. As we’ll see later, the invention might 
also be something intangible, like the steps in a process; in other instances, the information 
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a person discloses in the patent might itself be the invention. In addition, the description 
in the patent specification might not adequately characterize the things the inventor did 
in the world, raising concerns that the patentee has not held up her end of the patent 
bargain. Finally, the claims themselves may not map precisely to the things the inventor 
did or the things the patentee hoped to cover. 
These issues are perhaps most salient when we consider patent scope—the question 
of how narrowly or broadly does a patent reach. Scope is explicitly at issue in claim 
construction, the process of giving legal effect to the words of the claim. But scope is also 
implicit in many doctrines in the patent system, including patent eligibility, enablement, 
and infringement. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
2197 (2016). Most of the cases in this chapter were principally presented to the courts as 
claim construction cases, but you will also read analyses that sound more in enablement 
or infringement than in claim construction. This is partly attributable to the state of the 
doctrine at the time the cases were decided; courts in the 1800s did not so neatly draw 
lines between patent law doctrines as they (attempt to) do today. But it is also a result of 
the fact that these doctrines are to some extent necessarily intertwined. 
We’ll begin our exploration of the invention, the patent, and the claim with the 
lightbulb. The lightbulb is an iconic invention. You may right now be picturing a lightbulb 
appearing above an inventor’s head as she shouts “Eureka!” You also probably have an 
idea of who invented the lightbulb.  As you read the landmark case that follows, consider 
what the Court’s discussion implies for your idea of what it meant to “invent” the 
“lightbulb” and who deserved the label “inventor” as a result. 
Consolidated Electric Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co. 
(The Incandescent Lamp Patent Case) 
159 U.S. 465 (1895) 
This was a bill in equity, filed by the Consolidated Electric Light Company against the 
McKeesport Light Company, to recover damages for the infringement of letters patent 
No. [317,676], issued May 12, 1885, to the Electro-Dynamic Light Company, assignee of 
Sawyer and Man, for an electric light. The defendants justified under certain patents to 
Thomas A. Edison, particularly No. 223,898, issued January 27, 1880; denied the novelty 
and utility of the complainant’s patent; and averred that the same had been fraudulently 
and illegally procured. The real defendant was the Edison Electric Light Company, and 
the case involved a contest between what are known as the Sawyer and Man and the 
Edison systems of electric lighting. 
In their application, Sawyer and Man stated that their invention related to “that class 
of electric lamps employing an incandescent conductor inclosed in a transparent, 
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hermetically sealed vessel or chamber, from which oxygen is excluded, and . . . more 
especially to the incandescing conductor, its substance, its form, and its combination with 
the other elements composing the lamp. Its object is to secure a cheap and effective 
apparatus; and our improvement consists, first, of the combination, in a lamp chamber, 
composed wholly of glass, as described in patent No. 205,144,” upon which this patent 
was declared to be an improvement, “of an incandescing conductor of carbon made from 
a vegetable fibrous material, in contradistinction to a similar conductor made from 
mineral or gas carbon, and also in the form of such conductor so made from such 
vegetable carbon, and combined in the lighting circuit with the exhausted chamber of the 
lamp.” 
The following drawings exhibit the substance of the invention: 
 
The specification further stated that: 
In the practice of our invention, we have made use of carbonized paper, and also 
wood carbon. We have also used such conductors or burners of various shapes, 
such as pieces with their lower ends secured to their respective supports, and 
having their upper ends united so as to form an inverted V-shaped burner. We 
have also used conductors of varying contours,—that is, with rectangular bends 
instead of curvilinear ones; but we prefer the arch shape. 
No especial description of making the illuminating carbon conductors, described 
in this specification, and making the subject-matter of this improvement, is 
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thought necessary, as any of the ordinary methods of forming the material to be 
carbonized to the desired shape and size, and carbonizing it while confined in 
retorts in powdered carbon, substantially according to the methods in practice 
before the date of this improvement, may be adopted in the practice thereof by any 
one skilled in the arts appertaining to the making of carbons for electric lighting 
or for other use in the arts. 
An important practical advantage which is secured by the arch form of 
incandescing carbon is that it permits the carbon to expand and contract under the 
varying temperatures to which it is subjected when the electric current is turned 
on or off without altering the position of its fixed terminals. Thus, the necessity for 
a special mechanical device to compensate for the expansion and contraction 
which has heretofore been necessary is entirely dispensed with, and thus the lamp 
is materially simplified in its construction. Another advantage of the arch form is 
that the shadow cast by such burners is less than that produced by other forms of 
burners when fitted with the necessary devices to support them. 
. . . 
The advantages resulting from the manufacture of the carbon from vegetable 
fibrous or textile material instead of mineral or gas carbon are many. Among them 
may be mentioned the convenience afforded for cutting and making the conductor 
in the desired form and size, the purity and equality of the carbon obtained, its 
susceptibility to tempering, both as to hardness and resistance, and its toughness 
and durability. . . . 
The claims were as follows: 
(1) An incandescing conductor for an electric lamp, of carbonized fibrous or textile 
material, and of an arch or horseshoe shape, substantially as hereinbefore set forth. 
(2) The combination, substantially as hereinbefore set forth, of an electric circuit 
and an incandescing conductor of carbonized fibrous material, included in and 
forming part of said circuit, and a transparent, hermetically sealed chamber, in 
which the conductor is inclosed. 
(3) The incandescing conductor for an electric lamp, formed of carbonized paper, 
substantially as described. 
(4) An incandescing electric lamp consists of the following elements in 
combination: First, an illuminating chamber made wholly of glass hermetically 
sealed, and out of which all carbon-consuming gas has been exhausted or driven; 
second, an electric-circuit conductor passing through the glass wall of said 
chamber, and hermetically sealed therein, as described; third, an illuminating 
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conductor in said circuit, and forming part thereof within said chamber, consisting 
of carbon made from a fibrous or textile material, having the form of an arch or 
loop, substantially as described, for the purpose specified. 
. . . 
[T]he court held the patent to be invalid, and dismissed the bill. Thereupon 
complainant appealed to this court. 
Mr. Justice BROWN . . . delivered the opinion of the court. 
In order to obtain a complete understanding of the scope of the Sawyer and Man 
patent, it is desirable to consider briefly the state of the art at the time the application was 
originally made, which was in January, 1880. 
Two general forms of electric illumination had for many years been the subject of 
experiments more or less successful, one of which was known as the “arc light,” produced 
by the passage of a current of electricity between the points of two carbon pencils placed 
end to end, and slightly separated from each other. In its passage from one point to the 
other through the air, the electric current took the form of an arc, and gave the name to 
the light. This form of light had been produced by Sir Humphry Davy as early as 1810, 
and, by successive improvements in the carbon pencils and in their relative adjustment to 
each other, had come into general use as a means of lighting streets, halls, and other large 
spaces; but by reason of its intensity, the uncertain and flickering character of the light, 
and the rapid consumption of the carbon pencils, it was wholly unfitted for domestic use. 
The second form of illumination is what is known as the “incandescent system,” and 
consists generally in the passage of a current of electricity through a continuous strip or 
piece of refractory material, which is a conductor of electricity, but a poor conductor; in 
other words, a conductor offering a considerable resistance to the flow of the current 
through it. It was discovered early in this century that various substances might be heated 
to a white heat by passing a sufficiently strong current of electricity through them. . . . 
For many years prior to 1880, experiments had been made by a large number of 
persons, in various countries, with a view to the production of an incandescent light which 
could be made available for domestic purposes, and could compete with gas in the matter 
of expense. Owing part[l]y to a failure to find a proper material, which should burn but 
not consume, partly to the difficulty of obtaining a perfect vacuum in the globe in which 
the light was suspended, and partly to a misapprehension of the true principle of 
incandescent lighting, these experiments had not been attended with success; although it 
had been demonstrated as early as 1845 that, whatever material was used, the conductor 
must be inclosed in an a[ir]-tight bulb, to prevent it from being consumed by the oxygen 
in the atmosphere. The chief difficulty was that the carbon burners were subject to a rapid 
disintegration or evaporation, which electricians assumed was due to the disrupting 
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action of the electric current, and hence the conclusion was reached that carbon contained 
in itself the elements of its own destruction, and was not a suitable material for the burner 
of an incandescent lamp. 
It is admitted that the lamp described in the Sawyer and Man patent is no longer in 
use, and was never a commercial success; that it does not embody the principle of high 
resistance with a small illuminating surface; that it does not have the filament burner of 
the modern incandescent lamp; that the lamp chamber is defective; and that the lamp 
manufactured by the complainant, and put upon the market, is substantially the Edison 
lamp; but it is said that, in the conductor used by Edison (a particular part of the stem of 
the bamboo, lying directly beneat[h] the siliceous cuticle, the peculiar fitness for which 
purpose was undoubtedly discovered by him), he made use of a fibrous or textile material 
covered by the patent to Sawyer and Man, and is therefore an infringer. It was admitted, 
however, that the third claim—for a conductor of carbonized paper—was not infringed. 
The two main defenses to this patent are (1) that it is defective upon its face, in 
attempting to monopolize the use of all f[i]brous and textile materials for the purpose of 
electric illuminations; and (2) that Sawyer and Man were not in fact the first to discover 
that these were better adapted than mineral carbons to such purposes. 
Is the complainant entitled to a monopoly of all fibrous and textile materials for 
incandescent conductors? If the patentees had discovered in fibrous and textile substances 
a quality common to them all, or to them generally, as distinguishing them from other 
materials, such as minerals, etc., and such quality or characteristic adapted them 
peculiarly to incandescent conductors, such claim might not be too broad. If, for instance, 
minerals or porcelains had always been used for a particular purpose, and a person should 
take out a patent for a similar article of wood, and woods generally were adapted to that 
purpose, the claim might not be too broad, though defendant used wood of a different 
kind from that of the patentee. But if woods generally were not adapted to the purpose, 
and yet the patentee had discovered a wood possessing certain qualities, which gave it a 
peculiar fitness for such purpose, it would not constitute an infringement for another to 
discover and use a different kind of wood, which was found to contain similar or superior 
qualities. The present case is an apt illustration of this principle. Sawyer and Man 
supposed they had discovered in carbonized paper the best material for an incandescent 
conductor. Instead of confining themselves to carbonized paper, as they might properly 
have done, and in fact did in their third claim, they made a broad claim for every fibrous 
or textile material, when in fact an examination of over 6,000 vegetable growths showed 
that none of them possessed the peculiar qualities that fitted them for that purpose. Was 
everybody, then, precluded by this broad claim from making further investigation? We 
think not. 
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The injustice of so holding is manifest in view of the experiments made, and continued 
for several months, by Mr. Edison and his assistants, among the different species of 
vegetable growth, for the purpose of ascertaining the one best adapted to an incandescent 
conductor. Of these he found suitable for his purpose only about three species of bamboo, 
one species of cane from the valley of the Amazon (impossible to be procured in quantities 
on account of the climate), and one or two species of fibers from the agave family. Of the 
special bamboo, the walls of which have a thickness of about 3/8 of an inch, he used only 
about 20/1000 of an inch in thickness. In this portion of the bamboo the fibers are more 
nearly parallel, the cell walls are apparently smallest, and the pithy matter between the 
fibers is at its minimum. . . . But finally, while experimenting with a bamboo strip which 
formed the edge of a palm-leaf fan, cut into filaments, [Edison] obtained surprising 
results. After microscopic examination of the material, he dispatched a man to Japan to 
make arrangements for securing the bamboo in quantities. It seems that the characteristic 
of the bamboo which makes it particularly suitable is that the fibers run more nearly 
parallel than in other species of wood. . . . There is no generic quality, however, in 
vegetable fibers, because they are fibrous, which adapts them to the purpose. Indeed, the 
fibers are rather a disadvantage. . . . No exogenous, and very few endogenous, growths 
are suitable. The messenger whom he dispatched to different parts of Japan and China 
sent him about 40 different kinds of bamboo . . . . From this it appears very clearly that 
there is no such quality common to fibrous and textile substances generally as makes them 
suitable for an incandescent conductor, and that the bamboo which was finally pitched 
upon, and is now generally used, was not selected because it was of vegetable growth, 
but because it contained certain peculiarities in its fibrous structure which distinguished 
it from every other fibrous substance. The question really is whether the imperfectly 
successful experiments of Sawyer and Man, with carbonized paper and wood carbon, 
conceding all that is claimed for them, authorize them to put under tribute the results of 
the brilliant discoveries made by others. 
It is required by Rev. St. § 4888, that the application shall contain “a written description 
of the device, and of the manner and process of making[,] constructing, compounding, 
and using it in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person, skilled in 
the art or science to which it appertains or with which it is most nearly connected, to make, 
construct, compound, and use the same.” The object of this is to apprise the public of what 
the patentee claims as his own, the courts of what they are called upon to construe, and 
competing manufacturers and dealers of exactly what they are bound to avoid. If the 
description be so vague and uncertain that no one can tell, except by independent 
experiments, how to construct the patented device, the patent is void. 
. . . 
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Applying this principle to the patent under consideration, how would it be possible 
for a person to know what fibrous or textile material was adapted to the purpose of an 
incandescent conductor, except by the most careful and painstaking experimentation? If, 
as before observed, there were some general quality, running through the whole fibrous 
and textile kingdom, which distinguished it from every other, and gave it a peculiar 
fitness for the particular purpose, the man who discovered such quality might justly be 
entitled to a patent; but that is not the case here. . . . Under these circumstances, to hold 
that one who had discovered that a certain fibrous or textile material answered the 
required purpose should obtain the right to exclude everybody from the whole domain 
of fibrous and textile materials, and thereby shut out any further efforts to discover a 
better specimen of that class than the patentee had employed, would be an unwarranted 
extension of his monopoly, and operate rather to discourage than to promote invention. 
If Sawyer and Man had discovered that a certain carbonized paper would answer the 
purpose, their claim to all carbonized paper would, perhaps, not be extravagant; but the 
fact that paper happens to belong to the fibrous kingdom did not invest them with 
sovereignty over this entire kingdom, and thereby practically limit other experimenters 
to the domain of minerals. 
In fact, such a construction of this patent as would exclude competitors from making 
use of any fibrous or textile material would probably defeat itself, since, if the patent were 
infringed by the use of any such material, it would be anticipated by proof of the prior use 
of any such material. In this connection it would appear, not only that wood charcoal had 
been constantly used since the days of Sir Humphry Davy for arc lighting, but that in the 
English patent to Greener and Staite, of 1846, for an incandescent light, “charcoal, reduced 
to a state of powder,” was one of the materials employed. So also, in the English patent of 
1841 to De Moleyns, “a finely pulverized boxwood charcoal or plumbago” was used for 
an incandescent electric lamp. Indeed, in the experiments of Sir Humphry Davy, early in 
the century, pieces of well-burned charcoal were heated to a vivid whiteness by the 
electric current, and other experiments were made which evidently contemplated the use 
of charcoal heated to the point of incandescence. . . . There is undoubtedly a good deal of 
testimony tending to show that, for the past 50 or 60 years, the word “charcoal” has been 
used in the art, not only to designate carbonized wood, but mineral or hard carbons, such 
as were commonly employed for the carbon pencils of arc lamps. But we think it quite 
evident that, in the patents and experiments above referred to, it was used in its ordinary 
sense of charcoal obtained from wood. The very fact of the use of such word to designate 
mineral carbons indicates that such carbons were believed to possess peculiar properties 
required for illumination, that before that had been supposed to belong to wood charcoal. 
. . . [W]e are all agreed that the claims of this patent, with the exception of the third, 
are too indefinite to be the subject of a valid monopoly. . . . 
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Context & Application 
1. So: Who invented the lightbulb? Relatedly: What is the lightbulb? 
2. How did Sawyer and Man understand their own contribution to the development 
of the lightbulb? To what extent do you think the specification and the claims reflected 
that understanding? Were Sawyer and Man deliberately trying to capture more than they 
deserved? What else might explain any dissonance between their understanding of the 
invention, as reflected in the specification, and the reach of their claims?  
3. How did the Court understand Sawyer and Man’s contribution to the 
development of the lightbulb? To what extent does it coincide or diverge from Sawyer 
and Man’s understanding? How much weight did the Court place on the specification to 
establish the patent’s scope? How much weight on the words of the claims? How much 
weight on the Court’s assessment of the state of the art before Sawyer and Man? From 
where does the Court derive its assessment? 
4. The procedural posture of the case is a bit complicated. Consolidated Electric Light 
Company sued McKeesport Light Company for infringing Patent No. 317,676. 
Consolidated Electric had acquired the patent from Electro-Dynamic Light Company, 
which had earlier acquired it from the inventors, Sawyer and Man. McKeesport raised 
several defenses. One of them relied on patents that had issued to Edison. But Edison’s 
patents could not excuse McKeesport from infringement of Consolidated Electric’s patent. 
In other words, even if McKeesport had the right to use inventions covered by patents 
issued to Edison, it might still be liable for infringing Consolidated Electric’s patents.  
Patent law permits an inventor to obtain a patent on a nonobvious improvement to an 
existing patent. This can lead to what is known as a “blocking patent” situation. See Robert 
Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 
62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994). In such a situation neither the subsequent inventor nor the 
owner of the rights to the earlier patent can use the improvement without the permission 
of the other. Edison was relevant, however, insofar as his experiments informed the 
Court’s assessment of whether the Sawyer and Man patents satisfied the enablement 
requirement. As we’ll see later, a robust set of rules have developed to determine whether 
the information disclosed in the specification is sufficient. Here, note that Edison’s work 
appears principally to shed light on the question of whether Sawyer and Man’s patents 
met this requirement, not because any patents Edison obtained could have excused 
McKeesport’s infringement. If McKeesport were to have avoided liability, it would have 
been because Sawyer and Man’s patent was invalid or because McKeesport did not 
engage in the conduct covered by the patent. 
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5.  Suppose Sawyer and Man had understood that high resistance was key to making 
the lightbulb work but had not found any materials with sufficiently high resistance to 
make the lightbulb commercially viable. Would the outcome in the case have changed? 
How would you have advised them if they sought your assistance in applying for a 
patent? 
6.  Edison was a sophisticated actor in the patent system; his lab regularly used 
patents to learn about what others had done and its work resulted in over a thousand 
patents. But he did not rely on patent exclusivity alone to appropriate the value of the 
inventions he worked on. The opinion notes that “[a]fter microscopic examination of the 
material, [Edison] dispatched a man to Japan to make arrangements for securing the 
bamboo in quantities.” How do you suppose he might have secured large quantities of 
bamboo? What are the implications for a competitive market in lightbulbs? What does 
this suggest about the private efficacy and social desirability of patents as compared to 
non-patent mechanisms for appropriating the social value of an invention? See Jonathan 
M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251 (2003) 
(describing non-patent tools available to private actors to appropriate the value of their 
inventions); Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism, 128 
YALE L.J. 544 (2019) (situating patents within a larger toolkit of government policies for 
encouraging investment in innovation). 
7. For an introduction to the large literature exploring the relationship between the 
invention, the patent, and the claim, see Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark P. McKenna, Claiming 
Design, 167 U. PENN. L. REV. 123 (2018) (contrasting the patent, copyright, and trademark 
approaches to claiming designs); Christopher A. Cotropia, What Is the “Invention”?, 53 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1855 (2012) (distinguishing between an “external invention” 
approach that focuses on the specification and a “claim-centered invention” approach that 
focuses “almost exclusively on the claim”); Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the 
Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (2012) (critiquing the modern patent system’s 
emphasis on the claim and arguing for that a better approach would recognize the 
invention as a “substantive, technical concept” grounded in the statutory language); Dan 
L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts: Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 
157 U. PENN. L. REV. 1743 (2009) (arguing that the patent system ought to return to some 
of the central claiming principles that prevailed until the 1870s); Jeanne Fromer, Claiming 
Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (2009) (comparing the patent and copyright 
system’s approaches to claiming rights to their respective subject matters).  
x x x 
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While the core legal question in The Incandescent Lamp Patent Case was whether the 
patent was valid, the core legal question in the cases that follow is whether the patent is 
infringed. Still, the problem of patent scope—and the underlying relationship between 
the invention, the patent, and the claim—remains at the heart of the analysis. As you read 
these cases, think back to what you learned from The Incandescent Lamp Patent Case about 
the history of the development of the lightbulb and the way that history influenced the 
Court’s resolution of the dispute. With that in mind, consider what the inventors in each 
case might have contributed to the art, and how the court’s understanding of that 
contribution influences (or doesn’t influence) its analysis. 
Winans v. Denmead 
56 U.S. 330 (1853) 
Mr. Justice CURTIS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States, for the District of 
Maryland. The plaintiff in error brought his action in that court for an infringement of the 
exclusive right to make, use, and sell “an improvement in cars for the transportation of 
coal,” &c., granted to him by letters-patent, bearing date on the 26th day of June, 1847; 
and, the judgment of that court being for the defendants, he has brought the record here 
by this writ of error. 
. . . 
On such a trial, two questions arise. The first is, what is the thing patented; the second, 
has that thing been constructed, used, or sold by the defendants. 
. . . 
In this, as in most patent cases, founded on alleged improvements in machines, in 
order to determine what is the thing patented, it is necessary to inquire: 
1. What is the structure or device, described by the patentee, as embodying his 
invention. 
2. What mode of operation is introduced and employed by this structure or device. 
3. What result is attained by means of this mode of operation. 
4. Does the specification of claim cover the described mode of operation by which 
the result is attained. 
. . . [T]he structure, described by this patent, is the body of a burden railroad car, made 
of sheet iron, the upper part being cylindrical, and the lower part in the form of a frustum 
of a cone, the under edge of which has a flange secured upon it, to which flange a movable 
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bottom is attached. This bottom is made movable, in order to discharge the load through 
the aperture left by removing it. 
To understand the mode of operation introduced and employed by means of this form 
of the car body . . . what appears on the face of the specification, and was testified to by 
experts at the trial as correct, [is] that, by reason of the circular form of the car body, the 
pressure of the load outwards was equal in every direction, and thus the load supported 
itself in a great degree; that, by making the lower part conical, this principle of action 
operated throughout the car, with the exception of the small space to which the movable 
bottom was attached; that, being conical, the lower part of the car could be carried down 
below the truck, between the wheels, thus lowering the centre of gravity of the load; that 
the pressure outwards upon all parts of the circle being equal, the tensile strength of the 
iron was used to a much greater degree than in a car of a square form; and, finally, that 
this form of the lower part of the car facilitated the complete discharge of the load through 
the aperture, when the bottom was removed. 
. . . 
The practical result attained [by] this mode of operation is correctly described by the 
patentee . . . . The specification states: 
The transportation of coal, and all other heavy articles in lumps, has been attended 
with great injury to the cars, requiring the bodies to be constructed with great 
strength to resist the outward pressure on the sides, as well as the vertical pressure 
on the bottom, due not only to the weight of the mass, but the mobility of the 
lumps among each other tending to “pack,” as it is technically termed. Experience 
has shown that cars, on the old mode of construction, cannot be made to carry a 
load greater than its own weight; but, by my improvement, I am enabled to make 
cars of greater durability than those heretofore made, which will transport double 
their own weight of coal, &c. 
Having thus ascertained what is the structure described, the mode of operation it 
embodies, and the practical result attained, the next inquiry is, does the specification of 
claim cover this mode of operation, by which this result is effected? 
It was upon this question the case turned at the trial in the Circuit Court. 
The testimony showed that the defendants had made cars similar to the plaintiff’s, 
except that the form was octagonal instead of circular. There was evidence tending to 
prove that, considered in reference to the practical uses of such a car, the octagonal car 
was substantially the same as the circular. [The defendants’ witness] testified[:] 
That the advantage of a reduced bottom of the car was obtained, whether the car 
was conical or octagonal; that the strengthening of the bottom, due to the adoption 
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of a conical form, was the same when the octagonal form was adopted, or the 
circular. That the circular form was the best to resist the pressure . . . an octagonal 
one better than the square form; . . . that a polygon of many sides would be 
equivalent to a circle; that the octagon car, practically, was as good as the conical 
ones; and that, substantially, the witness saw no difference between the two. 
. . . 
The substance of [the district court’s] ruling was, that the claim was limited to the 
particular geometrical form mentioned in the specification; and as the defendants had not 
made cars in that particular form, there could be no infringement, even if the cars made 
by the defendants attained the same result by employing, what was in fact, the same mode 
of operation as that described by the patentee. We think this ruling was erroneous. 
Under our law a patent cannot be granted merely for a change of form. . . . Merely to 
change the form of a machine is the work of a constructor, not of an inventor; such a 
change cannot be deemed an invention. . . . To change the form of an existing machine, 
and by means of such change to introduce and employ other mechanical principles or 
natural powers, or, as it is termed, a new mode of operation, and thus attain a new and 
useful result, is the subject of a patent. Such is the basis on which the plaintiff’s patent 
rests. 
Its substance is a new mode of operation, by means of which a new result is obtained. 
It is this new mode of operation which gives it the character of an invention, and entitles 
the inventor to a patent; and this new mode of operation is, in view of the patent law, the 
thing entitled to protection. The patentee may, and should, so frame his specification of 
claim as to cover this new mode of operation which he has invented; and the only question 
in this case is, whether he has done so; or whether he has restricted his claim to one 
particular geometrical form. 
. . . 
Now, while it is undoubtedly true, that the patentee may so restrict his claim as to 
cover less than what he invented, or may limit it to one particular form of machine, 
excluding all other forms, though they also embody his invention, yet such an 
interpretation should not be put upon his claim if it can fairly be construed otherwise, and 
this for two reasons: 
1. Because the reasonable presumption is, that, having a just right to cover and protect 
his whole invention, he intended to do so. 
2. Because specifications are to be construed liberally, in accordance with the design 
of the Constitution and the patent laws of the United States, to promote the progress of 
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the useful arts, and allow inventors to retain to their own use, not any thing which is 
matter of common right, but what they themselves have created. 
The claim of the plaintiff is in the following words: 
What I claim as my invention, and desire to secure by letters-patent, is making the 
body of a car for the transportation of coal, &c., in the form of a frustum of a cone, 
substantially as herein described, whereby the force exerted by the weight of the 
load presses equally in all directions, and does not tend to change the form thereof, 
so that every part resists its equal proportion, and by which, also, the lower part is 
so reduced as to pass down within the truck frame and between the axles, to lower 
the centre of gravity of the load without diminishing the capacity of the car as 
described. 
I also claim extending the body of the car below the connecting pieces of the truck 
frame, and the line of draught, by passing the connecting bars of the truck frame, 
and the draught bar, through the body of the car, substantially as described. 
It is generally true, when a bpatentee describes a machine, and then claims it as described, 
that he is understood to intend to claim, and does by law actually cover, not only the 
precise forms he has described, but all other forms which embody his invention; it being 
a familiar rule that, to copy the principle or mo[d]e of operation described, is an 
infringement, although such copy should be totally unlike the original in form or 
proportions. 
Why should not this rule be applied to this case? 
It is not sufficient to distinguish this case to say, that here the invention consists in a 
change of form, and the patentee has claimed one form only. 
Patentable improvements in machinery are almost always made by changing some 
one or more forms of one or more parts, and thereby introducing some mechanical 
principle or mode of action not previously existing in the machine, and so securing a new 
or improved result. . . . If the machine complained of were a copy, in form, of the machine 
described in the specification, of course it would be at once seen to be an infringement. It 
could be nothing else. It is only ingenious diversities of form and proportion, presenting 
the appearance of something unlike the thing patented, which give rise to questions; and 
the property of inventors would be valueless, if it were enough for the defendant to say, 
your improvement consisted in a change of form; you describe and claim but one form; I 
have not taken that, and so have not infringed. 
The answer is, my improvement did not consist in a change of form, but in the new 
employment of principles or powers, in a new mode of operation, embodied in a form by 
means of which a new or better result is produced; it was this which constituted my 
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invention; this you have copied, changing only the form; and that answer is justly 
applicable to this patent. 
. . . 
Where form and substance . . . are separable; where the whole substance of the 
invention may be copied in a different form, it is the duty of courts and juries to look 
through the form for the substance of the invention—for that which entitled the inventor 
to his patent, and which the patent was designed to secure; where that is found, there is 
an infringement; and it is not a defence, that it is embodied in a form not described, and 
in terms claimed by the patentee. 
. . . The exclusive right to the thing patented is not secured, if the public are at liberty 
to make substantial copies of it, varying its form or proportions. And, therefore, the 
patentee, having described his invention, and shown its principles, and claimed it in that 
form which most perfectly embodies it, is, in contemplation of law, deemed to claim every 
form in which his invention may be copied, unless he manifests an intention to disclaim 
some of those forms. 
Indeed it is difficult to perceive how any other rule could be applied, practicably, to 
cases like this. How is a question of infringement of this patent to be tried? It may safely 
be assumed, that neither the patentee nor any other constructer has made, or will make, a 
car exactly circular. In practice, deviations from a true circle will always occur. How near 
to a circle, then, must a car be, in order to infringe? May it be slightly elliptical, or 
otherwise depart from a true circle, and, if so, how far? 
In our judgment, the only answer that can be given to these questions is, that it must 
be so near to a true circle as substantially to embody the patentee’s mode of operation, 
and thereby attain the same kind of result as was reached by his invention. It is not 
necessary that the defendant’s cars should employ the plaintiff’s invention to as good 
advantage as he employed it, or that the result should be precisely the same in degree. It 
must be the same in kind, and effected by the employment of his mode of operation in 
substance. Whether, in point of fact, the defendant’s cars did copy the plaintiff’s invention, 
in the sense above explained, is a question for the jury, and the court below erred in not 
leaving that question to them upon the evidence in the case, which tended to prove the 
affirmative. 
The judgment of the court below must be reversed. 
Mr. Chief Justice TANEY, Mr. Justice CATRON, Mr. Justice DANIEL, and Mr. Justice 
CAMPBELL, dissented. 
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Context & Application 
1. What did coal cars look like before Winans produced the alleged invention at issue 
in the case? How did they work? What kinds of problems were associated with those coal 
cars? How did Winans’s coal car differ from those most commonly used? What 
advantages did it purportedly offer over existing coal cars? 
2. Winans v. Denmead is now best known as the case in which the Supreme Court first 
permitted allegations of infringement to be premised on the basis that the accused device 
was equivalent to the patented one, even though the accused device did not fall within 
the literal words of the claim. This approach to infringement, now referred to as the 
doctrine of equivalents, will be explored in detail in Chapter 9 on Infringement.  
3. In the first decades of the American patent system, patents did not have claims. By 
the mid-1800s, inventors began including in the specification a statement of the form “I 
claim as my invention . . .” Although Winans is now associated with the doctrine of 
equivalents, its approach to understanding the scope of the patent was typical in its era. 
The goal in reading the specification and the claims (if there were any claims) was “to 
allow inventors to retain to their own use, not any thing which is matter of common right, 
but what they themselves have created.” In the Patent Act of 1870, Congress required that 
inventors include claims that “particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, 
improvement, or combination which he claims as his invention or discovery.” This more 
pointedly raised the question of how the claims relate to the rest of the specification, as 
the next case illustrates. 
4. One important aspect of the Court’s opinion was its understanding of the claim 
language “the frustum of a cone.” What did the Court understand that phrase to mean? 
How did the Court reach that understanding? In what way did that understanding 
influence its determination of whether the patent was infringed? 
5. Suppose Winans had asked you to draft his patent application. How would you 
have drafted the claims? Is there anything in the specification that you would have 
changed from what you read in Winans? Bear in mind that Winans would likely have 
wanted a patent that would both withstand validity challenges and capture a wide range 
of potential infringers. Other doctrines, novelty and nonobviousness, would prevent 
Winans from including within the scope of his patent inventions that existed before his 
work; meanwhile, disclosure doctrines like written description and enablement would 
prevent Winans from including within the scope of his patent inventions that he could 
not adequately describe or teach others how to make and use. 
6. Suppose Denmead walked into your office with the Winans patent in hand. He 
asks you for your advice on how to avoid infringement. What would you have told him? 
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Merrill v. Yeomans 
94 U.S. 568 (1876) 
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court. 
The defendants were dealers in oils, and not manufacturers of them. If the appellant’s 
patent was for a new oil, the product of a mode of treating the oils of that character which 
he describes in his application, the defendants may be liable . . . . If, however, appellant’s 
patent is only for the mode of treating these oils invented and described by him,—in other 
words, for his new process of making this new article of hydrocarbon oil,—then it is clear 
the defendants have not infringed the patent, because . . . they manufactured none of the 
oils which they bought and sold. 
The counsel for appellant here maintain that his patent is for the new article, and is 
not for the process, though he describes it fully, by which that article is produced. The 
appellees insist, with equal earnestness, that the patent is exclusively for the process by 
which the new oil is made. 
The issue thus presented must be decided solely upon a correct construction of the 
plaintiff’s patent, and the accompanying specifications, in which, as required by the act of 
Congress, he makes the statement of his invention. 
No such question could have arisen if appellant had used language which clearly and 
distinctly points out what it is that he claims in his invention. 
We use the word ‘claim’ as distinct from ‘description.’ It must be conceded that the 
appellant’s specification describes with minuteness and precision both the 
instrumentality and the process by which he makes the oil in question. . . . 
He also describes, though in short terms, the article produced, the main feature of 
which he declares to be its freedom from the offensive odor which, before his invention, 
seemed to be an inseparable quality of those oils; and he mentions some of the more 
important uses to which this deodorized oil is applicable in the arts. 
It is fairly to be inferred from this statement, that, if all which is described as new in 
these specifications is really so, the inventor has a right to a patent for . . . : 
[(1)] a new process or mode of distilling heavy hydrocarbon oils, by which they are 
deprived of their offensive odors[, and (2)] the product of this new process of distillation; 
namely, the deodorized heavy hydrocarbon oils fitted for use in the arts. 
When a man supposes he has made an invention or discovery useful in the arts, and 
therefore the proper subject of a patent, it is, nine times out of ten, an improvement of 
some existing article, process, or machine, and is only useful in connection with it. It is 
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necessary, therefore, for him, in his application to the Patent Office, to describe that upon 
which he engrafts his invention, as well as the invention itself; and, in cases where the 
invention is a new combination of old devices, he is bound to describe with particularity 
all these old devices, and then the new mode of combining them, for which he desires a 
patent. It thus occurs that, in every application for a patent, the descriptive part is 
necessarily largely occupied with what is not new, in order to an understanding of what 
is new. 
The act of Congress, therefore, very wisely requires of the applicant a distinct and 
specific statement of what he claims to be new, and to be his invention. In practice, this 
allegation of the distinct matters for which he claims a patent comes at the close of the 
schedule or specification, and is often accompanied by a disclaimer of any title to certain 
matters before described, in order to prevent conflicts with pre-existing patents. 
This distinct and formal claim is, therefore, of primary importance, in the effort to 
ascertain precisely what it is that is patented to the appellant in this case. 
. . . Turning our attention to the first claim, we are compelled to say that the language 
is far from possessing that precision and clearness of statement with which one who 
proposes to secure a monopoly at the expense of the public ought to describe the thing 
which no one but himself can use or enjoy, without paying him for the privilege of doing 
so. It is as follows: 
I claim the above-described new manufacture of the deodorized heavy 
hydrocarbon oils, suitable for lubricating and other purposes, free from the 
characteristic odors of hydrocarbon oils, and having a slight smell like fatty oil, 
from hydrocarbon oils, by treating them substantially as is hereinbefore described. 
The word “manufacture” in this sentence is one which is used with equal propriety to 
express the process of making an article, or the article so made. “The manufacture of 
hydrocarbon oils” means primarily the making of hydrocarbon oils. It may mean the thing 
made also. Are there other words in the sentence calculated to throw light on the meaning 
of this one?  [Ed. note: The Court then quoted again from the patent, slightly modifying 
some of the language:] 
I claim the above-described new manufacture of hydrocarbon oils, . . . by treating 
them substantially as hereinbefore described.  
It seems to us that the most natural meaning of these words is, that “I claim this new mode 
of manufacturing hydrocarbon oils, by treating them as hereinbefore described.” This is 
the meaning which would first suggest itself to the mind. If the product is meant, the 
words “by treating them substantially as hereinbefore described” are useless. They are 
not only useless, but embarrassing; for, by the well-settled rules of construing all 
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instruments, some importance must be attached to them; and, if they are to be regarded 
at all, they must either refer to the process of making the oils for which the applicant is 
claiming a patent, or they are intended to limit his claim for a patent for the product to 
that product only, when produced by treating the oils in the manner before described. 
. . . 
We can see no reason why the applicant for the patent, if he had in his mind a claim 
for the article produced, should have intended so to limit his claim. If the article was the 
discovery which he sought the exclusive right to make, use, and sell, he was entitled to 
that monopoly, however produced. 
If, however, he had in his own mind only a claim for the process of manufacture by 
which the article was made, then his reference to the mode of treating the oils from which 
it came was evidently proper and intelligible. 
But the language in the specifications aids us in construing the claim. In the sentence 
next preceding this claim, he says: “It will also be evident to those skilled in the art that 
my invention will be used, if the above-mentioned process be worked, to produce the 
deodorized heavy oils above described from distilled hydrocarbon oils,” &c. It is very 
clear that what he here calls his invention is a thing which produces the deodorized oils, 
and not the oil itself. So again he says: “From the above it will be obvious that my 
invention consists in producing heavy hydrocarbon oils, suitable for lubricating and other 
purposes, and free from the characteristic odor, by distilling from them the volatile matter 
from which objectionable odors arise.” Again he says: “In carrying on my new 
manufacture of deodorizing heavy oils with this apparatus, I place the oil to be 
deodorized in the still, and heat it by the fire beneath to the required temperature to 
commence the operation, the steam being shut off from the coil, and the outlet cock being 
opened to admit of the expulsion of any water from within the coil.” Here the word 
“manufacture” is used in the sense of the word “process,”—a word which could be 
substituted for it, without a shade of change in the meaning. As it can here mean nothing 
else but process, we have a definition of the meaning to be attached to it in other parts of 
the same paper, if that meaning were otherwise doubtful. 
But, apart from these verbal criticisms,—all of which are just, and tend strongly to 
show what was the invention claimed by appellant,—it is impossible to read the four 
printed pages of specifications, in which appellant minutely describes his invention, 
without observing that they are almost wholly directed to the apparatus, the mode of 
using it, and the peculiar process of distillation, by which the more volatile parts of the 
heavy oils, which contain the offensive odors, are separated from the main body of the oil, 
pass over in that process, and leave the remainder free from this great drawback in its use 
in the arts. Why should this be so, if the applicant for the patent was only looking to the 
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products as his invention,—the deodorized heavy hydrocarbon oils? If the oil alone was 
to be patented, by whatever process made, this elaborate description of one particular 
process was unnecessary. 
A strong appeal is made by counsel to give the appellant the benefit of a liberal 
construction in support of the patent. Cases are cited in which this court has held that, 
rather than defeat a patent where it appears that a valuable invention has really been 
made, this court, giving full effect to all that is found in the application on which the Patent 
Office acted, will uphold that which was really invented, and which comes within any fair 
interpretation of the patentee’s assertion of claim. 
We are not disposed to depart from this rule in the present case. There is no question 
here but that the patent is good for the second claim,—for the superheating coil, with its 
steam-pipe, &c.; and we are all of opinion that it is good for the process of distillation 
described in the specifications, by which the heavy hydrocarbon oils are deodorized. It is, 
therefore, a valid patent for two important matters, well set forth and described. If the 
patentee is also entitled to a patent for the product of this distillation, and has failed, as 
we think he has, to obtain it, the law affords him a remedy, by a surrender and reissue. 
When this is done, the world will have fair notice of what he claims, of what his patent 
covers, and must govern themselves accordingly. 
The growth of the patent system in the last quarter of a century in this country has 
reached a stage in its progress where the variety and magnitude of the interests involved 
require accuracy, precision, and care in the preparation of all the papers on which the 
patent is founded. It is no longer a scarcely recognized principle, struggling for a foothold, 
but it is an organized system, with well-settled rules, supporting itself at once by its utility, 
and by the wealth which it creates and commands. The developed and improved 
condition of the patent law, and of the principles which govern the exclusive rights 
conferred by it, leave no excuse for ambiguous language or vague descriptions. The public 
should not be deprived of rights supposed to belong to it, without being clearly told what 
it is that limits these rights. The genius of the inventor, constantly making improvements 
in existing patents,—a process which gives to the patent system its greatest value,—
should not be restrained by vague and indefinite descriptions of claims in existing patents 
from the salutary and necessary right of improving on that which has already been 
invented. It seems to us that nothing can be more just and fair, both to the patentee and to 
the public, than that the former should understand, and correctly describe, just what he 
has invented, and for what he claims a patent. 
In consistency with these views, we are of opinion that the appellant in this case has 
described and claimed a patent for the process of deodorizing the heavy hydrocarbon oils, 
and that he has not claimed as his invention the product of that process. 
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Context & Application 
1. What problem was Merrill trying to solve? How did he solve it? To what extent 
does the claim reflect his solution? Could you have drafted a claim for Merrill that would 
both have withstood a novelty or nonobviousness challenge and also captured the activity 
of the defendants in this case?  
2. Contrast the role that the claim played in Merrill with the role that it played in 
Winans. Recall that in Winans, the Court saw itself as trying to ensure that inventors could 
“retain to their own use, not any thing which is matter of common right, but what they 
themselves have created.” To what extent does that accord with how the Court 
understood its role in Merrill? What might justify the approach to the claim taken in 
Merrill? 
3. What did the Court think was ambiguous about the claim language in Merrill? 
What gave rise to the ambiguity? Suppose you had to draft a claim to the process at 
issue—what would that claim look like? Now suppose you had to draft a claim to the 
produce at issue—what would that claim look like? The Court in Merrill began by 
identifying a purported ambiguity in the claim language. Go back to Winans—can you 
identify an ambiguity in the claim language that would permit the Court to interpret the 
patent in that case to cover the accused device? 
4. The patent in Merrill had, of course, not only a claim but also a specification that 
described the invention. How did the specification inform the Court’s analysis? How did 
the Court see the relationship between what Merrill invented, his description of the 
invention in the specification, and the claims at the end of the patent? 
x x x 
Courts today take yet another approach to understanding the scope of the patent. The 
case that follows is an emblematic (if perhaps a bit extreme) example of the modern 
approach to claim scope. As you read it, consider what role the inventor’s contribution 
plays in the court’s effort to reconcile the claim and specification. 
Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc. 
358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
Judge BRYSON delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Appellants Liebel-Flarsheim Company and Mallinckrodt Inc. (collectively, “Liebel”) 
sued appellee Medrad, Inc. for infringement . . . . The patents claim certain methods and 
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devices for use in connection with powered fluid injectors, which can be used to inject 
fluids into patients during medical procedures. One of the patents, U.S. Patent No. 
5,456,669 (“the ’669 patent”), is drawn to methods of loading powered injectors from the 
front. A related patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,658,261 (“the ’261 patent”), is drawn to front-
loadable powered injectors and to disposable front-loadable syringes for use in such 
injectors. . . . [The district court construed the asserted claims to require the use of pressure 
jackets around the syringes. Because Medrad’s accused injectors did not use pressure 
jackets, the district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement.] 
I 
Powered injectors are used in various medical applications, such as injecting contrast 
agents into the vascular systems of patients who undergo certain diagnostic imaging 
procedures. A powered injector ordinarily uses a motor drive that is attached to a syringe 
plunger. The drive pulls the plunger rearward to draw contrast agent into the syringe and 
then drives the plunger forward to inject contrast agent through a tube and into the 
patient. The contrast agent is usually injected into the patient under high pressure. 
A 
Liebel asserted that Medrad’s powered injectors infringed seven claims of the ’669 
patent and twenty claims of the ’261 patent. The ’669 and ’261 patents derive from a 1991 
application, Ser. No. 712,110 (“the ’110 application”). Prior to the filing of the ′110 
application, the injectors sold by both Liebel and Medrad required that the syringes be 
breech loaded, i.e., loaded through the rear of the injectors. Breech loading has 
disadvantages, including inefficiency in the loading process and the risk of spillage and 
contamination that can result from disconnecting the syringe from the tube through which 
contrast agent is delivered to the patient. The ’110 application and the patents that 
eventually issued from it were directed to front loading, rather than breech loading, the 
powered injectors. 
The specifications of the ’669 and ’261 patents are essentially identical. Each of the 
embodiments of the injector described in the two patents includes a pressure jacket into 
which the syringe is inserted. The pressure jacket surrounds the syringe and prevents it 
from breaking under the internal pressure generated when the contrast agent is injected 
into the patient. Based largely on the fact that the ’669 and ’261 patents do not contain any 
description of an injector that lacks a pressure jacket, the district court construed all of the 
asserted claims from those two patents to require a pressure jacket, even though none of 
the asserted claims expressly refers to a pressure jacket. The district court concluded that 
“the specification makes clear that the injector includes a pressure jacket.” Based on that 
observation, the court ruled that “the asserted claims do not cover a jacketless injector, 
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even though the asserted claims might be considered broad enough to disclose a jacketless 
injector when read without reference to the specification.” 
II 
Liebel’s appeal with respect to the asserted claims of the ’669 and ’261 patents turns 
on whether the common specification of the two patents limits the scope of the asserted 
claims to injectors that include pressure jackets. We hold that it does not. The asserted 
claims do not expressly require pressure jackets, and the common specification does not 
state that a pressure jacket is a required component of the inventions. Moreover, even if 
the original disclosure supported Medrad’s contention that the invention, as originally 
conceived, required the use of a pressure jacket, the prosecution history of the ’669 and 
’261 patents makes clear that the patentee drafted the asserted claims specifically to cover 
injectors lacking pressure jackets. In light of the applicants’ clearly stated intention to 
cover jacketless injectors, any question regarding the support or lack of support for the 
claims in the original disclosure bears on the issues of priority and validity, not on the 
issue of claim construction. Accordingly, for the reasons more fully set forth below, we 
conclude that the district court erred by construing the asserted claims to require pressure 
jackets. 
A 
 Claim 10 of the ’669 patent is representative of the asserted claims of the ’669 and ′261 
patents. It provides as follows: 
A method of loading a tubular replacement syringe into a high pressure power 
injector for injecting fluid into an animal, the method comprising the steps of: 
providing a power injector having: 
a syringe receiving opening with a generally circular periphery therein adapted to 
receive a rearward end of a syringe having a generally circular rim, 
a ram and a motor linked to the ram and operable to reciprocate the ram along a 
segment of a line projecting through the opening; and providing a hollow tubular 
syringe that includes: 
a cylindrical body having an axis, a generally circular rim, a rearward end and a 
closed forward end with a fluid discharge orifice therein, and 
a plunger axially slidable in the body, the syringe body being structurally capable 
of withstanding, at least from the rim to the orifice, fluid at an operating pressure 
of at least 100 psi within the interior thereof; 
then: 
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inserting into the opening, by generally rearward axial movement of the syringe, 
the rearward end of the body; 
rotating the syringe in the opening a fraction of a turn to thereby lock the body 
around the rim to the injector around the periphery of the opening; and 
engaging the plunger with the ram; 
then: 
energizing the motor and thereby driving the ram forward along the line and 
parallel to the axis to move the plunger axially forward at a programmed speed to 
inject the fluid at the operating pressure from within the syringe and through the 
orifice at a programmed rate into the animal. 
Neither claim 10 of the ’669 patent nor any of the other asserted claims recites a pressure 
jacket. The district court, however, construed the claims to require pressure jackets by 
focusing on the “syringe receiving opening” limitation . . . . After finding that limitation 
to be ambiguous with respect to the location of the opening, the court looked to the 
specification and concluded that, because the syringe-receiving opening in each of the 
embodiments of the invention was located at the front end of a pressure jacket, the 
“opening” referred to in each of the asserted claims had to be located at the front end of a 
pressure jacket. Medrad embraces the district court’s claim construction analysis and 
makes the more general argument that because the “pressure-jacketed injector” is the only 
subject matter described in the specification, that subject matter constitutes the invention 
itself, not simply a preferred embodiment of a broader invention. 
We have had many occasions to cite one or both of the twin axioms regarding the role 
of the specification in claim construction: On the one hand, claims “must be read in view 
of the specification, of which they are a part.” On the other hand, it is improper to read a 
limitation from the specification into the claims. . . . We have recognized that “there is 
sometimes a fine line between reading a claim in light of the specification, and reading a 
limitation into the claim from the specification.” As we have explained, “an inherent 
tension exists as to whether a statement is a clear lexicographic definition or a description 
of a preferred embodiment. The problem is to interpret claims ‘in view of the specification’ 
without unnecessarily importing limitations from the specification into the claims.” . . . 
At the outset, we reject the district court’s conclusion that the term “opening” should 
be defined as limited to an opening in a pressure jacket. The specification does not define 
“opening” restrictively, nor is there anything in the specification that supports the district 
court’s conclusion that the term is ambiguous. The asserted claims refer to the “syringe 
receiving opening,” or simply the “opening,” as having various characteristics, but none 
of the asserted claims state, explicitly or by necessary implication, that the opening must 
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be formed in or in conjunction with a pressure jacket. Claim 10 of the ’669 patent, for 
example, requires “a ram and a motor linked to the ram and operable to reciprocate the 
ram along a segment of a line projecting through the opening.” The claim further provides 
that the rearward end of the syringe will be inserted into the opening and rotated in the 
opening to lock it in place. Thus, the “opening” must be located so that the ram 
reciprocates along a segment of a line projecting through the opening and so that the rear 
end of the syringe can be inserted into the opening and affixed to the injector at that point. 
But the claim language does not suggest that the “opening” must also be located at the 
front end of a pressure jacket. 
Other asserted claims likewise refer to the location of the opening without referring to 
the location of the opening vis-à-vis a pressure jacket. . . . In each case, the claim specifies 
the location and structure of the opening while making no mention of a pressure jacket. 
In common usage, an opening is simply an aperture, and nothing in the ’669 and ’261 
patents indicates that the term “opening” should be understood to carry with it the 
requirement that it must always be located in the front of a pressure jacket. Accordingly, 
contrary to the district court, we find no ambiguity in the term “opening” and no reason 
to resolve the purported ambiguity by reading that term restrictively. . . .  
B 
 Medrad argues that because all the embodiments described in the common 
specification of the ’669 and ’261 patents feature pressure jackets, the claims of those 
patents must be construed as limited to devices that use pressure jackets. In Medrad’s 
words, when “the subject matter claimed in the patent-in-suit is the only subject matter 
described . . . that subject matter is the invention, and not simply a ‘preferred 
embodiment’ of a broader invention.” 
 There are several answers to Medrad’s argument. The first is that this court has 
expressly rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the 
claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to that embodiment. Even when 
the specification describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent will not be 
read restrictively unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim 
scope using “words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.” 
For example, in Brookhill–Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1301 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003), the court interpreted the term “remote” broadly to include surgical procedures 
performed with the surgeon present in the same room as the patient, although the written 
description only described performing the surgical procedure without the surgeon 
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present in the same room as the patient, because “no statement in the written description 
constituted a limitation on the scope of the invention.” . . . 
In this case, the specification does not describe the invention as limited to 
embodiments having pressure jackets, and none of the other reasons that have been 
invoked for giving claims a narrow reading are present. Although all the embodiments 
described in the common specification of the ’669 and ’261 patents include a pressure 
jacket, the written description does not contain a clear disavowal of embodiments lacking 
a pressure jacket. . . . The abstract of the patents states that an “animal fluid injector, 
replaceable syringe and method of replacement of the syringe in the injector are provided 
in which the syringe is loadable and unloadable into and from the injector through the 
open front end of a pressure jacket of the injector.” Although that language can reasonably 
be understood as constituting a general description of the invention, the quoted passage 
does not suggest that a pressure jacket is an essential component of the invention, nor is 
there any language in that passage, or elsewhere in the specification, that disclaims the 
use of the invention in the absence of a pressure jacket. 
D 
Apart from the literal language of the asserted claims and the prosecution history, the 
doctrine of claim differentiation provides significant added support for Liebel’s claim 
construction. As we noted above, the ’669 and ’261 patents both contain claims that 
explicitly recite the requirement of a pressure jacket and that are dependent from asserted 
independent claims that do not contain such a requirement. In the ’669 patent, asserted 
claim 10 recites a method of loading a tubular replacement syringe into a high pressure 
power injector without reference to a pressure jacket. Claim 14, which depends from claim 
10, adds four limitations that recite the use of a pressure jacket in the process of inserting 
the syringe. A comparison of claims 10 and 14 makes clear that the only significant 
distinction between the two is that claim 14 requires the use of a pressure jacket. 
. . . As this court has frequently stated, the presence of a dependent claim that adds a 
particular limitation raises a presumption that the limitation in question is not found in 
the independent claim. Although that presumption can be overcome if the circumstances 
suggest a different explanation, or if the evidence favoring a different claim construction 
is strong, the presumption is unrebutted in this case, as Medrad has offered no alternative 
explanation for why the “pressure jacket” limitation is found in the dependent claims but 
not in the corresponding independent claims. In such a setting, where the limitation that 
is sought to be “read into” an independent claim already appears in a dependent claim, 
the doctrine of claim differentiation is at its strongest. The doctrine thus substantially 
undermines Medrad’s contention that all of the claims of the ’669 and ’261 patents require 
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the presence of a pressure jacket, even though the express requirement of a pressure jacket 
is found only in certain claims and not in any of the claims asserted in this case. 
E 
In support of its claim construction, the district court stated, without elaboration, that 
it is “unlikely that the specification, which was drafted for claims that disclosed an injector 
that included a pressure jacket, would describe an injector that does not require a pressure 
jacket, much less enable one skilled in the art to make and use such a device.” Medrad 
supplements that observation by arguing, also without elaboration, that if the asserted 
claims are not construed to require a pressure jacket, those claims “would be of doubtful 
validity.” 
 This court has frequently alluded to the “familiar axiom that claims should be so 
construed, if possible, as to sustain their validity.” At the same time, however, the court 
has “admonished against judicial rewriting of claims to preserve validity.” Accordingly, 
unless the court concludes, after applying all the available tools of claim construction, that 
the claim is still ambiguous, the axiom regarding the construction to preserve the validity 
of the claim does not apply. 
. . . 
In this case, the applicants in effect drafted particular claims of the applications that 
matured into the ’669 and ’261 patents so as to omit the pressure jacket limitation that had 
been present in all of the claims of the parent ’110 application. . . . [I]t would be improper 
to disregard the effect of that action on the scope of those claims simply because the 
claims, if broadly construed, might be vulnerable to a challenge to their priority and 
validity. Rather, because the proper construction of the claims is clear, the questions of 
priority and validity are separate issues that must be separately addressed on remand. 
. . . 
Reversed and remanded. 
Context & Application 
1. What did powered fluid injectors look like before Liebel-Flarsheim produced the 
alleged invention at issue in the case? How did they work? What kinds of problems were 
associated with the preexisting powered fluid injectors? How did Liebel-Flarsheim’s 
differ from those and what advantages did it purportedly offer? 
2. What role does the specification play in the Liebel-Flarsheim court’s analysis? How 
does it compare to the role of the specification in Winans v. Denmead and Merrill v. 
Yeomans? 
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3. What does the court mean when it cautions against “read[ing] a limitation from 
the specification into the claims”? Why would that be undesirable? How does it differ 
from reading a claim “in view of the specification”? Did Winans read the claim “in view 
of the specification” or did it “read a limitation from the specification into the claims”? 
What about Merrill? 
4. The Liebel-Flarsheim court also relies on the claim differentiation canon. The 
intuition here is that each claim should cover some variation on the invention; if the scope 
of coverage was identical, there would be no reason to include both claims. We will 
explore the claim differentiation canon, along with other claim construction tools, in more 
detail in our chapter on claim construction. 
5. Suppose you wanted to argue that the claim language itself implicitly included the 
requirement that the invention include a pressure jacket. You also conclude that the there 
is insufficient support for interpreting the “syringe receiving opening” to require a 
pressure jacket. Is there any other language in the claim would you rely on?
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3. PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER 
In order to be eligible for a patent, an applicant must claim patentable subject matter. 
This might seem tautological: of course you can only obtain a patent on subject matter that 
is amenable to patenting. And indeed there are many things that seem as though they 
must qualify as patentable subject matter—a new pencil sharpener, for example, or a new 
lightbulb. So too are there many things that seem as though they must not qualify as 
patentable subject matter; poems, the quality of light at sunset, and the feeling of being 
thirsty all appear to lie well outside the boundaries of patent law. 
But hard questions arise when we try to define patent law’s boundaries precisely. 
Consider again, as we did in Chapter 2, the constitutional clause from which Congress 
derives the authority to create a patent system: 
The Congress shall have the power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. 
U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. This clause does not explicitly refer to patent eligibility. But 
there may be implicit limits in the references to “Inventors” and “Discoveries,” as well as 
in the nature of “Progress” that Congress is empowered to promote.  
The first patent statute enacted by Congress in 1790 similarly made no explicit 
mention of patentable subject matter as a distinct doctrine. Nor did the Act of 1793, which 
redefined patentable subject matter as “any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” But these statutory 
categories (which survive largely intact in the current version of Section 101 of the Patent 
Act) implicitly limit the scope of things that can be patented. By the late 1800s, the 
statutory categories were defined, although some more precisely than others. See Sarah R. 
Burstein, The “Article of Manufacture” in 1887, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 26-31 (2017) 
(describing the “well-established” view in 1887 that the “statutory classes of invention” 
were each “separate categories, between which the lines of division are sharply drawn,” 
even if there were disputes about where some of those lines were, precisely). Still, the 
(perhaps inevitable) proposition that only patentable things can be patented seems to have 
been taken mostly for granted in the earliest days of the American patent system.  
The roots of modern patentable subject matter doctrine, with its emphasis on judge-
made exclusions from the scope of eligible subject matter, emerged in the mid-1800s. In 
its initial incarnation, the American patent system was a creature of the First Industrial 
Revolution. Inventors created an array of machines capable of performing manufacturing 
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tasks more efficiently than humans could on their own. Many of those machines—ranging 
from the threshing machine (which removed seeds from grain stalks) to the Fourdrinier 
machine (which turned paper-making from a hand-made craft into an industrial-scale 
activity)—were the subject of patents, as were industrial processes.  
The Second Industrial Revolution soon put pressure on the legal system’s 
understanding of just what it is that can be patented. Inventions harnessed powers of 
nature that were previously only poorly understood (or even entirely unknown) and that 
sometimes remained so even as people begin to make use of them. Electricity is the 
foremost example, but other efforts to deploy an improved scientific understanding of the 
natural world into our daily lives brought hard questions of patentable subject matter to 
the bench, where courts began to develop what is now recognized as patentable subject 
matter doctrine. These technological developments eventually forced the patent system 
to reconsider its basic foundations.  
Further complicating matters, Congress also created two new types of patents—
design and plant patents—with their own statutory subject matter provisions. This 
chapter will focus on utility patents and the patentable subject requirement of § 101; we 
will address the subject matter requirements that apply to design and plant patents in 
subsequent chapters.  
Note also that patent eligibility has an unsettled relationship to other statutory 
requirements for obtaining a patent. The ambiguities here are made more challenging by 
the sometimes-contested terminology applied to the various requirements. We will use 
the terms “patent eligibility” and “patentable subject matter” to refer to doctrines that 
determine whether an invention is the kind of thing that might possibly be patented and 
that flow from the statutory language in Section 101. We will avoid the term 
“patentability,” which comes up frequently in judicial opinions, but is used inconsistently; 
at times, it refers to the novelty, nonobviousness, and utility apart from the eligibility 
requirement and at other times to all four of these requirements together—eligibility, 
novelty, nonobviousness, and utility. 
The relevance of limits on the scope of patent eligibility has ebbed and flowed over 
time. At times, the legal system has been exceptionally reluctant to deny patents on the 
grounds that they do not claim patentable subject matter. At other times, including right 
now, the PTO and the courts frequently invoke patentable subject matter to deny 
applications and invalidate issued patents. 
Immediately prior to the current resurgence of patentable subject matter doctrine, the 
landscape was dominated by Diamond v. Chakrabarty. Doctor Ananda Chakrabarty had 
applied for a patent claiming bacteria that were capable of breaking down crude oil; the 
goal was to use these bacteria to help clean the ocean after oil spills. Chakrabarty 
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produced the bacteria by incorporating plasmids—short strands of genetic material—into 
the bacteria. Bacteria with the plasmids produced proteins that degraded oil into smaller 
components, which do not inflict the ecological damage that crude oil does. The bacteria 
at issue, drawn from the genus Pseudomonas, did not naturally incorporate those plasmids. 
The Court held that the patentable subject matter requirement did not prevent 
Chakrabarty from obtaining a claim to the bacteria incorporating the plasmids. Focusing 
on Section 101’s categories, the Court articulated the following framework for interpreting 
the statutory boundaries of patentable subject matter: 
[T]his Court has read the term “manufacture” in § 101 in accordance with its 
dictionary definition to mean “the production of articles for use from raw or 
prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties, 
or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by machinery.” Similarly, 
“composition of matter” has been construed consistent with its common usage to 
include “all compositions of two or more substances and . . . all composite articles, 
whether they be the results of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or 
whether they be gases, fluids, powders or solids.” In choosing such expansive 
terms as “manufacture” and “composition of matter,” modified by the 
comprehensive “any,” Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would 
be given wide scope. 
The relevant legislative history also supports a broad construction. The Patent Act 
of 1793, authored by Thomas Jefferson, defined statutory subject matter as “any 
new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
or useful improvement [thereof].” The Act embodied Jefferson’s philosophy that 
“ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement.” Subsequent patent statutes in 
1836, 1870, and 1874 employed this same broad language. In 1952, when the patent 
laws were recodified, Congress replaced the word “art” with “process,” but 
otherwise left Jefferson’s language intact. The Committee Reports accompanying 
the 1952 Act inform us that Congress intended statutory subject matter to “include 
anything under the sun that is made by man.” 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1980) (emphasis added). 
That last line—that patentable subject matter includes “anything under the sun that is 
made by man”—aptly characterized the legal system’s approach to eligibility following 
Chakrabarty. Patents issued for inventions ranging from isolated strands of human DNA 
to a method of exercising a cat with a laser pointer to a method of buying things on the 
Internet with one click. Perhaps the high point of this era was the Federal Circuit’s 
decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, which affirmed the 
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eligibility of business methods and, more generally, anything that “produce[d] a useful, 
concrete, and tangible result.” 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
The exceptionally lax approach to patentable subject matter of the Chakrabarty/State 
Street era came to a close in 2010, with the Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski v. Kappos. 
That was the first of four patentable subject matter cases in five years—a remarkable 
degree of attention from the Court to a single doctrine in patent law.  
The Supreme Court’s recent patentable subject matter quartet—Bilski, Mayo, Myriad, 
and Alice—imposed relatively stringent limits on what can be patented. In doing so, the 
Court dug deep into the historical development of this doctrine, often relying heavily on 
cases decided well over a century ago. Because even quite old cases can influence the 
outcomes in contemporary cases, it is important to have a firm understanding of those old 
cases. We might therefore begin in the mid- to late-1800s, when something like what is 
now called patentable subject matter first emerged in courts. That would permit us to 
track the development of this doctrine as it happened. 
But doing so might render it difficult to see why those cases matter now for two 
reasons. First, because the doctrine was so ill-formed at the time, it can be hard to start 
picking up its contours in cases decided when patentable subject matter was blended with 
other doctrines like nonobviousness (which itself developed in the courts at around the 
same time) and enablement. And second, the more recent cases have at times recast the 
old ones, such that it is not always apparent just from a reading of the old cases how they 
might apply today. That is, the current implications of the old cases become clear only in 
light of how those cases have been read by more recent ones. 
We tbegin with the case that formalized the modern framework for patentable subject 
matter, Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International. We then go back to the earliest cases to see 
how we arrived at our current crossroads. That historical development will be reviewed 
with an eye to understanding how to apply the modern test, as well as the core conceptual 
issues raised by patentable subject matter. With the historical background in place, we’ll 
explore how courts have applied the tests recently developed by the Supreme Court. Still, 
other ways to sequence this material are eminently viable, and you should feel no qualms 
about moving through this chapter in the order that makes the most sense for your 
studies. With that said, let’s begin in media res, with the Court’s decision in Alice. 
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A. Patentable Subject Matter: The Modern Framework 
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l 
573 U.S. 208 (2014) 
Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The patents at issue in this case disclose a computer-implemented scheme for 
mitigating “settlement risk” (i.e., the risk that only one party to a financial transaction will 
pay what it owes) by using a third-party intermediary. The question presented is whether 
these claims are patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, or are instead drawn to a patent-
ineligible abstract idea. We hold that the claims at issue are drawn to the abstract idea of 
intermediated settlement, and that merely requiring generic computer implementation 
fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. We therefore affirm 
the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  
I 
A 
Petitioner Alice Corporation is the assignee of several patents [United States Patent 
Nos. 5,970,479, 6,912,510, 7,149,720, and 7,725,375] that disclose schemes to manage certain 
forms of financial risk. According to the specification largely shared by the patents, the 
invention “enables the management of risk relating to specified, yet unknown, future 
events.” The specification further explains that the “invention relates to methods and 
apparatus, including electrical computers and data processing systems applied to 
financial matters and risk management.” 
The claims at issue relate to a computerized scheme for mitigating “settlement risk”—
i.e., the risk that only one party to an agreed-upon financial exchange will satisfy its 
obligation. In particular, the claims are designed to facilitate the exchange of financial 
obligations between two parties by using a computer system as a third-party 
intermediary.2  
2 The parties agree that claim 33 of the ’479 patent is representative of the method 
claims. Claim 33 recites: 
“A method of exchanging obligations as between parties, each party holding a 
credit record and a debit record with an exchange institution, the credit records 
and debit records for exchange of predetermined obligations, the method 
comprising the steps of: 
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“(a) creating a shadow credit record and a shadow debit record for each 
stakeholder party to be held independently by a supervisory institution from the 
exchange institutions; 
“(b) obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of-day balance for each 
shadow credit record and shadow debit record; 
“(c) for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation, the supervisory 
institution adjusting each respective party’s shadow credit record or shadow debit 
record, allowing only these transactions that do not result in the value of the 
shadow debit record being less than the value of the shadow credit record at any 
time, each said adjustment taking place in chronological order, and 
“(d) at the end-of-day, the supervisory institution instructing one of the exchange 
institutions to exchange credits or debits to the credit record and debit record of 
the respective parties in accordance with the adjustments of the said permitted 
transactions, the credits and debits being irrevocable, time invariant obligations 
placed on the exchange institutions.” 
The intermediary creates “shadow” credit and debit records (i.e., account ledgers) that 
mirror the balances in the parties’ real-world accounts at “exchange institutions” (e.g., 
banks). The intermediary updates the shadow records in real time as transactions are 
entered, allowing “only those transactions for which the parties’ updated shadow records 
indicate sufficient resources to satisfy their mutual obligations.” At the end of the day, the 
intermediary instructs the relevant financial institutions to carry out the “permitted” 
transactions in accordance with the updated shadow records, thus mitigating the risk that 
only one party will perform the agreed-upon exchange. 
In sum, the patents in suit claim (1) the foregoing method for exchanging obligations 
(the method claims), (2) a computer system configured to carry out the method for 
exchanging obligations (the system claims), and (3) a computer-readable medium 
containing program code for performing the method of exchanging obligations (the media 
claims). All of the claims are implemented using a computer; the system and media claims 
expressly recite a computer, and the parties have stipulated that the method claims 
require a computer as well. 
B 
Respondents CLS Bank International and CLS Services Ltd. (together, CLS Bank) 
operate a global network that facilitates currency transactions. . . . The District Court held 
that all of the claims are patent ineligible because they are directed to the abstract idea of 
“employing a neutral intermediary to facilitate simultaneous exchange of obligations in 
order to minimize risk.” 
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A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, 
holding that it was not “manifestly evident” that petitioner’s claims are directed to an 
abstract idea. The Federal Circuit granted rehearing en banc, vacated the panel opinion, 
and affirmed the judgment of the District Court in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion. . . .  
We . . . now affirm. 
II 
Section 101 of the Patent Act defines the subject matter eligible for patent protection. 
It provides: 
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements 
of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
“We have long held that this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Association for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013). We have interpreted § 101 
and its predecessors in light of this exception for more than 150 years. Bilski [v. Kappos, 561 
U.S. 593, 601–602 (2010)]; see also O’Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 112–120 (1854); Le Roy v. 
Tatham, 14 How. 156, 174–175 (1853). 
We have described the concern that drives this exclusionary principle as one of pre-
emption. Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are “the basic tools of 
scientific and technological work.” “Monopolization of those tools through the grant of a 
patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it,” thereby 
thwarting the primary object of the patent laws. We have “repeatedly emphasized this . . . 
concern that patent law not inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future 
use of” these building blocks of human ingenuity. 
At the same time, we tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest it 
swallow all of patent law. At some level, “all inventions . . . embody, use, reflect, rest 
upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” Thus, an invention 
is not rendered ineligible for patent simply because it involves an abstract concept. See 
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981). “Applications” of such concepts “‘to a new and 
useful end,’” we have said, remain eligible for patent protection. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 
U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
Accordingly, in applying the § 101 exception, we must distinguish between patents 
that claim the “‘building blocks’” of human ingenuity and those that integrate the 
building blocks into something more, thereby “transforming” them into a patent-eligible 
invention. The former “would risk disproportionately tying up the use of the underlying” 
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ideas, and are therefore ineligible for patent protection. The latter pose no comparable risk 
of pre-emption, and therefore remain eligible for the monopoly granted under our patent 
laws. 
III 
In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., we set forth a framework 
for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 
ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, we 
determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible 
concepts. If so, we then ask, “what else is there in the claims before us?” To answer that 
question, we consider the elements of each claim both individually and “as an ordered 
combination” to determine whether the additional elements “transform the nature of the 
claim” into a patent-eligible application. We have described step two of this analysis as a 
search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is 
“sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent 
upon the ineligible concept itself.”3 
3 Because the approach we made explicit in Mayo considers all claim elements, both 
individually and in combination, it is consistent with the general rule that patent 
claims “must be considered as a whole.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981); 
see Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594. 
A 
 We must first determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible 
concept. We conclude that they are: These claims are drawn to the abstract idea of 
intermediated settlement. 
The “abstract ideas” category embodies “the longstanding rule that an idea of itself is 
not patentable.” Benson, supra, at 67; see also Le Roy, supra, at 175 (“A principle, in the 
abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as 
no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right”). . . . 
We most recently addressed the category of abstract ideas in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 
593 (2010). The claims at issue in Bilski described a method for hedging against the 
financial risk of price fluctuations. Claim 1 recited a series of steps for hedging risk, 
including: (1) initiating a series of financial transactions between providers and 
consumers of a commodity; (2) identifying market participants that have a counterrisk for 
the same commodity; and (3) initiating a series of transactions between those market 
participants and the commodity provider to balance the risk position of the first series of 
consumer transactions. Claim 4 “put the concept articulated in claim 1 into a simple 
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mathematical formula.” The remaining claims were drawn to examples of hedging in 
commodities and energy markets. 
“All members of the Court agreed” that the patent at issue in Bilski claimed an 
“abstract idea.” Specifically, the claims described “the basic concept of hedging, or 
protecting against risk.” The Court explained that “hedging is a fundamental economic 
practice long prevalent in our system of commerce and taught in any introductory finance 
class.’” “The concept of hedging” as recited by the claims in suit was therefore a patent-
ineligible “abstract idea, just like the algorithms at issue in Benson and Flook.” 
It follows from our prior cases, and Bilski in particular, that the claims at issue here are 
directed to an abstract idea. Petitioner’s claims involve a method of exchanging financial 
obligations between two parties using a third-party intermediary to mitigate settlement 
risk. The intermediary creates and updates “shadow” records to reflect the value of each 
party’s actual accounts held at “exchange institutions,” thereby permitting only those 
transactions for which the parties have sufficient resources. At the end of each day, the 
intermediary issues irrevocable instructions to the exchange institutions to carry out the 
permitted transactions. 
On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated 
settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk. Like the risk hedging 
in Bilski, the concept of intermediated settlement is “a fundamental economic practice long 
prevalent in our system of commerce.” See, e.g., Emery, Speculation on the Stock and Produce 
Exchanges of the United States, in 7 STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW 283, 
346–356 (1896) (discussing the use of a “clearing-house” as an intermediary to reduce 
settlement risk). The use of a third-party intermediary (or “clearing house”) is also a 
building block of the modern economy. See, e.g., Yadav, The Problematic Case of 
Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 GEO. L.J. 387, 406–412 (2013); J. HULL, RISK 
MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 103–104 (3d ed. 2012). Thus, intermediated 
settlement, like hedging, is an “abstract idea” beyond the scope of § 101. 
Petitioner acknowledges that its claims describe intermediated settlement, but rejects 
the conclusion that its claims recite an “abstract idea.” Drawing on the presence of 
mathematical formulas in some of our abstract-ideas precedents, petitioner contends that 
the abstract-ideas category is confined to “preexisting, fundamental truths” that “‘exist in 
principle apart from any human action.’” 
Bilski belies petitioner’s assertion. The concept of risk hedging we identified as an 
abstract idea in that case cannot be described as a “preexisting, fundamental truth.” The 
patent in Bilski simply involved a “series of steps instructing how to hedge risk.” Although 
hedging is a longstanding commercial practice, it is a method of organizing human 
activity, not a “truth” about the natural world “that has always existed.” One of the claims 
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in Bilski reduced hedging to a mathematical formula, but the Court did not assign any 
special significance to that fact, much less the sort of talismanic significance petitioner 
claims. Instead, the Court grounded its conclusion that all of the claims at issue were 
abstract ideas in the understanding that risk hedging was a “fundamental economic 
practice.” 
B 
 Because the claims at issue are directed to the abstract idea of intermediated 
settlement, we turn to the second step in Mayo’s framework. We conclude that the method 
claims, which merely require generic computer implementation, fail to transform that 
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. 
1 
 At Mayo step two, we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether 
it contains an “inventive concept” sufficient to “transform” the claimed abstract idea into 
a patent-eligible application. A claim that recites an abstract idea must include “additional 
features” to ensure “that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize 
the abstract idea.” Mayo made clear that transformation into a patent-eligible application 
requires “more than simply stating the abstract idea while adding the words ‘apply it.’” 
Mayo itself is instructive. The patents at issue in Mayo claimed a method for measuring 
metabolites in the bloodstream in order to calibrate the appropriate dosage of thiopurine 
drugs in the treatment of autoimmune diseases. The respondent in that case contended 
that the claimed method was a patent-eligible application of natural laws that describe the 
relationship between the concentration of certain metabolites and the likelihood that the 
drug dosage will be harmful or ineffective. But methods for determining metabolite levels 
were already “well known in the art,” and the process at issue amounted to “nothing 
significantly more than an instruction to doctors to apply the applicable laws when 
treating their patients.” “Simply appending conventional steps, specified at a high level 
of generality,” was not “enough” to supply an “‘inventive concept.’” 
 The introduction of a computer into the claims does not alter the analysis at Mayo step 
two. In Benson, for example, we considered a patent that claimed an algorithm 
implemented on “a general-purpose digital computer.” Because the algorithm was an 
abstract idea, the claim had to supply a “new and useful” application of the idea in order 
to be patent eligible. But the computer implementation did not supply the necessary 
inventive concept; the process could be “carried out in existing computers long in use.” 
We accordingly “held that simply implementing a mathematical principle on a physical 
machine, namely a computer, is not a patentable application of that principle.” 
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 Flook is to the same effect. There, we examined a computerized method for using a 
mathematical formula to adjust alarm limits for certain operating conditions (e.g., 
temperature and pressure) that could signal inefficiency or danger in a catalytic 
conversion process. Once again, the formula itself was an abstract idea, and the computer 
implementation was purely conventional. In holding that the process was patent 
ineligible, we rejected the argument that “implementing a principle in some specific 
fashion” will “automatically fall within the patentable subject matter of § 101.” Thus, 
“Flook stands for the proposition that the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas 
cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of [the idea] to a particular 
technological environment.” 
In Diehr, by contrast, we held that a computer-implemented process for curing rubber 
was patent eligible, but not because it involved a computer. The claim employed a “well-
known” mathematical equation, but it used that equation in a process designed to solve a 
technological problem in “conventional industry practice.” The invention in Diehr used a 
“thermocouple” to record constant temperature measurements inside the rubber mold—
something “the industry had not been able to obtain.” The temperature measurements 
were then fed into a computer, which repeatedly recalculated the remaining cure time by 
using the mathematical equation. These additional steps, we recently explained, 
“transformed the process into an inventive application of the formula.” In other words, 
the claims in Diehr were patent eligible because they improved an existing technological 
process, not because they were implemented on a computer. 
 These cases demonstrate that the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot 
transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Stating an 
abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply it’” is not enough for patent eligibility. Nor 
is limiting the use of an abstract idea “to a particular technological environment.” Stating 
an abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a computer” simply combines 
those two steps, with the same deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer 
amounts to a mere instruction to “implement” an abstract idea “on . . . a computer,” that 
addition cannot impart patent eligibility. This conclusion accords with the pre-emption 
concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the ubiquity of computers, wholly 
generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of “additional feature” that 
provides any “practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed 
to monopolize the abstract idea itself.” 
The fact that a computer “necessarily exists in the physical, rather than purely 
conceptual, realm,” is beside the point. There is no dispute that a computer is a tangible 
system (in § 101 terms, a “machine”), or that many computer-implemented claims are 
formally addressed to patent-eligible subject matter. But if that were the end of the § 101 
inquiry, an applicant could claim any principle of the physical or social sciences by 
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reciting a computer system configured to implement the relevant concept. Such a result 
would make the determination of patent eligibility “depend simply on the draftsman’s 
art,” thereby eviscerating the rule that “‘laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 
ideas are not patentable.’” 
2 
The representative method claim in this case recites the following steps: (1) “creating” 
shadow records for each counterparty to a transaction; (2) “obtaining” start-of-day 
balances based on the parties’ real-world accounts at exchange institutions; 
(3) “adjusting” the shadow records as transactions are entered, allowing only those 
transactions for which the parties have sufficient resources; and (4) issuing irrevocable 
end-of-day instructions to the exchange institutions to carry out the permitted 
transactions. Petitioner principally contends that the claims are patent eligible because 
these steps “require a substantial and meaningful role for the computer.” As stipulated, 
the claimed method requires the use of a computer to create electronic records, track 
multiple transactions, and issue simultaneous instructions; in other words, “the computer 
is itself the intermediary.” 
In light of the foregoing, the relevant question is whether the claims here do more than 
simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea of intermediated settlement 
on a generic computer. They do not. 
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computer at each 
step of the process is “purely conventional.” Using a computer to create and maintain 
“shadow” accounts amounts to electronic recordkeeping—one of the most basic functions 
of a computer. The same is true with respect to the use of a computer to obtain data, adjust 
account balances, and issue automated instructions; all of these computer functions are 
“well-understood, routine, conventional activities” previously known to the industry. In 
short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic 
computer functions. 
Considered “as an ordered combination,” the computer components of petitioner’s 
method “add nothing . . . that is not already present when the steps are considered 
separately.” Viewed as a whole, petitioner’s method claims simply recite the concept of 
intermediated settlement as performed by a generic computer. The method claims do not, 
for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. Nor do they effect 
an improvement in any other technology or technical field. Instead, the claims at issue 
amount to “nothing significantly more” than an instruction to apply the abstract idea of 
intermediated settlement using some unspecified, generic computer. Under our 
precedents, that is not “enough” to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible 
invention. [The Court then concluded that the computer system and computer-readable 
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medium claims fail for “substantially the same reasons.”] For the foregoing reasons, the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is affirmed. 
Context and Application 
1. The Alice/Mayo Two-Step. Alice purports to draw its two-step framework from the 
Court’s decision two years earlier in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., 566 
U.S. 66 (2012). Mayo involved method claims related to thiopurine drugs, which doctors 
used to treat autoimmune diseases before the invention. Patients did not have reasonably 
uniform reactions to thiopurine drugs; instead, some patients suffered from serious side 
effects while others experienced modest or no relief. Doctors had to adjust the dosage of 
the thiopurine drug until they achieved the desired results. The claimed methods in Mayo 
“help[ed] doctors . . . determine whether a given dosage level is too low or too high.”  
In Mayo, the Court began by noting that “scientists already understood that the levels 
in a patient’s blood of certain metabolites, including, in particular, 6–thioguanine and its 
nucleotides (6–TG) and 6–methyl–mercaptopurine (6–MMP), were correlated with the 
likelihood that a particular dosage of a thiopurine drug could cause harm or prove 
ineffective.” Armed with this knowledge, the inventors set out to precisely identify the 
thiopurine-metabolite thresholds associated with toxicity and inefficacy. The inventors 
then obtained patents, of which the Court took as typical the following claim: 
A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated 
gastrointestinal disorder, comprising: 
(a) administering a drug providing 6–thioguanine to a subject having said 
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and 
(b) determining the level of 6–thioguanine in said subject having said immune-
mediated gastrointestinal disorder, 
wherein the level of 6–thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8x108 red blood 
cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently 
administered to said subject and 
wherein the level of 6–thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8x108 red 
blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently 
administered to said subject.  
The Court concluded that these claims were ineligible. Alice included an extensive 
discussion of the Step Two analysis in Mayo, but did not incorporate much about Mayo’s 
analysis at Step One. Here is the entirety of that analysis: 
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Prometheus’ patents set forth laws of nature—namely, relationships between 
concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a dosage 
of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause harm. Claim 1, for example, 
states that if the levels of 6–TG in the blood (of a patient who has taken a dose of a 
thiopurine drug) exceed about 400 pmol per 8x108 red blood cells, then the 
administered dose is likely to produce toxic side effects. While it takes a human 
action (the administration of a thiopurine drug) to trigger a manifestation of this 
relation in a particular person, the relation itself exists in principle apart from any 
human action. The relation is a consequence of the ways in which thiopurine 
compounds are metabolized by the body—entirely natural processes. And so a 
patent that simply describes that relation sets forth a natural law. 
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77. Do you see in here a requirement that courts evaluate whether a 
claim is “directed to” ineligible subject matter? How does the “directed to” analysis in 
Mayo compare to that in Alice? Are the claims in each case problematic for the same 
reasons? We will return to the question of what it means for a claim to be “directed to” 
ineligible subject matter when we explore post-Alice cases. 
2. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion for a unanimous Court in Mayo begins as follows: 
Section 101 of the Patent Act defines patentable subject matter. It says: “Whoever 
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a 
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. 35 U.S.C. § 
101.” The Court has long held that this provision contains an important implicit 
exception. “Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not 
patentable. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 
U.S. 593 (2010); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); Le Roy v. Tatham, 
14 How. 156, 175 (1853); O’Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 112–120 (1854); cf. Neilson v. 
Harford, Webster’s Patent Cases 295, 371 (1841). 
Why do you think he began the opinion by quoting statutory language? And why did he 
then immediately follow with a reference to an implicit judicial exception? What is the 
relationship between the statutory language and the judicial exception? Diehr, Le Roy, 
O’Reilly, and Neilson will all make appearances in the next subsection of this chapter—
when you read them, consider the extent to which they support the proposition for which 
they are cited here. 
3. Gene patents. Between Mayo and Alice, the Court decided Association for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013). The patents in Myriad related to the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. Mutations in those genes “can dramatically increase an 
individual’s risk of developing breast and ovarian cancer.” “Before Myriad’s discovery of 
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the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, scientists knew that heredity played a role in establishing 
a woman’s risk of developing breast and ovarian cancer, but they did not know which 
genes were associated with those cancers.” Researchers at Myriad “identified the exact 
location of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes on chromosomes 17 and 13.” “Once it found the 
location and sequence of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, Myriad sought and obtained a 
number of patents.” 
Some claims in those patents recited “isolated DNA coding for” BRCA1 and BRCA2 
proteins and protein fragments with specified sequences of amino acids; other claims 
recited nucleotide sequences comprising only relevant cDNA exons. Exons comprise the 
portions of genetic sequences that code for the amino acids that make up proteins; exons 
exclude everything that does not code for the amino acids. cDNA does not normally occur 
naturally; instead, scientists create cDNA in the laboratory from mRNA, which cells 
themselves do produce as part of the ordinary process of making proteins from DNA. The 
case arose after Myriad asserted that doctors testing their patients for the presence of 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations infringed its patents on the isolated DNA and cDNA 
sequences. One such doctor, “along with medical patients, advocacy groups, and other 
doctors” sought a declaratory judgment that Myriad’s patents were invalid. At the time, 
the Court had not yet decided Bilski. The PTO, meanwhile, had been routinely issuing 
patents on human genes, especially in the wake of 1995 PTO Guidelines that articulated 
the PTO’s view that utility concerns should not stand in the way of issuing biotechnology 
patents. See 1995 PTO Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36,263 (July 14, 1995).  
The Court decided Myriad after deciding Mayo. But the two-step framework 
articulated in Mayo and formalized in Alice did not play any overt role in Myriad. For more 
on the Myriad opinion’s curious omission of Mayo, see Dan L. Burk, The Curious Incident of 
the Supreme Court in Myriad Genetics, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505 (2014). Instead, the Court 
deemed Chakrabarty to be “central” to its inquiry, despite its intervening decisions in Bilski 
and Mayo. Myriad 569 U.S. at 591. Unlike the “new” bacterium “with markedly different 
characteristics from any found in nature” at issue in Chakrabarty, Myriad “did not create 
anything. To be sure, it found an important and useful gene, but separating that gene from 
its surrounding genetic material is not an act of invention.” Relying on its decision in Funk 
Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948), the Court held that Myriad’s 
claim “fell squarely within the law of nature exception” because it “did not alter” the 
genetic material “in any way.” Myriad, 569 U.S. at 590-91. The chemical changes required 
to isolate DNA “from the human genome” were irrelevant because Myriad’s “claim is 
concerned primarily with the information contained in the genetic sequence, not with the 
specific chemical composition of a particular molecule”; the cDNA claims, however, were 
deemed to be patent eligible because it is “an exons-only molecule that is not naturally 
occurring.” Justice Scalia filed a brief concurrence: 
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I join the judgment of the Court, and all of its opinion except Part I–A and some 
portions of the rest of the opinion going into fine details of molecular biology. I am 
unable to affirm those details on my own knowledge or even my own belief. It 
suffices for me to affirm, having studied the opinions below and the expert briefs 
presented here, that the portion of DNA isolated from its natural state sought to 
be patented is identical to that portion of the DNA in its natural state; and that 
complementary DNA (cDNA) is a synthetic creation not normally present in 
nature. 
For more on the scientific and business context regarding the Myriad litigation, see Jorge 
Contreras, Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics: A Critical 
Reassessment, 27 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2020). For a comparative approach to the problem 
of gene patents, with a focus on Australia’s consideration of Myriad’s claims to the BRCA 
genes, see Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Jane Nielsen & Dianne Nicol, Patenting Nature—A 
Comparative Perspective, 5 J.L. & BIOSCI. 550 (2018). 
4. The Court asserts in Alice—as it does in Bilski, Mayo, and Myriad—that it has “long 
held that [Section 101] contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 
U.S. 208, 216 (2014). As we’ll see, the Court has long engaged with the patentable subject 
matter doctrine. But the implicit exceptions to Section 101 have not always been so clear.  
Consider the Court’s 2005 grant of certiorari in Laboratory Corp. of America v. Metabolite 
Labs., which it subsequently dismissed as improvidently granted. 548 U.S. 124. The 
dismissal was over the vigorous dissent of Justices Breyer, Stevens, and Souter. Those 
Justices indicated that they would have held invalid the claimed process of “using any 
test (whether patented or unpatented) to measure the level in a body fluid of an amino 
acid called homocysteine and then noticing whether its level is elevated about the norm; 
if so, a vitamin deficiency is likely.” The primary reason for dismissing the case was that 
Section 101 and the “law of nature” objection to the claim was not squarely presented to 
the district court or the Federal Circuit. Justice Breyer’s dissent contended that LabCorp 
“argued the essence” of the patentable subject matter issue by asserting that, as construed 
by the district court, the claim was “too vague because that construction would allow 
anyone to obtain a patent on any scientific correlation” and “it would permit the 
respondents improperly to gain a monopoly over a basic scientific fact despite settled law 
that no such claim should be allowed.” Setting aside the question whether LabCorp’s 
arguments presented the “essence” of the eligibility issue, we might wonder why 
LabCorp did not more explicitly frame its arguments in Section 101 terms. One plausible 
answer is that the Section 101 bases for invalidity were not as clearly defined before the 
Court’s recent quartet as the Court would like to have you think. As you read the older 
cases that follow, consider the extent to which you think these exceptions have been 
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present in the Court’s opinions and the extent to which they form three coherent and 
distinct categories of excluded subject matter. 
5. Of the Court’s recent quartet of patentable subject matter opinions, Mayo and Alice 
were both unanimous, and the only separate opinion in Myriad was Justice Scalia’s brief 
concurrence. But the first of these cases, Bilski v. Kappos, produced more notable 
disagreements. While all the Justices agreed that the claims in the application at issue were 
ineligible, they disagreed about the reasons for their ineligibility. Their disagreement 
centered on the “machine-or-transformation test,” which looks to whether a process “is 
tied to a particular machine or apparatus” or “transforms a particular article into a 
different state or thing” and on the patent eligibility of business methods. See Bilski 
v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy first concluded that the machine-or-
transformation test “is a useful clue,” but “is not the sole test for deciding whether an 
invention is a patent-eligible ‘process,’” This part of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, however, 
was only joined in by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito. (Justice Scalia 
joined the remainder of Justice Kennedy’s opinion but joined Justice Breyer’s concurrence 
with respect to the machine-or-transformation test.) Second, Justice Kennedy concluded 
that business methods are not categorically excluded from the scope of patentable subject 
matter. Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy reasoned that the claims were ineligible because 
they “explain[ed] the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk,” which “is a 
fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce and taught in 
any introductory finance class” “Allowing petitioners to patent risk hedging would pre-
empt use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over an 
abstract idea.  
Justice Stevens concurred, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. They 
would have “restor[ed] patent law to its historical and constitutional moorings” by 
holding that the claims “describe[d] only a general method of engaging in business 
transactions—and business methods are not patentable.” Suggesting that the Federal 
Circuit made “a grave mistake” in adopting the “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test 
in State Street, Justice Stevens’s concurrence would have concluded that “a claim that 
merely describes a method of doing business does not qualify as a ‘process’ under § 101.” 
The opinion is also notable for rejecting the proposition that the text of the statute alone 
can provide meaningful guidance to the scope of patentable subject matter, and for its 
extended discussion of “the history of our patent law” (including its English roots) to 
inform the modern contours of the doctrine.  
Justice Breyer, with Justice Scalia joining, concurred in Justice Stevens’s conclusion 
that business methods are not patentable, but wrote separately “to highlight the 
substantial agreement” on the Court. Justice Breyer’s concurrence asserted that both the 
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Court’s opinion and Justice Stevens’s concurrence were consistent with the following four 
points: (1) “although the text of § 101 is broad, it is not without limit”; (2) “the so-called 
‘machine-or-transformation test,’ has . . . repeatedly helped the Court to determine what 
is a patentable ‘process’”; (3) “while the machine-or-transformation test has always been 
a ‘useful and important clue,’ it has never been the ‘sole test’ for determining 
patentability”; and (4) “although the machine-or-transformation test is not the only test 
for patentability, this by no means indicates that anything which produces a ‘useful, 
concrete and tangible result’ is patentable.”  
6. The Bilski-Mayo-Myriad-Alice quartet has had a massive impact on patent practice. 
Eligibility challenges are much more commonly raised and much more commonly 
successful, especially in the wake of Alice. According to one study, in the two years before 
Alice, only 26 patents were challenged on § 101 grounds, with 32.1% of those challenges 
succeeding; in the 32 months after Alice, 324 patents were challenged—a more than ten-
fold increase—with 41.6% of those challenges succeeding. Software patents have come 
under particular scrutiny. The same study found that 201 of 325 software patents 
challenged between June 2014 and February 2017 were deemed ineligible. The two next 
most-commonly challenged fields of technology, communications and business methods, 
have significant overlaps with software. Patents in those fields were deemed ineligible in 
184 of 283 challenges. All other fields combined to produce 64 ineligibility results in 121 
challenges. For more details on this study and a broader assessment of the impacts of Alice 
and the Court’s other recent eligibility cases, see Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Peter S. Menell, & David 
O. Taylor, Final Report of the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology Section 101 Workshop: 
Addressing Patent Eligibility Challenges, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 551 (2018). For just some of 
the literature spawned by the quartet, see Symposium, The Meaning of Myriad, 5 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 973 (2015); Symposium, Cracking the Code: Ongoing Section 101 Patentability 
Concerns in Biotechnology and Computer Software, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1751 (2014); 
Symposium, The Future of Patents: Bilski and Beyond, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1245 (2011). 
7. The Supreme Court has repeatedly focused on “preemption” in its justifications 
for the patentable subject matter requirement: 
We have described the concern that drives this exclusionary principle as one of 
pre-emption. Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are the basic 
tools of scientific and technological work. Monopolization of those tools through 
the grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to 
promote it, thereby thwarting the primary object of the patent laws. We have 
repeatedly emphasized this . . . concern that patent law not inhibit further 
discovery by improperly tying up the future use of these building blocks of human 
ingenuity. 
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Alice, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). We might wonder when and why preemption is 
undesirable. Although the Court states that granting exclusivity in “the basic tools of 
scientific and technological work” could “impede innovation,” the same might be said of 
patent exclusivity for all kinds of inventions, not just “the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work.” In other words, the public good justification for the patent system 
posits that there is a general tradeoff between the dynamic benefits of increased incentives 
and the static costs of reduced access. What, then, makes laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas different? 
One common view is that the preemption concern arises from the possibility that laws 
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas have a systematically broader impact on 
downstream innovation than do the kinds of things that fall within the scope of patentable 
subject matter. The intuition is that the kinds of things that are excluded are frequently 
used as the foundation for subsequent innovations and that they rarely have independent 
(commercial?) value. Think of E = mc2 and all manner of nuclear-related technology 
power; the former is a law of nature that is used as the foundation for developing 
technologies that depend on the energy contained in an atom. 
But this explanation does not fit well with some of the actual disputes that the Court 
has confronted. For example, Mayo deemed the correlation between thiopurine 
metabolites and drug efficacy/toxicity to be an unpatentable law of nature. But that 
correlation doesn’t seem likely to be the foundation for a wide array of subsequent 
innovation; instead, it seems to be limited to helping the set of patients who take these 
thiopurine drugs. As Katherine Strandburg argues, 
The preemption rhetoric is a red herring. A sole focus on broad downstream 
impact is unsatisfactory, both as a theoretical matter and as an explanation of the 
Supreme Court’s patentable subject matter jurisprudence. Most of the Court’s 
patentable subject matter decisions rely, instead, on the fact that the claims at issue 
incorporate subject matter that is deemed per se excluded from patentability. Their 
outcomes turn, not on overbreadth, but on determining whether the inventor’s 
application of per se unpatentable elements is sufficiently inventive to traverse the 
boundary between unpatentable and patentable terrain. Current doctrinal and 
theoretical shortcomings and confusion are exacerbated by attempts to shoehorn 
this type of analysis into a misunderstood preemption mold. 
Katherine J. Strandburg, Much Ado About Preemption, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 563, 566 (2012). This 
still leaves the question of why certain subject matter is “per se excluded from 
patentability.” Id. For some plausible explanations, see Tun-Jen Chiang, Competing Visions 
of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1858 (2014) (arguing that normative 
values, like those related to freedom of thought and the dignity of the human body, justify 
patentable subject matter exclusions better than do economic concerns arising from the 
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monopoly costs associated with patent exclusivity); Emily Michiko Morris, Intuitive 
Patenting, 66 S. CAROLINA L. REV. 61 (2014) (arguing that there is no “objective criteria” for 
determining whether certain subject matter should be excluded and that, instead, courts 
should simply rely on intuition to draw the boundary between patentable and 
unpatentable subject matter). 
8. The patentable subject matter inquiry appears to require the resolution of some 
potential factual disputes. For example, the parties might dispute what is “conventional” 
or “well known in the art.” Despite this possibility, courts have frequently granted 
motions to dismiss complaints on the basis that the asserted claims covered only ineligible 
subject matter. Is it appropriate for them to do so? Or should parties have at least an 
opportunity to engage in discovery before the court decides whether the claims are 
ineligible? 
B. Patentable Subject Matter: How Did We Get Here? 
The origin of patentable subject matter is generally traced to a pair of cases: Neilson v. 
Harford and Le Roy v. Tatham. Neilson, decided in England, was the first to set (or at least, 
to appear to set) some boundaries on the kinds of innovations that can be patented. Le Roy 
then brought those boundaries to America. 
The patent in Neilson related to furnaces. Furnaces of various kinds had been used for 
millennia. To maintain the extremely high temperatures required for melting metal, 
furnaces need both fuel (e.g., coal) and air. Bellows were used to blow air into furnaces 
and engineers had noticed that these furnaces appeared to work better in the winter. This 
led to the view that the air blown into the furnace should be as cold as possible. The patent 
in Neilson, meanwhile, described heating the air before blowing it into the furnace. From 
the patent’s specification: 
A blast or current of air must be produced by bellows or other blowing apparatus, 
in the ordinary way, to which mode of producing the blast or current of air this 
patent is not intended to extend. The blast or current of air so produced is to be 
passed from the bellows or blowing apparatus into an air-vessel or receptacle, 
made sufficiently strong to endure the blast, and from that vessel or receptacle, by 
means of a tube, pipe, or aperture, into the fire, forge, or furnace. The vessel or 
receptacle must be air-tight, or nearly so, except the apertures for the admission 
and emission of the air; and at the commencement and during the continuance of 
the blast, it must be kept artificially heated to a considerable temperature. It is 
better that the temperature be kept to a red heat, or nearly so; but so high a 
temperature is not absolutely necessary to produce a beneficial effect. The air-
vessel or receptacle may be conveniently made of iron, but as the effect does not 
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depend upon the nature of the material, other metals or convenient materials may 
be used. The size of the air-vessel must depend upon the blast, and upon the heat 
necessary to be produced. For an ordinary smith’s fire or forge, an air-vessel or 
receptacle capable of containing 1200 cubic inches will be of proper dimensions; 
and for a cupola of the usual size for cast-iron founders, an air-vessel capable of 
containing 10,000 cubic inches will be of a proper size. . . . The form or shape of the 
vessel or receptacle is immaterial to the effect, and may be adapted to the local 
circumstances or situation. The air-vessel may generally be conveniently heated 
by a fire distinct from the fire to be affected by the blast or current of air; and 
generally, it will be better that the air-vessel, and the fire by which it is heated, 
should be inclosed in brick-work or masonry, through which the pipes or tubes 
connected with the air-vessel should pass. The manner of applying the heat to the 
air-vessel is, however, immaterial to the effect, if it be kept at a proper temperature. 
The defendant raised a variety of objections to the patent’s validity. Some of these 
appeared to raise questions about the adequacy of the patent’s description of the 
invention, others about the nature of the invention itself: 
[T]he alleged invention is not the subject of a patent, because it claims a principle: 
that the terms in which the subject of the patent is described, viz. “an invention for 
the improved application of air to produce heat in fires, forges, and furnaces, 
where bellows and other blowing apparatus are required,” are ambiguous, and it 
is doubtful whether the patent is for the invention of the application of hot air, or 
only for an improved mode of applying hot air: . . . that the said specification, so 
far as it can be understood as descriptive of an apparatus for forming and 
supplying hot air, describes an apparatus which does not answer the purpose: that 
the said specification is invalid on account of its general vagueness: . . . 
The plaintiff responded: 
It has been suggested that this is a patent merely for a principle; but that is not so; 
it is a patent for the mode of carrying a principle into effect. The mode of heating 
air and increasing combustion was known before; this patent is taken out for the 
novel application of air so heated to certain useful purposes—for passing the air 
in a heated state instead of a cold state as formerly, into furnaces; and the mode of 
operation is by interposing a closed vessel, exposed to heat, between the blowing 
apparatus and the furnace. 
As you read the case, bear in mind that the technology at issue was no minor thing; 
improvements to furnaces were crucial drivers of the Industrial Revolution, providing 
iron in the suddenly massive quantities required by a vast array of novel devices. 
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Neilson v. Harford 
151 E.R. 1266 (1841) 
The judgment of the Court was now delivered by Parke, B.  
[The Court first evaluated whether the construction of the specification was a question 
for the jury or the judge. Concluding that the judge was responsible, the Court went on to 
construe the specification.]  
Then, taking the construction of this specification on ourselves, . . . it becomes 
necessary to examine what the nature of the invention is which the plaintiff has disclosed 
by this instrument. It is very difficult to distinguish it from the specification of a patent for 
a principle, and this at first created in the minds of some of the Court much difficulty; but, 
after full consideration, we think that the plaintiff does not merely claim a principle, but 
a machine embodying a principle, and a very valuable one. We think the case must be 
considered as if, the principle being well known, the plaintiff had first invented a mode 
of applying it by a mechanical apparatus to furnaces; and his invention then consists in 
this—the interposing a receptacle for heated air between the blowing apparatus and the 
furnace. In this receptacle he directs the air to be heated, by the application of heat 
externally to the receptacle, and thus he accomplishes the object of applying the blast, 
which before was of cold air, in a heated state to the furnace. 
Now in this specification, after stating that air heated up to a red heat may be used, 
but that it is not necessary to go so far to produce a beneficial effect, he proceeds to state 
that the size of the receptacle will depend on the blast necessary for the furnace, and gives 
directions as to that; and then he adds, the shape of the receptacle “is immaterial to the 
effect, and may be adapted to local circumstances.” It is this part of the specification which 
has raised the difficulty. At the trial I construed this passage as meaning that the shape 
was immaterial to the degree of effect in heating the blast; and if this were so, the jury 
having, by their finding, negatived the truth and accuracy of this statement, the 
specification would be bad, as containing a false statement in a material circumstance, of 
a nature that, if literally acted upon by a competent workman, it would mislead him, and 
cause the experiment to fail. Nor do we think that the point contended for by Sir W. Follett, 
that if a man acquainted with the process of heating air were employed, the mis-statement 
could not mislead him, would at all relieve the plaintiff from the difficulty; for this would 
be to support the specification by a fresh invention and correction by a scientific person; 
and no authority can be found that, in such a case, a specification would be good. To be 
valid, we think it should be such as, if fairly followed out by a competent workman, 
without invention or addition, would produce the machine for which a patent is taken 
out, and that such machine, so constructed, must be one beneficial to the public. 
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. . . 
The word “effect” occurs four times in this specification; and it is a just rule of 
construction, to judge of the meaning of a particular phrase by taking the whole 
instrument together. In the first sentence, the patentee, speaking of the temperature being 
so high as that of a red heat, adds, “that so high a temperature is not absolutely necessary 
to produce a beneficial effect;” then he adds, that the receptacle may be made of iron, “but 
as the effect does not depend upon the nature of the material, other metals or convenient 
materials may be used.” Here he cannot mean that all metals, or convenient materials, will 
equally be heated by the application of external fire, for some heat more easily, and others 
more slowly; but he means that the quantity of the heated air, whether heated in an air-
vessel or any other (if heated at a proper temperature), will not materially alter the 
beneficial effect on the furnace to which it is applied. “Effect” here, then, is equivalent to 
a beneficial effect; and the sense of the passage is this,—“but as the effect, to be a beneficial 
effect, does not depend on the nature of the material,” and so forth. The same is, we think, 
obviously the meaning of the word “effect,” in the concluding sentence of the 
specification—“the manner of applying the heat to the air-vessel is, however, immaterial 
to the effect, if it be kept at a proper temperature;” in other words, the effect will be a 
beneficial effect on the furnace, whatever be the manner in which you apply heat to the 
air-vessel, provided only that you so apply it as to raise its temperature sufficiently. Then 
if so, it is not unreasonable, we think, to construe the word “effect,” in the sentence on 
which this question turns, in a similar way, and to hold it to mean an assertion by the 
patentee, that though the size of the vessel must be regulated as directed, yet the shape of 
the air-vessel is immaterial to the effect; that is to say, any shape will produce a beneficial 
effect, and may be adapted to local circumstances. Now if this be so, still it casts upon him 
the necessity of proving, to the satisfaction of the jury, that any shape in which the air-
vessel could reasonably be expected to be made by a competent workman, would produce 
a beneficial effect, and be a valuable discovery. On the present occasion we are bound, as 
to this point, by the finding of the jury, who have arrived at this conclusion of fact; and if 
they are right, we think the verdict was not correctly entered for the defendants on this 
4th issue, but that it should have been entered for the plaintiffs. . . . 
Le Roy v. Tatham 
55 U.S. 156 (1852) 
Mr. Justice McLEAN delivered the opinion of the court. . . . 
[John and Charles Hanson were the named inventors on a patent, which they assigned 
to Henry and Benjamin Tatham. The Tathams assigned an undivided third of the patent 
to George Tatham. The Tathams then sued Le Roy and others] to recover damages for an 
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alleged infringement of a patent for new and useful improvements in machinery for 
making pipes and tubes from metallic substances. 
. . . 
The schedule, which is annexed to the patent, and forms a part of it, states that the 
invention consists “in certain improvements upon, and additions to, the machinery used 
for manufacturing pipes and tubes from lead or tin, or an alloy of soft metals capable of 
being forced, by great pressure, from out of a receiver, through or between apertures, dies, 
and cores, when in a set or solid state,” . . . the patentees say, “Pipes thus made are found 
to possess great solidity and unusual strength, and a fine uniformity of thickness and 
accuracy of bore is arrived at, [which], it is believed, has never before been attained by 
any other machinery.” 
“The essential difference in the character of this pipe, which distinguishes it . . . from 
all other heretofore known or attempted, is that it is wrought under heat, by pressure and 
constriction, from set metal; . . . it is not a casting formed in a mould.” 
. . . “We do not claim as our invention and improvement, any of the parts of the above-
described machinery, independently of its arrangement and combination above set forth. 
What we do claim as our invention, and desire to secure, is, the combination of the 
following parts above described, to wit: the core and bridge, or guide-piece, with the 
cylinder, the piston, the chamber and the die, when used to form pipes of metal, under 
heat and pressure, in the manner set forth, or in any other manner substantially the same.” 
The plaintiffs gave in evidence . . . tending to prove . . . “that the lead pipe 
manufactured thereby, was superior in quality and strength, capable of resisting much 
greater pressure, and more free from defects than any pipe before made; that in all the 
modes of making lead pipe, previously known and in use, it could be made only in short 
pieces, but that by this improved mode it could be made of any required length, and also 
of any required size; . . . .” 
“And the plaintiffs also gave evidence tending to prove that lead, when recently 
become set, and while under heat and extreme pressure in a close vessel, would reunite 
perfectly, after a separation of its parts; and that in the process described in the said patent, 
lead pipe was manufactured by being thus separated and reunited . . . .” 
. . . 
The word principle is used by elementary writers on patent subjects, and sometimes in 
adjudications of courts, with such a want of precision in its application, as to mislead. It 
is admitted, that a principle is not patentable. A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental 
truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either 
of them an exclusive right. Nor can an exclusive right exist to a new power, should one be 
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discovered in addition to those already known. Through the agency of machinery a new 
steam power may be said to have been generated. But no one can appropriate this power 
exclusively to himself, under the patent laws. The same may be said of electricity, and of 
any other power in nature, which is alike open to all, and may be applied to useful 
purposes by the use of machinery. 
In all such cases, the processes used to extract, modify, and concentrate natural 
agencies, constitute the invention. The elements of the power exist; the invention is not in 
discovering them, but in applying them to useful objects. Whether the machinery used be 
novel, or consist of a new combination of parts known, the right of the inventor is secured 
against all who use the same mechanical power, or one that shall be substantially the 
same. 
A patent is not good for an effect, or the result of a certain process, as that would 
prohibit all other persons from making the same thing by any means whatsoever. This, by 
creating monopolies, would discourage arts and manufactures, against the avowed policy 
of the patent laws. 
A new property discovered in matter, when practically applied, in the construction of 
a useful article of commerce or manufacture, is patentable; but the process through which 
the new property is developed and applied, must be stated, with such precision as to 
enable an ordinary mechanic to construct and apply the necessary process. This is 
required by the patent laws of England and of the United States, in order that when the 
patent shall run out, the public may know how to profit by the invention. It is said, in . . . 
Househill Company v. Neilson, Webster’s Patent Cases, 683, “A patent will be good, though 
the subject of the patent consists in the discovery of a great, general, and most 
comprehensive principle in science or law of nature, if that principle is by the specification 
applied to any special purpose, so as thereby to effectuate a practical result and benefit 
not previously attained.” In that case, Mr. Justice Clerk . . . said, “the specification does 
not claim any thing as to the form, nature, shape, materials, numbers, or mathematical 
character of the vessel or vessels in which the air is to be heated, or as to the mode of 
heating such vessels,” &c. The patent was for “the improved application of air to produce 
heat in fires, forges and furnaces, where bellows or other blowing apparatus are 
required.” 
In that case, although the machinery was not claimed as a part of the invention, the 
jury were instructed to inquire, “whether the specification was not such as to enable 
workmen of ordinary skill to make machinery or apparatus capable of producing the 
effect set forth in said letters-patent and specification.” [I]n order to ascertain whether the 
defendants had infringed the patent, the jury should inquire whether they [used] 
“machinery or apparatus substantially the same with the machinery or apparatus 
described in the plaintiffs’ specification, and to the effect set forth in said letters-patent 
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and specification.” So it would seem that where a patent is obtained, without a claim to 
the invention of the machinery, through which a valuable result is produced, a precise 
specification is required; and the test of infringement is, whether the defendants have used 
substantially the same process to produce the same result. 
In the case before us, the court instructed the jury that the invention did not consist 
“in the novelty of the machinery, but in bringing a newly discovered principle into 
practical application, by which a useful article of manufacture is produced, and wrought 
pipe made as distinguished from cast pipe.” 
A patent for leaden pipes would not be good, as it would be for an effect, and would, 
consequently, prohibit all other persons from using the same article, however 
manufactured. Leaden pipes are the same, the metal being in no respect different. Any 
difference in form and strength must arise from the mode of manufacturing the pipes. The 
new property in the metal claimed to have been discovered by the patentees, belongs to 
the process of manufacture, and not to the thing made. 
But we must look to the claim of the invention stated in their application by the 
patentees. They say, “We do not claim as our invention and improvement any of the parts 
of the above described machinery, independently of their arrangement and combination 
above set forth.” “What we claim as our invention . . . is, the combination of the following 
parts above described, to wit, the core and bridge or guide-piece, the chamber, and the 
die, when used to form pipes of metal, under heat and pressure, in the manner set forth, 
or in any other manner substantially the same.” 
The patentees have founded their claim on this specification, and they can neither 
modify nor abandon it in whole or in part. The combination of the machinery is claimed, 
through which the new property of lead was developed, as a part of the process in the 
structure of the pipes. But the jury were instructed, “that the originality of the invention 
did not consist in the novelty of the machinery, but in bringing a newly discovered 
principle into practical application.” The patentees claimed the combination of the 
machinery as their invention in part, and no such claim can be sustained without 
establishing its novelty—not as to the parts of which it is composed, but as to the 
combination. The question whether the newly developed property of lead, used in the 
formation of pipes, might have been patented, if claimed as developed, without the 
invention of machinery, was not in the case. 
. . . 
We think there was error in the above instruction, that the novelty of the combination 
of the machinery, specifically claimed by the patentees as their invention, was not a 
material fact for the jury, and that on that ground, the judgment must be reversed. The 
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other rulings of the court excepted to, we shall not examine, as they are substantially 
correct. 
Context and Application 
1.  Neilson and Le Roy are often relied upon as the earliest patentable subject matter 
cases. Can you apply the Alice two-step analysis to the inventions in those cases? From 
what you read of the patent documents in those cases, which were quite different from 
the patents you would read today, do you think the claims were “directed to” potentially 
ineligible subject matter? If so, can you identify an “inventive application” that would 
save the claims? 
2. The Supreme Court has taken to citing Neilson and Le Roy as support for its 
“inventive application” requirement. In the modern framework, that requirement has 
been relied on to reject claims that engage in “well-understood, routine, conventional 
activities.” Alice, 573 U.S. 208, 225 (2014). The idea appears to be that the discovery of a 
law of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract idea is insufficient to sustain a claim; 
instead, the patent system demands that the claim reflect some additional innovative 
contribution. But the discussion of patenting “principles” in Neilson and Le Roy appears 
to point in a different direction. Rather than requiring that the claim incorporate some 
innovation in addition to the ineligible subject matter, those cases seem to demand that 
the specification render it relatively straightforward for a skilled artisan to apply the 
ineligible subject matter to achieve a useful result. In other words, the concern expressed 
in the cases is that the specification enable the practical use of the ineligible subject matter. 
This contrasts with the modern demand that the specification reveal some innovation 
above and beyond the ineligible subject matter. For more on this reading of Neilson and 
Le Roy, as well as the subsequent development of the inventive application requirement, 
see Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Inventive Application: A History, 67 FLA. L. REV. 565 (2015). 
x x x 
In addition to Neilson and Le Roy, one more mid-1800s decision continues to play a 
prominent role in contemporary patentable subject matter jurisprudence: O’Reilly 
v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853). The case involved Samuel Morse’s efforts to patent his 
contributions to the development of the telegraph.  Before evaluating the claim, the Court 
noted “the first fact of electro-magnetism was discovered by Oersted, of Copenhagen,” in 
the winter of 1819-20.  Although “men of science” believed that “this newly-discovered 
power might be used to communicate intelligence to distant places,” they faced a 
significant obstacle: 
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The great difficulty in their way was the fact that the galvanic current, however 
strong in the beginning, became gradually weaker as it advanced on the wire; and 
was not strong enough to produce a mechanical effect, after a certain distance had 
been traversed. But, encouraged by the discoveries which were made from time to 
time, and strong in the belief that an electro-magnetic telegraph was practicable, 
many eminent and scientific men in Europe, as well as in this country, became 
deeply engaged in endeavoring to surmount what appeared to be the chief 
obstacle to its success. 
The excerpt below focuses on the Court’s analysis of claim 8 of Morse’s patent. Pay 
attention not only to the grounds on which the Court thinks the claim is vulnerable but 
also the Court’s understanding of the bases for decision in Neilson and Le Roy. 
O’Reilly v. Morse 
56 U.S. 62 (1853) 
Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the court. 
[After rejecting other arguments for invalidating all of Morse’s claims, the Court said 
that “the difficulty arises on” claim 8, specifically with the following language]: 
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts of machinery 
described in the foregoing specification and claims; the essence of my invention 
being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call 
electro-magnetism, however developed for marking or printing intelligible 
characters, signs, or letters, at any distances, being a new application of that power 
of which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer. 
It is impossible to misunderstand the extent of this claim. He claims the exclusive right to 
every improvement where the motive power is the electric or galvanic current, and the 
result is the marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters at a distance. 
If this claim can be maintained, it matters not by what process or machinery the result 
is accomplished. For aught that we now know some future inventor, in the onward march 
of science, may discover a mode of writing or printing at a distance by means of the electric 
or galvanic current, without using any part of the process or combination set forth in the 
plaintiff’s specification. His invention may be less complicated—less liable to get out of 
order—less expensive in construction, and in its operation. But yet if it is covered by this 
patent the inventor could not use it, nor the public have the benefit of it without the 
permission of this patentee. 
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Nor is this all, while he shuts the door against inventions of other persons, the patentee 
would be able to avail himself of new discoveries in the properties and powers of electro-
magnetism which scientific men might bring to light. For he says he does not confine his 
claim to the machinery or parts of machinery, which he specifies; but claims for himself a 
monopoly in its use, however developed, for the purpose of printing at a distance. New 
discoveries in physical science may enable him to combine it with new agents and new 
elements, and by that means attain the object in a manner superior to the present process 
and altogether different from it. And if he can secure the exclusive use by his present 
patent he may vary it with every new discovery and development of the science, and need 
place no description of the new manner, process, or machinery, upon the records of the 
patent office. And when his patent expires, the public must apply to him to learn what it 
is. In fine he claims an exclusive right to use a manner and process which he has not 
described and indeed had not invented, and therefore could not describe when he 
obtained his patent. The court is of opinion that the claim is too broad, and not warranted 
by law. 
. . . 
[The Court then turned to Neilson, the hot-blast furnaces patent case:] 
[T]he defendant . . . insisted—that the machinery for heating the air and throwing it 
hot into the furnace was not sufficiently described in the specification, and the patent void 
on that account—and also, that a patent for throwing hot air into the furnace, instead of 
cold, and thereby increasing the intensity of the heat, was a patent for a principle, and that 
a principle was not patentable. 
Upon the first of these defences, the jury found that a man of ordinary skill and 
knowledge of the subject, looking at the specification alone, could construct such an 
apparatus as would be productive of a beneficial result, sufficient to make it worth while 
to adapt it to the machinery in all cases of forges, cupolas, and furnaces, where the blast 
is used. 
And upon the second ground of defence, Baron Parke, who delivered the opinion of 
the court, said: 
It is very difficult to distinguish it from the specification of a patent for a principle, 
and this at first created in the minds of the court much difficulty; but after full 
consideration we think that the plaintiff does not merely claim a principle, but a 
machine, embodying a principle, and a very valuable one. We think the case must 
be considered as if the principle being well known, the plaintiff had first invented 
a mode of applying it by a mechanical apparatus to furnaces, and his invention 
then consists in this: by interposing a receptacle for heated air between the blowing 
apparatus and the furnace. In this receptacle he directs the air to be heated by the 
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application of heat externally to the receptacle, and thus he accomplishes the object 
of applying the blast, which was before cold air, in a heated state to the furnace. 
We see nothing in this opinion differing in any degree from the familiar principles of law 
applicable to patent cases. Neilson claimed no particular mode of constructing the 
receptacle, or of heating it. He pointed out the manner in which it might be done; but 
admitted that it might also be done in a variety of ways; and at a higher or lower 
temperature; and that all of them would produce the effect in a greater or less degree, 
provided the air was heated by passing through a heated receptacle. And hence it seems 
that the court at first doubted, whether it was a patent for any thing more than the 
discovery that hot air would promote the ignition of fuel better than cold. And if this had 
been the construction, the court, it appears, would have held his patent to be void; because 
the discovery of a principle in natural philosophy or physical science, is not patentable. 
But after much consideration, it was finally decided that this principle must be 
regarded as well known, and that the plaintiff had invented a mechanical mode of 
applying it to furnaces; and that his invention consisted in interposing a heated receptacle, 
between the blower and the furnace, and by this means heating the air after it left the 
blower, and before it was thrown into the fire. Whoever, therefore, used this method of 
throwing hot air into the furnace, used the process he had invented, and thereby infringed 
his patent, although the form of the receptacle or the mechanical arrangements for heating 
it, might be different from those described by the patentee. For whatever form was 
adopted for the receptacle, or whatever mechanical arrangements were made for heating 
it, the effect would be produced in a greater or less degree, if the heated receptacle was 
placed between the blower and the furnace, and the current of air passed through it. 
. . . [H]is patent was supported, because he had invented a mechanical apparatus, by 
which a current of hot air, instead of cold, could be thrown in. And this new method was 
protected by his patent. The interposition of a heated receptacle, in any form, was the 
novelty he invented. 
We do not perceive how the claim in the case before us, can derive any countenance 
from this decision. If the Court of Exchequer had said that Neilson’s patent was for the 
discovery, that hot air would promote ignition better than cold, and that he had an 
exclusive right to use it for that purpose, there might, perhaps, have been some reason to 
rely upon it. But the court emphatically denied this right to such a patent. And his claim, 
as the patent was construed and supported by the court, is altogether unlike that of the 
patentee before us. 
For Neilson discovered, that by interposing a heated receptacle between the blower 
and the furnace, and conducting the current of air through it, the heat in the furnace was 
increased. And this effect was always produced, whatever might be the form of the 
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receptacle, or the mechanical contrivances for heating it, or for passing the current of air 
through it, and into the furnace. 
But Professor Morse has not discovered, that the electric or galvanic current will 
always print at a distance, no matter what may be the form of the machinery or mechanical 
contrivances through which it passes. You may use electro-magnetism as a motive power, 
and yet not produce the described effect, that is, print at a distance intelligible marks or 
signs. To produce that effect, it must be combined with, and passed through, and operate 
upon, certain complicated and delicate machinery, adjusted and arranged upon 
philosophical principles, and prepared by the highest mechanical skill. And it is the high 
praise of Professor Morse, that he has been able, by a new combination of known powers, 
of which electro-magnetism is one, to discover a method by which intelligible marks or 
signs may be printed at a distance. And for the method or process thus discovered, he is 
entitled to a patent. But he has not discovered that the electro-magnetic current, used as 
motive power, in any other method, and with any other combination, will do as well. 
[The Court then turned to Leroy v. Tatham:] [T]he patentee had discovered that lead, 
recently set, would, under heat and pressure in a close vessel, reunite perfectly, after a 
separation of its parts, so as to make wrought, instead of cast pipe. And the court held 
that he was not entitled to a patent for this newly-discovered principle or quality in lead; 
and that such a discovery was not patentable. But that he was entitled to a patent for the 
new process or method in the art of making lead pipe, which this discovery enabled him 
to invent and employ; and was bound to describe such process or method, fully, in his 
specification. 
. . . 
Indeed, independently of judicial authority, we do not think that the language used in 
the act of Congress, can justly be expounded otherwise. 
The 5th section of the act of 1836, declares that a patent shall convey to the inventor 
for a term not exceeding fourteen years, the exclusive right of making, using, and vending 
to others to be used, his invention or discovery; referring to the specification for the 
particulars thereof. 
The 6th section  . . . provides that any person shall be entitled to a patent who has 
discovered or invented a new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter; or a new and useful improvement on any previous discovery in either of them. 
But before he receives a patent, he shall deliver a written description of his invention or 
discovery, “and of the manner and process of making, constructing, using, and 
compounding the same,” in such exact terms at to enable any person skilled in the art or 
science to which it appertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make, 
construct, compound, and use the same. 
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This court has decided, that the specification required by this law is a part of the 
patent; and that the patent issues for the invention described in the specification. 
Now whether the Telegraph is regarded as an art or machine, the manner and process 
of making or using it must be set forth in exact terms. The act of Congress makes no 
difference in this respect between an art and a machine. An improvement in the art of 
making bar iron or spinning cotton must be so described; and so must the art of printing 
by the motive power of steam. And in all of these cases it has always been held, that the 
patent embraces nothing more than the improvement described and claimed as new, and 
that any one who afterwards discovered a method of accomplishing the same object, 
substantially and essentially differing from the one described, had a right to use it. Can 
there be any good reason why the art of printing at a distance, by means of the motive 
power of the electric or galvanic current, should stand on different principles? Is there any 
reason why the inventor’s patent should cover broader ground? It would be difficult to 
discover any thing in the act of Congress which would justify this distinction. The 
specification of this patentee describes his invention or discovery, and the manner and 
process of constructing and using it; and his patent, like inventions in the other arts above 
mentioned, covers nothing more. 
The provisions of the acts of Congress in relation to patents may be summed up in a 
few words. 
Whoever discovers that a certain useful result will be produced, in any art, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, by the use of certain means, is entitled to a patent 
for it; provided he specifies the means he uses in a manner so full and exact, that any one 
skilled in the science to which it appertains, can, by using the means he specifies, without 
any addition to, or subtraction from them, produce precisely the result he describes. And 
if this cannot be done by the means he describes, the patent is void. And if it can be done, 
then the patent confers on him the exclusive right to use the means he specifies to produce 
the result or effect he describes, and nothing more. And it makes no difference, in this 
respect, whether the effect is produced . . . by the application of discoveries or principles 
in natural philosophy known or unknown before his invention . . . . In either case he must 
describe the manner and process as above mentioned, and the end it accomplishes. And 
any one may lawfully accomplish the same end without infringing the patent, if he uses 
means substantially different from those described. 
Indeed, if the eighth claim of the patentee can be maintained, there was no necessity 
for any specification, further than to say that he had discovered that, by using the motive 
power of electro-magnetism, he could print intelligible characters at any distance. We 
presume it will be admitted on all hands, that no patent could have issued on such a 
specification. Yet this claim can derive no aid from the specification filed. It is outside of 
it, and the patentee claims beyond it. And if it stands, it must stand simply on the ground 
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that the broad terms abovementioned were a sufficient description, and entitled him to a 
patent in terms equally broad. In our judgment the act of Congress cannot be so construed. 
The patent then being illegal and void, so far as respects the eighth claim . . . . 
x x x 
While the earliest patentable subject matter cases involved inventions in the physical 
and mechanical fields, innovations arising from advancements in biology have 
consistently presented some of the thorniest eligibility problems. The next pair of cases, 
Parke-Davis v. H.K Mulford and Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., introduce some 
persistent themes regarding the relationship between what is claimed and what is, in 
some sense, found in nature. 
Parke-Davis v. H.K. Mulford 
189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y 1911) 
HAND, District Judge. 
I will first take up the consideration of [Patent] No. 730,176. . . . 
The anticipations I will deal with first, because, in the view which I have taken of the 
two patents, that is the simpler consideration. The patentee originally attempted to claim 
the active principle itself. This was in his first application where he claimed process and 
product; but the examiner would not allow these claims, basing his rejection upon his 
interpretation of American Wood Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 23 Wall. 566, that no 
product is patentable, . . . which is merely separated by the patentee from its surrounding 
materials and remains unchanged. After some argument upon this score, the patentee 
voluntarily divided out the product patents expressing such intention on December 22, 
1902. When he came to file his product patent, he proceeded upon the same theory, first 
claiming the active principle of the glands. The examiner required a division, but raised 
no objection to the form in which these claims were given. In his amendment of March 13, 
1903, which was about two months after his first application, he changed all the claims so 
that they read substantially as they do at present and were not limited to the active 
principle. I think that this effected a substantial change in meaning, and that the defendant 
is right in insisting that the claims are now broader than a mere claim for the chemically 
free base, or active principle, and that they cover any substance which possesses the 
physiological characteristics of the glands and is substantially pure. By doing this, 
Takamine threfore laid himself open to any anticipation which was a substance of that 
character, even though the substance did not contain the chemically pure base. 
 CHAPTER 3  
108 
. . . Nevertheless, as I have already said, the claims of patent No. 730,176 do not cover 
a salt and are especially designed to exclude a salt. It so happens, moreover, that all of 
four alleged anticipating products never existed except in the form of a salt. . . . the only 
necessary question here is: Since they were not actually themselves bases, whether pure 
or impure, whether it involved invention to produce the base of Takamine. This question 
does not deserve any extended consideration. The difficulties of the old products were so 
great as made any substantial advance from them important. It is enough that Takamine 
was the first to isolate any base whatever, all other products existing in the form of a salt, 
because prior investigators were all trying to reduce the principle down as purely as 
possible. The invention was therefore novel. 
. . . 
Nor do any of the claims call for only an ‘effect.‘ That rule I understand to mean 
nothing more than that the claims must not be too abstract. I do not think that any of the 
claims in the patent are at all abstract, but each forms a concrete enough criterion to test 
the product intended. There is no claim which selects a single characteristic or function. 
The very phrase ‘physiological characteristics and reactions of the suprarenal glands‘ 
refers to some 15 lines of the specification (page 2, lines 102-116), and this phrase is always 
coupled with at least two other differentia. That is sufficient to identify the product in my 
judgment in every case. 
 Nor is the patent only for a degree of purity, and therefore not for a new ‘composition 
of matter.‘ As I have already shown, it does not include a salt, and no one had ever isolated 
a substance which was not in salt form, and which was anything like Takamine’s. Indeed, 
Sadtler supposes it to exist as a natural salt, and that the base was an original production 
of Takamine’s. That was a distinction not in degree, but in kind. But, even if it were merely 
an extracted product without change, there is no rule that such products are not 
patentable. Takamine was the first to make it available for any use by removing it from 
the other gland-tissue in which it was found, and, while it is of course possible logically 
to call this a purification of the principle, it became for every practical purpose a new thing 
commercially and therapeutically. That was a good ground for a patent. That the change 
here resulted in ample practical differences is fully proved. Everyone, not already 
saturated with scholastic distinctions, would recognize that Takamine’s crystals were not 
merely the old dried glands in a purer state, nor would his opinion change if he learned 
that the crystals were obtained from the glands by a process of eliminating the inactive 
organic substances. The line between different substances and degrees of the same 
substance is to be drawn rather from the common usages of men than from nice 
considerations of dialectic. 
. . . 
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Whatever confusion the intricacy of the subject-matter causes, one fact stands out, 
which no one ought fairly to forget. Before Takamine’s discovery the best experts were 
trying to get a practicable form of the active principle. The uses of the gland were so great 
that it became part of the usual therapy in the best form which was accessible. As soon as 
Takamine put out his discovery, other uses practically disappeared; by that I do not mean 
absolutely, but that the enormous proportion of use now is of Takamine’s products. . . . 
All this ought to count greatly for the validity of the patent, and Takamine has a great 
start, so to speak, from such facts. It is true that he overstates the degree of stability of his 
acid solution without any preservative. Strictly it is not in that form fit for sale about in 
drug stores where it may be kept for long even in a stoppered bottle; but commercial or 
practical stability is a somewhat elastic term, and this is a case where he should be entitled 
to a lenient construction, for he has been author of a valuable invention and has succeeded 
where the most expert have failed.  
Context and Application 
1. Which of the categories of ineligible subject matter were plausibly implicated by 
the claims in the ’176 patent: laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas? 
2. How did the court evaluate the relationship between the argument that the claims 
were anticipated (i.e., not novel) and the argument that the claims were invalid because 
they “call for only an ‘effect’”? Is the argument that “the patent [is] only for a degree of 
purity, and therefore not for a new ‘composition of matter’” an argument that the patent 
is anticipated or an argument that it claims ineligible subject matter? 
3. What is the “principle” to which the court refers? What about the “effect”? 
4. Judge Hand concluded his opinion in Parke-Davis with the following commentary 
on some persistent questions about the allocation of authority among institutions in the 
patent system: 
I cannot stop without calling attention to the extraordinary condition of the law 
which makes it possible for a man without any knowledge of even the rudiments 
of chemistry to pass upon such questions as these. The inordinate expense of time 
is the least of the resulting evils, for only a trained chemist is really capable of 
passing upon such facts, e.g., in this case the chemical character of Von Furth’s so-
called ‘zinc compound,‘ or the presence of inactive organic substances. In 
Germany, where the national spirit eagerly seeks for all the assistance it can get 
from the whole range of human knowledge, they do quite differently. The court 
summons technical judges to whom technical questions are submitted and who 
can intelligently pass upon the issues without blindly groping among testimony 
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upon matters wholly out of their ken. How long we shall continue to blunder along 
without the aid of unpartisan and authoritative scientific assistance in the 
administration of justice, no one knows; but all fair persons not conventionalized 
by provincial legal habits of mind ought, I should think, unite to effect some such 
advance. . . . 
189 F. at 115. Notwithstanding Judge Hand’s pleas, the U.S. patent system continues to 
rely on non-technically trained trial judges and juries to resolve most factual issues in 
patent law. Do you think this is desirable or should we adopt something like the German 
system, in which patent cases are heard by judges who have technical expertise in the 
subject matter of the patents? What are some of the tradeoffs involved? See Sapna Kumar, 
Judging Patents, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV. 871 (2021) (describing the use of technically 
qualified judges in European patent courts and comparing it to the practice of relying on 
technically trained experts to advise U.S. courts). At the appellate level, the U.S. patent 
system now has a specialized court, the Federal Circuit, that hears appeals in patent cases 
(as well as a few other designated kinds of cases). While many of the judges on that court 
have some kind of formal education in a scientific or technical field, not all do. Should 
they? Keep in mind the allocation of authority between trial and appellate courts on 
matters of fact and matters of law. Finally, how does Judge Hand’s closing lament 
compare to Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Myriad?  
5. For an analysis of the role that Parke-Davis played in the then-nascent embrace of 
patents by the pharmaceutical industry, as well as its more recent impact on gene patents, 
see Christopher Beauchamp, Patenting Nature: A Problem of History, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 
257 (2013).  
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. 
333 U.S. 127 (1948) 
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This is a patent infringement suit brought by respondent. The charge of infringement 
is limited to certain product claims of Patent No. 2,200,532 issued to Bond on May 14, 
1940.1 
1 The product claims in suit are 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, and 14. Claim 4 is illustrative 
of the invention which is challenged. It reads as follows: “An inoculant for 
leguminous plants comprising a plurality of selected mutually non-inhibitive 
strains of different species of bacteria of the genus Rhizobium, said strains being 
unaffected by each other in respect to their ability to fix nitrogen in the leguminous 
plant for which they are specific.” 
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. . . The question of validity is the only question presented by this petition for certiorari. 
Through some mysterious process leguminous plants are able to take nitrogen from 
the air and fix it in the plant for conversion to organic nitrogenous compounds. The ability 
of these plants to fix nitrogen from the air depends on the presence of bacteria of the genus 
Rhizobium which infect the roots of the plant and form nodules on them. These root-
nodule bacteria of the genus Rhizobium fall into at least six species. No one species will 
infect the roots of all species of leguminous plants. But each will infect well-defined 
groups of those plants. Each species of root-nodule bacteria is made up of distinct strains 
which vary in efficiency. Methods of selecting the strong strains and of producing a 
bacterial culture from them have long been known. The bacteria produced by the 
laboratory methods of culture are placed in a powder or liquid base and packaged for sale 
to and use by agriculturists in the inoculation of the seeds of leguminous plants. This also 
has long been well known. 
It was the general practice, prior to the Bond patent, to manufacture and sell inoculants 
containing only one species of root-nodule bacteria. The inoculant could therefore be used 
successfully only in plants of the particular cross-inoculation group corresponding to this 
species. Thus if a farmer had crops of clover, alfalfa, and soy beans he would have to use 
three separate inoculants. There had been a few mixed cultures for field legumes. But they 
had proved generally unsatisfactory because the different species of the Rhizobia bacteria 
produced an inhibitory effect on each other when mixed in a common base, with the result 
that their efficiency was reduced. Hence it had been assumed that the different species 
were mutually inhibitive. Bond discovered that there are strains of each species of root-
nodule bacteria which do not exert a mutually inhibitive effect on each other. He also 
ascertained that those mutually non-inhibitive strains can, by certain methods of selection 
and testing, be isolated and used in mixed cultures. Thus he provided a mixed culture of 
Rhizobia capable of inoculating the seeds of plants belonging to several cross-inoculation 
groups. It is the product claims which disclose that mixed culture that the Circuit Court 
of Appeals had held valid. 
 We do not have presented the question whether the methods of selecting and testing 
the non-inhibitive strains are patentable. We have here only product claims. Bond does 
not create state of inhibition or of non-inhibition in the bacteria. Their qualities are the 
work of nature. Those qualities are of course not patentable. For patents cannot issue for 
the discovery of the phenomena of nature. See Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175. The 
qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, are 
part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of laws of nature, 
free to all men and reserved exclusively to none. He who discovers a hitherto unknown 
phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there 
is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of 
 CHAPTER 3  
112 
nature to a new and useful end. The Circuit Court of Appeals thought that Bond did much 
more than discover a law of nature, since he made an new and different composition of 
non-inhibitive strains which contributed utility and economy to the manufacture and 
distribution of commercial inoculants. But we think that that aggregation of species fell 
short of invention within the meaning of the patent statutes. 
Discovery of the fact that certain strains of each species of these bacteria can be mixed 
without harmful effect to the properties of either is a discovery of their qualities of non-
inhibition. It is no more than the discovery of some of the handiwork of nature and hence 
is not patentable. The aggregation of select strains of the several species into one product 
is an application of that newly-discovered natural principle. But however ingenious the 
discovery of that natural principle may have been, the application of it is hardly more than 
an advance in the packaging of the inoculants. Each of the species of root-nodule bacteria 
contained in the package infects the same group of leguminous plants which it always 
infected. No species acquires a different use. The combination of species produces no new 
bacteria, no change in the six species of bacteria, and no enlargement of the range of their 
utility. Each species has the same effect it always had. The bacteria perform in their natural 
way. Their use in combination does not improve in any way their natural functioning. 
They serve the ends nature originally provided and act quite independently of any effort 
of the patentee. 
 There is, of course, an advantage in the combination. The farmer need not buy six 
different packages for six different crops. He can buy one package and use it for any or all 
of his crops of leguminous plants. And, as respondent says, the packages of mixed 
inoculants also hold advantages for the dealers and manufacturers by reducing inventory 
problems and the like. But a product must be more than new and useful to be patented; it 
must also satisfy the requirements of invention or discovery. Cuno Engineering Corp. 
v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 90, 91 (1941). The application of this newly-
discovered natural principle to the problem of packaging of inoculants may well have 
been an important commercial advance. But once nature’s secret of the non-inhibitive 
quality of certain strains of the species of Rhizobium was discovered, the state of the art 
made the production of a mixed inoculant a simple step. Even though it may have been 
the product of skill, it certainly was not the product of invention. There is no way in which 
we could call it such unless we borrowed invention from the discovery of the natural 
principle itself. That is to say, there is no invention here unless the discovery that certain 
strains of the several species of these bacteria are non-inhibitive and may thus be safely 
mixed is invention. But we cannot so hold without allowing a patent to issue on one of 
the ancient secrets of nature now disclosed. All that remains, therefore, are advantages of 
the mixed inoculants themselves. They are not enough. 
. . . Reversed. 
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Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, concurring. 
My understanding of Bond’s contribution is that prior to his attempts, packages of 
mixed cultures of inoculants presumably applicable to two or more different kinds of 
legumes had from time to time been prepared, but had met with indifferent success. The 
reasons for failure were not understood, but the authorities had concluded that in general 
pure culture inoculants were alone reliable because mixtures were ineffective due to the 
mutual inhibition of the combined strains of bacteria. Bond concluded that there might be 
special strains which lacked this mutual inhibition, or were at all events mutually 
compatible. Using techniques that had previously been developed to test efficiency in 
promoting nitrogen fixation of various bacterial strains, Bond tested such efficiency of 
various mixtures of strains. He confirmed his notion that some strains were mutually 
compatible . . . . 
If this is a correct analysis of Bond’s endeavors two different claims of originality are 
involved: (1) the idea that there are compatible strains, and (2) the experimental 
demonstration that there were in fact some compatible strains. . . . The strains by which 
Bond secured compatibility are not identified and are identifiable only by their 
compatibility. 
Unless I misconceive the record, Bond makes no claim that Funk Brothers used the 
same combination of strains that he had found mutually compatible. He appears to claim 
that since he was the originator of the idea that there might be mutually compatible strains 
and had practically demonstrated that some such strains exist, everyone else is forbidden 
to use a combination of strains whether they are or are not identical with the combinations 
that Bond selected and packaged together. . . . 
The consequences of such a conclusion call for its rejection. . . . 
It only confuses the issue, however, to introduce such terms as “the work of nature” 
and the “laws of nature.” For these are vague and malleable terms infected with too much 
ambiguity and equivocation. Everything that happens may be deemed “the work of 
nature,” and any patentable composite exemplifies in its properties “the laws of nature.” 
Arguments drawn from such terms for ascertaining patentability could fairly be 
employed to challenge almost every patent. On the other hand, the suggestion that “if 
there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the 
law of nature to a new and useful end” may readily validate Bond’s claim. Nor can it be 
contended that there was no invention because the composite has no new properties other 
than its ingredients in isolation. Bond’s mixture does in fact have the new property of 
multi-service applicability. Multi-purpose tools, multivalent vaccines, vitamin complex 
composites, are examples of complexes whose sole new property is the conjunction of the 
properties of their components. Surely the Court does not mean unwittingly to pass on 
 CHAPTER 3  
114 
the patentability of such products by formulating criteria by which future issues of 
patentability may be prejudged. In finding Bond’s patent invalid I have tried to avoid a 
formulation which, while it would in fact justify Bond’s patent, would lay the basis for 
denying patentability to a large area within existing patent legislation. 
Context and Application 
1. Although the Court has cited earlier decisions for the “inventive application” 
analysis, Jeffrey Lefstin argues that the “true origin of inventive application as a test for 
patent eligibility was Justice Douglas’s opinion in Funk Brothers.” Jeffrey A. Lefstin, 
Inventive Application: A History, 67 FLA. L. REV. 565, 624 (2015). Starting with a historical 
analysis of the early hot-blast cases, Lefstin concludes that Funk Brothers radically altered 
the law of patent eligibility by demanding that, when an inventor discovers a law of 
nature or natural phenomena, the patent must claim not merely “a practical application of 
the inventor’s discovery,” but instead “an inventive application” of that discovery. This 
heightened requirement prevented patents on straightforward applications of even 
remarkable discoveries. Id. at 628-31. 
2. Funk Brothers was also the first case in which the Court clearly articulated “laws of 
nature” and “natural phenomena” as distinct categories of prohibited subject matter. But 
what exactly is a law of nature or natural phenomenon? The boundaries between the 
“manmade” and “natural” worlds are not always sharply defined. See Jacob S. Sherkow, 
The Natural Complexity of Patent Eligibility, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1137 (2014) (urging more 
reliance on scientific and philosophical perspectives, especially those associated with the 
theory of natural complexity, to define “laws of nature” and “natural phenomena”). 
x x x  
Developments in computers, software, and related technologies have forced the 
patent system to consider claims with more attenuated connections to the material world. 
Two cases in particular, Parker v. Flook and Diamond v. Diehr, have become touchstones for 
navigating the waters between ineligible abstract ideas and eligible inventions. As you 
read these cases, consider how—if at all—you might be able to reconcile them.  
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Parker v. Flook 
437 U.S. 584 (1978) 
Mr. Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Respondent applied for a patent on a “Method for Updating Alarm Limits.” The only 
novel feature of the method is a mathematical formula. In Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 
(1972), we held that the discovery of a novel and useful mathematical formula may not be 
patented. The question in this case is whether the identification of a limited category of 
useful, though conventional, post-solution applications of such a formula makes 
respondent’s method eligible for patent protection. 
I 
An “alarm limit” is a number. During catalytic conversion processes, operating 
conditions such as temperature, pressure, and flow rates are constantly monitored. When 
any of these “process variables” exceeds a predetermined “alarm limit,” an alarm may 
signal the presence of an abnormal condition indicating either inefficiency or perhaps 
danger. Fixed alarm limits may be appropriate for a steady operation, but during transient 
operating situations, such as start-up, it may be necessary to “update” the alarm limits 
periodically. 
Respondent’s patent application describes a method of updating alarm limits. In 
essence, the method consists of three steps: an initial step which merely measures the 
present value of the process variable (e.g., the temperature); an intermediate step which 
uses an algorithm to calculate an updated alarm-limit value; and a final step in which the 
actual alarm limit is adjusted to the updated value. The only difference between the 
conventional methods of changing alarm limits and that described in respondent’s 
application rests in the second step—the mathematical algorithm or formula. . . . 
The patent application does not purport to explain how to select the appropriate 
margin of safety, the weighting factor, or any of the other variables. Nor does it purport 
to contain any disclosure relating to the chemical processes at work, the monitoring of 
process variables, or the means of setting off an alarm or adjusting an alarm system. All 
that it provides is a formula for computing an updated alarm limit. Although the 
computations can be made by pencil and paper calculations, the abstract of disclosure 
makes it clear that the formula is primarily useful for computerized calculations 
producing automatic adjustments in alarm settings.  
The patent claims cover any use of respondent’s formula for updating the value of an 
alarm limit on any process variable involved in a process comprising the catalytic 
chemical conversion of hydrocarbons. Since there are numerous processes of that kind in 
the petrochemical and oil-refining industries, the claims cover a broad range of potential 
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uses of the method. They do not, however, cover every conceivable application of the 
formula. 
III 
This case turns entirely on the proper construction of § 101 of the Patent Act, which 
describes the subject matter that is eligible for patent protection. It does not involve the 
familiar issues of novelty and obviousness that routinely arise under §§ 102 and 103 when 
the validity of a patent is challenged. For the purpose of our analysis, we assume that 
respondent’s formula is novel and useful and that he discovered it. We also assume . . . 
that the formula is the only novel feature of respondent’s method. The question is whether 
the discovery of this feature makes an otherwise conventional method eligible for patent 
protection. 
The plain language of § 101 does not answer the question. It is true, as respondent 
argues, that his method is a “process” in the ordinary sense of the word. But that was also 
true of the algorithm, which described a method for converting binary-coded decimal 
numerals into pure binary numerals, that was involved in Gottschalk v. Benson. The 
holding that the discovery of that method could not be patented as a “process” forecloses 
a purely literal reading of § 101. Reasoning that an algorithm, or mathematical formula, is 
like a law of nature, Benson applied the established rule that a law of nature cannot be the 
subject of a patent. Quoting from earlier cases, we said: 
“A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; 
these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.” 
Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175 (1852). Phenomena of nature, though just 
discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, 
as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work. 
The line between a patentable “process” and an unpatentable “principle” is not always 
clear. Both are “conceptions of the mind, seen only by their effects when being executed 
or performed.” In Benson we concluded that the process application in fact sought to 
patent an idea, noting that 
the mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical application 
except in connection with a digital computer, which means that if the judgment 
below is affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula 
and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.  
Respondent correctly points out that this language does not apply to his claims. He does 
not seek to “wholly preempt the mathematical formula,” since there are uses of his 
formula outside the petrochemical and oil-refining industries that remain in the public 
domain. And he argues that the presence of specific “post-solution” activity—the 
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adjustment of the alarm limit to the figure computed according to the formula—
distinguishes this case from Benson and makes his process patentable. We cannot agree. 
The notion that post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in itself, 
can transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts form over 
substance. A competent draftsman could attach some form of post-solution activity to 
almost any mathematical formula; the Pythagorean theorem would not have been 
patentable, or partially patentable, because a patent application contained a final step 
indicating that the formula, when solved, could be usefully applied to existing surveying 
techniques. . . . 
 Yet it is equally clear that a process is not unpatentable simply because it contains a 
law of nature or a mathematical algorithm.12 
12 In Eibel Process Co., the Court upheld a patent on an improvement on a 
papermaking machine that made use of the law of gravity to enhance the flow of 
the product. The patentee, of course, did not claim to have discovered the force of 
gravity, but that force was an element in his novel conception. Tilghman v. Proctor 
involved a process claim for “‘the manufacturing of fat acids and glycerine from 
fatty bodies.’” The Court distinguished the process from the principle involved as 
follows: “The claim of the patent is not for a mere principle. The chemical principle 
or scientific fact upon which it is founded is, that the elements of neutral fat require 
to be severally united with an atomic equivalent of water in order to separate from 
each other and become free. This chemical fact was not discovered by Tilghman. 
He only claims to have invented a particular mode of bringing about the desired 
chemical union between the fatty elements and water.”  
For instance, in Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86, the 
applicant sought a patent on a directional antenna system in which the wire arrangement 
was determined by the logical application of a mathematical formula. . . . Mr. Justice 
Stone, writing for the Court, explained: 
While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not patentable 
invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of 
scientific truth may be. 
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130, expresses a similar approach: 
He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a 
monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a 
discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature to a new and 
useful end.  
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Mackay Radio and Funk Bros. point to the proper analysis for this case: The process itself, 
not merely the mathematical algorithm, must be new and useful. Indeed, the novelty of 
the mathematical algorithm is not a determining factor at all. Whether the algorithm was 
in fact known or unknown at the time of the claimed invention, as one of the “basic tools 
of scientific and technological work,” it is treated as though it were a familiar part of the 
prior art. 
This is also the teaching of our landmark decision in O’Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62. In 
that case the Court rejected Samuel Morse’s broad claim covering any use of 
electromagnetism for printing intelligible signs, characters, or letters at a distance. In 
reviewing earlier cases applying the rule that a scientific principle cannot be patented, the 
Court placed particular emphasis on the English case of Neilson v. Harford, Web. Pat. Cases 
295, 371 (1844), which involved the circulation of heated air in a furnace system to increase 
its efficiency. The English court rejected the argument that the patent merely covered the 
principle that furnace temperature could be increased by injecting hot air, instead of cold 
into the furnace. That court’s explanation of its decision was relied on by this Court in 
Morse: 
“It is very difficult to distinguish the Neilson patent from the specification of a 
patent for a principle, and this at first created in the minds of the court much 
difficulty; but after full consideration, we think that the plaintiff does not merely 
claim a principle, but a machine, embodying a principle, and a very valuable one. 
We think the case must be considered as if the principle being well known, the plaintiff had 
first invented a mode of applying it . . . .”  
We think this case must also be considered as if the principle or mathematical formula 
were well known. 
Respondent argues that this approach improperly imports into § 101 the 
considerations of “inventiveness” which are the proper concerns of §§ 102 and 103. This 
argument is based on two fundamental misconceptions. 
First, respondent incorrectly assumes that if a process application implements a 
principle in some specific fashion, it automatically falls within the patentable subject 
matter of § 101 and the substantive patentability of the particular process can then be 
determined by the conditions of §§ 102 and 103. This assumption is based on respondent’s 
narrow reading of Benson, and is as untenable in the context of § 101 as it is in the context 
of that case. It would make the determination of patentable subject matter depend simply 
on the draftsman’s art and would ill serve the principles underlying the prohibition 
against patents for “ideas” or phenomena of nature. The rule that the discovery of a law 
of nature cannot be patented rests, not on the notion that natural phenomena are not 
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processes, but rather on the more fundamental understanding that they are not the kind 
of “discoveries” that the statute was enacted to protect.15 
15 The underlying notion is that a scientific principle, such as that expressed in 
respondent’s algorithm, reveals a relationship that has always existed. “An 
example of such a discovery of a scientific principle was Newton’s formulation of 
the law of universal gravitation, relating the force of attraction between two 
bodies, F, to their masses, m and m′, and the square of the distance, d, between 
their centers, according to the equation F=mm′/d2. But this relationship always 
existed—even before Newton announced his celebrated law. Such ‘mere’ 
recognition of a theretofore existing phenomenon or relationship carries with it no 
rights to exclude others from its enjoyment. . . . Patentable subject matter must be 
new (novel); not merely heretofore unknown. There is a very compelling reason 
for this rule. The reason is founded upon the proposition that in granting patent 
rights, the public must not be deprived of any rights that it theretofore freely 
enjoyed.” P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS, § 4, p. 13 (1975). 
The obligation to determine what type of discovery is sought to be patented must precede 
the determination of whether that discovery is, in fact, new or obvious. 
Second, respondent assumes that the fatal objection to his application is the fact that 
one of its components—the mathematical formula—consists of unpatentable subject 
matter. In countering this supposed objection, respondent relies on opinions by the Court 
of Customs and Patent Appeals which reject the notion “that a claim may be dissected, 
the claim components searched in the prior art, and, if the only component found novel is 
outside the statutory classes of invention, the claim may be rejected under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101.” Our approach to respondent’s application is, however, not at all inconsistent with 
the view that a patent claim must be considered as a whole. Respondent’s process is 
unpatentable under § 101, not because it contains a mathematical algorithm as one 
component, but because once that algorithm is assumed to be within the prior art, the 
application, considered as a whole, contains no patentable invention. Even though a 
phenomenon of nature or mathematical formula may be well known, an inventive 
application of the principle may be patented. Conversely, the discovery of such a 
phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there is some other inventive concept in its 
application. 
Here it is absolutely clear that respondent’s application contains no claim of patentable 
invention. The chemical processes involved in catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons are 
well known, as are the practice of monitoring the chemical process variables, the use of 
alarm limits to trigger alarms, the notion that alarm limit values must be recomputed and 
readjusted, and the use of computers for “automatic monitoring-alarming.” Respondent’s 
application simply provides a new and presumably better method for calculating alarm 
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limit values. If we assume that that method was also known, as we must under the 
reasoning in Morse, then respondent’s claim is, in effect, comparable to a claim that the 
formula 2pr can be usefully applied in determining the circumference of a wheel. . . . 
To a large extent our conclusion is based on reasoning derived from opinions written 
before the modern business of developing programs for computers was conceived. The 
youth of the industry may explain the complete absence of precedent supporting 
patentability. Neither the dearth of precedent, nor this decision, should therefore be 
interpreted as reflecting a judgment that patent protection of certain novel and useful 
computer programs will not promote the progress of science and the useful arts, or that 
such protection is undesirable as a matter of policy. Difficult questions of policy 
concerning the kinds of programs that may be appropriate for patent protection and the 
form and duration of such protection can be answered by Congress on the basis of current 
empirical data not equally available to this tribunal.  
. . . 
Reversed. 
Mr. Justice STEWART, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice 
REHNQUIST join, dissenting. 
It is a commonplace that laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are 
not patentable subject matter. A patent could not issue, in other words, on the law of 
gravity, or the multiplication tables, or the phenomena of magnetism, or the fact that 
water at sea level boils at 100 degrees centigrade and freezes at zero—even though newly 
discovered. Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175; O’Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 112–121; 
Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 20 Wall. 498, 507; Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707; Mackay 
Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86, 94; Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo 
Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130. 
The recent case of Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, stands for no more than this long-
established principle, which the Court there stated in the following words: “Phenomena 
of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are 
not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.” In Benson 
the Court held unpatentable claims for an algorithm that “were not limited to any 
particular art or technology, to any particular apparatus or machinery, or to any particular 
end use.” A patent on such claims, the Court said, “would wholly pre-empt the 
mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.” 
The present case is a far different one. The issue here is whether a claimed process 
loses its status of subject-matter patentability simply because one step in the process would 
not be patentable subject matter if considered in isolation. The Court of Customs and 
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Patent Appeals held that the process is patentable subject matter, Benson being 
inapplicable since “the present claims do not preempt the formula or algorithm contained 
therein, because solution of the algorithm, per se, would not infringe the claims.” 
That decision seems to me wholly in conformity with basic principles of patent law. 
Indeed, I suppose that thousands of processes and combinations have been patented that 
contained one or more steps or elements that themselves would have been unpatentable 
subject matter. Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, is a case in 
point. There the Court upheld the validity of an improvement patent that made use of the 
law of gravity, which by itself was clearly unpatentable. 
The Court today . . . strikes what seems to me an equally damaging blow at basic 
principles of patent law by importing into its inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 101 the criteria of 
novelty and inventiveness. Section 101 is concerned only with subject-matter 
patentability. Whether a patent will actually issue depends upon the criteria of §§ 102 and 
103, which include novelty and inventiveness, among many others. It may well be that 
under the criteria of §§ 102 and 103 no patent should issue on the process claimed in this 
case . . . . But in my view the claimed process clearly meets the standards of subject-matter 
patentability of § 101. 
. . . Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment before us. 
Diamond v. Diehr 
450 U.S. 175 (1981) 
Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We granted certiorari to determine whether a process for curing synthetic rubber 
which includes in several of its steps the use of a mathematical formula and a 
programmed digital computer is patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
I 
The patent application at issue was filed by the respondents on August 6, 1975. The 
claimed invention is a process for molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured 
precision products. The process uses a mold for precisely shaping the uncured material 
under heat and pressure and then curing the synthetic rubber in the mold so that the 
product will retain its shape and be functionally operative after the molding is completed.  
Respondents claim that their process ensures the production of molded articles which 
are properly cured. Achieving the perfect cure depends upon several factors including the 
thickness of the article to be molded, the temperature of the molding process, and the 
amount of time that the article is allowed to remain in the press. It is possible using well-
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known time, temperature, and cure relationships to calculate by means of the Arrhenius 
equation when to open the press and remove the cured product. Nonetheless, according 
to the respondents, the industry has not been able to obtain uniformly accurate cures 
because the temperature of the molding press could not be precisely measured, thus 
making it difficult to do the necessary computations to determine cure time.  
Because the temperature inside the press has heretofore been viewed as an 
uncontrollable variable, the conventional industry practice has been to calculate the cure 
time as the shortest time in which all parts of the product will definitely be cured, 
assuming a reasonable amount of mold-opening time during loading and unloading. But 
the shortcoming of this practice is that operating with an uncontrollable variable 
inevitably led in some instances to overestimating the mold-opening time and overcuring 
the rubber, and in other instances to underestimating that time and undercuring the 
product.  
Respondents characterize their contribution to the art to reside in the process of 
constantly measuring the actual temperature inside the mold. These temperature 
measurements are then automatically fed into a computer which repeatedly recalculates 
the cure time by use of the Arrhenius equation. When the recalculated time equals the 
actual time that has elapsed since the press was closed, the computer signals a device to 
open the press. According to the respondents, the continuous measuring of the 
temperature inside the mold cavity, the feeding of this information to a digital computer 
which constantly recalculates the cure time, and the signaling by the computer to open 
the press, are all new in the art.  
The patent examiner rejected the respondents’ claims on the sole ground that they 
were drawn to nonstatutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. . . . 
II 
Last Term in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), this Court discussed the 
historical purposes of the patent laws and in particular 35 U.S.C. § 101. As in Chakrabarty, 
we must here construe 35 U.S.C. § 101 which provides: 
Whoever, invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine manufacture, 
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain 
a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.  
In cases of statutory construction, we begin with the language of the statute. Unless 
otherwise defined, “words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, 
common meaning,” and, in dealing with the patent laws, we have more than once 
cautioned that “courts should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions 
which the legislature has not expressed.” 
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 The Patent Act of 1793 defined statutory subject matter as “any new and useful art, 
machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement 
thereof.” Not until the patent laws were recodified in 1952 did Congress replace the word 
“art” with the word “process.” It is that latter word which we confront today, and in order 
to determine its meaning we may not be unmindful of the Committee Reports 
accompanying the 1952 Act which inform us that Congress intended statutory subject 
matter to “include anything under the sun that is made by man.” 
Although the term “process” was not added to 35 U.S.C. § 101 until 1952 a process has 
historically enjoyed patent protection because it was considered a form of “art” as that 
term was used in the 1793 Act. . . . 
Analysis of the eligibility of a claim of patent protection for a “process” did not change 
with the addition of that term to § 101. Recently, in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), 
we . . . added: “Transformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing’ is 
the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines.”  
 Analyzing respondents’ claims according to the above statements from our cases, we 
think that a physical and chemical process for molding precision synthetic rubber 
products falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter. That 
respondents’ claims involve the transformation of an article, in this case raw, uncured 
synthetic rubber, into a different state or thing cannot be disputed. The respondents’ 
claims describe in detail a step-by-step method for accomplishing such, beginning with 
the loading of a mold with raw, uncured rubber and ending with the eventual opening of 
the press at the conclusion of the cure. Industrial processes such as this are the types which 
have historically been eligible to receive the protection of our patent laws.  
III 
 Our conclusion regarding respondents’ claims is not altered by the fact that in several 
steps of the process a mathematical equation and a programmed digital computer are 
used. This Court has undoubtedly recognized limits to § 101 and every discovery is not 
embraced within the statutory terms. Excluded from such patent protection are laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); 
Gottschalk v. Benson, supra, at 67; Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130, 
(1948). “An idea of itself is not patentable,” Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 20 Wall. 498, 
507 (1874). “A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; 
these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.” Le Roy 
v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175 (1853). Only last Term, we explained: 
A new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not 
patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law 
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that E = mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such discoveries 
are “manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”  
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S., at 309. 
Our recent holdings in Gottschalk v. Benson, and Parker v. Flook, both of which are 
computer-related, stand for no more than these long-established principles. In Benson, we 
held unpatentable claims for an algorithm used to convert binary code decimal numbers 
to equivalent pure binary numbers. The sole practical application of the algorithm was in 
connection with the programming of a general purpose digital computer. We defined 
“algorithm” as a “procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem,” and we 
concluded that such an algorithm, or mathematical formula, is like a law of nature, which 
cannot be the subject of a patent.  
Parker v. Flook, presented a similar situation. The claims were drawn to a method for 
computing an “alarm limit.” An “alarm limit” is simply a number and the Court 
concluded that the application sought to protect a formula for computing this number. 
Using this formula, the updated alarm limit could be calculated if several other variables 
were known. The application, however, did not purport to explain how these other 
variables were to be determined, nor did it purport “to contain any disclosure relating to 
the chemical processes at work, the monitoring of process variables, or the means of 
setting off an alarm or adjusting an alarm system. All that it provides is a formula for 
computing an updated alarm limit.” 
In contrast, the respondents here do not seek to patent a mathematical formula. 
Instead, they seek patent protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber. Their process 
admittedly employs a well-known mathematical equation, but they do not seek to pre-
empt the use of that equation. Rather, they seek only to foreclose from others the use of 
that equation in conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process. These 
include installing rubber in a press, closing the mold, constantly determining the 
temperature of the mold, constantly recalculating the appropriate cure time through the 
use of the formula and a digital computer, and automatically opening the press at the 
proper time. Obviously, one does not need a “computer” to cure natural or synthetic 
rubber, but if the computer use incorporated in the process patent significantly lessens the 
possibility of “overcuring” or “undercuring,” the process as a whole does not thereby 
become unpatentable subject matter. 
 Our earlier opinions lend support to our present conclusion that a claim drawn to 
subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a 
mathematical formula, computer program, or digital computer. . . . It is now 
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known 
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection. See, e. g., Funk Bros. Seed  
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Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948); Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper 
Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1877); O’Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62 
(1854); and Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156 (1853). As Justice Stone explained four decades 
ago: “While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable 
invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific 
truth may be.” Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio of America, 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939).  
 We think this statement in Mackay takes us a long way toward the correct answer in 
this case. Arrhenius’ equation is not patentable in isolation, but when a process for curing 
rubber is devised which incorporates in it a more efficient solution of the equation, that 
process is at the very least not barred at the threshold by § 101. 
 In determining the eligibility of respondents’ claimed process for patent protection 
under § 101, their claims must be considered as a whole. It is inappropriate to dissect the 
claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in 
the analysis. This is particularly true in a process claim because a new combination of 
steps in a process may be patentable even though all the constituents of the combination 
were well known and in common use before the combination was made. The “novelty” 
of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in 
determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of 
possibly patentable subject matter.12  
12 It is argued that the procedure of dissecting a claim into old and new elements 
is mandated by our decision in Flook which noted that a mathematical algorithm 
must be assumed to be within the “prior art.” It is from this language that the 
petitioner premises his argument that if everything other than the algorithm is 
determined to be old in the art, then the claim cannot recite statutory subject 
matter. The fallacy in this argument is that we did not hold in Flook that the 
mathematical algorithm could not be considered at all when making the § 101 
determination. To accept the analysis proffered by the petitioner would, if carried 
to its extreme, make all inventions unpatentable because all inventions can be 
reduced to underlying principles of nature which, once known, make their 
implementation obvious. . . . 
It has been urged that novelty is an appropriate consideration under § 101. 
Presumably, this argument results from the language in § 101 referring to any “new and 
useful” process, machine, etc. Section 101, however, is a general statement of the type of 
subject matter that is eligible for patent protection “subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.” Specific conditions for patentability follow and § 102 covers in 
detail the conditions relating to novelty. The question therefore of whether a particular 
invention is novel is “wholly apart from whether the invention falls into a category of 
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statutory subject matter.” The legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act is in accord with 
this reasoning. The Senate Report stated: 
Section 101 sets forth the subject matter that can be patented, “subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.” The conditions under which a patent 
may be obtained follow, and Section 102 covers the conditions relating to novelty.  
It is later stated in the same Report: 
Section 102, in general, may be said to describe the statutory novelty required for 
patentability, and includes, in effect, an amplification and definition of “new” in 
section 101.  
Finally, it is stated in the “Revision Notes”: 
The corresponding section of the existing statute is split into two sections, section 
101 relating to the subject matter for which patents may be obtained, and section 
102 defining statutory novelty and stating other conditions for patentability. 
In this case, it may later be determined that the respondents’ process is not deserving of 
patent protection because it fails to satisfy the statutory conditions of novelty under § 102 
or nonobviousness under § 103. A rejection on either of these grounds does not affect the 
determination that respondents’ claims recited subject matter which was eligible for 
patent protection under § 101. 
IV 
 We have before us today only the question of whether respondents’ claims fall within 
the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter. We view respondents’ claims as 
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent 
a mathematical formula. We recognize, of course, that when a claim recites a mathematical 
formula (or scientific principle or phenomenon of nature), an inquiry must be made into 
whether the claim is seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract. A 
mathematical formula as such is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, Gottschalk 
v. Benson, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the 
formula to a particular technological environment. Parker v. Flook. Similarly, insignificant 
post-solution activity will not transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable 
process.14 
14 Arguably, the claims in Flook did more than present a mathematical formula. The 
claims also solved the calculation in order to produce a new number or “alarm 
limit” and then replaced the old number with the number newly produced. The 
claims covered all uses of the formula in processes “comprising the catalytic 
chemical conversion of hydrocarbons.” There are numerous such processes in the 
petrochemical and oil refinery industries and the claims therefore covered a broad 
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range of potential uses. The claims, however, did not cover every conceivable 
application of the formula. We rejected in Flook the argument that because all 
possible uses of the mathematical formula were not pre-empted, the claim should 
be eligible for patent protection. Our reasoning in Flook is in no way inconsistent 
with our reasoning here. A mathematical formula does not suddenly become 
patentable subject matter simply by having the applicant acquiesce to limiting the 
reach of the patent for the formula to a particular technological use. A 
mathematical formula in the abstract is nonstatutory subject matter regardless of 
whether the patent is intended to cover all uses of the formula or only limited uses. 
Similarly, a mathematical formula does not become patentable subject matter 
merely by including in the claim for the formula token postsolution activity such 
as the type claimed in Flook. We were careful to note in Flook that the patent 
application did not purport to explain how the variables used in the formula were 
to be selected, nor did the application contain any disclosure relating to chemical 
processes at work or the means of setting off an alarm or adjusting the alarm unit. 
All the application provided was a “formula for computing an updated alarm 
limit.” 
To hold otherwise would allow a competent draftsman to evade the recognized 
limitations on the type of subject matter eligible for patent protection. On the other hand, 
when a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a 
structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which 
the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a 
different state or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101. Because we do 
not view respondents’ claims as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula, but rather 
to be drawn to an industrial process for the molding of rubber products, we affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.15 
15 The dissent’s analysis rises and falls on its characterization of respondents’ 
claims as presenting nothing more than “an improved method of calculating the 
time that the mold should remain closed during the curing process.” The dissent 
states that respondents claim only to have developed “a new method of 
programming a digital computer in order to calculate—promptly and 
repeatedly—the correct curing time in a familiar process.” Respondents’ claims, 
however, are not limited to the isolated step of “programming a digital computer.” 
Rather, respondents’ claims describe a process of curing rubber beginning with 
the loading of the mold and ending with the opening of the press and the 
production of a synthetic rubber product that has been perfectly cured—a result 
heretofore unknown in the art. The fact that one or more of the steps in 
respondents’ process may not, in isolation, be novel or independently eligible for 
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patent protection is irrelevant to the question of whether the claims as a whole 
recite subject matter eligible for patent protection under § 101. As we explained 
when discussing machine patents in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 
518 (1972): “The patents were warranted not by the novelty of their elements but 
by the novelty of the combination they represented. Invention was recognized 
because Laitram’s assignors combined ordinary elements in an extraordinary 
way—a novel union of old means was designed to achieve new ends. Thus, for 
both inventions the whole in some way exceeded the sum of its parts.”  
It is so ordered. 
Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice BRENNAN, Justice MARSHALL, and Justice 
BLACKMUN join, dissenting. 
The starting point in the proper adjudication of patent litigation is an understanding 
of what the inventor claims to have discovered. The Court’s decision in this case rests on 
a misreading of the Diehr and Lutton patent application. Moreover, the Court has 
compounded its error by ignoring the critical distinction between the character of the 
subject matter that the inventor claims to be novel—the § 101 issue—and the question 
whether that subject matter is in fact novel—the § 102 issue. 
I 
Before discussing the major flaws in the Court’s opinion, a word of history may be 
helpful. . . .  
Prior to 1968, well-established principles of patent law probably would have 
prevented the issuance of a valid patent on almost any conceivable computer program. 
Under the “mental steps” doctrine, processes involving mental operations were 
considered unpatentable. The mental-steps doctrine was based upon the familiar 
principle that a scientific concept or mere idea cannot be the subject of a valid patent. The 
doctrine was regularly invoked to deny patents to inventions consisting primarily of 
mathematical formulae or methods of computation. It was also applied against patent 
claims in which a mental operation or mathematical computation was the sole novel 
element or inventive contribution; it was clear that patentability could not be predicated 
upon a mental step. Under the “function of a machine” doctrine, a process which 
amounted to nothing more than a description of the function of a machine was 
unpatentable. This doctrine had its origin in several 19th-century decisions of this Court, 
and it had been consistently followed thereafter by the lower federal courts. Finally, the 
definition of “process” announced by this Court in Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787–
788 (1877), seemed to indicate that a patentable process must cause a physical 
transformation in the materials to which the process is applied. 
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. . . 
In Flook, this Court clarified Benson in three significant respects. First, Flook held that 
the Benson rule of unpatentable subject matter was not limited, as the lower court believed, 
to claims which wholly pre-empted an algorithm or amounted to a patent on the 
algorithm itself. Second, the Court made it clear that an improved method of calculation, 
even when employed as part of a physical process, is not patentable subject matter under 
§ 101. Finally, the Court explained the correct procedure for analyzing a patent claim 
employing a mathematical algorithm. Under this procedure, the algorithm is treated for 
§ 101 purposes as though it were a familiar part of the prior art; the claim is then examined 
to determine whether it discloses “some other inventive concept.”22 
22 This form of claim analysis did not originate with Flook. Rather, the Court 
derived it from the landmark decision of O’Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 115 (1854). 
In addition, this analysis is functionally the same as the point-of-novelty analysis 
used in conjunction with the mental-steps doctrine. . . .  
II 
[T]he starting point in the proper adjudication of patent litigation is an understanding 
of what the inventor claims to have discovered. . . . 
In the first sentence of its opinion, the Court states the question presented as “whether 
a process for curing synthetic rubber . . . is patentable subject matter.” Of course, that 
question was effectively answered many years ago when Charles Goodyear obtained his 
patent on the vulcanization process. The patent application filed by Diehr and Lutton, 
however, teaches nothing about the chemistry of the synthetic rubber-curing process, 
nothing about the raw materials to be used in curing synthetic rubber, nothing about the 
equipment to be used in the process, and nothing about the significance or effect of any 
process variable such as temperature, curing time, particular compositions of material, or 
mold configurations. In short, Diehr and Lutton do not claim to have discovered anything 
new about the process for curing synthetic rubber. 
As the Court reads the claims in the Diehr and Lutton patent application, the 
inventors’ discovery is a method of constantly measuring the actual temperature inside a 
rubber molding press. As I read the claims, their discovery is an improved method of 
calculating the time that the mold should remain closed during the curing process. If the 
Court’s reading of the claims were correct, I would agree that they disclose patentable 
subject matter. On the other hand, if the Court accepted my reading, I feel confident that 
the case would be decided differently.  
There are three reasons why I cannot accept the Court’s conclusion that Diehr and 
Lutton claim to have discovered a new method of constantly measuring the temperature 
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inside a mold. First, there is not a word in the patent application that suggests that there 
is anything unusual about the temperature-reading devices used in this process—or 
indeed that any particular species of temperature-reading device should be used in it. 
Second, since devices for constantly measuring actual temperatures—on a back porch, for 
example—have been familiar articles for quite some time, I find it difficult to believe that 
a patent application filed in 1975 was premised on the notion that a “process of constantly 
measuring the actual temperature” had just been discovered. Finally, the Patent and 
Trademark Office Board of Appeals expressly found that “the only difference between the 
conventional methods of operating a molding press and that claimed in [the] application 
rests in those steps of the claims which relate to the calculation incident to the solution of 
the mathematical problem or formula used to control the mold heater and the automatic 
opening of the press.” . . .  
A fair reading of the entire patent application, as well as the specific claims, makes it 
perfectly clear that what Diehr and Lutton claim to have discovered is a method of using 
a digital computer to determine the amount of time that a rubber molding press should 
remain closed during the synthetic rubber-curing process. There is no suggestion that 
there is anything novel in the instrumentation of the mold, in actuating a timer when the 
press is closed, or in automatically opening the press when the computed time expires. 
Nor does the application suggest that Diehr and Lutton have discovered anything about 
the temperatures in the mold or the amount of curing time that will produce the best cure. 
What they claim to have discovered, in essence, is a method of updating the original 
estimated curing time by repetitively recalculating that time pursuant to a well-known 
mathematical formula in response to variations in temperature within the mold. Their 
method of updating the curing time calculation is strikingly reminiscent of the method of 
updating alarm limits that Dale Flook sought to patent. 
During the [Flook] conversion process, variables such as temperature, pressure, and 
flow rates were constantly monitored and fed into the computer; in this case, temperature 
in the mold is the variable that is monitored and fed into the computer. In Flook, the digital 
computer repetitively recalculated the “alarm limit”—a number that might signal the 
need to terminate or modify the catalytic conversion process; in this case, the digital 
computer repetitively recalculates the correct curing time—a number that signals the time 
when the synthetic rubber molding press should open. 
The essence of the claimed discovery in both cases was an algorithm that could be 
programmed on a digital computer. In Flook, the algorithm made use of multiple process 
variables; in this case, it makes use of only one. In Flook, the algorithm was expressed in a 
newly developed mathematical formula; in this case, the algorithm makes use of a well-
known mathematical formula. Manifestly, neither of these differences can explain today’s 
holding. . . .  
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III 
The Court misapplies Parker v. Flook because . . . it fails to understand or completely 
disregards the distinction between the subject matter of what the inventor claims to have 
discovered—the § 101 issue—and the question whether that claimed discovery is in fact 
novel—the § 102 issue. If there is not even a claim that anything constituting patentable 
subject matter has been discovered, there is no occasion to address the novelty issue. Or, 
as was true in Flook, if the only concept that the inventor claims to have discovered is not 
patentable subject matter, § 101 requires that the application be rejected without reaching 
any issue under § 102 . . . . 
Proper analysis, therefore, must start with an understanding of what the inventor 
claims to have discovered—or phrased somewhat differently—what he considers his 
inventive concept to be. It seems clear to me that Diehr and Lutton claim to have 
developed a new method of programming a digital computer in order to calculate—
promptly and repeatedly—the correct curing time in a familiar process. In the § 101 
analysis, we must assume that the sequence of steps in this programming method is novel, 
unobvious, and useful. The threshold question of whether such a method is patentable 
subject matter remains. 
If that method is regarded as an “algorithm” . . . and if no other inventive concept is 
disclosed in the patent application, the question must be answered in the negative. In both 
Benson and Flook, the parties apparently agreed that the inventor’s discovery was properly 
regarded as an algorithm; the holding that an algorithm was a “law of nature” that could 
not be patented therefore determined that those discoveries were not patentable processes 
within the meaning of § 101. 
As the Court recognizes today, Flook also rejected the argument that patent protection 
was available if the inventor did not claim a monopoly on every conceivable use of the 
algorithm but instead limited his claims by describing a specific postsolution activity . . . . 
[T]he Court characterizes that postsolution activity as “insignificant,” or as merely 
“token” activity. As a practical matter however, the postsolution activity described in the 
Flook application was no less significant than the automatic opening of the curing mold 
involved in this case. For setting off an alarm limit at the appropriate time is surely as 
important to the safe and efficient operation of a catalytic conversion process as is 
actuating the mold-opening device in a synthetic rubber-curing process. In both cases, the 
post-solution activity is a significant part of the industrial process. But in neither case 
should that activity have any legal significance because it does not constitute a part of the 
inventive concept that the applicants claimed to have discovered.  
. . . 
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Even the Court does not suggest that the computer program developed by Diehr and 
Lutton is a patentable discovery. Accordingly, if we treat the program as though it were 
a familiar part of the prior art—as well-established precedent requires—it is absolutely 
clear that their application contains no claim of patentable invention. Their application 
was therefore properly rejected under § 101 by the Patent Office and the Board of Appeals. 
IV 
The broad question whether computer programs should be given patent protection 
involves policy considerations that this Court is not authorized to address. . . .  
. . . Because invention claimed in the patent application at issue in this case makes no 
contribution to the art that is not entirely dependent upon the utilization of a computer in 
a familiar process, I would reverse . . . . 
Context and Application 
1. Flook and Diehr have play an important role in the current patent eligibility 
framework. The Court in Mayo relied on the difference between these two cases to buttress 
its conclusion that the claim at issue was ineligible. See Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Labs., 566 U.S. 66, 82 (2012) (“The claim before us presents a case for 
patentability that is weaker than the (patent-eligible) claim in Diehr and no stronger than 
the (unpatentable) claim in Flook.”). But there is considerable tension in how these cases 
evaluate the question of patent eligibility. See Bernard Chao, Moderating Mayo, 107 NW. 
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 82, 89 (2012) (“Flook and Diehr are simply irreconcilable”). This 
tension arises in large part because the cases appear to disagree on whether it is 
appropriate to separately identify elements in a claim that are “old” from those that are 
“new,” and consider only the “new” elements in the eligibility analysis. As John Golden 
explains, 
[Diehr] emphasizes the principle that, in an assessment of subject-matter eligibility, 
claims “must be considered as a whole,” it being “inappropriate to dissect the 
claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old 
elements in the analysis.” At the same time, Diehr advocates an “anti-principle” 
that reveals some willingness to dissect claims: Diehr instructs that inclusion of 
“insignificant post-solution activity” into a claim “will not transform an 
unpatentable principle into a patentable process.” In support of this anti-principle, 
Diehr cites the Court’s 1978 opinion in Parker v. Flook, in which the opinion for the 
Court had suggested the possibility of at least partial dissection of claims into old 
and new elements for purposes of subject-matter eligibility analysis. In Flook, the 
Court rejected “the notion that post-solution activity, no matter how conventional 
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or obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable 
process,” saying that such an idea “exalts form over substance.” 
John Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr Says Another: A Need for Housecleaning in the Law 
of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1765, 1781 (2014). One possible way to 
resolve this tension is to view Flook as covering “a relatively limited class [of cases 
involving claims to] essentially trivial combinations of excluded subject matter and 
conventional steps,” while viewing Diehr as standing for the proposition that claims are 
eligible so long as they (1) cover solutions to “technological problem[s]” or (2) “improve[] 
an existing technological process.” Id. at 1788, 1792. 
The Court also characterizes Flook and Diehr as Step Two cases; that is, it has used 
them to illustrate the difference between claims that incorporate an inventive concept and 
claims that do not. Another way to resolve the tension between the cases is to view them 
as Step One cases. If we apply a central claiming approach to understanding the claims, 
we can distinguish Flook from Diehr on the grounds that the patent in Flook characterized 
the inventor’s contribution as encompassing ineligible subject matter (the novel algorithm 
for recalculating alarm limits) while the patent in Diehr characterized the inventor’s 
contribution as encompassing eligible subject matter (the improved method of molding 
rubber). From this perspective, the claim in Flook was “directed to” ineligible subject 
matter, while the claim in Diehr was not. See Andres Sawicki, The Central Claiming 
Renaissance, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 645, 704-07 (2018). 
C. Applying the Modern Framework 
The Mayo/Alice framework has had an enormous impact on contemporary patent 
practice. Its impacts have been particularly acute in the fields of software, biotechnology, 
and medical diagnostics. In each of those fields, § 101 has become the principal hurdle to 
obtaining a patent, and the primary mechanism for attacking an issued patent. For a 
comprehensive overview of the post-Alice landscape, see Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Peter S. 
Menell, & David O. Taylor, Final Report of the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology Section 
101 Workshop: Addressing Patent Eligibility Challenges, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 551 (2018). 
The Federal Circuit, the district courts, and the USPTO have all weighed in on the 
flurry of Section 101 issues being presented in the wake of the Court’s recent eligibility 
jurisprudence. As you read the following opinions, consider whether they help clarify 
(1) what it means for a claim to be “directed to” ineligible subject matter; (2) what kinds 
of things qualify as an “inventive concept” that would save an otherwise ineligible claim; 
and (3) how patentable subject matter relates to the “newness” and disclosure doctrines 
that are explored in more detail in other chapters. In addition, consider the procedural 
and institutional implications of the evolving eligibility doctrine. 
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BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC 
827 F.3d 1341 (2016) 
CHEN, Circuit Judge. 
BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. appeals from the grant of a motion to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6), in which the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Texas held that . . . the claims of U.S. Patent No. 5,987,606 are invalid as a matter of law 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. BASCOM has alleged that the claims of the ’606 patent contain an 
“inventive concept” in their ordered combination of limitations sufficient to satisfy the 
second step of the Supreme Court’s Alice test. We find nothing in the intrinsic record to 
refute that allegation as a matter of law. We therefore vacate the district court’s order 
dismissing BASCOM’s complaint, and remand for further proceedings. 
Background 
The ’606 patent was filed March 19, 1997. Back in 1997, the Internet was known to 
contain information that consumers, students, and businesses wanted to access. As the 
patent describes in the “Background of the Present Invention” section, web browsers 
“such as the Netscape Navigator™ or the Microsoft Explorer™” allowed users to access 
websites in the form of HTML files. Some websites, however, contained information 
deemed unsuitable for some users. . . .  
The computer industry responded to this need by developing a software tool that 
allowed control over the type of information received over the Internet. The software tool 
inspected a user’s request to access a website and applied one or more filtering 
mechanisms: “exclusive filtering (‘black-listing’) which prevents access to all sites on a 
predetermined list of Internet sites; inclusive filtering (‘white-listing’) which allows access 
only to a predetermined list of Internet sites; and word-screening or phrase-screening 
which prevents access to web site ‘pages’ which contain any word or phrase on a 
predetermined list.” 
According to the ’606 patent, filtering software was first placed on local computers, 
such that each local computer had its own tool for filtering websites (or other Internet 
content) requested by the operator of the computer. . . .  
To overcome some of the disadvantages of installing filtering software on each local 
computer, another prior art system relocated the filter to a local server. For example, a 
corporation with one connection to the Internet might have placed a server between the 
computers of its employees and the Internet connection. . . . “A computer literate end-
user” therefore could no longer easily “modify or thwart” the filtering tool to gain access 
to blocked websites. However, the one-size-fits-all filter on the local server was not ideal 
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because “a single set of filtering criteria is often not appropriate for all of the end-users.” 
. . . 
[The same tradeoffs existed when] some Internet Service Providers (ISPs), such as 
“America Online,” installed a filter on their remote servers . . . . 
The ’606 patent describes its invention as combining the advantages of the then-
known filtering tools while avoiding their drawbacks. . . . 
The claimed invention is able to provide individually customizable filtering at the 
remote ISP server by taking advantage of the technical capability of certain 
communication networks. In these networks, the ISP is able to associate an individual user 
with a specific request to access a website (or other Internet content), and can distinguish 
that user’s requests from other users’ requests. One way that the ISP is able to make this 
association, as described in the ’606 patent, is by requiring each user to first complete a 
log-in process with the ISP server. After a user has logged in, the ISP server can associate 
the user with a request to access a specific website. Because the filtering tool on the ISP 
server contains each user’s customized filtering mechanism, the filtering tool working in 
combination with the ISP server can apply a specific user’s filtering mechanism to the 
websites requested by that user. . . . The ’606 patent describes its filtering system as a novel 
advance over prior art computer filters, in that no one had previously provided 
customized filters at a remote server. 
The claims of the ’606 patent generally recite a system for filtering Internet content. 
The claimed filtering system is located on a remote ISP server that associates each network 
account with (1) one or more filtering schemes and (2) at least one set of filtering elements 
from a plurality of sets of filtering elements, thereby allowing individual network 
accounts to customize the filtering of Internet traffic associated with the account. . . . For 
the individually customizable filtering claims, BASCOM points to claim 1 as instructive. 
1. A content filtering system for filtering content retrieved from an Internet 
computer network by individual controlled access network accounts, said filtering 
system comprising: 
a local client computer generating network access requests for said individual 
controlled access network accounts; 
at least one filtering scheme; 
a plurality of sets of logical filtering elements; and 
a remote ISP server coupled to said client computer and said Internet computer 
network, said ISP server associating each said network account to at least one 
filtering scheme and at least one set of filtering elements, said ISP server further 
receiving said network access requests from said client computer and executing 
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said associated filtering scheme utilizing said associated set of logical filtering 
elements. 
For the hybrid filtering scheme claims, BASCOM points to claim 23, which depends on 
claim 22, as instructive. 
22. An ISP server for filtering content forwarded to controlled access network 
account generating network access requests at a remote client computer, each 
network access request including a destination address field, said ISP server 
comprising: 
a master inclusive-list of allowed sites; 
a plurality of sets of exclusive-lists of excluded sites, each controlled access 
network account associated with at least one set of said plurality of exclusive-lists 
of excluded sites; and 
a filtering scheme, said filtering scheme allowing said network access request if 
said destination address exists on said master inclusive-list but not on said at least 
one associated exclusive-list, whereby said controlled access accounts may be 
uniquely associated with one or more sets of excluded sites. 
23. The ISP server of claim 22 further comprising: 
a plurality of inclusive-lists of allowed sites, each controlled access user associated 
with at least one of said plurality of inclusive-lists of allowed sites, said filtering 
program further allowing said network access request if said requested 
destination address exists on said at least one associated inclusive-list. 
bBASCOM sued [AT&T]. AT&T moved to dismiss BASCOM’s complaint under FRCP 
12(b)(6), on the basis that each claim of the ’606 patent was invalid under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101. . . .  
Standard of Review 
. . . We review the district court’s determination of patent-eligibility under § 101 de 
novo. 
Discussion 
A patent may be obtained for “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The 
Supreme Court has “long held that this provision contains an important implicit 
exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” The 
Supreme Court has also consistently held that § 101 provides a basis for a 
patentability/validity determination that is independent of—and on an equal footing 
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with—any other statutory patentability provision. Courts may therefore dispose of 
patent-infringement claims under § 101 whenever procedurally appropriate. . . .  
We have found software-related patents eligible under both steps of the test Alice sets 
out. We found a patent to a particular improvement to a database system patent-eligible 
under step one in Enfish LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
There, we found claim language reciting the invention’s specific improvements to help 
our determination in step one of the Alice framework that the invention was directed to 
those specific improvements in computer technology. But we also recognized that, “in 
other cases involving computer-related claims, there may be close calls about how to 
characterize what the claims are directed to.” “In such cases . . . an analysis of whether 
there are arguably concrete improvements in the recited computer technology could take 
place under step two.” That is, some inventions’ basic thrust might more easily be 
understood as directed to an abstract idea, but under step two of the Alice analysis, it 
might become clear that the specific improvements in the recited computer technology go 
beyond “well-understood, routine, conventional activities” and render the invention 
patent-eligible. . . .  
The claims of the ’606 patent are directed to filtering content on the Internet. 
Specifically, claim 1 is directed to a “content filtering system for filtering content retrieved 
from an Internet computer network.” Claim 22 similarly is directed to an “ISP server for 
filtering content.” The specification reinforces this notion by describing the invention as 
relating “generally to a method and system for filtering Internet content.” We agree with 
the district court that filtering content is an abstract idea because it is a longstanding, well-
known method of organizing human behavior, similar to concepts previously found to be 
abstract. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) (holding that “tracking financial transactions to determine whether they exceed 
a pre-set spending limit (i.e., budgeting)” is an abstract idea that “is not meaningfully 
different from the ideas found to be abstract in other cases . . . involving methods of 
organizing human activity”); see also Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347 (finding that 
“1) collecting data, 2) recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and 3) storing 
that recognized data in a memory” was an abstract idea because “data collection, 
recognition, and storage is undisputedly well-known” and “humans have always 
performed these functions”); Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 
1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding that “a process of organizing information through 
mathematical correlations” is an abstract idea). An abstract idea on “an Internet computer 
network” or on a generic computer is still an abstract idea. 
BASCOM argues that the claims are directed to something narrower: the specific 
implementation of filtering content set forth in the claim limitations. Specifically, 
BASCOM asserts that claim 1 is “directed to the more specific problem of providing 
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Internet-content filtering in a manner that can be customized for the person attempting to 
access such content while avoiding the need for (potentially millions of) local servers or 
computers to perform such filtering and while being less susceptible to circumvention by 
the user,” and claim 23 is directed to “the even more particular problem of structuring a 
filtering scheme not just to be effective, but also to make user-level customization remain 
administrable as users are added instead of becoming intractably complex.” We recognize 
that this court sometimes incorporates claim limitations into its articulation of the idea to 
which a claim is directed. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1337 (relying on a step of an algorithm . . . 
in defining the idea of a claim for step-one purposes). . . . The Enfish claims, understood 
in light of their specific limitations, were unambiguously directed to an improvement in 
computer capabilities. Here, in contrast, the claims and their specific limitations do not 
readily lend themselves to a step-one finding that they are directed to a nonabstract 
idea. . . . 
We now turn to step two, and the search for an “inventive concept.” The “inventive 
concept” may arise in one or more of the individual claim limitations or in the ordered 
combination of the limitations. An inventive concept that transforms the abstract idea into 
a patent-eligible invention must be significantly more than the abstract idea itself, and 
cannot simply be an instruction to implement or apply the abstract idea on a computer. 
The district court looked at each limitation individually and noted that the limitations 
“local client computer,” “remote ISP server,” “Internet computer network,” and 
“controlled access network accounts” are described in the specification as well-known 
generic computer components. The district court also noted that a filtering system is 
described in the specification as “any type of code which may be executed” along with 
database entries. See ’606 patent, 4:28–30 (“It will be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the 
art that the filtering scheme can be any of a number of known-schemes, or hybrids 
thereof.”). The district court then looked at the limitations collectively, and held that 
“filtering software, apparently composed of filtering schemes and filtering elements, was 
well-known in the prior art,” and “using ISP servers to filter content was well-known to 
practitioners.” The district court thus concluded that BASCOM had not asserted 
adequately that the claims disclose an inventive concept because the limitations, 
“considered individually, or as an ordered combination, are no more than routine 
additional steps involving generic computer components and the Internet, which interact 
in well-known ways to accomplish the abstract idea of filtering Internet content.” 
We agree with the district court that the limitations of the claims, taken individually, 
recite generic computer, network and Internet components, none of which is inventive by 
itself. BASCOM does not assert that it invented local computers, ISP servers, networks, 
network accounts, or filtering. Nor does the specification describe those elements as 
inventive. 
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However, we disagree with the district court’s analysis of the ordered combination of 
limitations. In light of Mayo and Alice, it is of course now standard for a § 101 inquiry to 
consider whether various claim elements simply recite “well-understood, routine, 
conventional activities.” The district court’s analysis in this case, however, looks similar 
to an obviousness analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 103, except lacking an explanation of a reason 
to combine the limitations as claimed. The inventive concept inquiry requires more than 
recognizing that each claim element, by itself, was known in the art. As is the case here, 
an inventive concept can be found in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement 
of known, conventional pieces. 
The inventive concept described and claimed in the ’606 patent is the installation of a 
filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the end-users, with customizable filtering 
features specific to each end user. This design gives the filtering tool both the benefits of 
a filter on a local computer and the benefits of a filter on the ISP server. BASCOM explains 
that the inventive concept rests on taking advantage of the ability of at least some ISPs to 
identify individual accounts that communicate with the ISP server, and to associate a 
request for Internet content with a specific individual account. . . . [T]he inventive concept 
harnesses this technical feature of network technology in a filtering system by associating 
individual accounts with their own filtering scheme and elements while locating the 
filtering system on an ISP server. See Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 
869 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Inventions with specific applications or improvements to 
technologies in the marketplace are not likely to be so abstract that they override the 
statutory language and framework of the Patent Act.”). On this limited record, this 
specific method of filtering Internet content cannot be said, as a matter of law, to have 
been conventional or generic. 
The claims do not merely recite the abstract idea of filtering content along with the 
requirement to perform it on the Internet, or to perform it on a set of generic computer 
components. Such claims would not contain an inventive concept. See CyberSource Corp. 
v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (reasoning that the use of the 
Internet to verify a credit card transaction does not meaningfully add to the abstract idea 
of verifying the transaction). Nor do the claims preempt all ways of filtering content on 
the Internet; rather, they recite a specific, discrete implementation of the abstract idea of 
filtering content. Filtering content on the Internet was already a known concept, and the 
patent describes how its particular arrangement of elements is a technical improvement 
over prior art ways of filtering such content. . . . [P]rior art filters were either susceptible 
to hacking and dependent on local hardware and software, or confined to an inflexible 
one-size-fits-all scheme. BASCOM asserts that the inventors recognized there could be a 
filter implementation versatile enough that it could be adapted to many different users’ 
preferences while also installed remotely in a single location. Thus, construed in favor of 
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the nonmovant—BASCOM—the claims are “more than a drafting effort designed to 
monopolize the [abstract idea].” Instead, the claims may be read to “improve an existing 
technological process.” 
This court’s recent case law on step two of the Alice test further establishes the patent-
eligibility of the claims before us. . . .  
Turning first to DDR, we held that DDR’s patent claimed a technical solution to a 
problem unique to the Internet—websites instantly losing views upon the click of a link, 
which would send the viewer across cyberspace to another company’s website. The 
claimed invention solved that problem in a particular, technical way by sending the 
viewer to a hybrid webpage that combined visual elements of the first website with the 
desired content from the second website that the viewer wished to access. The creation of 
this hybrid webpage that co-displays the look and feel of the first website with the desired 
content from the second website required a specific technical solution that did more than 
claim all implementations for retaining web viewers. 
Although the invention in DDR’s patent was engineered in the context of retaining 
potential customers, the invention was not claiming a business method per se, but was 
instead claiming a technical way to satisfy an existing problem for website hosts and 
viewers. Similarly, although the invention in the ’606 patent is engineered in the context 
of filtering content, the invention is not claiming the idea of filtering content simply 
applied to the Internet. The ’606 patent is instead claiming a technology-based solution 
(not an abstract-idea-based solution implemented with generic technical components in a 
conventional way) to filter content on the Internet that overcomes existing problems with 
other Internet filtering systems. By taking a prior art filter solution (one-size-fits-all filter 
at the ISP server) and making it more dynamic and efficient (providing individualized 
filtering at the ISP server), the claimed invention represents a “software-based invention 
that improves the performance of the computer system itself.” 
. . . 
As explained above, construed in favor of BASCOM as they must be in this procedural 
posture, the claims of the ’606 patent do not preempt the use of the abstract idea of filtering 
content on the Internet or on generic computer components performing conventional 
activities. The claims carve out a specific location for the filtering system (a remote ISP 
server) and require the filtering system to give users the ability to customize filtering for 
their individual network accounts. 
Conclusion 
While the claims of the ’606 patent are directed to the abstract idea of filtering content, 
BASCOM has adequately alleged that the claims pass step two of Alice’s two-part 
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framework. BASCOM has alleged that an inventive concept can be found in the ordered 
combination of claim limitations that transform the abstract idea of filtering content into 
a particular, practical application of that abstract idea. We find nothing on this record that 
refutes those allegations as a matter of law or justifies dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). . . . 
Vacated and remanded. 
NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in the result. 
I agree with the court that the claims of the Bascom patent are eligible for participation 
in the system of patents. . . . However, it has become increasingly apparent, as various 
factual situations have been brought into Section 101 challenges, that these new litigation 
opportunities have led to judicial protocols that are time-consuming and usually 
unnecessary. . . .  
I write separately to urge a more flexible approach to the determination of patent 
eligibility, for the two-step protocol for ascertaining whether a patent is for an “abstract 
idea” is not always necessary to resolve patent disputes. There is no good reason why the 
district court should be constrained from determining patentability, instead of eligibility 
based on “abstract idea,” when the patentability/validity determination would be 
dispositive of the dispute. 
Patentability v. Eligibility 
A new and useful process or machine or manufacture or composition of matter is not 
an abstract idea, and if the claims are deemed to be so broad as to be abstract, application 
of the requirements of patentability is a direct path to resolution of validity disputes. 
Claims that are imprecise or that read on prior art or that are unsupported by description 
or that are not enabled raise questions of patentability, not eligibility. 
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) requires a written description in “full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms,” and § 112(b) requires “claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the 
subject matter” of the invention. The process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
Section 101 must comply with Section 112. Subject matter that complies with Section 112 
averts the generality or vagueness or imprecision or over-breadth that characterize 
abstract ideas. These are conditions of patentability, not of eligibility. The “conditions and 
requirements of this title” weed out the abstract idea. 
The Court recognized that “all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest 
upon, or apply . . . abstract ideas.” I have come upon no guide to when a claim crosses the 
boundary between unacceptable abstractness and acceptable specificity. Experience with 
this aspect demonstrates its imprecision. This conundrum is resolved on application of 
the criteria of patentability. Nor is this a new observation: “precedent illustrates that 
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pragmatic analysis of section 101 is facilitated by considerations analogous to those of 
section 102 and 103 as applied to the particular case.” 
AT&T’s Motion to Dismiss 
In arguing “inventive concept,” both sides presented arguments that would also be 
relevant to patentability. . . . AT&T, supporting the “abstract idea” position on which it 
prevailed before the district court, argues that content filtration was a generally known 
concept, and thus was an “abstract idea” under Alice step one. AT&T argues that the 
Bascom filtration method is not an “inventive concept” under step two. AT&T also argues 
that the Bascom claims are invalid under Sections 103 and 112. 
Bascom states that for issues under Sections 103 and 112, additional evidence would 
be provided, evidence not needed for response to a motion to dismiss for abstractness. We 
agree that Bascom must be accorded the opportunity to litigate these issues directly, rather 
than as overflow from the eligibility debate.  
On appellate review, I agree with the majority that the Bascom claims contain an 
“inventive concept” in the claims’ “ordered combination of limitations,” and that this 
establishes eligibility. In the district court, the only issue that was finally decided is that 
of eligibility. Thus remand is the appropriate next step. However, I again point to the 
increased efficiency, and savings in cost and time, by direct resolution of patentability. 
The Court’s rulings in Alice and Mayo do not require that every broadly claimed patent 
must be treated in two separate litigation procedures, if charged with abstractness. 
While the two-step protocol helps to decide whether a particular claim is “eligible” for 
patenting, we should clarify the district court’s authority to resolve the issues of patent 
validity directly. Direct application to the Bascom claims of the law of sections 102, 103, 
or 112, could have resolved this dispute in one litigation cycle of trial and appeal, instead 
of the repeated effort now required. 
Context and Application 
1.  What did BASCOM identify as the inventive concept in the claims? Was it the 
technological nature of what the patent purported to cover that saved it? Or was it the fact 
that others hadn’t done quite the same thing before the inventor’s work? If the latter, how 
does the eligibility analysis differ from an analysis that looks for whether the claim is 
novel and nonobvious? 
2. Judge Newman’s concurrence emphasizes procedural considerations associated 
with the eligibility determination. Many of her concerns flow from the fact that eligibility 
decisions are frequently made on motions to dismiss, rather than at summary judgment 
or trial. As a result of trial courts’ tendency to resolve Section 101 challenges before 
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discovery, other potentially dispositive questions (including on issues like 
nonobviousness or enablement) are not resolved before appeal. The consequence is that 
alleged infringers prevail in the trial court on eligibility grounds, patentees then prevail 
on appeal, and the process must return to the trial court for resolution of all other issues, 
before ultimately (in many cases) returning to the appellate court. Judge Newman argues 
that trial courts should defer consideration of eligibility questions until after other matters 
are resolved. Are you persuaded that eligibility should be considered only after novelty 
and nonobviousness are resolved? See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Quick Decisions in Patent Cases, 
106 GEO. L.J. 619, 649-63 (2018) (defending the reliance on patent eligibility as “a 
mechanism to dismiss low-merit suits before the parties incur significant litigation costs); 
Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering Patent 
Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1673 (2010) (arguing that courts should, 
where possible, resolve straightforward novelty and nonobviousness challenges before 
evaluating difficult eligibility ones). 
McRO, Inc. v. AI Namco Games Am., Inc. 
837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
REYNA, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal is from a grant of judgment on the pleadings . . . that the asserted claims 
of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,307,576 and 6,611,278 are invalid. The United States District Court 
for the Central District of California found that the asserted claims are . . . invalid under 
35 U.S.C. § 101. We hold that the ordered combination of claimed steps, using 
unconventional rules that relate sub-sequences of phonemes, timings, and morph weight 
sets, is not directed to an abstract idea and is therefore patent-eligible subject matter under 
§ 101. Accordingly, we reverse. 
Background 
A 
The ’576 patent and the ’278 patent were both issued to Maury Rosenfeld and are both 
titled “Method for Automatically Animating Lip Synchronization and Facial Expression 
of Animated Characters.” The ’278 patent is a continuation of the ’576 patent and shares 
the same written description. 
1 
The patents relate to automating part of a preexisting 3–D animation method. As 
explained in the background of the patents, the admitted prior art method uses multiple 
3–D models of a character’s face to depict various facial expressions made during speech. 
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To animate the character as it speaks, the method morphs the character’s expression 
between the models. The “neutral model” is the 3–D representation of the resting, neutral 
facial expression of an animated character. The other models of the character’s face are 
known as “morph targets,” and each one represents that face as it pronounces a phoneme, 
i.e., makes a certain sound. This visual representation of the character’s face making a 
sound is also called a “viseme.” An example morph target for the “aah” phoneme is 
shown below. Each of these morph targets and the neutral model has identified points, 
called “vertices,” in certain places on the face. The set of differences in the location of these 
vertices (and the corresponding point on the face) between the neutral model and the 
morph target form a “delta set” of vectors representing the change in location of the 
vertices between the two models. For each morph target, there is a corresponding delta 
set consisting of the vectors by which the vertices on that morph target differ from the 
neutral model. 
Facial expressions are described as a function of the amount each morph target, and 
its corresponding delta set, is applied to modify the character model. “In producing 
animation products, a value usually from 0 to 1 is assigned to each delta set by the 
animator and the value is called the ‘morph weight.’” The set of morph weights for all the 
delta sets is called a “morph weight set.” The neutral model is represented by a morph 
weight set with all morph weights of 0. A desired morph target is represented by the 
morph weight of 1 for that morph target’s delta set and a morph weight of 0 for all other 
delta sets. 
The power of this prior art animation method is in generating intermediate faces by 
using morph weights between 0 and 1 to blend together multiple morph targets. For 
example, the face halfway between the neutral model and the “oh” face can be expressed 
simply by setting the “oh” morph weight to 0.5. . . . For each morph weight set, the 
resulting facial expression is calculated by determining the displacement of each vertex 
from the neutral model as the product of the morph weights in the morph weight set and 
the corresponding delta sets for the morph targets. 
Animation of the character and lip synchronization preexisting the invention was 
generally accomplished by an animator with the assistance of a computer. Animators used 
“a ‘keyframe’ approach, where the artist set the appropriate morph weights at certain 
important times (‘keyframes’)” instead of at every frame. Animators knew what phoneme 
a character pronounced at a given time from a “time aligned phonetic transcription” 
(“timed transcript”). This listed the “occurrence in time” of each phoneme the character 
pronounced . . . . 
Animators, using a computer, manually determined the appropriate morph weight 
sets for each keyframe based on the phoneme timings in the timed transcript. “For each 
keyframe, the artist would look at the screen and, relying on her judgment, manipulate 
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the character model until it looked right—a visual and subjective process.” . . . . A 
computer program would then interpolate between the keyframes set by the animator, 
creating the intermediate frames by determining the appropriate morph weight sets at 
intermediate points in time simply based on continuously transitioning between the 
keyframes. 
2 
The patents criticize the preexisting keyframe approach as “very tedious and time 
consuming, as well as inaccurate due to the large number of keyframes necessary to depict 
speech.” . . . 
Essentially, the patents aim to automate a 3–D animator’s tasks, specifically, 
determining when to set keyframes and setting those keyframes. This automation is 
accomplished through rules that are applied to the timed transcript to determine the 
morph weight outputs. The patents describe many exemplary rule sets that go beyond 
simply matching single phonemes from the timed transcript with the appropriate morph 
target. Instead, these rule sets aim to produce more realistic speech by “taking into 
consideration the differences in mouth positions for similar phonemes based on context.” 
One exemplary set of rules provided and applied in the specification of the ’576 patent 
is for a character transitioning from silence through saying “hello.” This exemplary set of 
rules provides for inserting a transition starting shortly before the first syllable after a 
silence. The transition marks when the character begins to transition from silence, shown 
by the closed-mouthed neutral model, to the morph target for the first syllable, with its 
open-mouthed shape. That is, the rule automates a character’s facial expressions so the 
character will wait until shortly before it starts speaking to begin opening its mouth. In 
terms of the prior art method, the effect of this rule is to automatically create a keyframe 
at a point that no phoneme is being pronounced. If instead no transition were placed at 
that position, the resulting animation would have an unrealistic quality. The character 
would open its mouth gradually from the beginning of the sequence through its first 
utterance as a result of the computer interpolating a continuous transition between those 
two points. In the prior art system, an animator would have to subjectively identify the 
problematic sequence and manually fix it by adding an appropriate keyframe. The 
invention, however, uses rules to automatically set a keyframe at the correct point to 
depict more realistic speech, achieving results similar to those previously achieved 
manually by animators. 
Claim 1 of the ’576 patent is representative and dispositive of the asserted claims for 
the purposes of appeal: 
A method for automatically animating lip synchronization and facial expression 
of three-dimensional characters comprising: 
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obtaining a first set of rules that define output morph weight set stream as a 
function of phoneme sequence and time of said phoneme sequence; 
obtaining a timed data file of phonemes having a plurality of sub-sequences; 
generating an intermediate stream of output morph weight sets and a plurality of 
transition parameters between two adjacent morph weight sets by evaluating said 
plurality of sub-sequences against said first set of rules; 
generating a final stream of output morph weight sets at a desired frame rate from 
said intermediate stream of output morph weight sets and said plurality of 
transition parameters; and 
applying said final stream of output morph weight sets to a sequence of animated 
characters to produce lip synchronization and facial expression control of said 
animated characters. 
Standard of Review 
. . . We also review de novo whether a claim is invalid under the judicially created 
exceptions to § 101. 
Discussion 
A 
As an initial matter, we note that, in this case, claim construction is helpful to resolve 
the question of patentability under § 101. Specifically, the parties’ dispute about whether 
the “first set of rules” must evaluate sequential phonemes or can evaluate individual 
phonemes is resolved by the claim language. We agree with McRO that the claims are 
limited to rules that evaluate sub-sequences consisting of multiple sequential phonemes. 
This limitation is apparent on the face of the claims. In particular, the intermediate morph 
weight sets and transition parameters are generated “by evaluating said plurality of sub-
sequences against said first set of rules.” This limitation could not be satisfied by rules 
that only evaluate individual phonemes. Instead, the claimed “first set of rules” must be 
formulated to evaluate sub-sequences of phonemes. 
B 
This appeal involves the abstract idea exception. 
In Alice, the Court applied a two-step framework for analyzing whether claims are 
patent eligible. First, we determine whether the claim at issue is “directed to” a judicial 
exception, such as an abstract idea. Mathematical formulas are a type of abstract idea. The 
abstract idea exception prevents patenting a result where “it matters not by what process 
or machinery the result is accomplished.” O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113, 
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(1854). We do not assume that such claims are directed to patent ineligible subject matter 
because “all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” Instead, “the claims are considered in their 
entirety to ascertain whether their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject 
matter.” . . . 
In Alice, the Court applied some of its § 101 jurisprudence that preceded the two-step 
framework, including Flook and Diehr. In Flook, claims requiring the use of a specific 
equation were unpatentable because they “simply provided a new and presumably better 
method of calculating alarm limit values.” The mathematical “formula itself was an 
abstract idea” and “the computer implementation was purely conventional” because “the 
use of computers for automatic monitoring-alarming was well known.” “Flook stands for 
the proposition that the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas cannot be 
circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the idea to a particular technological 
environment.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358. 
The claims in Diehr, in contrast, were patentable. The claims likewise “employed a 
well-known mathematical equation.” A computer performed the calculations as part of a 
broader process for curing rubber, but “the process as a whole did not thereby become 
unpatentable subject matter.” Instead, the Court looked to how the claims “used that 
equation in a process designed to solve a technological problem in conventional industry 
practice.” When looked at as a whole, “the claims in Diehr were patent eligible because 
they improved an existing technological process, not because they were implemented on 
a computer.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358. 
1 
The district court determined that claim 1 of the ‘567 patent is “drawn to the abstract 
idea of automated rules-based use of morph targets and delta sets for lip-synchronized 
three-dimensional animation.” We disagree. We have previously cautioned that courts 
“must be careful to avoid oversimplifying the claims” by looking at them generally and 
failing to account for the specific requirements of the claims. Here, the claims are limited 
to rules with specific characteristics. As the district court recognized during claim 
construction, “the claims themselves set out meaningful requirements for the first set of 
rules: they ‘define a morph weight set stream as a function of phoneme sequence and 
times associated with said phoneme sequence.’” They further require “applying said first 
set of rules to each sub-sequence . . . of timed phonemes.” Whether at step one or step two 
of the Alice test, in determining the patentability of a method, a court must look to the 
claims as an ordered combination, without ignoring the requirements of the individual 
steps. The specific, claimed features of these rules allow for the improvement realized by 
the invention. 
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As the specification confirms, the claimed improvement here is allowing computers 
to produce “accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in animated 
characters” that previously could only be produced by human animators. As the district 
court correctly recognized, this computer automation is realized by improving the prior 
art through “the use of rules, rather than artists, to set the morph weights and transitions 
between phonemes.” The rules are limiting in that they define morph weight sets as a 
function of the timing of phoneme sub-sequences. Defendants do not dispute that 
processes that automate tasks that humans are capable of performing are patent eligible 
if properly claimed; instead, they argue that the claims here are abstract because they do 
not claim specific rules. This argument echoes the district court’s finding that the claims 
improperly purport to cover all rules. The claimed rules here, however, are limited to rules 
with certain common characteristics, i.e., a genus. 
Claims to the genus of an invention, rather than a particular species, have long been 
acknowledged as patentable. E.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980) 
(patentable claim to “a bacterium from the genus Pseudomonas containing therein at least 
two stable energy-generating plasmids, each of said plasmids providing a separate 
hydrocarbon degradative pathway.”). Patent law has evolved to place additional 
requirements on patentees seeking to claim a genus; however, these limits have not been 
in relation to the abstract idea exception to § 101. Rather they have principally been in 
terms of whether the patentee has satisfied the tradeoff of broad disclosure for broad claim 
scope implicit in 35 U.S.C. § 112. It is self-evident that genus claims create a greater risk of 
preemption, thus implicating the primary concern driving § 101 jurisprudence, but this 
does not mean they are unpatentable. 
The preemption concern arises when the claims are not directed to a specific invention 
and instead improperly monopolize “the basic tools of scientific and technological work.” 
The abstract idea exception has been applied to prevent patenting of claims that abstractly 
cover results where “it matters not by what process or machinery the result is 
accomplished.” Morse, 56 U.S. at 113; see also Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301. “A patent is not good 
for an effect, or the result of a certain process” because such patents “would prohibit all 
other persons from making the same thing by any means whatsoever.” Le Roy v. Tatham, 
55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1853). A patent may issue “for the means or method of 
producing a certain result, or effect, and not for the result or effect produced.” Diehr, 450 
U.S. 175, 182 n.7. We therefore look to whether the claims in these patents focus on a 
specific means or method that improves the relevant technology or are instead directed to 
a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and 
machinery.  
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2 
Claim 1 of the ’576 patent is focused on a specific asserted improvement in computer 
animation, i.e., the automatic use of rules of a particular type. We disagree with 
Defendants’ arguments that the claims simply use a computer as a tool to automate 
conventional activity. While the rules are embodied in computer software that is 
processed by general-purpose computers, Defendants provided no evidence that the 
process previously used by animators is the same as the process required by the claims. 
In support, Defendants point to the background section of the patents, but that 
information makes no suggestion that animators were previously employing the type of 
rules required by claim 1. Defendants concede an animator’s process was driven by 
subjective determinations rather than specific, limited mathematical rules. The prior art 
“animator would decide what the animated face should look like at key points in time 
between the start and end times, and then ‘draw’ the face at those times.” The computer 
here is employed to perform a distinct process to automate a task previously performed 
by humans. McRO states that animators would initially set keyframes at the point a 
phoneme was pronounced to represent the corresponding morph target as a starting point 
for further fine tuning. This activity, even if automated by rules, would not be within the 
scope of the claims because it does not evaluate sub-sequences, generate transition 
parameters or apply transition parameters to create a final morph weight set. It is the 
incorporation of the claimed rules, not the use of the computer, that “improved the 
existing technological process” by allowing the automation of further tasks. This is unlike 
Flook, Bilski, and Alice, where the claimed computer-automated process and the prior 
method were carried out in the same way. 
Further, the automation goes beyond merely “organizing existing information into a 
new form” or carrying out a fundamental economic practice. The claimed process uses a 
combined order of specific rules that renders information into a specific format that is then 
used and applied to create desired results: a sequence of synchronized, animated 
characters. While the result may not be tangible, there is nothing that requires a method 
“be tied to a machine or transform an article” to be patentable. The concern underlying 
the exceptions to § 101 is not tangibility, but preemption. Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1301. 
The limitations in claim 1 prevent preemption of all processes for achieving automated 
lip-synchronization of 3–D characters. McRO has demonstrated that motion capture 
animation provides an alternative process for automatically animating lip 
synchronization and facial expressions. Even so, we have recognized that “the absence of 
complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” The narrower concern here 
is whether the claimed genus of rules preempts all techniques for automating 3–D 
animation that rely on rules. Claim 1 requires that the rules be rendered in a specific way: 
as a relationship between sub-sequences of phonemes, timing, and the weight to which 
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each phoneme is expressed visually at a particular timing (as represented by the morph 
weight set). The specific structure of the claimed rules would prevent broad preemption 
of all rules-based means of automating lip synchronization, unless the limits of the rules 
themselves are broad enough to cover all possible approaches.  
. . . 
Defendants’ attorney’s argument that any rules-based lip-synchronization process 
must use the claimed type of rules has appeal, but no record evidence supports this 
conclusion. Defendants again rely only on the patents’ description of one type of rules, 
but the description of one set of rules does not mean that there exists only one set of rules, 
and does not support the view that other possible types of rules with different 
characteristics do not exist. The only information cited to this court about the relationship 
between speech and face shape points to the conclusion that there are many other possible 
approaches to automating lip synchronization using rules. For example, Amicus cites 
Kiyoshi Honda, Physiological Processes of Speech Processing, in SPRINGER HANDBOOK OF 
SPEECH PRODUCTION 7 (Jacob Benesty et al. eds., 2008), as support for the proposition that 
the claimed rules reflect natural laws. Honda shows, however, that the interaction 
between vocalization and facial expression is very complex, and there are relationships 
present other than those required by the claimed rules. This complex interaction permits 
development of alternative rules-based methods of animating lip synchronization and 
facial expressions of three-dimensional characters, such as simulating the muscle action 
underlying characters’ facial expressions. Under these circumstances, therefore, we need 
not assume that future alternative discoveries are foreclosed. 
Here, the structure of the limited rules reflects a specific implementation not 
demonstrated as that which “any animator engaged in the search for an automation 
process would likely have utilized.” By incorporating the specific features of the rules as 
claim limitations, claim 1 is limited to a specific process for automatically animating 
characters using particular information and techniques and does not preempt approaches 
that use rules of a different structure or different techniques. See Morse, 56 U.S. at 113. 
When looked at as a whole, claim 1 is directed to a patentable, technological improvement 
over the existing, manual 3–D animation techniques. The claim uses the limited rules in a 
process specifically designed to achieve an improved technological result in conventional 
industry practice. . . .  
Because we find that claim 1 is not directed to ineligible subject matter, we do not 
reach Alice step two. . . . 
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Context and Application 
1. The claims in McRO were deemed to be directed to patentable subject matter. In 
contrast, the claims in BASCOM were deemed to be directed to an ineligible abstract idea 
(although they were ultimately eligible because they contained an inventive concept). 
What differences in the claims account for this? 
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc. 
788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
REYNA, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal is from a grant of summary judgment of invalidity of the asserted claims 
of U.S. Patent No. 6,258,540. The United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California found that the asserted claims of the ′540 patent are not directed to patent 
eligible subject matter and are therefore invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. For the reasons 
explained below, we affirm. 
I 
In 1996, Drs. Dennis Lo and James Wainscoat discovered cell-free fetal DNA 
(“cffDNA”) in maternal plasma and serum, the portion of maternal blood samples that 
other researchers had previously discarded as medical waste. cffDNA is non-cellular fetal 
DNA that circulates freely in the blood stream of a pregnant woman. Applying a 
combination of known laboratory techniques to their discovery, Drs. Lo and Wainscoat 
implemented a method for detecting the small fraction of paternally inherited cffDNA in 
maternal plasma or serum to determine fetal characteristics, such as gender. The 
invention, commercialized by Sequenom as its MaterniT21 test, created an alternative for 
prenatal diagnosis of fetal DNA that avoids the risks of widely-used techniques that took 
samples from the fetus or placenta. In 2001, Drs. Lo and Wainscoat obtained the ’540 
patent . . . . 
The parties agree that the patent does not claim cffDNA or paternally inherited 
cffDNA. Instead, the ’540 patent claims certain methods of using cffDNA. The steps of the 
method of claim 1 . . . include amplifying the cffDNA contained in a sample of a plasma 
or serum from a pregnant female and detecting the paternally inherited cffDNA. . . . In 
the amplification step, DNA is extracted from the serum or plasma samples and amplified 
by polymerase chain reaction (“PCR”) or another method. PCR exponentially amplifies 
the cffDNA sample to detectable levels. 
In the detecting step, the lab technician adds the amplified cffDNA to an agarose gel 
containing ethidium bromide to stain and visualize the paternally inherited cffDNA. 
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The ’540 patent also provides for making a diagnosis of certain fetal characteristics 
based on the detection of paternally inherited cffDNA. The specification explains that 
analysis of cffDNA permits more efficient determination of genetic defects and that a 
pregnant woman carrying a fetus with certain genetic defects will have more cffDNA in 
her blood than will a woman with a normal fetus. 
Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 19–22, 24, and 25 of the ’540 patent are at issue in this appeal. 
Independent claim 1 [which the parties stipulated is representative] requires: 
1. A method for detecting a paternally inherited nucleic acid of fetal origin 
performed on a maternal serum or plasma sample from a pregnant female, which 
method comprises 
amplifying a paternally inherited nucleic acid from the serum or plasma sample 
and 
detecting the presence of a paternally inherited nucleic acid of fetal origin in the 
sample. 
II 
Appellee Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. . . . makes and sells the Harmony Test, a non-
invasive test used for prenatal diagnosis of certain fetal characteristics. . . . 
. . . [T]he parties filed cross motions for summary judgment regarding invalidity under 
35 U.S.C. § 101. The district court agreed with Ariosa’s argument that the claims of the 
’540 patent were directed to the natural phenomenon of paternally inherited cffDNA and 
that the claims did not add enough to the natural phenomenon to make the claims patent 
eligible under § 101. . . . 
III 
We review . . . de novo the question of whether a claim is invalid under section 101. 
. . . 
In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), the 
Supreme Court set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications 
of those concepts. First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-
ineligible concept. If the answer is yes, then we next consider the elements of each claim 
both individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine whether additional 
elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible application. The 
Supreme Court has described the second step of this analysis as a search for an “inventive 
concept”—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure that the 
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patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept 
itself.” 
. . . [T]he asserted claims of the ’540 patent are directed to a multistep method that 
starts with cffDNA taken from a sample of maternal plasma or serum—a naturally 
occurring non-cellular fetal DNA that circulates freely in the blood stream of a pregnant 
woman. It is undisputed that the existence of cffDNA in maternal blood is a natural 
phenomenon. Sequenom does not contend that Drs. Lo and Wainscoat created or altered 
any of the genetic information encoded in the cffDNA, and it is undisputed that the 
location of the nucleic acids existed in nature before Drs. Lo and Wainscoat found them. 
The method ends with paternally inherited cffDNA, which is also a natural phenomenon. 
The method therefore begins and ends with a natural phenomenon. Thus, the claims are 
directed to matter that is naturally occurring. 
The written description supports the conclusion that the claims of the ’540 patent are 
directed to a naturally occurring thing or natural phenomenon. In the Summary and 
Objects of the Invention section of the ’540 patent, the patent states that “it has now been 
discovered that foetal DNA is detectable in maternal serum or plasma samples.” The 
patent goes on to state that “this is a surprising and unexpected finding; maternal plasma 
is the very material that is routinely discarded by investigators studying noninvasive 
prenatal diagnosis using foetal cells in maternal blood.” In the discussion, the patent 
notes: “In this study we have demonstrated the feasibility of performing non-invasive 
foetal RhD genotyping from maternal plasma. This represents the first description of 
single gene diagnosis from maternal plasma.” 
Further, the description of the invention notes: “we have demonstrated that foetal 
DNA is present in maternal plasma and serum,” and “these observations indicate that 
maternal plasma/serum DNA may be a useful source of material for the non-invasive 
prenatal diagnosis of certain genetic disorders.” The patent also states: “the most 
important observation in this study is the very high concentration of foetal DNA in 
maternal plasma and serum.” Thus, the claims at issue, as informed by the specification, 
are generally directed to detecting the presence of a naturally occurring thing or a natural 
phenomenon, cffDNA in maternal plasma or serum. . . . 
Because the claims at issue are directed to naturally occurring phenomena, we turn to 
the second step of Mayo’s framework. In the second step, we examine the elements of the 
claim to determine whether the claim contains an inventive concept sufficient to 
“transform” the claimed naturally occurring phenomenon into a patent-eligible 
application. We conclude that the practice of the method claims does not result in an 
inventive concept that transforms the natural phenomenon of cffDNA into a patentable 
invention. 
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Mayo made clear that transformation into a patent-eligible application requires “more 
than simply stating the law of nature while adding the words ‘apply it.’” A claim that 
recites an abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon must include “additional 
features” to ensure “that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize 
the abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon.” For process claims that 
encompass natural phenomenon, the process steps are the additional features that must 
be new and useful. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591 (1978).  
. . . 
Like the patentee in Mayo, Sequenom contends that the claimed methods are patent 
eligible applications of a natural phenomenon, specifically a method for detecting 
paternally inherited cffDNA. Using methods like PCR to amplify and detect cffDNA was 
well-understood, routine, and conventional activity in 1997. The method at issue here 
amounts to a general instruction to doctors to apply routine, conventional techniques 
when seeking to detect cffDNA. Because the method steps were well-understood, 
conventional and routine, the method of detecting paternally inherited cffDNA is not new 
and useful. The only subject matter new and useful as of the date of the application was 
the discovery of the presence of cffDNA in maternal plasma or serum. 
The specification of the ’540 patent confirms that the preparation and amplification of 
DNA sequences in plasma or serum were well-understood, routine, conventional 
activities performed by doctors in 1997. The ’540 patent provides that “the preparation of 
serum or plasma from the maternal blood sample is carried out by standard techniques.” 
It also provides that “standard nucleic acid amplification systems can be used, including 
PCR, the ligase chain reaction, nucleic acid sequence based amplification (NASBA), 
branched DNA methods, and so on.” 
Other evidence supports this conclusion. For example, Sequenom’s expert, Dr. Evans, 
testified at deposition that PCR and other methodologies for amplifying DNA were 
“already well known in science in 1997.” Similarly, in a declaration filed during 
prosecution of the ’540 patent, Dr. Lo testified that “suitable amplification techniques can 
be ordinary PCR or more sophisticated developments thereof, but these techniques were 
all known in the literature before the date of my invention.” 
The detecting step was similarly well-understood, routine, and conventional. During 
prosecution of the application that became the ’540 patent, the applicant stated: 
. . . 
One skilled in the art is readily able to apply the teachings of the present 
application to any one of the well-known techniques for detection of DNA with a 
view to analysis of foetal DNA in paternal [sic] plasma or serum. 
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. . . 
The dependent claims are broad examples of how to detect cffDNA in maternal 
plasma. The dependent claims are focused on the use of the natural phenomenon in 
combination with well-understood, routine, and conventional activity. For example, claim 
2 identifies the polymerase chain reaction as the amplification technique to be used in the 
detection method of claim 1. As noted above, this technique was well-understood, routine, 
and conventional in 1997, as specified by the patent itself. Like claim 1, claims 5 and 8 
focus on detecting a specific chromosome within the cffDNA—a natural phenomenon—
again, adding no inventive concept to the limitations of claim 1. None of the remaining 
asserted dependent or independent claims differ substantially from these claims. Thus, in 
this case, appending routine, conventional steps to a natural phenomenon, specified at a 
high level of generality, is not enough to supply an inventive concept. Where claims of a 
method patent are directed to an application that starts and ends with a naturally 
occurring phenomenon, the patent fails to disclose patent eligible subject matter if the 
methods themselves are conventional, routine and well understood applications in the 
art. The claims of the ’540 patent at issue in this appeal are not directed to patent eligible 
subject matter and are, therefore, invalid. 
IV 
In its opinion, the district court addressed the principle of preemption . . . : 
The ’540 patent does not merely claim uses or applications of cffDNA, it claims 
methods for detecting the natural phenomenon. Because generally one must be 
able to find a natural phenomenon to use it and apply it, claims covering the only 
commercially viable way of detecting that phenomenon do carry a substantial risk 
of preempting all practical uses of it.  
Sequenom argues that there are numerous other uses of cffDNA aside from those claimed 
in the ’540 patent, and thus, the ’540 patent does not preempt all uses of cffDNA . . . . 
Sequenom also argues that “a method applying or using a natural phenomenon in a 
manner that does not preclude alternative methods in the same field is non-preemptive, 
and, by definition, patent-eligible under Section 101.” Similarly, Sequenom and amici 
argue that because the particular application of the natural phenomena that the ’540 
patent claims embody are narrow and specific, the claims should be upheld. . . . 
 The Supreme Court has made clear that the principle of preemption is the basis for 
the judicial exceptions to patentability. For this reason, questions on preemption are 
inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis. The concern is that “patent law not inhibit 
further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of these building blocks of human 
ingenuity.” In other words, patent claims should not prevent the use of the basic building 
blocks of technology—abstract ideas, naturally occurring phenomena, and natural laws. 
 CHAPTER 3  
156 
While preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete 
preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility. In this case, Sequenom’s attempt to 
limit the breadth of the claims by showing alternative uses of cffDNA outside of the scope 
of the claims does not change the conclusion that the claims are directed to patent 
ineligible subject matter. Where a patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent 
ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework, as they are in this case, preemption 
concerns are fully addressed and made moot. 
Sequenom and amici encourage us to draw distinctions among natural phenomena 
based on whether or not they will interfere significantly with innovation in other fields 
now or in the future. The Supreme Court cases, however, have not distinguished among 
different laws of nature or natural phenomenon according to whether or not the principles 
they embody are sufficiently narrow. In Parker v. Flook, the Supreme Court stated the issue 
in the case as follows: “The question in this case is whether the identification of a limited 
category of useful, though conventional, post-solution applications of such a formula 
makes respondent’s method eligible for patent protection.” The answer to that question 
was “no” because granting exclusive rights to the mathematical formula would be 
exempting it from any future use. 
V 
For completeness, we address Sequenom’s remaining arguments. Sequenom argues 
that “before the ’540 patent, no one was using the plasma or serum of pregnant mothers to 
amplify and detect paternally-inherited cffDNA.” This argument implies that the 
inventive concept lies in the discovery of cffDNA in plasma or serum. Even if so, this is 
not the invention claimed by the ’540 patent. 
Sequenom further argues that “one simple measure of Drs. Lo and Wainscoat’s 
contribution is that their 1997 Lancet publication has been cited over a thousand times.” 
Sequenom also notes that “the method reflects a significant human contribution in that 
Drs. Lo and Wainscoat combined and utilized man-made tools of biotechnology in a new 
way that revolutionized prenatal care.” We agree but . . . the Supreme Court instructs that 
“groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 
101 inquiry.” The discovery of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes was a significant 
contribution to the medical field, but it was not patentable. While Drs. Lo and Wainscoat’s 
discovery regarding cffDNA may have been a significant contribution to the medical field, 
that alone does not make it patentable. We do not disagree that detecting cffDNA in 
maternal plasma or serum that before was discarded as waste material is a positive and 
valuable contribution to science. But even such valuable contributions can fall short of 
statutory patentable subject matter . . . . 
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LINN, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
I join the court’s opinion invalidating the claims of the ’540 patent only because I am 
bound by the sweeping language of the test set out in Mayo Collaborative Services 
v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012). In my view, the breadth of the second 
part of the test was unnecessary to the decision reached in Mayo. This case represents the 
consequence—perhaps unintended—of that broad language in excluding a meritorious 
invention from the patent protection it deserves and should have been entitled to retain. 
. . . 
In applying the second part of the test, the Supreme Court in Mayo discounted, 
seemingly without qualification, any “post-solution activity that is purely conventional or 
obvious.” This was unnecessary in Mayo, because doctors were already performing in 
combination all of the claimed steps of administering the drug at issue, measuring 
metabolite levels, and adjusting dosing based on the metabolite levels. 
In Diamond v. Diehr, the Supreme Court held that “a new combination of steps in a 
process may be patentable even though all the constituents of the combination were well-
known and in common use before the combination was made.” As Mayo explained: Diehr 
“pointed out that the basic mathematical equation, like a law of nature, was not 
patentable. But Diehr found the overall process patent eligible because of the way the 
additional steps of the process integrated the equation into the process as a whole.” 
Despite that recognition, Mayo discounted entirely the “conventional activity” recited in 
the claims in that case because the steps “add nothing specific to the laws of nature other 
than what is well-understood, routine, conventional activity, previously engaged in by 
those in the field.” While that conclusion might have been warranted in that case, given 
the fact that the “conventional activities” in Mayo were the very steps that doctors were 
already doing—administering the drug at issue, measuring metabolite levels, and 
adjusting dosing based on the metabolite levels—the Supreme Court did not limit its 
ruling to those particular facts and circumstances. 
The Supreme Court’s blanket dismissal of conventional post-solution steps leaves no 
room to distinguish Mayo from this case, even though here no one was amplifying and 
detecting paternally-inherited cffDNA using the plasma or serum of pregnant mothers. 
Indeed, the maternal plasma used to be “routinely discarded,” ’540 patent col. 1 ll.50–53, 
because, as Dr. Evans testified, “nobody thought that fetal cell-free DNA would be 
present.” 
It is hard to deny that Sequenom’s invention is truly meritorious. Prior to the ’540 
patent, prenatal diagnoses required invasive methods, which “presented a degree of risk 
to the mother and to the pregnancy.” Id. at col. 1 ll.16–17. The available “techniques were 
time-consuming or required expensive equipment.” Id. at col. 1 ll.17–37. Dr. Mark Evans 
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testified that “despite years of trying by multiple methods, no one was ever able to achieve 
acceptable success and accuracy.” In a groundbreaking invention, Drs. Lo and Wainscoat 
discovered that there was cell-free fetal DNA in the maternal plasma. The Royal Society 
lauded this discovery as “a paradigm shift in non-invasive prenatal diagnosis,” and the 
inventors’ article describing this invention has been cited well over a thousand times. The 
commercial embodiment of the invention, the MaterniT21 test, was the first marketed 
non-invasive prenatal diagnostic test for fetal aneuploidies, such as Down’s syndrome, 
and presented fewer risks and a more dependable rate of abnormality detection than other 
tests. Unlike in Mayo, the ’540 patent claims a new method that should be patent eligible. 
While the instructions in the claims at issue in Mayo had been widely used by doctors—
they had been measuring metabolites and recalculating dosages based on 
toxicity/inefficacy limits for years—here, the amplification and detection of cffDNA had 
never before been done. The new use of the previously discarded maternal plasma to 
achieve such an advantageous result is deserving of patent protection. Cf. Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Prometheus Rebound: Diagnostics, Nature, and Mathematical Algorithms, 122 YALE 
L.J. ONLINE 341, 343–44 (2013) (noting that despite Mayo’s declaration that a claim to “a 
new way of using an existing drug” is patentable, Mayo, it is unclear how a claim to new 
uses for existing drugs would survive Mayo’s sweeping test). 
In short, Sequenom’s invention is nothing like the invention at issue in Mayo. 
Sequenom “effectuated a practical result and benefit not previously attained,” so its patent 
would traditionally have been valid. But for the sweeping language in the Supreme 
Court’s Mayo opinion, I see no reason, in policy or statute, why this breakthrough 
invention should be deemed patent ineligible. 
Context and Application 
1. Of these three cases—BASCOM, McRO, and Ariosa—which contribution 
underlying the patent do you think contributed the most value to society (however you 
chose to understand “value to society”)? Which contribution most needed the incentives 
that patent law provides? 
2. Do you agree with the court’s view that the claims here were indistinguishable 
from those in Mayo? What could the inventors in Mayo and those in Ariosa have done 
differently—either with respect to their inventive work or with respect specifically to their 




Often, when people say “patents” they really mean “utility patents.” Utility patents, 
the only form of patent grant in the United States included in the Patent Act of 1790, are 
distinct from the later-added design and plant patents and will be the focus of this chapter. 
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides: 
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain 
a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. 
35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). The concept of utility also appears in § 112 of the Patent 
Act, which provides: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which 
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best 
mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention. 
35 U.S.C. § 112(a). These requirements—that a patentable invention be “useful” and that 
the patent document describe how to use it—form the basis for the utility doctrine.  
But what does it mean for an invention to be useful? In patent law, “useful” does not 
mean the same thing as important. Inventions surrounding frivolous pursuits are 
patentable; they are useful in that they serve the purpose of bringing their users pleasure. 
As Sarah Rajec and Andrew Gilden explain in Patenting Pleasure: 
The question of what is “useful” can be an incredibly complicated question about 
what pursuits are worthwhile and whether and how various inventions aid in 
those pursuits. Utility, it turns out, is inseparable from social norms about the 
worth of any given activity. . . A closer look shows that bringing pleasure has long 
been recognized as useful by the patent system. For example, the USPTO issued a 
patent to James L. Haven and Charles Hettrick in 1866 for a “new and useful 
bandelore,” now better known as a yo-yo. This was the same year Milton Bradley 
applied for a patent on a board game called “the checkered game of life,” which, 
although a game, is described as imparting on youthful minds “the great moral 
principles of virtue and vice.”  
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Andrew Gilden & Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Patenting Pleasure (draft at 12), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=3792793. 
A simple version of the utility doctrine is: A patented invention should have some 
purpose, and the specification should make that purpose clear. As you will see in Lowell 
v. Lewis, the courts have not always heavily enforced this patentability criteria, reasoning 
that there is little incentive to get or enforce patents on things that are useless and little 
cost to granting such patents. However, the utility requirement has served as a barrier in 
some circumstances. 
Courts have developed three distinct strands of utility doctrine from the statutory 
language quoted above. The first is credible or operable utility: Is the invention capable of 
doing what it says it does? The second is beneficial or moral utility: Does the invention 
provide any social benefit—or, is it at least not socially harmful? The third is practical 
utility: Does the patent describe a specific and substantial utility? An invention must 
satisfy all three requirements to qualify for a utility patent, although generally only one 
sort of utility is relevant to any particular case. 
A. Credible Utility 
Credible utility, also called operable utility, requires that a patent be able to do what 
it says it does. In simple terms, the doctrine bars patentability for impossible inventions, 
such as perpetual motion machines or time travel inventions. The Manual of Patent 
Examining Procedure instructs examiners not to impose a rejection based on lack of utility 
if the applicant has asserted a particular practical purpose and “the assertion would be 
considered credible by a person of ordinary skill in the art.” MPEP § 2107. Because the 
failure to assert that the invention credibly serves some purpose is also a failure to enable 
the invention, the MPEP pairs this rejection with an enablement rejection in an Examiner 
Note to the section. 
However, the bar to credible utility is fairly low. The Federal Circuit has held that 
invalidity requires the claimed invention must be “totally incapable of achieving a useful 
result,” Brooktree Corp.v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
Even if the invention performs a function “crudely,” that satisfies the requirement. And 
as we will see in In re Brana, partial success of an invention is enough to satisfy the 
requirement of credible utility. 
B. Beneficial Utility 
Beneficial utility, also called moral utility, can be traced to a pair of cases from 1817 in 
which Justice Story sat by designation in Massachusetts district court. While Lowell has 
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been cited to reject patents for lack of morality, the invention at issue—an improvement 
to a pump—was not challenged as immoral. As you read the case, consider what sorts of 
value judgments are appropriate for different legal, political, and social institutions. 
Lowell v. Lewis 
15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) 
STORY, Circuit Justice (charging jury). 
The present action is brought by the plaintiff for a supposed infringement of a patent-
right, granted, in 1813, to Mr. Jacob Perkins (from whom the plaintiff claims by 
assignment) for a new and useful improvement in the construction of pumps. The 
defendant asserts, in the first place, that the invention is neither new nor useful . . . . 
To entitle the plaintiff to a verdict, he must establish, that his machine is a new and 
useful invention; and of these facts his patent is to be considered merely prima facie 
evidence of a very slight nature. He must, in the first place, establish it to be a useful 
invention; for the law will not allow the plaintiff to recover, if the invention be of a 
mischievous or injurious tendency. The defendant, however, has asserted a much more 
broad and sweeping doctrine; and one, which I feel myself called upon to negative in the 
most explicit manner. He contends, that it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove, that his 
invention is of general utility; so that in fact, for the ordinary purposes of life, it must 
supersede the pumps in common use. In short, that it must be, for the public, a better 
pump than the common pump; and that unless the plaintiff can establish this position, the 
law will not give him the benefit of a patent, even though in some peculiar cases his 
invention might be applied with advantage. I do not so understand the law. . . . All that 
the law requires is, that the invention should not be frivolous or injurious to the well-
being, good policy, or sound morals of society. The word ‘useful,’ therefore, is 
incorporated into the act in contradistinction to mischievous or immoral. For instance, a 
new invention to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to facilitate private 
assassination, is not a patentable invention. But if the invention steers wide of these 
objections, whether it be more or less useful is a circumstance very material to the interests 
of the patentee, but of no importance to the public. If it be not extensively useful, it will 
silently sink into contempt and disregard. There is no pretence, that Mr. Perkins’ pump is 
a mischievous invention; and if it has been used injuriously to the patentee by the 
defendant, it certainly does not lie in his mouth to contest its general utility. Indeed the 
defendant asserts, that Baker’s pump is useful in a very eminent degree, and, if it be 
substantially the same as Perkins’s, there is an end of the objection; if it be not substantially 
the same, then the plaintiff must fail in his action. So that, in either view, the abstract 
question seems hardly of any importance in this cause. . . . 
 CHAPTER 4  
162 
Context & Application 
1. Lowell has come to stand for the proposition that the Patent Office and courts need 
not evaluate the relative merits of an invention in determining utility. Why does the court 
say that relative utility is “very material to the interests of the patentee, but of no 
importance to the public”? What happens to inventions that are useful, but not as useful 
as other inventions? And what do you make of the next sentence, where the court says 
that if the pumps are substantially the same, then there is an end of the objection (about 
utility)? 
2. Why is this case cited for its holding about the morality of inventions? In another 
case decided the same year, Justice Story explained: 
By useful invention, in the statute, is meant such a one as may be applied to some 
beneficial use in society, in contradistinction to an invention, which is injurious to 
the morals, the health, or the good order of society. It is not necessary to establish, 
that the invention is of such general utility, as to supersede all other inventions 
now in practice to accomplish the same purpose. It is sufficient, that it has no 
obnoxious or mischievous tendency, that it may be applied to practical uses, and 
that so far as it is applied, it is salutary. If its practical utility be very limited, it will 
follow, that it will be of little or no profit to the inventor; and if it be trifling, it will 
sink into utter neglect. The law, however, does not look to the degree of utility; it 
simply requires, that it shall be capable of use, and that the use is such as sound 
morals and policy do not discountenance or prohibit. 
Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817). 
Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc. 
185 F.3d 1364 (1999) 
BRYSON, Circuit Judge. 
The district court in this case held a patent invalid for lack of utility on the ground that 
the patented invention was designed to deceive customers by imitating another product 
and thereby increasing sales of a particular good. We reverse and remand. 
Juicy Whip, Inc., is the assignee of US Pat. No. 5,575,405, which is entitled “Post–Mix 
Beverage Dispenser With an Associated Simulated Display of Beverage.” A “post-mix” 
beverage dispenser stores beverage syrup concentrate and water in separate locations 
until the beverage is ready to be dispensed. The syrup and water are mixed together 
immediately before the beverage is dispensed, which is usually after the consumer 
requests the beverage. In contrast, in a “pre-mix” beverage dispenser, the syrup 
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concentrate and water are pre-mixed and the beverage is stored in a display reservoir 
bowl until it is ready to be dispensed. The display bowl is said to stimulate impulse buying 
by providing the consumer with a visual beverage display. A pre-mix display bowl, 
however, has a limited capacity and is subject to contamination by bacteria. It therefore 
must be refilled and cleaned frequently. 
. . . 
Section 101 of the Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 101, provides that “whoever invents 
or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new and useful improvement thereof,” may obtain a patent on the invention or 
discovery. The threshold of utility is not high: An invention is “useful” under section 101 
if it is capable of providing some identifiable benefit. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 
534, (1966); Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 
1992) (“To violate § 101 the claimed device must be totally incapable of achieving a useful 
result”); Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274, 275 (7th Cir. 1903) (test for utility is whether invention 
“is incapable of serving any beneficial end”). 
 To be sure, since Justice Story’s opinion in Lowell v. Lewis, it has been stated that 
inventions that are “injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society” 
are unpatentable. As examples of such inventions, Justice Story listed “a new invention to 
poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to facilitate private assassination.” Courts 
have continued to recite Justice Story’s formulation, but the principle that inventions are 
invalid if they are principally designed to serve immoral or illegal purposes has not been 
applied broadly in recent years. For example, years ago courts invalidated patents on 
gambling devices on the ground that they were immoral, but that is no longer the law. 
In holding the patent in this case invalid for lack of utility, the district court relied on 
two Second Circuit cases dating from the early years of this century, Rickard v. Du Bon, 
103 F. 868 (2d Cir. 1900), and Scott & Williams v. Aristo Hosiery Co., 7 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 
1925). In the Rickard case, the court held invalid a patent on a process for treating tobacco 
plants to make their leaves appear spotted. At the time of the invention, according to the 
court, cigar smokers considered cigars with spotted wrappers to be of superior quality, 
and the invention was designed to make unspotted tobacco leaves appear to be of the 
spotted—and thus more desirable—type. The court noted that the invention did not 
promote the burning quality of the leaf or improve its quality in any way; “the only effect, 
if not the only object, of such treatment, is to spot the tobacco, and counterfeit the leaf 
spotted by natural causes.” 
The Aristo Hosiery case concerned a patent claiming a seamless stocking with a 
structure on the back of the stocking that imitated a seamed stocking. The imitation was 
commercially useful because at the time of the invention many consumers regarded seams 
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in stockings as an indication of higher quality. The court noted that the imitation seam did 
not “change or improve the structure or the utility of the article,” and that the record in 
the case justified the conclusion that true seamed stockings were superior to the seamless 
stockings that were the subject of the patent. “At best,” the court stated, “the seamless 
stocking has imitation marks for the purposes of deception, and the idea prevails that with 
such imitation the article is more salable.” That was not enough, the court concluded, to 
render the invention patentable. 
 We decline to follow Rickard and Aristo Hosiery, as we do not regard them as 
representing the correct view of the doctrine of utility under the Patent Act of 1952. The 
fact that one product can be altered to make it look like another is in itself a specific benefit 
sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement of utility. 
It is not at all unusual for a product to be designed to appear to viewers to be 
something it is not. For example, cubic zirconium is designed to simulate a diamond, 
imitation gold leaf is designed to imitate real gold leaf, synthetic fabrics are designed to 
simulate expensive natural fabrics, and imitation leather is designed to look like real 
leather. In each case, the invention of the product or process that makes such imitation 
possible has “utility” within the meaning of the patent statute, and indeed there are 
numerous patents directed toward making one product imitate another. See, e.g., U.S. Pat. 
No. 5,762,968 (method for producing imitation grill marks on food without using heat); 
U.S. Pat. No. 5,899,038 (laminated flooring imitating wood); U.S. Pat. No. 5,571,545 
(imitation hamburger). Much of the value of such products resides in the fact that they 
appear to be something they are not. Thus, in this case the claimed post-mix dispenser 
meets the statutory requirement of utility by embodying the features of a post-mix 
dispenser while imitating the visual appearance of a pre-mix dispenser. 
The fact that customers may believe they are receiving fluid directly from the display 
tank does not deprive the invention of utility. Orange Bang has not argued that it is 
unlawful to display a representation of the beverage in the manner that fluid is displayed 
in the reservoir of the invention, even though the fluid is not what the customer will 
actually receive. Moreover, even if the use of a reservoir containing fluid that is not 
dispensed is considered deceptive, that is not by itself sufficient to render the invention 
unpatentable. The requirement of “utility” in patent law is not a directive to the Patent 
and Trademark Office or the courts to serve as arbiters of deceptive trade practices. Other 
agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug Administration, 
are assigned the task of protecting consumers from fraud and deception in the sale of food 
products. As the Supreme Court put the point more generally, “Congress never intended 
that the patent laws should displace the police powers of the States, meaning by that term 
those powers by which the health, good order, peace and general welfare of the 
community are promoted.” Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 347–48 (1880). 
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Of course, Congress is free to declare particular types of inventions unpatentable for 
a variety of reasons, including deceptiveness. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (exempting from 
patent protection inventions useful solely in connection with special nuclear material or 
atomic weapons). Until such time as Congress does so, however, we find no basis in 
section 101 to hold that inventions can be ruled unpatentable for lack of utility simply 
because they have the capacity to fool some members of the public. The district court 
therefore erred in holding that the invention of the ’405 patent lacks utility because it 
deceives the public through imitation in a manner that is designed to increase product 
sales. Reversed and remanded. 
Context & Application 
1. Is deception “injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society?” 
Does it matter who is being deceived—or, to put it another way, does it matter who the 
audience for the deception is? Is the juice dispenser at issue in Juicy Whip more comparable 
to the gambling machines or the hosiery and tobacco leaves that were found unpatentable 
in the past? 
2. Lowell and Juicy Whip are separated by 182 years, which included massive 
changes in social values and in patent doctrine. Perhaps the more important legal change 
was the rise of the administrative state. Is there reason to think that the existence of the 
FDA and the FTC make it less necessary to have the PTO determine what inventions are 
“injurious” to morals? Which direction does it cut that some agencies make ex ante 
decisions on protection (PTO) and market access (FDA) while others govern behavior ex 
post (FTC)? Does a robust moral utility requirement make it more or less likely that 
immoral goods will make it to market? 
C. Practical Utility 
Practical utility is the area of utility doctrine with the most bite, particularly in modern 
times. It has developed primarily in fields surrounding chemistry and biochemistry. In 
mechanical fields, it is generally a simple enough matter to describe the utility of a 
machine—it moves itself or things from one place or state of matter to another place or 
state of matter. But it can be more difficult to discern or describe the utility of a new 
chemical composition. Sean Seymore has pointed out that judicial application of the 
doctrine results in technology-specific patentability requirements, allowing patents on 
inventions in most fields but providing a more serious bar to patentability in chemical 
fields as well as other unpredictable fields or new technologies that aren’t yet well 
understood. Making Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1046 (2014). This is because of the 
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requirement that an inventor state the purpose of her invention. In unpredictable fields, 
inventors may discover a new molecule or develop a new organism that has promising 
qualities, but the specific use of which is not yet known. In a sense, the utility requirement, 
as applied in these novel and unpredictable technologies, is a timing requirement: an 
inventor must have done enough research to state a use for her invention before applying 
for a patent. 
The Supreme Court set forth the current law of practical utility in Brenner v. Manson 
(1960). Two Federal Circuit cases, In re Brana (1995) and In re Fisher (2005) interpret and 
apply Brenner in different ways. As you read the cases, think about whether both Federal 
Circuit interpretations are consistent with Brenner, and with each other. What 
distinguishes them from each other, besides time? And, to the extent that practical utility 
is often a timing question of how far along researchers are in their discoveries, are 
differences in the state of the art sufficient to explain the different case outcomes? 
Brenner v. Manson 
383 U.S. 519 (1966) 
[In December 1957, Howard Ringold and George Rosenkranz applied for a patent on 
a novel process for making a known steroid, claiming priority to a Mexican filing on 
December 17, 1956. Manson filed an application for the same method three years later, but 
claimed an earlier priority date and requested an interference to determine who was 
entitled to the patent, under the first to invent system of priority. The Patent Office denied 
Manson’s application on the ground that he had not disclosed utility for the chemical 
compound that was produced by the claimed process, unpersuaded by his argument that 
the steroids produced were of a class that was being screened for tumor-inhibiting 
properties in mice and that an adjacent homologue had proven effective in that role. The 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed, holding that “where a claimed process 
produces a known product it is not necessary to show utility for the product” so long as 
the product “is not alleged to be detrimental to the public interest.” The Court granted 
certiorari.] 
Mr. Justice FORTAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Our starting point is the proposition, neither disputed nor disputable, that one may 
patent only that which is “useful.” . . . [T]he concept of utility has maintained a central 
place in all of our patent legislation, beginning with the first patent law in 1790 and 
culminating in the present law’s provision that  
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Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain 
a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. 
 As is so often the case, however, a simple, everyday word can be pregnant with 
ambiguity when applied to the facts of life. That this is so is demonstrated by the present 
conflict between the Patent Office and the CCPA over how the test is to be applied to a 
chemical process which yields an already known product whose utility—other than as a 
possible object of scientific inquiry—has not yet been evidenced. It was not long ago that 
agency and court seemed of one mind on the question. In Application of Bremner, 182 F.2d 
216, 217 (C.C.P.A.) the court affirmed rejection by the Patent Office of both process and 
product claims. It noted that “no use for the products claimed to be developed by the 
processes had been shown in the specification.” It held that “It was never intended that a 
patent be granted upon a product, or a process producing a product, unless such product 
be useful.” Nor was this new doctrine in the court. 
The Patent Office has remained steadfast in this view. The CCPA, however, has moved 
sharply away from Bremner. The trend began in Application of Nelson, 280 F.2d 172. There, 
the court reversed the Patent Office’s rejection of a claim on a process yielding chemical 
intermediates “useful to chemists doing research on steroids,” despite the absence of 
evidence that any of the steroids thus ultimately produced were themselves “useful.” The 
trend has accelerated, culminating in the present case where the court held it sufficient 
that a process produces the result intended and is not “detrimental to the public interest.” 
It is not remarkable that differences arise as to how the test of usefulness is to be 
applied to chemical processes. Even if we knew precisely what Congress meant in 1790 
when it devised the “new and useful” phraseology and in subsequent re-enactments of 
the test, we should have difficulty in applying it in the context of contemporary chemistry 
where research is as comprehensive as man’s grasp and where little or nothing is wholly 
beyond the pale of “utility”—if that word is given its broadest reach. 
Respondent does not—at least in the first instance—rest upon the extreme 
proposition, advanced by the court below, that a novel chemical process is patentable so 
long as it yields the intended product and so long as the product is not itself “detrimental.” 
Nor does he commit the outcome of his claim to the slightly more conventional 
proposition that any process is “useful” within the meaning of § 101 if it produces a 
compound whose potential usefulness is under investigation by serious scientific 
researchers, although he urges this position, too, as an alternative basis for affirming the 
decision of the CCPA. Rather, he begins with the much more orthodox argument that his 
process has a specific utility which would entitle him to a declaration of interference even 
under the Patent Office’s reading of §101. The claim is that the supporting affidavits filed 
pursuant to Rule 204(b), by reference to Ringold’s 1956 article, reveal that an adjacent 
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homologue of the steroid yielded by his process has been demonstrated to have tumor-
inhibiting effects in mice, and that this discloses the requisite utility. We do not accept any 
of these theories as an adequate basis for overriding the determination of the Patent Office 
that the “utility” requirement has not been met. 
 Even on the assumption that the process would be patentable were respondent to 
show that the steroid produced had a tumor-inhibiting effect in mice, we would not 
overrule the Patent Office finding that respondent has not made such a showing. The 
Patent Office held that, despite the reference to the adjacent homologue, respondent’s 
papers did not disclose a sufficient likelihood that the steroid yielded by his process 
would have similar tumor-inhibiting characteristics. Indeed, respondent himself 
recognized that the presumption that adjacent homologues have the same utility has been 
challenged in the steroid field because of “a greater known unpredictability of compounds 
in that field.” In these circumstances and in this technical area, we would not overturn the 
finding of the Primary Examiner, affirmed by the Board of Appeals and not challenged 
by the CCPA. 
The second and third points of respondent’s argument present issues of much 
importance. Is a chemical process “useful” within the meaning of § 101 either (1) because 
it works—i.e., produces the intended product? or (2) because the compound yielded 
belongs to a class of compounds now the subject of serious scientific investigation? These 
contentions present the basic problem for our adjudication. Since we find no specific 
assistance in the legislative materials underlying § 101, we are remitted to an analysis of 
the problem in light of the general intent of Congress, the purposes of the patent system, 
and the implications of a decision one way or the other. 
In support of his plea that we attenuate the requirement of “utility,” respondent relies 
upon Justice Story’s well-known statement that a “useful” invention is one “which may 
be applied to a beneficial use in society, in contradistinction to an invention injurious to 
the morals, health, or good order of society, or frivolous and insignificant”—and upon the 
assertion that to do so would encourage inventors of new processes to publicize the event 
for the benefit of the entire scientific community, thus widening the search for uses and 
increasing the fund of scientific knowledge. Justice Story’s language sheds little light on 
our subject. Narrowly read, it does no more than compel us to decide whether the 
invention in question is “frivolous and insignificant”—a query no easier of application 
than the one built into the statute. Read more broadly, so as to allow the patenting of any 
invention not positively harmful to society, it places such a special meaning on the word 
“useful” that we cannot accept it in the absence of evidence that Congress so intended. 
There are, after all, many things in this world which may not be considered “useful” but 
which, nevertheless are totally without a capacity for harm. 
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It is true, of course, that one of the purposes of the patent system is to encourage 
dissemination of information concerning discoveries and inventions. And it may be that 
inability to patent a process to some extent discourages disclosure and leads to greater 
secrecy than would otherwise be the case. The inventor of the process, or the corporate 
organization by which he is employed, has some incentive to keep the invention secret 
while uses for the product are searched out. However, in light of the highly developed art 
of drafting patent claims so that they disclose as little useful information as possible—
while broadening the scope of the claim as widely as possible—the argument based upon 
the virtue of disclosure must be warily evaluated. Moreover, the pressure for secrecy is 
easily exaggerated, for if the inventor of a process cannot himself ascertain a “use” for that 
which his process yields, he has every incentive to make his invention known to those 
able to do so. Finally, how likely is disclosure of a patented process to spur research by 
others into the uses to which the product may be put? To the extent that the patentee has 
power to enforce his patent, there is little incentive for others to undertake a search for 
uses.  
Whatever weight is attached to the value of encouraging disclosure and of inhibiting 
secrecy, we believe a more compelling consideration is that a process patent in the 
chemical field, which has not been developed and pointed to the degree of specific utility, 
creates a monopoly of knowledge which should be granted only if clearly commanded by 
the statute. Until the process claim has been reduced to production of a product shown to 
be useful, the metes and bounds of that monopoly are not capable of precise delineation. 
It may engross a vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable area. Such a patent may confer 
power to block off whole areas of scientific development, without compensating benefit 
to the public. The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress 
for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with 
substantial utility. Unless and until a process is refined and developed to this point—
where specific benefit exists in currently available form—there is insufficient justification 
for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad field. 
 These arguments for and against the patentability of a process which either has no known 
use or is useful only in the sense that it may be an object of scientific research would apply 
equally to the patenting of the product produced by the process. Respondent appears to 
concede that with respect to a product, as opposed to a process, Congress has struck the 
balance on the side of nonpatentability unless “utility” is shown. Indeed, the decisions of 
the CCPA are in accord with the view that a product may not be patented absent a 
showing of utility greater than any adduced in the present case. We find absolutely no 
warrant for the proposition that although Congress intended that no patent be granted on 
a chemical compound whose sole “utility” consists of its potential role as an object of use-
testing, a different set of rules was meant to apply to the process which yielded the 
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unpatentable product. That proposition seems to us little more than an attempt to evade 
the impact of the rules which concededly govern patentability of the product itself. 
 This is not to say that we mean to disparage the importance of contributions to the 
fund of scientific information short of the invention of something “useful,” or that we are 
blind to the prospect that what now seems without “use” may tomorrow command the 
grateful attention of the public. But a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for 
the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion. “[A] patent system must be 
related to the world of commerce rather than to the realm of philosophy. . . .”  
The judgment of the CCPA is reversed. 
Mr. Justice HARLAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
What I find most troubling about the result reached by the Court is the impact it may 
have on chemical research. Chemistry is a highly interrelated field and a tangible benefit 
for society may be the outcome of a number of different discoveries, one discovery 
building upon the next. To encourage one chemist or research facility to invent and 
disseminate new processes and products may be vital to progress, although the product 
or process be without ‘utility’ as the Court defines the term, because that discovery 
permits someone else to take a further but perhaps less difficult step leading to a 
commercially useful item. In my view, our awareness in this age of the importance of 
achieving and publicizing basic research should lead this Court to resolve uncertainties 
in its favor and uphold the respondent’s position in this case.  
. . . 
Fully recognizing that there is ample room for disagreement on this problem when, as 
here, it is reviewed in the abstract, I believe the decision below should be affirmed. 
Context & Application 
1. What does the Court mean when it invokes “the world of commerce” in opposition 
to “the realm of philosophy?”  
2. Michael Risch has suggested reinvigorating the utility requirement through a 
doctrine of “commercial utility.” Risch explains that practical utility is already targeted 
towards commercial goals, but suggests that “granting patents only when a purpose is 
discovered might shift limited resources toward discovering how new chemicals might 
benefit society.” Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1195 (2010). What 
are the benefits of allowing patents only for inventions that are ready for commercial 
distribution? What are the costs? 
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In Re Brana 
51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
PLAGER, Circuit Judge. 
Miguel F. Brana, et al. (applicants), appeal the . . . decision of the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (Board). The 
Board affirmed the examiner’s rejection of claims 10–13 of patent application Serial No. 
533,944 under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 [for lack of utility]. 
 I  
On June 30, 1988, applicants filed patent application Serial No. 213,690 (the ’690 
application) directed to 5–nitrobenzo[de]isoquinoline–1,3–dione compounds, for use as 
antitumor substances, having the following formula: 
 
where n is 1 or 2, R1 and R2 are identical or different and are each hydrogen, C1–C6–alkyl, 
C1–C6–hydroxyalkyl, pyrrolidinyl, morpholino, piperidinyl or piperacinyl, and R3 and 
R4 are identical or different and are each hydrogen, C1–C6–alkyl, C1–C6–acyl, C2–C7–
alkoxycarbonyl, ureyl, aminocarbonyl or C2–C7–alkylaminocarbonyl. These claimed 
compounds differ from several prior art benzo[de]isoquinoline–1,3–dione compounds 
due to the presence of a nitro group (O2N) at the 5–position and an amino or other amino 
group (NR3R4) at the 8–position of the isoquinoline ring. 
 The specification states that these non-symmetrical substitutions at the 5–and 8–
positions produce compounds with “a better action and a better action spectrum as 
antitumor substances” than known benzo[de]isoquinolines, namely those in K.D. Paull et 
al., Computer Assisted Structure–Activity Correlations, Drug Research, 34(II), 1243–46 
(1984) (Paull). Paull describes a computer-assisted evaluation of benzo[de]isoquinoline–
1,3–diones and related compounds which have been screened for antitumor activity by 
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testing their efficacy in vivo against two specific implanted murine (i.e., utilizing mice as 
test subjects) lymphocytic leukemias, P388 and L1210. These two in vivo tests are widely 
used by the National Cancer Institute (NCI) to measure the antitumor properties of a 
compound. Paull noted that one compound in particular, [“NSC 308847”], was found to 
show excellent activity against these two specific tumor models. Based on their analysis, 
compound NSC 308847 was selected for further studies by NCI. In addition to comparing 
the effectiveness of the claimed compounds with structurally similar compounds in Paull, 
applicants’ patent specification illustrates the cytotoxicity of the claimed compounds 
against human tumor cells, in vitro, and concludes that these tests “had a good action.” 
 The examiner initially rejected applicants’ claims in the ’690 application as obvious 
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in light of U.S. Patent No. 4,614,820, issued to and referred to 
hereafter as Zee–Cheng et al. Zee–Cheng et al. discloses a benzo[de]isoquinoline 
compound for use as an antitumor agent with symmetrical substitutions on the 5–position 
and 8–position of the quinoline ring; in both positions the substitution was either an 
amino or nitro group.  
 In a response . . . , the applicants rebutted the § 103 rejection. Applicants asserted that 
their mixed disubstituted compounds had unexpectedly better antitumor properties than 
the symmetrically substituted compounds in Zee–Cheng et al. In support of this assertion 
applicants attached the declaration of Dr. Gerhard Keilhauer. In his declaration Dr. 
Keilhauer reported that his tests indicated that applicants’ claimed compounds were far 
more effective as antitumor agents than the compounds disclosed in Zee–Cheng et al. 
when tested, in vitro, against two specific types of human tumor cells, HEp and HCT–29. 
. . . Although the applicants overcame the § 103 rejection, the examiner nevertheless issued 
a final rejection . . . . based on 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1. The examiner first noted that the 
specification failed to describe any specific disease against which the claimed compounds 
were active. Furthermore, the examiner concluded that the prior art tests performed in 
Paull and the tests disclosed in the specification were not sufficient to establish a 
reasonable expectation that the claimed compounds had a practical utility (i.e. antitumor 
activity in humans). 
[The Board affirmed the examiner’s final rejection, relying entirely on the examiner’s 
reasoning. the Board affirmed solely on the basis of the Examiner’s § 112 ¶ 1 rejection. 
Applicants appealed.] 
II 
At issue in this case is an important question of the legal constraints on patent office 
examination practice and policy. The question is, with regard to pharmaceutical 
inventions, what must the applicant prove regarding the practical utility or usefulness of 
the invention for which patent protection is sought.  
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 The requirement that an invention have utility is found in 35 U.S.C. § 101: “Whoever 
invents . . . any new and useful . . . composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent therefor 
. . . .” It is also implicit in § 112 ¶ 1, which reads: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which 
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best 
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. 
Obviously, if a claimed invention does not have utility, the specification cannot enable 
one to use it. 
 As noted, although the examiner and the Board both mentioned § 101, and the 
rejection appears to be based on the issue of whether the compounds had a practical 
utility, a § 101 issue, the rejection according to the Board stands on the requirements of 
§ 112 ¶ 1. It is to that provision that we address ourselves. The Board gives two reasons 
for the rejection; we will consider these in turn. 
2 
The second basis for the Board’s rejection was that, even if the specification did allege 
a specific use, applicants failed to prove that the claimed compounds are useful. Citing 
various references, the Board found, and the Commissioner now argues, that the tests 
offered by the applicants to prove utility were inadequate to convince one of ordinary 
skill in the art that the claimed compounds are useful as antitumor agents.  
This court’s predecessor has stated: 
A specification disclosure which contains a teaching of the manner and process of 
making and using the invention in terms which correspond in scope to those used 
in describing and defining the subject matter sought to be patented must be taken 
as in compliance with the enabling requirement of the first paragraph of § 112 
unless there is reason to doubt the objective truth of the statements contained 
therein which must be relied on for enabling support. 
In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971). From this it follows that the PTO has the 
initial burden of challenging a presumptively correct assertion of utility in the disclosure. 
Only after the PTO provides evidence showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would 
reasonably doubt the asserted utility does the burden shift to the applicant to provide 
rebuttal evidence sufficient to convince such a person of the invention’s asserted utility.  
The PTO has not met this initial burden. The references cited by the Board, Pazdur 
and Martin, do not question the usefulness of any compound as an antitumor agent or 
provide any other evidence to cause one of skill in the art to question the asserted utility 
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of applicants’ compounds. Rather, these references merely discuss the therapeutic 
predictive value of in vivo murine tests—relevant only if applicants must prove the 
ultimate value in humans of their asserted utility. Likewise, we do not find that the nature 
of applicants’ invention alone would cause one of skill in the art to reasonably doubt the 
asserted usefulness. 
The purpose of treating cancer with chemical compounds does not suggest an 
inherently unbelievable undertaking or involve implausible scientific principles. Modern 
science has previously identified numerous successful chemotherapeutic agents. In 
addition, the prior art, specifically Zee Cheng et al., discloses structurally similar 
compounds to those claimed by the applicants which have been proven in vivo to be 
effective as chemotherapeutic agents against various tumor models. 
Taking these facts—the nature of the invention and the PTO’s proffered evidence—
into consideration we conclude that one skilled in the art would be without basis to 
reasonably doubt applicants’ asserted utility on its face. The PTO thus has not satisfied its 
initial burden. Accordingly, applicants should not have been required to substantiate their 
presumptively correct disclosure to avoid a rejection under the first paragraph of § 112. 
We do not rest our decision there, however. Even if one skilled in the art would have 
reasonably questioned the asserted utility, i.e., even if the PTO met its initial burden 
thereby shifting the burden to the applicants to offer rebuttal evidence, applicants 
proffered sufficient evidence to convince one of skill in the art of the asserted utility. In 
particular, applicants provided through Dr. Kluge’s declaration test results showing that 
several compounds within the scope of the claims exhibited significant antitumor activity 
against the L1210 standard tumor model in vivo. Such evidence alone should have been 
sufficient to satisfy applicants’ burden. 
The prior art further supports the conclusion that one skilled in the art would be 
convinced of the applicants’ asserted utility. As previously mentioned, prior art—Zee 
Cheng et al. and Paull—disclosed structurally similar compounds which were proven in 
vivo against various tumor models to be effective as chemotherapeutic agents. Although 
it is true that minor changes in chemical compounds can radically alter their effects on the 
human body, evidence of success in structurally similar compounds is relevant in 
determining whether one skilled in the art would believe an asserted utility.  
The Commissioner counters that such in vivo tests in animals are only preclinical tests 
to determine whether a compound is suitable for processing in the second stage of testing, 
by which he apparently means in vivo testing in humans, and therefore are not reasonably 
predictive of the success of the claimed compounds for treating cancer in humans. The 
Commissioner, as did the Board, confuses the requirements under the law for obtaining a 
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patent with the requirements for obtaining government approval to market a particular 
drug for human consumption. 
Our court’s predecessor has determined that proof of an alleged pharmaceutical 
property for a compound by statistically significant tests with standard experimental 
animals is sufficient to establish utility. In concluding that similar in vivo tests were 
adequate proof of utility the court in In re Krimmel stated: 
We hold as we do because it is our firm conviction that one who has taught the 
public that a compound exhibits some desirable pharmaceutical property in a 
standard experimental animal has made a significant and useful contribution to 
the art, even though it may eventually appear that the compound is without value 
in the treatment in humans. 
Krimmel, 292 F.2d 948, 953 (C.C.P.A. 1961). Moreover, NCI apparently believes these tests 
are statistically significant because it has explicitly recognized both the P388 and L1210 
murine tumor models as standard screening tests for determining whether new 
compounds may be useful as antitumor agents. 
In the context of this case the Martin and Pazdur references, on which the 
Commissioner relies, do not convince us otherwise. Pazdur only questions the reliability 
of the screening tests against lung cancer; it says nothing regarding other types of tumors. 
Although the Martin reference does note that some laboratory oncologists are skeptical 
about the predictive value of in vivo murine tumor models for human therapy, Martin 
recognizes that these tumor models continue to contribute to an increasing human cure 
rate. In fact, the authors conclude that this perception (i.e. lack of predictive reliability) is 
not tenable in light of present information. 
 On the basis of animal studies, and controlled testing in a limited number of humans 
(referred to as Phase I testing), the Food and Drug Administration may authorize Phase 
II clinical studies. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(1); 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(5), (a)(8) (1994). 
Authorization for a Phase II study means that the drug may be administered to a larger 
number of humans, but still under strictly supervised conditions. The purpose of the 
Phase II study is to determine primarily the safety of the drug when administered to a 
larger human population, as well as its potential efficacy under different dosage regimes. 
See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b). 
 FDA approval, however, is not a prerequisite for finding a compound useful within 
the meaning of the patent laws. Usefulness in patent law, and in particular in the context 
of pharmaceutical inventions, necessarily includes the expectation of further research and 
development. The stage at which an invention in this field becomes useful is well before 
it is ready to be administered to humans. Were we to require Phase II testing in order to 
prove utility, the associated costs would prevent many companies from obtaining patent 
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protection on promising new inventions, thereby eliminating an incentive to pursue, 
through research and development, potential cures in many crucial areas such as the 
treatment of cancer. 
 In view of all the foregoing, we conclude that applicants’ disclosure complies with 
the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1. 
. . . 
Reversed. 
In re Fisher 
421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
MICHEL, Chief Judge. 
Dane K. Fisher and Raghunath Lalgudi (collectively “Fisher”) appeal from the 
decision of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences affirming the examiner’s final rejection of the only pending claim of 
application Serial No. 09/619,643 (the “’643 application”), entitled “Nucleic Acid 
Molecules and Other Molecules Associated with Plants,” as unpatentable for lack of utility 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and lack of enablement under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. . . . 
I 
A 
The claimed invention relates to five purified nucleic acid sequences that encode 
proteins and protein fragments in maize plants. The claimed sequences are commonly 
referred to as “expressed sequence tags” or “ESTs.” Before delving into the specifics of 
this case, it is important to understand more about the basic principles of molecular 
genetics and the role of ESTs. 
Genes are located on chromosomes in the nucleus of a cell and are made of 
deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”). DNA is composed of two strands of nucleotides in 
double helix formation. The nucleotides contain one of four bases, adenine (“A”), guanine 
(“G”), cytosine (“C”), and thymine (“T”), that are linked by hydrogen bonds to form 
complementary base pairs (i.e., A–T and G–C). 
 When a gene is expressed in a cell, the relevant double-stranded DNA sequence is 
transcribed into a single strand of messenger ribonucleic acid (“mRNA”). Messenger RNA 
contains three of the same bases as DNA (A, G, and C), but contains uracil (“U”) instead 
of thymine. mRNA is released from the nucleus of a cell and used by ribosomes found in 
the cytoplasm to produce proteins. 
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 Complementary DNA (“cDNA”) is produced synthetically by reverse transcribing 
mRNA. cDNA, like naturally occurring DNA, is composed of nucleotides containing the 
four nitrogenous bases, A, T, G, and C. Scientists routinely compile cDNA into libraries 
to study the kinds of genes expressed in a certain tissue at a particular point in time. One 
of the goals of this research is to learn what genes and downstream proteins are expressed 
in a cell so as to regulate gene expression and control protein synthesis.  
 An EST is a short nucleotide sequence that represents a fragment of a cDNA clone. It 
is typically generated by isolating a cDNA clone and sequencing a small number of 
nucleotides located at the end of one of the two cDNA strands. When an EST is introduced 
into a sample containing a mixture of DNA, the EST may hybridize with a portion of 
DNA. Such binding shows that the gene corresponding to the EST was being expressed 
at the time of mRNA extraction. 
 Claim 1 of the ’643 application recites: 
A substantially purified nucleic acid molecule that encodes a maize protein or 
fragment thereof comprising a nucleic acid sequence selected from the group 
consisting of SEQ ID NO: 1 through SEQ ID NO: 5. 
The ESTs . . . are obtained from cDNA library LIB3115, which was generated from pooled 
leaf tissue harvested from maize plants . . . grown in the fields at Asgrow research stations. 
[The ESTs] consist of 429, 423, 365, 411, and 331 nucleotides, respectively. When Fisher 
filed the ’643 application, he claimed ESTs corresponding to genes expressed from the 
maize pooled leaf tissue at the time of anthesis. Nevertheless, Fisher did not know the 
precise structure or function of either the genes or the proteins encoded for by those genes. 
 The ’643 application generally discloses that the five claimed ESTs may be used in a 
variety of ways, including: (1) serving as a molecular marker for mapping the entire maize 
genome, which consists of ten chromosomes that collectively encompass roughly 50,000 
genes; (2) measuring the level of mRNA in a tissue sample via microarray technology to 
provide information about gene expression; (3) providing a source for primers for use in 
the polymerase chain reaction (“PCR”) process to enable rapid and inexpensive 
duplication of specific genes; (4) identifying the presence or absence of a polymorphism; 
(5) isolating promoters via chromosome walking; (6) controlling protein expression; and 
(7) locating genetic molecules of other plants and organisms. 
. . . 
[The examiner rejected claim 1 for lack of utility and found that the claimed ESTs were 
not supported by a specific and substantial utility. The Board affirmed the rejection for 
lack of utility under § 101 and lack of enablement under § 112. This appeal followed.] 
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II 
Whether an application discloses a utility for a claimed invention is a question of fact. 
We consequently review the Board’s determination that the ’643 application failed to 
satisfy the utility requirement of § 101 for substantial evidence.  
A 
We agree with both the government and the amici that none of Fisher’s seven asserted 
uses meets the utility requirement of § 101. In Brenner, the Supreme Court . . . . announced 
a more rigorous test [than Lowell], stating: 
The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for 
granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention 
with substantial utility. Unless and until a process is refined and developed to this 
point—where specific benefit exists in currently available form—there is 
insufficient justification for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to 
be a broad field.  
Following Brenner, our predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and 
this court have required a claimed invention to have a specific and substantial utility to 
satisfy § 101. 
The Supreme Court has not defined what the terms “specific” and “substantial” mean 
per se. Nevertheless, together with the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, we have 
offered guidance as to the uses which would meet the utility standard of § 101. From this, 
we can discern the kind of disclosure an application must contain to establish a specific 
and substantial utility for the claimed invention. 
 Courts have used the labels “practical utility” and “real world” utility 
interchangeably in determining whether an invention offers a “substantial” utility. 
Indeed, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals stated that “‘practical utility’ is a 
shorthand way of attributing ‘real-world’ value to claimed subject matter. In other words, 
one skilled in the art can use a claimed discovery in a manner which provides some 
immediate benefit to the public.” Nelson, 626 F.2d at 856. It thus is clear that an application 
must show that an invention is useful to the public as disclosed in its current form, not 
that it may prove useful at some future date after further research. Simply put, to satisfy 
the “substantial” utility requirement, an asserted use must show that that claimed 
invention has a significant and presently available benefit to the public. 
 Turning to the “specific” utility requirement, an application must disclose a use which 
is not so vague as to be meaningless. . . . Thus, in addition to providing a “substantial” 
utility, an asserted use must also show that that claimed invention can be used to provide 
a well-defined and particular benefit to the public. 
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 In 2001, partially in response to questions about the patentability of ESTs, the PTO 
issued Utility Guidelines governing its internal practice for determining whether a 
claimed invention satisfies § 101. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 
(Jan. 5, 2001). The PTO incorporated these guidelines into the Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure (“MPEP”). The MPEP and Guidelines “are not binding on this court, but may 
be given judicial notice to the extent they do not conflict with the statute.” Enzo Biochem v. 
Gen–Probe, 323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002). According to the Utility Guidelines, a specific 
utility is particular to the subject matter claimed and would not be applicable to a broad 
class of invention. Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2107.01. The Utility 
Guidelines also explain that a substantial utility defines a “real world” use. In particular, 
“utilities that require or constitute carrying out further research to identify or reasonably 
confirm a ‘real world’ context of use are not substantial utilities.” Id. Further, the Utility 
Guidelines discuss “research tools,” a term often given to inventions used to conduct 
research. The PTO particularly cautions that 
an assessment that focuses on whether an invention is useful only in a research 
setting thus does not address whether the invention is in fact “useful” in a patent 
sense. The PTO must distinguish between inventions that have a specifically 
identified substantial utility and inventions whose asserted utility requires further 
research to identify or reasonably confirm. 
The PTO’s standards for assessing whether a claimed invention has a specific and 
substantial utility comport with this court’s interpretation of the utility requirement of 
§ 101. 
Turning to the parties’ arguments, Fisher first raises a legal issue, charging that the 
Board applied a heightened standard for utility in the case of ESTs. Fisher apparently 
bases this argument on statements made by the Board in connection with its discussion of 
whether the claimed ESTs can be used to identify a polymorphism. In that context, the 
Board stated: 
Somewhere between having no knowledge (the present circumstances) and 
having complete knowledge of the gene and its role in the plant’s development 
lies the line between “utility” and “substantial utility.” We need not draw the line 
or further define it in this case because the facts in this case represent the lowest 
end of the spectrum, i.e., an insubstantial use. 
Fisher reads the word “spectrum” out of context, claiming that the word somehow implies 
the application of a higher standard for utility than required by § 101. We conclude, 
however, that the Board did not apply an incorrect legal standard. In its decision, the 
Board made reference to a “spectrum” to differentiate between a substantial utility, which 
satisfies the utility requirement of § 101, and an insubstantial utility, which fails to satisfy 
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§ 101. The Board plainly did not announce or apply a new test for assessing the utility of 
ESTs. It simply followed the Utility Guidelines and MPEP, which mandate the specific 
and substantial utility test set forth in Brenner. Indeed, we note that Example 9 of the PTO’s 
“Revised Interim Utility Guidelines Training Materials” is applicable to the facts here. In 
that example, a cDNA fragment disclosed as being useful as a probe to obtain the full 
length gene corresponding to a cDNA fragment was deemed to lack a specific and 
substantial utility. Additionally, the MPEP particularly explains that a claim directed to a 
polynucleotide disclosed to be useful as a “gene probe” or “chromosome marker,” as is 
the case here, fails to satisfy the specific utility requirement unless a specific DNA target 
is also disclosed. MPEP § 2107.01. 
 Regarding the seven uses asserted by Fisher, we observe that each claimed EST 
uniquely corresponds to the single gene from which it was transcribed (“underlying 
gene”). As of the filing date of the ’643 application, Fisher admits that the underlying 
genes have no known functions. Fisher, nevertheless, claims that this fact is irrelevant 
because the seven asserted uses are not related to the functions of the underlying genes. 
We are not convinced by this contention. Essentially, the claimed ESTs act as no more than 
research intermediates that may help scientists to isolate the particular underlying 
protein-encoding genes and conduct further experimentation on those genes. The overall 
goal of such experimentation is presumably to understand the maize genome—the 
functions of the underlying genes, the identity of the encoded proteins, the role those 
proteins play during anthesis, whether polymorphisms exist, the identity of promoters 
that trigger protein expression, whether protein expression may be controlled, etc. 
Accordingly, the claimed ESTs are, in words of the Supreme Court, mere “objects of use-
testing,” to wit, objects upon which scientific research could be performed with no 
assurance that anything useful will be discovered in the end. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 535. 
 Fisher compares the claimed ESTs to certain other patentable research tools, such as 
a microscope. Although this comparison may, on first blush, be appealing in that both a 
microscope and one of the claimed ESTs can be used to generate scientific data about a 
sample having unknown properties, Fisher’s analogy is flawed. As the government points 
out, a microscope has the specific benefit of optically magnifying an object to immediately 
reveal its structure. One of the claimed ESTs, by contrast, can only be used to detect the 
presence of genetic material having the same structure as the EST itself. It is unable to 
provide any information about the overall structure let alone the function of the 
underlying gene. Accordingly, while a microscope can offer an immediate, real world 
benefit in a variety of applications, the same cannot be said for the claimed ESTs. Fisher’s 
proposed analogy is thus inapt. Hence, we conclude that Fisher’s asserted uses are 
insufficient to meet the standard for a “substantial” utility under § 101. 
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 Moreover, all of Fisher’s asserted uses represent merely hypothetical possibilities, 
objectives which the claimed ESTs, or any EST for that matter, could possibly achieve, but 
none for which they have been used in the real world. Focusing on the two uses 
emphasized by Fisher at oral argument, Fisher maintains that the claimed ESTs could be 
used to identify polymorphisms or to isolate promoters. Nevertheless, in the face of a 
utility rejection, Fisher has not presented any evidence, as the Board well noted, showing 
that the claimed ESTs have been used in either way. . . . Further, Fisher has not shown that 
a polymorphism or promoter so identified would have a “specific and substantial” use. 
The Board, in fact, correctly recognized this very deficiency and cited it as one of the 
reasons for upholding the examiner’s final rejection. 
 With respect to the remaining asserted uses, there is no disclosure in the specification 
showing that any of the claimed ESTs were used as a molecular marker on a map of the 
maize genome. There also is no disclosure establishing that any of the claimed ESTs were 
used or, for that matter, could be used to control or provide information about gene 
expression. … Consequently, because Fisher failed to prove that its claimed ESTs can be 
successfully used in the seven ways disclosed in the ’643 application, we have no choice 
but to conclude that the claimed ESTs do not have a “substantial” utility under § 101. 
Furthermore, Fisher’s seven asserted uses are plainly not “specific.” Any EST 
transcribed from any gene in the maize genome has the potential to perform any one of 
the alleged uses. . . . 
We agree with the Board that the facts here are similar to those in Brenner. . . .  The 
Brenner court held that the claimed process lacked a utility because it could be used only 
to produce a compound of unknown use. The Brenner court stated: “We find absolutely 
no warrant for the proposition that although Congress intended that no patent be granted 
on a chemical compound whose sole ‘utility’ consists of its potential role as an object of 
use-testing, a different set of rules was meant to apply to the process which yielded the 
unpatentable product.” 383 U.S. at 535. Applying that same logic here, we conclude that 
the claimed ESTs, which do not correlate to an underlying gene of known function, fail to 
meet the standard for utility intended by Congress. 
 . . .  
. . . In Brenner, the Supreme Court was primarily concerned with creating an 
unwarranted monopoly to the detriment of the public: 
Whatever weight is attached to the value of encouraging disclosure and of 
inhibiting secrecy, we believe a more compelling consideration is that a process 
patent in the chemical field, which has not been developed and pointed to the 
degree of specific utility, creates a monopoly of knowledge which should be 
granted only if clearly commanded by the statute. Until the process claim has been 
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reduced to production of a product shown to be useful, the metes and bounds of 
that monopoly are not capable of precise delineation. It may engross a vast, 
unknown, and perhaps unknowable area. Such a patent may confer power to 
block off whole areas of scientific development, without compensating benefit to 
the public. This is not to say that we mean to disparage the importance of 
contributions to the fund of scientific information short of the invention of 
something “useful,” or that we are blind to the prospect that what now seems 
without “use” may tomorrow command the grateful attention of the public. But a 
patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation 
for its successful conclusion. . . .  
Here, granting a patent to Fisher for its five claimed ESTs would amount to a hunting 
license because the claimed ESTs can be used only to gain further information about the 
underlying genes and the proteins encoded for by those genes. The claimed ESTs 
themselves are not an end of Fisher’s research effort, but only tools to be used along the 
way in the search for a practical utility.  
. . . 
As a final matter, we observe that the government and its amici express concern that 
allowing EST patents without proof of utility would discourage research, delay scientific 
discovery, and thwart progress in the “useful Arts” and “Science.” See U.S. Const. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 8. The government and its amici point out that allowing EST claims like Fisher’s 
would give rise to multiple patents, likely owned by several different companies, relating 
to the same underlying gene and expressed protein. Such a situation, the government and 
amici predict, would result in an unnecessarily convoluted licensing environment for 
those interested in researching that gene and/or protein. 
 The concerns of the government and amici, which may or may not be valid, are not 
ones that should be considered in deciding whether the application for the claimed ESTs 
meets the utility requirement of § 101. They are public policy considerations which are 
more appropriately directed to Congress as the legislative branch of government, rather 
than this court as a judicial body responsible simply for interpreting and applying 
statutory law. . . . Policy reasons aside, because we conclude that the utility requirement 
of § 101 is not met, we hold that Fisher is not entitled to a patent for the five claimed ESTs. 
. . . 
RADER, Circuit Judge, dissenting.  
This court today determines that expressed sequence tags (ESTs) do not satisfy 35 
U.S.C. § 101 unless there is a known use for the genes from which each EST is transcribed. 
While I agree that an invention must demonstrate utility to satisfy § 101, these claimed 
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ESTs have such a utility, at least as research tools in isolating and studying other 
molecules. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
 Several, if not all, of Fisher’s asserted utilities claim that ESTs function to study other 
molecules. In simple terms, ESTs are research tools. Admittedly ESTs have use only in a 
research setting. However, the value and utility of research tools generally is beyond 
question, even though limited to a laboratory setting. . . . These research tools are similar 
to a microscope; both take a researcher one step closer to identifying and understanding 
a previously unknown and invisible structure. Both supply information about a molecular 
structure. Both advance research and bring scientists closer to unlocking the secrets of the 
corn genome to provide better food production for the hungry world. If a microscope has 
§ 101 utility, so too do these ESTs. 
. . . 
In truth, I have some sympathy with the Patent Office’s dilemma. The Office needs 
some tool to reject inventions that may advance the “useful arts” but not sufficiently to 
warrant the valuable exclusive right of a patent. The Patent Office has seized upon this 
utility requirement to reject these research tools as contributing “insubstantially” to the 
advance of the useful arts. The utility requirement is ill suited to that task, however, 
because it lacks any standard for assessing the state of the prior art and the contributions 
of the claimed advance. The proper tool for assessing sufficient contribution to the useful 
arts is the obviousness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 103. . . . 
Context & Application 
1. How do Fisher and Brana differ? Can their holdings be reconciled? The rejection in 
In re Brana was based on a failure to meet the requirements of § 112, whereas the rejection 
in In re Fisher was based on the requirements of § 101. Is there a difference between the 
utility requirements of the two statutory sections? If so, how do those requirements differ? 
2. In dissent in In re Fisher, Judge Rader suggests that nonobviousness is the better 
standard by which to reject inventions that do not sufficiently contribute to the useful arts. 
Note that in In re Brana, the Examiner rejected on both utility and obviousness grounds, 
but the Board affirmed solely on the basis of the utility ruling. Keep these cases in mind 
as you read the materials on the § 103 nonobviousness requirement. Consider whether 







To get a patent, you have to publicly disclose certain information about your 
invention. Why might we want to require such disclosures? Why might a patent applicant 
not want to provide them? As we begin to explore these questions, consider the famous 
case of O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853). According to the record before the Court, “the 
first fact of electro-magnetism was discovered” in the winter of 1819–1820. At that point, 
scientists around the world recognized “that this newly-discovered power might be used 
to communicate intelligence to distant places” but they struggled with how, exactly, to do 
so. In 1832, Samuel Morse, a painter, turned his attention to that problem. He eventually 
developed a working telegraph. But when he tried to enforce his patent in court, the 
accused infringers argued that the patent was too broad. Specifically, they attacked claim 
eight, which stated: 
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts of machinery 
described in the foregoing specification and claims; the essence of my invention 
being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call 
electro-magnetism, however developed, for marking or printing intelligible 
characters, signs, or letters, at any distances, being a new application of that power 
of which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer. 
Thus, Morse claimed “the exclusive right to every improvement where the motive power 
is the electric or galvanic current, and the result is the marking or printing intelligible 
characters, signs, or letters at a distance.” The Court ruled that while Morse was entitled 
to a patent on the actual method or process or machine that he discovered or invented, he 
was not entitled to a patent that covered all future variations on that theme. The Court 
expressed concern that: 
[S]ome future inventor, in the onward march of science, may discover a mode of 
writing or printing at a distance by means of the electric or galvanic current, 
without using any part of the process or combination set forth in the plaintiff’s 
specification. His invention may be less complicated—less liable to get out of 
order—less expensive in construction, and in its operation. But yet if it is covered 
by this patent the inventor could not use it, nor the public have the benefit of it 
without the permission of this patentee. 
Nor is this all, while he shuts the door against inventions of other persons, the 
patentee would be able to avail himself of new discoveries in the properties and 
powers of electro-magnetism which scientific men might bring to light. . . . New 
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discoveries in physical science may enable him to combine it with new agents and 
new elements, and by that means attain the object in a manner superior to the 
present process and altogether different from it. And if he can secure the exclusive 
use by his present patent he may vary it with every new discovery and 
development of the science, and need place no description of the new manner, 
process, or machinery, upon the records of the patent office. . . . The court is of 
opinion that the claim is too broad, and not warranted by law. 
Under the Patent Act of 1836, which the Supreme Court applied in Morse, the specification 
had to disclose “the manner and process of making, constructing, using, and 
compounding” the invention, “in such exact terms at to enable any person skilled in the 
art or science to which it appertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make, 
construct, compound, and use the same.” See Morse, 56 U.S. at 118. The current Patent Act 
contains similar language: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which 
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best 
mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention. 
35 U.S.C. § 112(a). It also states that: “The specification shall conclude with one or more 
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the 
inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.” Id. § 112(b). Courts have read these 
provisions of § 112 as creating four distinct requirements for patentability: (1) enablement; 
(2) written description; (3) definiteness; and (4) best mode. Together, these requirements 
are often referred to as the “disclosure doctrines.” This Chapter will discuss them in turn. 
Before we begin, a quick note on terminology: Prior to the enactment of the AIA, § 112 
did not have defined subsections. So you may read (or hear) people say “section 112, first 
paragraph” or “section 112, ¶ 1” when referring to enablement, written description, and 
best mode. Similarly, you may see “section 112, second paragraph” or “section 112, ¶ 2” 
when referring to definiteness. The AIA assigned letters to the subsections of section 112; 
post-AIA cases accordingly refer to section 112(a), section 112(b), and so on. But the main 
substance of these provisions has not changed. 
A. Enablement 
Under § 112(a), the specification must describe “the manner and process of making 
and using” the invention “in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any 
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person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to 
make and use the same.” (emphasis added) We call this the requirement of “enablement.” 
CFMT, Inc. v. YieldUp Int’l Corp. 
349 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
RADER, Circuit Judge. 
On summary judgment, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware 
determined that CFMT, Inc.’s U.S. Patent No. 4,778,532 (the ’532 patent) and U.S. Patent 
No. 4,917,123 (the ’123 patent) are invalid . . . . [T]his court reverses-in-part, vacates-in-
part, and remands. 
 I 
The ’532 and ’123 patents cover a system for cleaning semiconductor wafers. The 
process for manufacturing semiconductor wafers must keep them as free as possible from 
contamination to prevent defects in semiconductors. To keep the wafers clean, 
conventional processes sequentially immerse the wafers in various liquids in an open 
environment. This bathing procedure exposes the wafers to airborne contaminants and 
also exposes workers to hazardous chemicals. 
 The ’532 and ’123 patents claim improvements in these open cleaning systems. 
Specifically, the ’532 and ’123 patents claim a system that is closed to the outside 
environment and requires no human handling. Instead the wafers remain at all times in a 
closed container that sequentially introduces different chemicals to clean the wafers. 
Because the ’123 patent is a divisional of the ’532 patent, the two patents have identical 
disclosures. The parent ’532 patent contains method claims only. Independent claim[] 1 
. . . [is] representative: 
1. An enclosed, full flow method for the cleaning of semiconductor wafers 
comprising positioning said wafers in a vessel, closing said vessel to the 
environment, and flowing process fluids sequentially and continuously past said 
wafers in said vessel, including the steps of 
(a) contacting said wafers with at least one cleaning fluid to remove contaminants 
from said wafers; 
(b) removing said cleaning fluid from said wafers with a rinsing fluid; and 
(c) removing said rinsing fluid from said wafers with a drying fluid; 
whereby the processing does not requirement (sic) movement or operator 
handling of said wafers between said steps; and 
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maintaining the vessel containing said wafers hydraulically full during each 
process step. 
. . . 
The divisional ’123 patent contains corresponding apparatus claims. Independent claim[] 
1 . . . [is] representative: 
1. Apparatus for wet processing of semiconductor wafers comprising: 
(a) vessel means for supporting said wafers in a closed circulation process stream 
wherein process fluids may sequentially flow past said wafers, said vessel being 
hydraulically full with process fluid when said process fluids flow past said 
wafers; 
(b) means for supplying at least one cleaning fluid to said process stream for 
removing contaminants from said wafers, and means for withdrawing said 
cleaning fluid from said process stream; 
(c) means for supplying a rinsing fluid to said process stream for removing other 
fluids from said wafers, means for minimizing gas/liquid interfaces in said rinsing 
fluid and means for withdrawing said rinsing fluid from said process stream; and 
 (d) means for supplying a drying fluid to said process stream for removing other 
fluids from said wafers and means for withdrawing said drying fluid from said 
process stream. 
. . . 
The record in this case shows that the inventors installed for Texas Instruments (TI) a 
machine that performed the claimed method. At first the apparatus did not meet this 
customer’s standards for wafer cleanliness. The inventors adjusted the apparatus and 
experimented for months before meeting the customer’s standards. In fact, the inventors 
obtained a third patent claiming the improvements in their initial apparatus. 
 CFMT and CFM Technologies, Inc. (collectively CFMT) sued YieldUp International 
Corp. (YieldUp) for infringement of the ’532 and ’123 patents. . . .  
 I 
YieldUp based its nonenablement argument on problems CFMT faced in setting up a 
commercial embodiment of the invention, the “beta tool Full Flow” machine. As noted 
before, CFMT had installed the Full Flow machine at a TI site. In its first runs, the machine 
did not meet TI’s cleanliness standards. After months of experiments, the inventors 
identified the problem in a drying step and solved it. Concurrently, a patent application 
that led to the ’532 patent was pending before the PTO. While prosecuting the application, 
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CFMT submitted a list of advantages of the invention to the PTO, but did not tell the PTO 
of the problems at TI. The examiner allowed the case and the ’532 patent issued. As also 
noted, the inventors eventually filed a patent application on the improvement that solved 
the problem. That application matured into U.S. Patent No. 4,911,761 (the ’761 patent). 
[T]he district court granted YieldUp’s motion for summary judgment that the ’532 and 
’123 patents were invalid for nonenablement. . . . 
II 
Enablement is a question of law with factual underpinnings; this court reviews the 
ultimate legal conclusion without deference. . . .  
 A 
The district court based its nonenablement judgment on two grounds: (1) lack of utility 
or inoperability and (2) undue experimentation needed to carry out the invention. The 
district court first construed each of the preamble terms “cleaning,” “treatment,” and “wet 
processing” as requiring “removal of contaminants.” Based on that construction, the 
district court concluded that “the claims of the ’532 and ’123 patents must enable one 
skilled in the art to clean semiconductor wafers using the Full Flow system.” The district 
court considered that “the first wafers processed with the Full Flow system appeared 
clean to the naked eye” but looked “filthy” viewed using laser scanning. The district court 
concluded that the TI data showed that the claimed system did not remove particles until 
the inventors developed the improvements leading to the ’761 patent. The district court 
found that “the Full Flow system that was based on the ’532 and ’123 patents could not 
clean semiconductor wafers.” The district court considered that the inventors 
experimented “for more than six months” making “hundreds of modifications.” The 
district court concluded that the “fact that the solution to the problem eventually resulted 
in the ’761 patent demonstrates that the experimentation required to enable the ’532 and 
’123 patents was not routine.” 
 The parties do not challenge the district court’s construction . . . . The parties also do 
not dispute that the record shows CFMT’s initial efforts to build the claimed apparatus 
and to carry out the individual steps of the claimed method required undue 
experimentation. Instead, this case asks this court to examine whether these claims 
required a specific level of contaminant removal that the disclosure did not enable. 
Further, this court must consider whether the improvements in the ’761 patent show that 
the ’532 and ’123 patents did not enable the scope of those claimed inventions. 
At the outset, the district court erred in requiring that the patent disclosures enable a 
single embodiment, the Full Flow system, to meet TI’s commercial standards. In essence, 
the district court set the enablement bar too high. Enablement does not require an inventor 
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to meet lofty standards for success in the commercial marketplace. Title 35 does not 
require that a patent disclosure enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use a 
perfected, commercially viable embodiment absent a claim limitation to that effect. 
 Title 35 requires only that the inventor enable one of skill in the art to make and use 
the full scope of the claimed invention. Thus, when an invention claims a general system 
to improve the cleaning process for semiconductor wafers, the disclosure enables that 
invention by showing improvements in the overall system. Of course, if a patent claimed 
a system that achieved cleanliness up to a specified numerical particle-free range, then 
enablement would require disclosure of a method that enables one of ordinary skill to 
achieve that range without undue experimentation. Thus, the level of disclosure necessary 
to satisfy section 112 of title 35 varies according to the scope of the claimed invention. 
 The claims of the ’532 and ’123 patents state no standard of cleaning. As the district 
court correctly found, “cleaning” in the context of this invention means generally 
removing contaminants from the wafer surface. Absent some standard for cleanliness in 
the claims, this court proceeds to examine the record for a showing that the disclosures of 
the CFMT patents would enable a person of skill in the art to make and use a system or 
apparatus to achieve any level of contaminant removal without undue experimentation.  
 The record contains evidence that the inventors’ prototype removed grease stains. 
The inventors testified that before setting up the TI apparatus, they verified by naked eye 
that a prototype of the invention removed penciled grease marks. This record evidence is 
probative of whether the “removal of contaminants” limitation is enabled. This court also 
notes that the record contains no evidence that a person of ordinary skill would have to 
undertake undue experimentation to build a similar prototype and carry out the claimed 
method to remove the contaminants—in this instance, grease marks. 
  The lengthy experiments at TI do not show nonenablement because the inventors 
undertook that work to satisfy TI’s particular commercial requirements, not to show 
enablement of the scope of the claimed inventions. “Patents are not production 
documents, and nothing in the patent law requires that a patentee must disclose data on 
how to mass-produce the invented product. The law requires that patents disclose 
inventions, not mass-production data, and that patents enable the practice of inventions, 
not the organization and operation of factories.” Reliance on the TI data alone also betrays 
another error, namely that this court gauges enablement at the date of the filing, not in 
light of later developments.  
. . . 
 Because the preamble term “cleaning” means only “removal of contaminants,” not 
removal of all contaminants or removal of contaminants according to the TI commercial 
standard, the inventor shows utility and enables the invention by disclosing “removal of 
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contaminants.” . . . In this case, with its specific claims and invention, the specification 
needed to teach one of ordinary skill to make and use a system or apparatus that removes 
any contaminants. In sum, any meaningful “cleaning” would satisfy the claimed goal of 
“cleaning of semiconductor wafers.” 
 The district court’s second ground for nonenablement invoked the ’761 improvement 
patent as evidence that the inventors engaged in undue experimentation to “clean” 
semiconductor wafers. The district court reasoned that the inventor had not enabled the 
’532 and ’123 patents because only the further invention of the ’761 improvement patent 
sufficed to meet TI’s commercial standard. 
  Improvement and selection inventions are ubiquitous in patent law; such 
developments do not alone cast doubt on enablement of the original invention. In general, 
few patented inventions are an immediate commercial success. Rather, most inventions 
require further development to achieve commercial success. Thus, additional inventive 
work does not alone show nonenablement. 
  Moreover, the district court’s reasoning presumes incorrectly that development of an 
improvement patent, the ’761 in this case, implies extensive experimentation. To the 
contrary, patent acquisition does not require any threshold level of effort or ingenuity. 
Thus, the ’761 improvement patent alone is not conclusive evidence of undue 
experimentation. 
 Because the district court misapplied the law of enablement in concluding that the 
claims of the ’532 and ’123 patents are invalid, this court vacates that part of the decision. 
. . . The district court may decide, under the correct legal standard, whether to grant 
CFMT’s cross-motion for summary judgment of enablement or whether to proceed to trial 
on that issue. . . . This court therefore reverses-in-part, vacates-in-part, and remands. 
Context & Application 
1. What is the purpose (or purposes) of the enablement requirement? In other words, 
why do we make inventors disclose how to make and use their inventions? 
2. Many people consider Morse an enablement case. Now that you know more about 
the current approach to enablement, do you agree? What other doctrines might Morse be 
based on? 
3. In practice, analyzing enablement issues can be technically complicated. But the 
core concept is simple. Imagine that you are writing a recipe for making enchiladas. You 
might safely assume that anyone using your recipe knows how to put a liquid in a pot 
and “bring it to a boil.” But what if you tell them to “fold in the cheese”? Will your readers 
know how to do that? The answer depends on how much experience your anticipated 
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readers have with cooking. Those with limited cooking experience may struggle if you 
just say “fold in the cheese.” But if you’re writing a cookbook aimed at more experienced 
cooks, you might not need to explain. Of course, a patent is not a recipe (or, as we learned 
in CFMT, a “production document”). But the basic principle is the same; the amount of 
explanation needed depends on the level of knowledge and skill we’d expect the readers 
to have. 
4. In CFMT, the court says that “Title 35 requires only that the inventor enable one 
of skill in the art to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention.” Where does the 
court look to determine what constitutes “the claimed invention”? 
5. In CFMT, the court mentioned that the parties did not appeal the district judge’s 
“construction”—i.e., the interpretation of the key claim terms. See Chapter 8.  As you read 
these cases, notice how claim construction and invalidity are intertwined. When you’re 
making arguments about what a claim term means, you have to think about whether the 
claim will cover the accused product while also paying attention to whether a certain 
construction will create validity problems. We’ll see this again in the next case. 
McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc. 
959 F.3d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2020) 
TARANTO, Circuit Judge.  
McRO, Inc., d/b/a Planet Blue brought this case against more than a dozen video game 
developers (the Developers), alleging that the Developers infringed . . . U.S. Patent No. 
6,611,278, owned by McRO. The district court held the claims invalid for ineligibility 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101, but we reversed that holding in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games 
America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (McRO I). On remand, the district court 
ultimately held that the Developers were entitled . . . to summary judgment of invalidity 
because the specification fails to enable the full scope of the claims. 
McRO appeals. We affirm the judgment of noninfringement. We vacate the judgment 
of invalidity and remand for the district court to consider any appropriate further 
proceedings . . . . 
I 
A 
McRO asserts claims 1, 4, and 13 of its patent. Claim 1 is representative for purposes 
of the issues on appeal: 
1. A method for automatically animating lip synchronization and facial expression 
of three-dimensional characters comprising: 
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obtaining a first set of rules that defines a morph weight set stream as a function 
of phoneme sequence and times associated with said phoneme sequence; 
obtaining a plurality of sub-sequences of timed phonemes corresponding to a 
desired audio sequence for said three-dimensional characters; 
generating an output morph weight set stream by applying said first set of rules 
to each sub-sequence of said plurality of sub-sequences of timed phonemes; and 
applying said output morph weight set stream to an input sequence of animated 
characters to generate an output sequence of animated characters with lip and 
facial expression synchronized to said audio sequence. 
B 
In 2012, McRO sued the Developers for patent infringement based on the Developers’ 
production and sale of video games that used one of two third-party software 
applications—FaceFX or Annosoft—to model facial animations. . . .  
[The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment on the pleadings holding 
the claims invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  On remand, the district court noted that the 
Developers had identified two animation techniques—bones animation and the “BALDI 
system”—that are not enabled by the specification but were practiced by the accused 
infringers. The court concluded that the Developers had provided clear and convincing 
evidence that “at the time of the invention, a person of skill in the art would not have the 
tools to practice the full scope of the ‘first set of rules’ limitation.”] 
II 
[W]hether a patent satisfies the enablement requirement is a question of law based on 
underlying factual findings. The party challenging the validity of the patent must provide 
clear and convincing evidence to support such factual findings.   
B 
We now address McRO’s appeal of the judgment of invalidity based on the 
specification’s failure to enable the full scope of claim 1’s required “first set of rules.” We 
agree with McRO that the Developers failed to identify with particularity any method of 
animation that falls within the scope of claim 1 and is not enabled. Without any specific 
examples, the district court’s reasoning is too abstract, too conclusory, to support 
summary judgment. We do not go so far as to hold that there is a triable issue of fact on 
enablement—instead, we vacate the judgment and remand for the district court to 
consider how to proceed. 
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1 
The requirement of enablement, stated in 35 U.S.C. § 112, enforces the essential “quid 
pro quo of the patent bargain” by requiring a patentee to teach the public how “to practice 
the full scope of the claimed invention.” . . . Although a patent’s specification need not 
“describe how to make and use every possible variant of the claimed invention,” “when 
a range is claimed, there must be reasonable enablement of the scope of the range.” To 
qualify as “reasonable,” “the specification must teach those skilled in the art how to make 
and use the full scope of the claimed invention without ‘undue experimentation.’”  
This statutory requirement is limited to what is claimed. Section 112 requires 
enablement of “only the claimed invention,” not matter outside the claims. For that 
reason, the “enablement inquiry necessarily depends on an interpretation of the claims.”  
Once the precise scope of the claimed invention is defined, the question is whether 
undue experimentation is required to make and use the full scope of embodiments of the 
invention claimed. Whether undue experimentation is required “is not a single, simple 
factual determination, but rather is a conclusion reached by weighing many factual 
considerations.” ALZA, 603 F.3d at 940 (citing In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 
1988)). Conducting the Wands analysis has routinely involved concrete identification of at 
least some embodiment or embodiments asserted not to be enabled—including what 
particular products or processes are or may be within the claim, so that breadth is shown 
concretely and not just as an abstract possibility, and how much experimentation a skilled 
artisan would have to undertake to make and use those products or processes.  
All the enablement cases on which the district court relied, and on which the 
Developers rely in this court, involved specific identification of products or processes that 
were or may be within the scope of the claims and were allegedly not enabled. In 
Automotive Technologies International, Inc. v. BMW of North America, for example, we 
considered whether a claimed “side impact crash sensor for a vehicle having front and 
rear wheels” was enabled. 501 F.3d 1274, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We observed that, under 
the governing claim construction (not disputed by the parties), the claim term embraced 
“electronic side impact sensors.” The enablement question, then, was a concrete one: 
whether the “specification did not enable the full scope of the invention because it did not 
enable electronic side impact sensors.”  
. . . In Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999–1001 (Fed. Cir. 2008), the claim 
covered both video games and movies, and it was movies that the court held to be not 
enabled. . . . In Trustees of Boston University v. Everlight Electronics Co. Ltd., 896 F.3d 1357, 
1360, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2018), the parties agreed that the claim covered six permutations for 
the relationship between a growth layer and a buffer layer, and it was one of those 
permutations that the court concluded was not enabled. 
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In short, none of the cases invoked by the district court and by the Developers have 
involved an abstract assertion of breadth, without concrete identification of matter that is 
not enabled but is or may be within the claim scope. As next explained, this case, in its 
current posture, involves such an abstract assertion of breadth. Under our claim 
construction, the bones and BALDI techniques are noninfringing and so cannot support a 
nonenablement determination. And no other concretely identified animation techniques 
have been advanced to support the district court’s and Developers’ enablement analyses. 
2 
The district court in this case determined that the specification of the ’278 patent fails 
to enable claim 1’s “first set of rules” limitation. Specifically, claim 1 requires “obtaining 
a first set of rules that defines a morph weight set stream as a function of phoneme 
sequence and times associated with said phoneme sequence.” This claim, the specification 
reveals, requires at least two operations. 
First, the specification makes clear that obtaining the set of rules presupposes 
identifying which mouth shapes (morph targets) should be used for representing a 
particular phoneme (or phoneme sequence) appearing on the “time aligned phonetic 
transcription” that is being synched to an animation. For example, the specification 
explains, an artist would have to know that “the ‘l’ in ‘hello’” requires a wider mouth 
shape than the “‘l’ in ‘burly.’”  
But on the record before us, this aspect of the claimed rules need not have been taught 
in the specification, and the district court did not rule otherwise. An “artisan’s knowledge 
of the prior art and routine experimentation can often fill gaps, interpolate between 
embodiments, and perhaps even extrapolate beyond the disclosed embodiments, 
depending upon the predictability of the art” and a “patent need not teach, and preferably 
omits, what is well known in the art.” Here, the district court explained that “both experts 
apparently agree that the state of computer animation overall and the development of 
rules for animation was well-developed in other contexts.” The specification itself 
indicates that animators knew how to match mouth positions to phonemes—doing so just 
took a significant amount of time because the process was manual. The inventors here do 
not purport to have discovered that the “l” in “hello” requires a wider mouth shape than 
the “l” in “burly.” 
The second, and assertedly novel, aspect of the invention, is a set of rules that tells the 
system how to automatically output the chosen mouth shapes in a format that can create 
an animation—as a continuous stream of morph weight sets that can transform a neutral 
model. Because this process is the novel aspect of the claimed invention, the specification 
must reasonably teach how to make and use this aspect of the invention.  
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3 
The Developers have not, at this point in the case, met their burden of identifying a 
set of rules, for automatically outputting chosen mouth shapes, that is or may be within 
the scope of claim 1.  
The district court identified, and relied on for the “more important” part of its analysis, 
two specific examples offered by Dr. Wyvill (the Developers’ expert): bones animation 
(the accused product) and the BALDI system. . . .  
Given our construction of the term “morph weight sets,” however, both bones 
animation and the BALDI system are clearly “outside the scope of the claims” and are 
thus “irrelevant to enablement.” With respect to bones animation, our noninfringement 
decision compels this conclusion—“bones” are not, and do not use, three-dimensional 
geometric vectors to move vertices. Record evidence compels the same conclusion with 
respect to the BALDI process, at least in the context of a summary-judgment motion. Dr. 
Wyvill, in the context of an expert opinion regarding obviousness, conceded that BALDI’s 
“parameter target values corresponding to each phoneme do not represent delta sets as 
construed” and that BALDI’s equations “do not represent the displacements of each 
vertex in terms of a simple xyz displacement vector.”  
4 
Without bones animation and the BALDI process available as claim-covered 
techniques that must be enabled, the district court’s reasoning is too abstract and too 
conclusory to support summary judgment. 
. . . 
We see no reason in this case to depart from our usual requirement that the challenger 
identify specifics that are or may be within the claim but are not enabled. Specifics have 
always mattered. Here, a “fuller set of fact-findings about what is within the scope of the 
claims” is necessary “to decide the enablement issue.”  
III 
We affirm the district court’s judgment that the Developers did not infringe the ’278 
patent. We vacate the district court’s judgment that the Developers were entitled to 
summary judgment that the ’278 patent is invalid for lack of enablement. Without holding 
that the Developers could not make such a showing, we remand the case for such further 
proceedings as are appropriate . . . .  
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Context & Application 
1. In McRO, the court says that enablement “enforces the essential quid pro quo of the 
patent bargain by requiring a patentee to teach the public how to practice the full scope 
of the claimed invention.” What does the court mean by “the public” here? 
2. In McRO, the court talks about enabling “the full scope” of the invention. How 
does the court determine what constitutes “the claimed invention”? And how “full” does 
full-scope enablement have to be? According to Jacob Sherkow, the full-scope doctrine 
requires a patent to “enable every potential embodiment of the invention—every way or 
mechanism it can be achieved—arising from the way the claim is drafted.” Patent Law’s 
Reproducibility Paradox, 66 DUKE L.J. 845, 875 (2017). But “[t]here is an enablement 
subdoctrine—the inoperative embodiments doctrine—which renders a broad claim not 
necessarily invalid as long as some (perhaps most) of the subject matter works as 
described.” Sean B. Seymore, Patenting Around Failure, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1139, 1166 (2018) 
(citing In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 735 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 1019 
(C.C.P.A. 1964)). What are the costs and benefits of these two approaches? If there is a 
conflict between these doctrines, how should it be reconciled?  
3. In a post about McRO, Dennis Crouch notes that, because enablement is a question 
of law, not of fact, “the defendant has the burden of persuading the judge on enablement, 
not proving its case.  Lack of enablement can be supported by various factual conclusions, 
and those must be proven with clear and convincing evidence.” McRO Returns to Federal 
Circuit: Valid but Not Infringed, PATENTLYO (May 20, 2020), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2020/05/returns-federal-infringed.html. We’ll see in the next 
section that written description is treated as a question of fact. Does it make sense to treat 
these two parts of § 112(a) differently? 
4. To satisfy the enablement requirement, “it is common to provide examples of how 
the invention is made or used. Examples often describe experiments and may provide 
instructions on how to make an invention or the effects of using said invention. While 
examples are not required, they are frequently included in patents and the absence thereof 
is frowned upon by the courts.” See Janet Freilich, Prophetic Patents, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
663, 672 (2019). Would it surprise you to know that these examples can be fictional? As 
Janet Freilich has explained, the USPTO and the courts “explicitly permit made-up 
experiments and fictional data in patents,” or “prophetic examples.” See id. at 666. Why 
would applicants want to include fictional examples in their patents? Why would the 
system allow them to do so? Should we be concerned that Freilich “found that 99% of 
citations to prophetic examples incorrectly cited the example as if it represented work that 
had actually been done”? Id. at 670. 
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5. One major issue in enablement is what constitutes “undue experimentation.” 
According to case law, “[t]he key word is ‘undue,’ not ‘experimentation.’” In re Angstadt, 
537 F.2d 498, 504 (C.C.P.A. 1976). But how much experimentation is “undue”? There is no 
bright-line rule; instead, courts can consider a variety of factors, including those set forth 
in In re Wands: 
Factors to be considered in determining whether a disclosure would require 
undue experimentation . . . (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the 
amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working 
examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the 
relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, 
and (8) the breadth of the claims. 
858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Which way do each of these factors cut? Are there other 
factors that might be helpful to consider? For more details on the Wands factors and how 
courts have applied them, see JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 169–82 (6th ed. 2020).  
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co. 
927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
LOURIE, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal and cross appeal . . . involve issues of patent validity, infringement, and 
inequitable conduct with respect to two patents: U.S. Patent 4,703,008 (’008), owned by 
Kirin–Amgen Inc. (Amgen), and U.S. Patent 4,677,195 (’195), owned by Genetics Institute, 
Inc. (GI). 
. . . 
We affirm the district court’s holdings in all respects, except that we reverse the court’s 
ruling that claims 1 and 3 of the ’195 patent are enabled. We also vacate that part of the 
district court’s judgment relating to infringement of those claims. 
Background 
Erythropoietin (EPO) is a protein consisting of 165 amino acids which stimulates the 
production of red blood cells. It is therefore a useful therapeutic agent in the treatment of 
anemias or blood disorders characterized by low or defective bone marrow production of 
red blood cells. 
The preparation of EPO products generally has been accomplished through the 
concentration and purification of urine from both healthy individuals and those 
exhibiting high EPO levels. A new technique for producing EPO is recombinant DNA 
technology in which EPO is produced from cell cultures into which genetically-
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engineered vectors containing the EPO gene have been introduced. The production of 
EPO by recombinant technology involves expressing an EPO gene through the same 
processes that occur in a natural cell. 
The Patents 
[T]he United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) issued to Dr. Rodney Hewick 
U.S. Patent 4,677,195, entitled “Method for the Purification of Erythropoietin and 
Erythropoietin Compositions” (the ’195 patent). The patent claims both homogeneous 
EPO and compositions thereof and a method for purifying human EPO using reverse 
phase high performance liquid chromatography. . . . The relevant claims of the ’195 patent 
are: 
1. Homogeneous erythropoietin characterized by a molecular weight of about 
34,000 daltons on SDS PAGE, movement as a single peak on reverse phase high 
performance liquid chromatography and a specific activity of at least 160,000 IU 
per absorbance unit at 280 nanometers. 
3. A pharmaceutical composition for the treatment of anemia comprising a 
therapeutically effective amount of the homogeneous erythropoietin of claim 1 in 
a pharmaceutically acceptable vehicle. 
. . . 
Dr. Hewick assigned the patent to GI. 
The other patent in this litigation is U.S. Patent 4,703,008, entitled “DNA Sequences 
Encoding Erythropoietin” (the ’008 patent), issued . . . to Dr. Fu–Kuen Lin, an employee 
of Amgen. The claims of the ’008 patent cover purified and isolated DNA sequences 
encoding erythropoietin and host cells transformed or transfected with a DNA sequence. 
[The key claim in the ’008 patent, claim 7, recited: “A purified and isolated DNA sequence 
consisting essentially of a DNA sequence encoding a polypeptide having an amino acid 
sequence sufficiently duplicative of that of erythropoietin to allow possession of the 
biological property of causing bone marrow cells to increase production of reticulocytes 
and red blood cells, and to increase hemoglobin synthesis or iron uptake.”] 
Discussion 
I 
Amgen argues that the district court’s holding that GI “provided clear and convincing 
evidence that the patent specification is insufficient to enable one of ordinary skill in the 
art to make and use the invention claimed in claim 7 of the ’008 patent without undue 
experimentation” constituted legal error. Amgen specifically argues that the district court 
erred because it “did not properly address the factors which this court has held must be 
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considered in determining lack of enablement based on assertion of undue 
experimentation,” citing this court's decision in In re Wands. 
Claim 7 is a generic claim, covering all possible DNA sequences that will encode any 
polypeptide having an amino acid sequence “sufficiently duplicative” of EPO to possess 
the property of increasing production of red blood cells. . . . 
Whether a claimed invention is enabled under 35 U.S.C. § 112 is a question of law, 
which we review de novo. “To be enabling under § 112, a patent must contain a description 
that enables one skilled in the art to make and use the claimed invention.”  
That some experimentation is necessary does not constitute a lack of enablement; the 
amount of experimentation, however, must not be unduly extensive. The essential 
question here is whether the scope of enablement of claim 7 is as broad as the scope of the 
claim. See generally In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833 (CCPA 1970); 2 D. CHISUM, PATENTS 
§ 7.03[7][b] (1990). 
The specification of the ’008 patent provides that: 
one may readily design and manufacture genes coding for microbial expression of 
polypeptides having primary conformations which differ from that herein 
specified for mature EPO in terms of the identity or location of one or more 
residues (e.g., substitutions, terminal and intermediate additions and deletions). 
DNA sequences provided by the present invention are thus seen to comprehend 
all DNA sequences suitable for use in securing expression in a procaryotic or 
eucaryotic host cell of a polypeptide product having at least a part of the primary 
structural conformation and one or more of the biological properties of 
erythropoietin, and selected from among: (a) the DNA sequences set out in FIGS. 
5 and 6; (b) DNA sequences which hybridize to the DNA sequences defined in (a) 
or fragments thereof; and (c) DNA sequences which, but for the degeneracy of the 
genetic code, would hybridize to the DNA sequences defined in (a) and (b). 
The district court found that over 3,600 different EPO analogs can be made by substituting 
at only a single amino acid position, and over a million different analogs can be made by 
substituting three amino acids. The patent indicates that it embraces means for 
preparation of “numerous” polypeptide analogs of EPO. Thus, the number of claimed 
DNA encoding sequences that can produce an EPO-like product is potentially enormous. 
In a deposition, Dr. Elliott, who was head of Amgen’s EPO analog program, testified 
that he did not know whether the fifty to eighty EPO analogs Amgen had made “had the 
biological property of causing bone marrow cells to increase production of reticulocytes 
and red blood cells, and to increase hemoglobin synthesis or iron uptake.” Based on this 
evidence, the trial court concluded that “defendants had provided clear and convincing 
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evidence that the patent specification is insufficient to enable one of ordinary skill in the 
art to make and use the invention claimed in claim 7 of the ’008 patent without undue 
experimentation.” In making this determination, the court relied in particular on the lack 
of predictability in the art, as demonstrated by the testimony of both Dr. Goldwasser, 
another scientist who worked on procedures for purifying urinary EPO (uEPO), and Dr. 
Elliott. After five years of experimentation, the court noted, “Amgen is still unable to 
specify which analogs have the biological properties set forth in claim 7.”  
We believe the trial court arrived at the correct decision, although for the wrong 
reason. By focusing on the biological properties of the EPO analogs, it failed to consider 
the enablement of the DNA sequence analogs, which are the subject of claim 7. Moreover, 
it is not necessary that a patent applicant test all the embodiments of his invention; what 
is necessary is that he provide a disclosure sufficient to enable one skilled in the art to 
carry out the invention commensurate with the scope of his claims. For DNA sequences, 
that means disclosing how to make and use enough sequences to justify grant of the claims 
sought. Amgen has not done that here. In addition, it is not necessary that a court review 
all the Wands factors to find a disclosure enabling. They are illustrative, not mandatory. 
What is relevant depends on the facts, and the facts here are that Amgen has not enabled 
preparation of DNA sequences sufficient to support its all-encompassing claims. 
It is well established that a patent applicant is entitled to claim his invention 
generically, when he describes it sufficiently to meet the requirements of Section 112. 
Here, however, despite extensive statements in the specification concerning all the 
analogs of the EPO gene that can be made, there is little enabling disclosure of particular 
analogs and how to make them. Details for preparing only a few EPO analog genes are 
disclosed. Amgen argues that this is sufficient to support its claims; we disagree. This 
“disclosure” might well justify a generic claim encompassing these and similar analogs, 
but it represents inadequate support for Amgen’s desire to claim all EPO gene analogs. 
There may be many other genetic sequences that code for EPO-type products. Amgen has 
told how to make and use only a few of them and is therefore not entitled to claim all of 
them. 
In affirming the district court’s invalidation . . . , we do not intend to imply that generic 
claims to genetic sequences cannot be valid where they are of a scope appropriate to the 
invention disclosed by an applicant. That is not the case here, where Amgen has claimed 
every possible analog of a gene containing about 4,000 nucleotides, with a disclosure only 
of how to make EPO and a very few analogs. 
The district court properly relied upon Fisher in making its decision. In that case, an 
applicant was attempting to claim an adrenocorticotrophic hormone preparation 
containing a polypeptide having at least twenty-four amino acids of a specified sequence. 
Only a thirty-nine amino acid product was disclosed. The court found that applicant could 
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not obtain claims that are insufficiently supported and hence not in compliance with the 
first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112. It stated: 
Appellant’s parent application . . . discloses no products, inherently or expressly, 
containing other than 39 amino acids, yet the claim includes all polypeptides, of 
the recited potency and purity, having at least 24 amino acids in the chain in the 
recited sequence. The parent specification does not enable one skilled in the art to 
make or obtain ACTHs with other than 39 amino acids in the chain, and there has 
been no showing that one of ordinary skill would have known how to make or 
obtain such other ACTHs without undue experimentation. . . . 
Section 112 requires that the scope of the claims must bear a reasonable correlation 
to the scope of enablement provided by the specification to persons of ordinary 
skill in the art. 
Fisher, 427 F.2d at 836, 839. 
Considering the structural complexity of the EPO gene, the manifold possibilities for 
change in its structure, with attendant uncertainty as to what utility will be possessed by 
these analogs, we consider that more is needed concerning identifying the various analogs 
that are within the scope of the claim, methods for making them, and structural 
requirements for producing compounds with EPO-like activity. It is not sufficient, having 
made the gene and a handful of analogs whose activity has not been clearly ascertained, 
to claim all possible genetic sequences that have EPO-like activity. Under the 
circumstances, we find no error in the court’s conclusion that the generic DNA sequence 
claims are invalid under Section 112. 
II 
Amgen challenges the district court’s determination that “the ’195 patent enables a 
person of ordinary skill in the art to obtain homogeneous EPO including rEPO and uEPO 
from natural sources” having a mean in vivo specific activity of at least 160,000. Claims 1 
and 3 contain the limitation that EPO have a specific activity of at least 160,000 IU/AU. 
The district court found, based upon expert testimony from both sides, that to those 
skilled in the art, in the absence of an express statement in the patent, the claims would be 
construed to refer to in vivo rather than in vitro specific activity. To support its challenge, 
Amgen asserts that the district court’s determination is contradicted by GI’s own bioassay 
data and by the district court's finding that “the ’195 patent fails to enable the purification 
of rEPO.” . . . 
. . . 
. . . [T]he question is whether the court erred in concluding that the claims requiring 
160,000 IU/AU by an in vivo measurement were enabled. We conclude that it did err. 
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Defendants have produced no evidence that it ever prepared EPO with a specific 
activity of at least 160,000 IU/AU in vivo using the disclosed methods. In its report to the 
FDA, GI stated that it had purified uEPO material “to homogeneity” by subjecting 
partially purified uEPO material to reverse phase high performance liquid 
chromatography (RP–HPLC), the technique taught by Hewick in the ’195 patent. The 
district court found that GI reported to the FDA that the specific activity of uEPO, based 
on in vivo bioassays, was only 109,000 IU/AU.11 GI originally arrived at the figure of 
160,000 IU/AU by calculation, before it had the capacity to derive quantitative information 
from bioassays. Hewick subjected the EPO to RP–HPLC, the EPO having an actual value 
of 83,000 IU/AU. After weighing the chromatograph, he found that “at least fifty percent” 
of the area under the chromatograph curve was attributable to something other than EPO. 
He then doubled the 83,000, and arrived at a theoretical specific activity of “at least about 
160,000 IU/AU.” That procedure, while possibly valid as a means for estimating the 
specific activity of a pure sample, does not establish that GI had a workable method for 
actually obtaining the pure material that it claimed. 
Moreover, the work of others shows that Hewick did not enable the preparation of 
uEPO having an in vivo specific activity of at least 160,000, as the claims required. Dr. 
Kawakita, a scientist at Kummamoto University in Japan, reported an in vivo specific 
activity of 101,000 IU/AU when using RP–HPLC according to Hewick’s method. This is 
similar to the 109,000 value reported to the FDA by GI. Kawakita did report a value of 
188,000, but did not follow the teachings in the ’195 patent. Defendants also rely on the 
testimony of Fritsch that “I've also seen further data in Chugai’s PLA indicating additional 
urinary EPO preparation that had activities of 190,000, I believe, units per absorbance 
unit.” However, the document to which Fritsch referred was not offered into evidence by 
GI after Amgen objected to its introduction and is not before us. 
. . . 
In addition to the question of enablement regarding uEPO, the district court found 
that the only purification attempt on rEPO in the manner set out in the ’195 patent failed 
to provide homogeneous EPO. The patent itself, in Example 2, discloses GI’s purification 
efforts on rEPO and indicates that GI did not obtain purified rEPO. As the district court 
found, “the patent does not contain any procedures for purifying rEPO to the point that 
RP–HPLC will be successful.” Thus, the patent fails to enable purification of either rEPO 
or uEPO. 
The burden of showing non-enablement is Amgen’s, not GI’s, but in the case of a 
challenged patent, when substantial discovery has occurred, and there is no credible 
evidence that the claimed purified material can be made by those skilled in the art by the 
disclosed process, and all evidence from both the inventor and his assignee and from third 
parties is to the contrary, we conclude that Amgen has met its burden to show that the 
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claims have not been adequately enabled. We do not hold that one must always prove 
that a disclosed process operates effectively to produce a claimed product. But, under 
these circumstances, we conclude that the court erred in holding that claims 1 and 3 were 
properly enabled. 
Context & Application 
1. In this case, the court discusses what are known as “genus claims.” A genus claim 
is “a broad patent claim that covers a group of structurally related products that 
incorporate the basic advance of the patented invention.” Dmitry Karshtedt, Mark A. 
Lemley & Sean B. Seymore, The Death of the Genus Claim, 35 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
(forthcoming 2021). Recently, a group of scholars argued that, today, genus claims in the 
chemical arts (e.g., those filed by pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and chemical 
companies) “are almost invariably held invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) for failure to 
enable or describe the full scope of the claimed invention.” Id. The authors argue that this 
is a problem but also state that despite “the death of genus claims,” id. at 4, “the industry 
proceeds apace—investing in innovation, obtaining and enforcing patents—despite 
this surprising turn in the case law,” id. at 5. If these broad claims are now pretty much 
always invalid but that hasn’t changed behaviors in the marketplace, what does that 
tell us about patent law in the chemical arts? Patent law more generally? 
B. Written Description 
Section 112(a) says that the specification must “contain a written description of the 
invention.” Whether this should be a separate requirement from enablement—and if so, 
when it applies—has been an issue of some debate. This section will examine the 
development of that doctrine and why it matters. But before we dive in, let’s talk a bit 
about patent prosecution. Patent applicants can amend and add claims during 
prosecution, either in the original application or in later applications.   
Today, patents are often thought of not as individual documents but as part of a 
family of patents that is related by their connection to a common written 
description . . . . For example, a patent family might include an original patent 
application that ultimately issued as a patent (the “parent”); a continuation filed 
off that original patent that, also, issued as a patent at a later date (the “child”); 
and a continuation-in-part that issued off the second patent in the family that, too, 
issued as a patent at a later date (the “grandchild”).  
Jason Rantanen, The Malleability of Patent Rights, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 895, 947 (2015). The 
Patent Act provides: 
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An application for patent for an invention disclosed in the manner provided by 
section 112(a) (other than the requirement to disclose the best mode) in an 
application previously filed in the United States, . . . which names an inventor or 
joint inventor in the previously filed application shall have the same effect, as to such 
invention, as though filed on the date of the prior application, if filed before the patenting 
or abandonment of or termination of proceedings on the first application or on an 
application similarly entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the first application and 
if it contains or is amended to contain a specific reference to the earlier filed 
application. . . . 
35 U.S.C. § 120 (emphasis added). These applications are called “continuations.” As 
Stephanie Plamondon Bair has explained: 
The main categories of continuation applications include continuations, requests for 
continued examination (RCEs, which are technically a subset of continuations), 
continuations-in-part (CIPs), and divisionals. Applicants file traditional continuation 
applications when they wish to argue for broader claims after some claims have 
been allowed. When no claims have been allowed and a final rejection has been 
issued, a continuation is labeled as an RCE. In contrast to traditional continuations 
and RCEs, a CIP application allows the applicant to add new information [i.e., 
“new matter”] to the continuation application. For CIPs, the priority date of the 
parent application is only available for those claims that do not make use of this 
additional information. Finally, a divisional application is usually filed following 
a finding by the USPTO that a single patent application contains two or more 
distinct inventions. The patentee may then file multiple related divisional 
applications, one for each distinct invention. 
Adjustments, Extensions, Disclaimers, and Continuations: When Do Patent Term Adjustments 
Make Sense?, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 445, 465 (2013) (emphasis added).  
[A] continuation allows an applicant to pursue claims broader than those that were 
allowed for possible later issue. A continuation application provides an attractive 
alternative to filing a new application for these broader claims because the 
continuation application effectively continues the initial application, allowing an 
applicant to claim the initial filing date for these claims, and thereby avoiding the 
possibility that intervening innovations (or the parent application itself) will act as 
prior art that renders the later, broader claims unpatentable.  
Id. at 464. And “[t]here is no limit to the number of continuation applications that may be 
filed.” Id. But why wait? As you read the following cases, think about why an applicant 
might want to save its broader claims (or any claims) for a continuation application, as 
opposed to putting them all in the original application. Why might we, as a system, not 
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want to let patent applicants make any changes that they want, any time they want to? As 
you read the next case, pay close attention to how and when the disputed claim was added 
to the patent. 
In re Ruschig 
379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967) 
RICH, Judge. 
This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the 
rejection of claim 13 of application serial No. 601,107, filed July 31, 1956, for “New Benzene 
Sulfonyl Ureas and Process for Their Preparation” Apparently The Upjohn Company has 
been prosecuting the application. 
. . . The claim on appeal . . . reads: “13. N-(p-chlorobenzenesulfonyl) -N-propylurea.” 
. . .  It is known by the generic name chlorpropamide and is sold under the trademark 
Diabinese by Chas. Pfizer & Co., Inc., as an oral medication for the control of diabetes 
mellitus . . . . 
The sole issue on this appeal is whether claim 13 is supported by the disclosure of 
appellants’ application . . . .  
[Upjohn added Claim 13  to the application “about a year after it was filed” and there 
was a dispute about whether Upjohn or Pfizer, who had filed a separate application, was 
entitled to the patent for chlorpropamide.]  
. . . 
It does not seem to be contested that the general disclosure of the application 
encompasses something like half a million possible compounds. It also discloses a number 
of specific compounds. Appellants’ argument is that one skilled in the art would find 
certain “guides” in the specification which would lead him to the compound of claim 13 
and that the compound is therefore disclosed. . . . 
. . . 
Appellants say . . . that the “guide” becomes more crystallized by the recitation of the 
alkylamines which can be employed in the four or five reactions described as using them. 
This list contains at least 19 primary amines which the specification says may be used. 
Appellants emphasize two, n-butylamine, which is elsewhere specifically disclosed as 
having been used, and n-propylamine. We do not see that listing the latter with the 18 
others adds anything to the initial statement that one may use an alkyl amine containing 
from 2 to 6 carbon atoms. Propylamine is such an amine but one is not led to it in 
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preference to the others merely by listing them all and identifying it, with the others, by 
name. 
Finally appellants refer to two tables listing, respectively, ten and twelve specific 
compounds, the first being the list of specific compounds whose blood sugar lowering 
activity is shown in the specification, the other, which duplicates the first and adds two 
compounds, being the specific examples of the specification. There is no N’-n-propyl 
compound among them. Perhaps one of appellants’ best points is that the activity table 
“stresses” compounds in which R(2) is a primary alkyl radical, i.e., ethyl, butyl, isobutyl 
and hexyl. The stress resides in the fact that eight of the ten are such compounds. And one 
of them, N-(4-chlorobenzenesulphonyl)-N’n-butyl urea, is a homolog of the compound of 
claim 13. It must be admitted that this is getting close. If n-propylamine had been used in 
making the compound instead of n-butylamine, the compound of claim 13 would have 
resulted. Appellants submit to us, as they did to the board, an imaginary specific example 
patterned on specific example 6 by which the above butyl compound is made so that we 
can see what a simple change would have resulted in a specific supporting disclosure 
being present in the specification. The trouble is that there is no such disclosure, easy 
though it is to imagine it. It is equally easy to imagine that the compound of claim 13 
might have been named in the specification. Working backward from a knowledge of 
chlorpropamide, that is by hindsight, it is all very clear what route one would travel 
through the forest of the specification to arrive at it. But looking at the problem, as we 
must, from the standpoint of one with no foreknowledge of the specific compound, it is 
our considered opinion that the board was correct in saying: 
Not having been specifically named or mentioned in any manner, one is left to 
selection from the myriads of possibilities encompassed by the broad disclosure, 
with no guide indicating or directing that this particular selection should be made 
rather than any of the many others which could also be made. 
Appellants refer to 35 U.S.C. § 112 as the presumed basis for this rejection and 
emphasize language therein about enabling one skilled in the art to make the invention, 
arguing therefrom that one skilled in the art would be enabled by the specification to make 
chlorpropamide. We find the argument unpersuasive for two reasons. First, it presumes 
some motivation for wanting to make the compound in preference to others. While we 
have no doubt a person so motivated would be enabled by the specification to make it, 
this is beside the point for the question is not whether he would be so enabled but whether 
the specification discloses the compound to him, specifically, as something appellants 
actually invented. We think it does not. Second, we doubt that the rejection is truly based 
on section 112, at least on the parts relied on by appellants. If based on section 112, it is on 
the requirement thereof that “The specification shall contain a written description of the 
invention.” We have a specification which describes appellants’ invention. The issue here 
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is in no wise a question of its compliance with section 112, it is a question of fact: Is the 
compound of claim 13 described therein? Does the specification convey clearly to those skilled 
in the art, to whom it is addressed, in any way, the information that appellants invented 
that specific compound? Having considered the specification in the light that has been 
shed on it by all the arguments pro and con, we conclude that it does not. 
The decision of the board is affirmed. 
Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar 
935 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
RICH, Circuit Judge. 
Sakharam D. Mahurkar and Quinton Instruments Company (collectively Mahurkar) 
appeal . . . . Granting partial summary judgment to Vas–Cath Incorporated and its licensee 
Gambro, Inc. (collectively Vas–Cath), the district court declared Mahurkar’s two United 
States utility patents Nos. 4,568,329 (’329 patent) and 4,692,141 (’141 patent), titled 
“Double Lumen Catheter,” invalid as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). In reaching its 
decision . . . , the district court concluded that none of the twenty-one claims of the two 
utility patents was entitled, under 35 U.S.C. § 120, to the benefit of the filing date of 
Mahurkar’s earlier-filed United States design patent application Serial No. 356,081 ('081 
design application), which comprised the same drawings as the utility patents, because 
the design application did not provide a “written description of the invention” as required 
by 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. We reverse the grant of summary judgment with 
respect to all claims. 
Background 
Sakharam Mahurkar filed the ’081 design application, also titled “Double Lumen 
Catheter,” on March 8, 1982. The application was abandoned on November 30, 1984. 
Figures 1–6 of the ’081 design application are reproduced below. 
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As shown, Mahurkar’s catheter comprises a pair of tubes (lumens) designed to allow 
blood to be removed from an artery, processed in an apparatus that removes impurities, 
and returned close to the place of removal. Prior art catheters utilized concentric circular 
lumens, while Mahurkar’s employs joined semi-circular tubes that come to a single 
tapered tip. Advantageously, the puncture area of Mahurkar’s semicircular catheter is 
42% less than that of a coaxial catheter carrying the same quantity of blood, and its conical 
tip yields low rates of injury to the blood. The prior art coaxial catheters are now obsolete; 
Mahurkar’s catheters appear to represent more than half of the world’s sales.  
After filing the ’081 design application, Mahurkar also filed a Canadian Industrial 
Design application comprising the same drawings plus additional textual description. On 
August 9, 1982, Canadian Industrial Design 50,089 (Canadian ’089) issued on that 
application. 
More than one year later, on October 1, 1984, Mahurkar filed the first of two utility 
patent applications that would give rise to the patents now on appeal. Notably, both 
utility applications included the same drawings as the ’081 design application. Serial No. 
656,601 (’601 utility application) claimed the benefit of the filing date of the ’081 design 
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application, having been denominated a “continuation” thereof. In an Office Action 
mailed June 6, 1985, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) examiner noted that “the 
prior application is a design application,” but did not dispute that the ’601 application 
was entitled to its filing date. On January 29, 1986, Mahurkar filed Serial No. 823,592 (’592 
utility application), again claiming the benefit of the filing date of the ’081 design 
application (the ’592 utility application was denominated a continuation of the ’601 utility 
application). In an office action mailed April 1, 1987, the examiner stated that the ’592 
utility application was “considered to be fully supported by applicant’s parent application 
[the ’081 design application].” The ’601 and ’592 utility applications issued in 1986 and 
1987, respectively, as the ’329 and ’141 patents, the subjects of this appeal. . . .  
Vas–Cath sued Mahurkar in June 1988, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 
catheters it manufactured did not infringe Mahurkar’s ’329 and ’141 utility patents. Vas–
Cath’s complaint alleged, inter alia, that the ’329 and ’141 patents were both invalid as 
anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) by Canadian ’089. Vas–Cath’s anticipation theory was 
premised on the argument that the ’329 and ’141 patents were not entitled under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 1204 to the filing date of the ’081 design application because its drawings did not provide 
an adequate “written description” of the claimed invention as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112, 
first paragraph.  
Mahurkar counterclaimed, alleging infringement. Both parties moved for summary 
judgment on certain issues, including validity. For purposes of the summary judgment 
motion, Mahurkar conceded that, if he could not antedate it, Canadian ’089 would 
represent an enabling and thus anticipating § 102(b) reference against the claims of his 
’329 and ’141 utility patents. Vas–Cath conceded that the ’081 design drawings enabled 
one skilled in the art to practice the claimed invention within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112, first paragraph. Thus, the question before the district court was whether the 
disclosure of the ’081 design application, namely, the drawings without more, adequately 
meets the “written description” requirement also contained in § 112, first paragraph, so 
as to entitle Mahurkar to the benefit of the 1982 filing date of the ’081 design application 
for his two utility patents and thereby antedates Canadian ’089. 
Concluding that the drawings do not do so, and that therefore the utility patents are 
anticipated by Canadian ’089, the district court held the ’329 and ’141 patents wholly 
invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), and subsequently granted Mahurkar’s motion for entry 
of a partial final judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) on the validity issue. This appeal 
followed. 
Discussion 
The issue before us is whether the district court erred in concluding, on summary 
judgment, that the disclosure of the ’081 design application does not provide a §112, first 
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paragraph “written description” adequate to support each of the claims of the ’329 and 
’141 patents. If the court so erred as to any of the 21 claims at issue, the admittedly 
anticipatory disclosure of Canadian ’089 will have been antedated (and the basis for the 
court’s grant of summary judgment nullified) as to those claims. 
The “Written Description” Requirement of § 112 
The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that 
the specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which 
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best 
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. 
Application of the “written description” requirement, derived from the portion of § 112 
emphasized above, is central to resolution of this appeal. The district court, having 
reviewed this court’s decisions on the subject, remarked that “unfortunately, it is not so 
easy to tell what the law of the Federal Circuit is.” Perhaps that is so, and, therefore, before 
proceeding to the merits, we review the case law development of the “written 
description” requirement with a view to improving the situation.  
The cases indicate that the “written description” requirement most often comes into 
play where claims not presented in the application when filed are presented thereafter. 
Alternatively, patent applicants often seek the benefit of the filing date of an earlier-filed 
foreign or United States application under 35 U.S.C. § 119 or 35 U.S.C. § 120, respectively, 
for claims of a later-filed application. The question raised by these situations is most often 
phrased as whether the application provides “adequate support” for the claim(s) at issue; 
it has also been analyzed in terms of “new matter” under 35 U.S.C. § 132. The “written 
description” question similarly arises in the interference context, where the issue is 
whether the specification of one party to the interference can support the claim(s) 
corresponding to the count(s) at issue, i.e., whether that party “can make the claim” 
corresponding to the interference count. 
To the uninitiated, it may seem anomalous that the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 
has been interpreted as requiring a separate “description of the invention,” when the 
invention is, necessarily, the subject matter defined in the claims under consideration. One 
may wonder what purpose a separate “written description” requirement serves, when the 
second paragraph of § 112 expressly requires that the applicant conclude his specification 
“with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject 
matter which the applicant regards as his invention.” 
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One explanation is historical: the “written description” requirement was a part of the 
patent statutes at a time before claims were required. A case in point is Evans v. Eaton, 20 
U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822), in which the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s 
decision that the plaintiff’s patent was “deficient,” and that the plaintiff could not recover 
for infringement thereunder. The patent laws then in effect, namely the Patent Act of 1793, 
did not require claims, but did require, in its 3d section, that the patent applicant “deliver 
a written description of his invention, and of the manner of using, or process of 
compounding, the same, in such full, clear and exact terms, as to distinguish the same 
from all things before known, and to enable any person skilled in the art or science of 
which it is a branch, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make, compound and 
use the same.” In view of this language, the Court concluded that the specification of a 
patent had two objects, the first of which was “to enable artizans to make and use the 
invention.” The second object of the specification was 
to put the public in possession of what the party claims as his own invention, so 
as to ascertain if he claims anything that is in common use, or is already known, 
and to guard against prejudice or injury from the use of an invention which the 
party may otherwise innocently suppose not to be patented. It is, therefore, for the 
purpose of warning an innocent purchaser, or other person using a machine, of his 
infringement of the patent; and at the same time, of taking from the inventor the 
means of practising upon the credulity or the fears of other persons, by pretending 
that his invention is more than what it really is, or different from its ostensible 
objects, that the patentee is required to distinguish his invention in his 
specification. 
A second, policy-based rationale for the inclusion in § 112 of both the first paragraph 
“written description” and the second paragraph “definiteness” requirements was set forth 
in Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551 (3d Cir. 1981): 
There is a subtle relationship between the policies underlying the description and 
definiteness requirements, as the two standards, while complementary, approach 
a similar problem from different directions. Adequate description of the invention 
guards against the inventor's overreaching by insisting that he recount his 
invention in such detail that his future claims can be determined to be 
encompassed within his original creation. The definiteness requirement shapes the 
future conduct of persons other than the inventor, by insisting that they receive 
notice of the scope of the patented device. 
With respect to the first paragraph of § 112 the severability of its “written description” 
provision from its enablement (“make and use”) provision was recognized by this court’s 
predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, as early as In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 
990 (CCPA 1967). . . . The issue, as the court saw it, was one of fact: “Does the specification 
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convey clearly to those skilled in the art, to whom it is addressed, in any way, the 
information that appellants invented that specific compound claimed?”  
In a 1971 case again involving chemical subject matter, the court expressly stated that 
“it is possible for a specification to enable the practice of an invention as broadly as it is 
claimed, and still not describe that invention.” In re DiLeone, 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 (CCPA 
1971). As an example, the court posited the situation “where the specification discusses 
only compound A and contains no broadening language of any kind. This might very well 
enable one skilled in the art to make and use compounds B and C; yet the class consisting 
of A, B and C has not been described.”  
The CCPA also recognized a subtle distinction between a written description adequate 
to support a claim under § 112 and a written description sufficient to anticipate its subject 
matter under § 102(b). The difference between “claim-supporting disclosures” and 
“claim-anticipating disclosures” was dispositive in In re Lukach, 442 F.2d 967 (CCPA 1971), 
where the court held that a U.S. “grandparent” application did not sufficiently describe 
the later-claimed invention, but that the appellant’s intervening British application, a 
counterpart to the U.S. application, anticipated the claimed subject matter. As the court 
pointed out, “the description of a single embodiment of broadly claimed subject matter 
constitutes a description of the invention for anticipation purposes, whereas the same 
information in a specification might not alone be enough to provide a description of that 
invention for purposes of adequate disclosure.”  
The purpose and applicability of the “written description” requirement were 
addressed in In re Smith and Hubin, 481 F.2d 910 (CCPA 1973), where the court stated: 
Satisfaction of the description requirement insures that subject matter presented 
in the form of a claim subsequent to the filing date of the application was 
sufficiently disclosed at the time of filing so that the prima facie date of invention 
can fairly be held to be the filing date of the application. This concept applies 
whether the case factually arises out of an assertion of entitlement to the filing date 
of a previously filed application under § 120 or arises in the interference context 
wherein the issue is support for a count in the specification of one or more of the 
parties or arises in an ex parte case involving a single application, but where the 
claim at issue was filed subsequent to the filing of the application. 
The CCPA’s “written description” cases often stressed the fact-specificity of the issue. The 
court even went so far as to state: 
It should be readily apparent from recent decisions of this court involving the 
question of compliance with the description requirement of § 112 that each case 
must be decided on its own facts. Thus, the precedential value of cases in this area 
is extremely limited. 
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In re Driscoll, 562 F.2d 1245, 1250 (CCPA 1977). 
Since its inception, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has frequently 
addressed the “written description” requirement of § 112. A fairly uniform standard for 
determining compliance with the “written description” requirement has been maintained 
throughout: “Although the applicant does not have to describe exactly the subject matter 
claimed, the description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize 
that he or she invented what is claimed.” “The test for sufficiency of support in a parent 
application is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys 
to the artisan that the inventor had possession at that time of the later claimed subject 
matter.” Our cases also provide that compliance with the “written description” 
requirement of § 112 is a question of fact, to be reviewed under the clearly erroneous 
standard.  
There appears to be some confusion in our decisions concerning the extent to which 
the “written description” requirement is separate and distinct from the enablement 
requirement. For example, in In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1984), we flatly 
stated: “The description requirement is found in 35 U.S.C. § 112 and is separate from the 
enablement requirement of that provision.” However, in a later case we said, “The 
purpose of the written description requirement of section 112, first paragraph is to state 
what is needed to fulfill the enablement criteria. These requirements may be viewed 
separately, but they are intertwined.” Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera Int’l, Inc., 835 F.2d 1419, 
1421 (Fed. Cir. 1987). “The written description must communicate that which is needed to 
enable the skilled artisan to make and use the claimed invention.” 
To the extent that Kennecott conflicts with Wilder, we note that decisions of a three-
judge panel of this court cannot overturn prior precedential decisions. This court in Wilder 
(and the CCPA before it) clearly recognized, and we hereby reaffirm, that 35 U.S.C. § 112, 
first paragraph, requires a “written description of the invention” which is separate and 
distinct from the enablement requirement. The purpose of the “written description” 
requirement is broader than to merely explain how to “make and use”; the applicant must 
also convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date 
sought, he or she was in possession of the invention. The invention is, for purposes of the 
“written description” inquiry, whatever is now claimed. 
The District Court’s Analysis 
We agree with the district court’s conclusion that drawings alone may be sufficient to 
provide the “written description of the invention” required by § 112, first paragraph. 
Several earlier cases, though not specifically framing the issue in terms of compliance with 
the “written description” requirement, support this conclusion. 
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For example, we previously stated that “there is no statutory prohibition against an 
applicant’s reliance, in claiming priority under 35 U.S.C. § 120, on a disclosure in a design 
application if the statutory conditions are met.”  
. . . 
These cases support our holding that, under proper circumstances, drawings alone 
may provide a “written description” of an invention as required by § 112. Whether the 
drawings are those of a design application or a utility application is not determinative, 
although in most cases the latter are much more detailed. In the instant case, however, the 
design drawings are substantially identical to the utility application drawings.  
Although we join with the district court in concluding that drawings may suffice to 
satisfy the “written description” requirement of § 112, we can not agree with the legal 
standard that the court imposed for “written description” compliance, nor with the court’s 
conclusion that no genuine issues of material fact were in dispute. 
With respect to the former, the district court stated that although the ’081 design 
drawings in question “allowed practice” i.e., enabled, they did not necessarily “show 
what the invention is . . . .” We find the district court’s concern with “what the invention 
is” misplaced, and its requirement that the ’081 drawings “describe what is novel or 
important” legal error. There is “no legally recognizable or protected ‘essential’ element, 
‘gist’ or ‘heart’ of the invention in a combination patent.” “The invention” is defined by 
the claims on appeal. The instant claims do not recite only a pair of semi-circular lumens, 
or a conical tip, or a ratio at which the tip tapers, or the shape, size, and placement of the 
inlets and outlets; they claim a double lumen catheter having a combination of those 
features. That combination invention is what the ’081 drawings show. As the district court 
itself recognized, “what Mahurkar eventually patented is exactly what the pictures in 
serial ’081 show.”  
. . .  
The district court erred in taking Mahurkar’s other patents into account. Mahurkar’s 
later patenting of inventions involving different range limitations is irrelevant to the issue 
at hand. Application sufficiency under § 112, first paragraph, must be judged as of the 
filing date.  
Conclusion 
The district court’s grant of summary judgment, holding all claims of the ’329 and ’141 
patents invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), is hereby reversed as to all claims, and the case 
remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.  
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Context & Application 
1.  Why don’t we let patent applicants amend or add claims at will? The Federal 
Circuit has said that: 
[T]here is nothing improper, illegal or inequitable in filing a patent application for 
the purpose of obtaining a right to exclude a known competitor’s product from the 
market; nor is it in any manner improper to amend or insert claims intended to 
cover a competitor’s product the applicant’s attorney has learned about during the 
prosecution of a patent application. 
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Where 
is the line between allowable amendments and prohibited ones? Where should that line 
be? Now that you know a little about patent continuation practice, do you see any 
opportunities for shenanigans? How does the written description requirement help (or 
not help) address those issues? 
2. We’ve seen that utility patent applications can claim priority to design patent 
applications. The reverse is also true; design patent applications can claim priority to non-
provisional utility patent applications. MPEP §§ 1504.10, 1504.20. This means that 
someone could try to get a utility patent, have it rejected, then file a continuation 
application seeking a design patent for a design disclosed in original application’s 
drawings. This also has implications for patent terms. Utility patent terms are calculated 
based on the filing date, see 35 U.S.C. §  154(a)(2), while design patent terms are based on 
the issuance date, see 35 U.S.C. § 173. 
3.  As the court alluded to in Vas-Cath, a piece of prior art must be enabling to 
invalidate. (For more on invalidating claims, see Chapter 6.) What would happen if 
someone made a working transporter, like the fictional one shown on “Star Trek”? Could 
the television show anticipate a patent claim that covered the working transporter? How 
would you start to analyze that issue, based just on what you know now? 
4.  In Vas-Cath, the court mentions the concept of “new matter.” The Patent Act states: 
“No amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of the invention.” 35 
U.S.C. § 132(a). Why should new matter be prohibited? What consequences flow if new 
matter is added?  
5. In Vas-Cath, the court also talks about interferences. “An interference is a contest 
under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 135(a) between an application and either another application or 
a patent. An interference is declared to assist the [USPTO] . . . in determining priority, that 
is, which party first invented the commonly claimed invention . . . .” MPEP § 2301. As 
we’ll see in Chapter 6, the AIA changed the rules for patent priority; one consequence of 
that change is that there are no interferences for patents governed by the AIA.  
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Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co. 
598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) 
LOURIE, Circuit Judge. 
Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Whitehead 
Institute for Biomedical Research, and the President and Fellows of Harvard College 
(collectively, “Ariad”) brought suit against Eli Lilly & Company (“Lilly”) in the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging infringement of U.S. Patent 
6,410,516 (“the ’516 patent”). . . . [A] panel of this court reversed the district court’s denial 
of Lilly’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) and held the asserted claims 
invalid for lack of written description.  
. . . 
In light of the controversy concerning the distinctness and proper role of the written 
description requirement, we granted Ariad’s petition [for rehearing en banc], . . . directing 
the parties to brief two questions:  
(1) Whether 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, contains a written description 
requirement separate from an enablement requirement? 
(2) If a separate written description requirement is set forth in the statute, what is 
the scope and purpose of that requirement? 
In addition to the parties’ briefs, the court received twenty-five amicus briefs. . . . 
I 
[A]lthough the parties take diametrically opposed positions on the existence of a 
written description requirement separate from enablement, both agree that the 
specification must contain a written description of the invention to establish what the 
invention is. The dispute, therefore, centers on the standard to be applied and whether it 
applies to original claim language. 
A 
As in any case involving statutory interpretation, we begin with the language of the 
statute itself. Section 112, first paragraph, reads as follows: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which 
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best 
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. 
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According to Ariad, a plain reading of the statute reveals two components: a written 
description (i) of the invention, and (ii) of the manner and process of making and using it. 
Yet those two components, goes Ariad’s argument, must be judged by the final 
prepositional phrase . . . . Specifically, Ariad parses the statute as follows: 
The specification shall contain 
[A] a written description 
[i] of the invention, and 
[ii] of the manner and process of making and using it, 
[B] in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in 
the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and 
use the same ... 
Ariad argues that its interpretation best follows the rule of English grammar that 
prepositional phrases (here, “of the invention,” “of the manner and process of making and 
using it,” and “in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms”) modify another word in the 
sentence (here, “written description”), and that it does not inexplicably ignore the comma 
after “making and using it” or sever the “description of the invention” from the 
requirement that it be in “full, clear, concise, and exact terms,” leaving the description 
without a legal standard. 
Ariad also argues that earlier versions of the Patent Act support its interpretation. 
Specifically, Ariad contends that the first Patent Act, adopted in 1790, and its immediate 
successor, adopted in 1793, required a written description of the invention that 
accomplished two purposes: (i) to distinguish the invention from the prior art, and (ii) to 
enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the invention. Ariad then asserts that 
when Congress assigned the function of defining the invention to the claims in 1836, 
Congress amended the written description requirement so that it served a single purpose: 
enablement. 
Lilly disagrees, arguing that § 112, first paragraph, contains three separate 
requirements. Specifically, Lilly parses the statute as follows: 
(1) “The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and” 
(2) “The specification shall contain a written description . . . of the manner and 
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as 
to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is 
most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and ” 
(3) “The specification . . . shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor 
of carrying out the invention.” 
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Lilly argues that Ariad’s construction ignores a long line of judicial precedent interpreting 
the statute’s predecessors to contain a separate written description requirement, an 
interpretation Congress adopted by reenacting the current language of § 112, first 
paragraph, without significant amendment. 
We agree with Lilly and read the statute to give effect to its language that the 
specification “shall contain a written description of the invention” and hold that § 112, 
first paragraph, contains two separate description requirements: a “written description 
[i] of the invention, and [ii] of the manner and process of making and using the invention.” 
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1. On this point, we do not read Ariad’s position to be in disagreement 
as Ariad concedes the existence of a written description requirement. Instead Ariad 
contends that the written description requirement exists, not for its own sake as an 
independent statutory requirement, but only to identify the invention that must comply 
with the enablement requirement. 
But, unlike Ariad, we see nothing in the statute’s language or grammar that 
unambiguously dictates that the adequacy of the “written description of the invention” 
must be determined solely by whether that description identifies the invention so as to 
enable one of skill in the art to make and use it. The prepositional phrase “in such full, 
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and 
use the same” modifies only “the written description . . . of the manner and process of 
making and using the invention,” as Lilly argues, without violating the rules of grammar. 
That the adequacy of the description of the manner and process of making and using the 
invention is judged by whether that description enables one skilled in the art to make and 
use the same follows from the parallelism of the language. 
While Ariad agrees there is a requirement to describe the invention, a few amici 
appear to suggest that the only description requirement is a requirement to describe 
enablement. If Congress had intended enablement to be the sole description requirement 
of § 112, first paragraph, the statute would have been written differently. Specifically, 
Congress could have written the statute to read, “The specification shall contain a written 
description of the invention, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any 
person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the same,” or “The specification shall contain 
a written description of the manner and process of making and using the invention, in 
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to 
make and use the same.” Under the amicis’ construction a portion of the statute—either 
“and of the manner and process of making and using it” or “a written description of the 
invention”—becomes surplusage, violating the rule of statutory construction that 
Congress does not use unnecessary words.  
Furthermore, since 1793, the Patent Act has expressly stated that an applicant must 
provide a written description of the invention, and after the 1836 Act added the 
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requirement for claims, the Supreme Court applied this description requirement separate 
from enablement. Congress recodified this language in the 1952 Act, and nothing in the 
legislative history indicates that Congress intended to rid the Act of this requirement. On 
the contrary, “Congress is presumed to be aware of a judicial interpretation of a statute 
and to adopt that interpretation when it reenacts a statute without change.”  
Finally, a separate requirement to describe one’s invention is basic to patent law. Every 
patent must describe an invention. It is part of the quid pro quo of a patent; one describes 
an invention, and, if the law’s other requirements are met, one obtains a patent. The 
specification must then, of course, describe how to make and use the invention (i.e., enable 
it), but that is a different task. A description of the claimed invention allows the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) to examine applications effectively; courts to 
understand the invention, determine compliance with the statute, and to construe the 
claims; and the public to understand and improve upon the invention and to avoid the 
claimed boundaries of the patentee’s exclusive rights. 
B 
Ariad argues . . . . that in Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) (1822), the Supreme Court 
recognized just two requirements under § 3 of the 1793 Act, the requirements “to enable” 
the invention and “to distinguish” it from all things previously known. And, goes Ariad’s 
argument, since the 1836 Act, which removed the latter language and added the 
requirement for claims, the Court has consistently held that a patent applicant need fulfill 
but a single “written description” requirement, the measure of which is enablement. 
Lilly disagrees and reads Evans as acknowledging a written description requirement 
separate from enablement. Lilly further contends that the Court has continually confirmed 
the existence of a separate written description requirement, including in O’Reilly v. Morse, 
56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853) under the 1836 Act; Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 
305 U.S. 47 (1938), under the 1870 Act; and more recently in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku 
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002). 
Like Lilly, we also read Supreme Court precedent as recognizing a written description 
requirement separate from an enablement requirement even after the introduction of 
claims. Specifically, in Schriber-Schroth, the Court held that a patent directed to pistons for 
a gas engine with “extremely rigid” webs did not adequately describe amended claims 
that recited flexible webs under the then-in-force version of § 112, first paragraph. The 
Court ascribed two purposes to this portion of the statute, only the first of which involved 
enablement:  
[1] to require the patentee to describe his invention so that others may construct 
and use it after the expiration of the patent and [2] to inform the public during the 
life of the patent of the limits of the monopoly asserted, so that it may be known 
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which features may be safely used or manufactured without a license and which 
may not. 
The Court then concluded that even if the original specification enabled the use of a 
flexible web, the claim could derive no benefit from it because “that was not the invention 
which the patentee described by his references to an extremely rigid web.” Although the 
Court did not expressly state that it was applying a description of the invention 
requirement separate from enablement, that is exactly what the Court did. 
Further, both before and after Schriber-Schroth, the Court has stated that the statute 
serves a purpose other than enablement. In Gill v. Wells, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 1 (1874), the 
Court held invalid a reissue patent for claiming a combination not described in the 
original application, but the Court also emphasized the need for all patents to meet the 
“three great ends” of § 26, only one of which was enablement. Specifically, the Court 
stated: 
(1) That the government may know what they have granted and what will become 
public property when the term of the monopoly expires. (2) That licensed persons 
desiring to practice the invention may know, during the term, how to make, 
construct, and use the invention. (3) That other inventors may know what part of 
the field of invention is unoccupied. 
As a subordinate federal court, we may not so easily dismiss such statements as dicta but 
are bound to follow them. 
C 
In addition to the statutory language and Supreme Court precedent supporting the 
existence of a written description requirement separate from enablement, stare decisis 
impels us to uphold it now. Ariad acknowledges that this has been the law for over forty 
years, and to change course now would disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing 
community, which has relied on it in drafting and prosecuting patents, concluding 
licensing agreements, and rendering validity and infringement opinions. As the Supreme 
Court stated in admonishing this court, we “must be cautious before adopting changes 
that disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing community.” If the law of written 
description is to be changed, contrary to sound policy and the uniform holdings of this 
court, the settled expectations of the inventing and investing communities, and PTO 
practice, such a decision would require good reason and would rest with Congress.  
E 
In contrast to amended claims, the parties have more divergent views on the 
application of a written description requirement to original claims. Ariad argues that 
Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997), 
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extended the requirement beyond its proper role of policing priority as part of enablement 
and transformed it into a heightened and unpredictable general disclosure requirement 
in place of enablement. Rather, Ariad argues, the requirement to describe what the 
invention is does not apply to original claims because original claims, as part of the 
original disclosure, constitute their own written description of the invention. Thus, 
according to Ariad, as long as the claim language appears in ipsis verbis in the specification 
as filed, the applicant has satisfied the requirement to provide a written description of the 
invention. 
Lilly responds that the written description requirement applies to all claims and 
requires that the specification objectively demonstrate that the applicant actually 
invented—was in possession of—the claimed subject matter. Lilly argues that § 112 
contains no basis for applying a different standard to amended versus original claims and 
that applying a separate written description requirement to original claims keeps 
inventors from claiming beyond their inventions and thus encourages innovation in new 
technological areas by preserving patent protection for actual inventions. 
Again we agree with Lilly. If it is correct to read § 112, first paragraph, as containing 
a requirement to provide a separate written description of the invention, as we hold here, 
Ariad provides no principled basis for restricting that requirement to establishing priority. 
Certainly nothing in the language of § 112 supports such a restriction; the statute does not 
say “The specification shall contain a written description of the invention for purposes of 
determining priority.” And although the issue arises primarily in cases involving priority, 
Congress has not so limited the statute, and neither will we. 
Furthermore, while it is true that original claims are part of the original specification, 
that truism fails to address the question whether original claim language necessarily 
discloses the subject matter that it claims. Ariad believes so, arguing that original claims 
identify whatever they state, e.g., a perpetual motion machine, leaving only the question 
whether the applicant has enabled anyone to make and use such an invention. We 
disagree that this is always the case. Although many original claims will satisfy the written 
description requirement, certain claims may not. For example, a generic claim may define 
the boundaries of a vast genus of chemical compounds, and yet the question may still 
remain whether the specification, including original claim language, demonstrates that 
the applicant has invented species sufficient to support a claim to a genus. The problem 
is especially acute with genus claims that use functional language to define the boundaries 
of a claimed genus. In such a case, the functional claim may simply claim a desired result, 
and may do so without describing species that achieve that result. But the specification 
must demonstrate that the applicant has made a generic invention that achieves the 
claimed result and do so by showing that the applicant has invented species sufficient to 
support a claim to the functionally-defined genus. 
 DISCLOSURE  
223 
Recognizing this, we held in Eli Lilly that an adequate written description of a claimed 
genus requires more than a generic statement of an invention's boundaries. The patent at 
issue in Eli Lilly claimed a broad genus of cDNAs purporting to encode many different 
insulin molecules, and we held that its generic claim language to “vertebrate insulin 
cDNA” or “mammalian insulin cDNA” failed to describe the claimed genus because it 
did not distinguish the genus from other materials in any way except by function, i.e., by 
what the genes do, and thus provided “only a definition of a useful result rather than a 
definition of what achieves that result.”  
We held that a sufficient description of a genus instead requires the disclosure of either 
a representative number of species falling within the scope of the genus or structural 
features common to the members of the genus so that one of skill in the art can “visualize 
or recognize” the members of the genus. We explained that an adequate written 
description requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, 
physical properties, or other properties, of species falling within the genus sufficient to 
distinguish the genus from other materials. We have also held that functional claim 
language can meet the written description requirement when the art has established a 
correlation between structure and function. But merely drawing a fence around the outer 
limits of a purported genus is not an adequate substitute for describing a variety of 
materials constituting the genus and showing that one has invented a genus and not just 
a species. 
. . . 
Ariad argues that Eli Lilly constituted a change in the law, imposing new requirements 
on biotechnology inventions. We disagree. . . . Neither the statute nor legal precedent 
limits the written description requirement to cases of priority or distinguishes between 
original and amended claims. . . . Once again we reject Ariad’s argument and hold that 
generic language in the application as filed does not automatically satisfy the written 
description requirement. 
F 
Since its inception, this court has consistently held that § 112, first paragraph, contains 
a written description requirement separate from enablement, and we have articulated a 
“fairly uniform standard,” which we now affirm. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 
1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Specifically, the description must “clearly allow persons of 
ordinary skill in the art to recognize that the inventor invented what is claimed.” In other 
words, the test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon 
reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the 
claimed subject matter as of the filing date.  
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The term “possession,” however, has never been very enlightening. It implies that as 
long as one can produce records documenting a written description of a claimed 
invention, one can show possession. But the hallmark of written description is disclosure. 
Thus, “possession as shown in the disclosure” is a more complete formulation. Yet 
whatever the specific articulation, the test requires an objective inquiry into the four 
corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art. 
Based on that inquiry, the specification must describe an invention understandable to that 
skilled artisan and show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed. 
This inquiry, as we have long held, is a question of fact. . . . [T]he level of detail 
required to satisfy the written description requirement varies depending on the nature 
and scope of the claims and on the complexity and predictability of the relevant 
technology. For generic claims, we have set forth a number of factors for evaluating the 
adequacy of the disclosure, including “the existing knowledge in the particular field, the 
extent and content of the prior art, the maturity of the science or technology, [and] the 
predictability of the aspect at issue.”  
The law must be applied to each invention at the time it enters the patent process, for 
each patented advance has a novel relationship with the state of the art from which it 
emerges. Thus, we do not try here to predict and adjudicate all the factual scenarios to 
which the written description requirement could be applied. Nor do we set out any bright-
line rules governing, for example, the number of species that must be disclosed to describe 
a genus claim, as this number necessarily changes with each invention, and it changes 
with progress in a field. Thus, whatever inconsistencies may appear to some to exist in 
the application of the law, those inconsistencies rest not with the legal standard but with 
the different facts and arguments presented to the courts. 
There are, however, a few broad principles that hold true across all cases. We have 
made clear that the written description requirement does not demand either examples or 
an actual reduction to practice; a constructive reduction to practice that in a definite way 
identifies the claimed invention can satisfy the written description requirement. 
Conversely, we have repeatedly stated that actual “possession” or reduction to practice 
outside of the specification is not enough. Rather, as stated above, it is the specification 
itself that must demonstrate possession. And while the description requirement does not 
demand any particular form of disclosure, or that the specification recite the claimed 
invention in haec verba, a description that merely renders the invention obvious does not 
satisfy the requirement. 
We also reject the characterization, cited by Ariad, of the court’s written description 
doctrine as a “super enablement” standard for chemical and biotechnology inventions. 
The doctrine never created a heightened requirement to provide a nucleotide-by-
nucleotide recitation of the entire genus of claimed genetic material; it has always 
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expressly permitted the disclosure of structural features common to the members of the 
genus. It also has not just been applied to chemical and biological inventions.  
Perhaps there is little difference in some fields between describing an invention and 
enabling one to make and use it, but that is not always true of certain inventions, including 
chemical and chemical-like inventions. Thus, although written description and 
enablement often rise and fall together, requiring a written description of the invention 
plays a vital role in curtailing claims that do not require undue experimentation to make 
and use, and thus satisfy enablement, but that have not been invented, and thus cannot 
be described. For example, a propyl or butyl compound may be made by a process 
analogous to a disclosed methyl compound, but, in the absence of a statement that the 
inventor invented propyl and butyl compounds, such compounds have not been 
described and are not entitled to a patent.  
The written description requirement also ensures that when a patent claims a genus 
by its function or result, the specification recites sufficient materials to accomplish that 
function—a problem that is particularly acute in the biological arts. . . .  
Context & Application 
1. What tools of statutory interpretation does the Federal Circuit use in Ariad? Notice 
here that, as with patentable subject matter, the court relies heavily on cases decided over 
a century ago. What inferences can we draw from this pattern? 
2. In this case, Eli Lilly suggests that Morse was a written description case. Do you 
agree? 
3.  To reach its conclusion in Ariad, the Federal Circuit relies in part on Ariad’s 
admission that a separate written description requirement had “been the law for over 
forty years” and expressed concern about upsetting “the settled expectations of the 
inventing and investing communities.” But what if those expectations were based on case 
law that clearly misinterpreted the statute? Would courts really have to, as the Federal 
Circuit suggests here, wait for Congress to change the law? Alternatively, what if the 
“inventing and investing communities” had expectations based on rules promulgated by 
the USPTO? Those rules do not have the force of law and are not entitled to deference 
from the courts. Based on the reasoning in Ariad, should courts defer to them anyway if 
they’ve been in place for 40 years? What about 30 years? Twenty? How long is enough for 
“settled expectations” to develop, with respect to either USPTO rules or Federal Circuit 
case law? 
4. So far, we have focused mainly on the law established in Ariad. But what about the 
underlying dispute? As the court explained: 
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The [asserted] claims are genus claims, encompassing the use of all substances that 
achieve the desired result of reducing the binding of [a particular protein whose 
structure and function was discovered by the inventors] to [that protein’s] 
recognition sites [on DNA molecules . . . . The specification also hypothesizes three 
types of molecules with the potential to reduce [the protein’s] activity in cells: 
decoy, dominantly interfering, and specific inhibitor molecules. 
. . .  
Specific inhibitors are molecules that are ‘able to block (reduce or eliminate) [the 
protein’s] binding’ to DNA in the nucleus. . . . 
Dominantly interfering molecules are ‘a truncated form of the [protein] … [that] 
would block [the actual protein] from inducing the expression of its target genes. 
. . . 
Decoy molecules are ‘designed to mimic a region of the gene whose expression 
would normally be induced by [the protein, leading the protein to] bind the decoy, 
and thus, not be available to bind its natural target. . . . 
. . . 
The ’516 patent discloses no working or even prophetic examples of methods that 
reduce [the protein’s] activity, and no completed syntheses of any of the molecules 
prophesized to be capable of reducing [that] activity. The state of the art at the time 
of filing was primitive and uncertain, leaving Ariad with an insufficient supply of 
prior art knowledge with which to fill the gaping holes in its disclosure. . . . 
[W]e hold that the asserted claims of the ′516 patent are invalid for lack of written 
description . . . . 
So, what did Ariad actually invent or discover? What was wrong with its patent?  
C. Definiteness 
Section 112(b) requires a specification to “conclude with one or more claims 
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or 
a joint inventor regards as the invention.” But just how particular and distinct does a 
patent claim have to be? This section will explore this requirement, generally referred to 
as “definiteness.” The Supreme Court set the contemporary standard for definiteness in 
its 2014 decision in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. But before we read that case, 
let’s see how at least one Federal Circuit panel interpreted and applied the definiteness 
standard pre-Nautilus.  
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Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc. 
417 F.3d 1342 (2005) 
PROST, Circuit Judge. 
Datamize, L.L.C. (“Datamize”) appeals from a decision . . . holding each claim of 
United States Patent No. 6,014,137 (“the ’137 patent”) invalid as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112, ¶ 2. We affirm. 
Background 
A 
The ’137 patent, entitled “Electronic Kiosk Authoring System,” discloses a software 
program that allows a person to author user interfaces for electronic kiosks. “The 
authoring system enables the user interface for each individual kiosk to be customized 
quickly and easily within wide limits of variation, yet subject to constraints adhering the 
resulting interface to good standards of aesthetics and user friendliness.”  
The authoring system gives the system author a limited range of pre-defined design 
choices for stylistic and functional elements appearing on the screens. “Major aesthetic or 
functional design choices as well as hierarchical methods of retrieving information may 
be built into the system while taking into account the considered opinions of aesthetic 
design specialists, database specialists, and academic studies on public access kiosk 
systems and user preferences and problems.” 
. . .  
At issue in this appeal is the definiteness of “aesthetically pleasing” as it is used in the 
context of claim 1 of the ’137 patent. 
The “aesthetically pleasing” claim language was not discussed by the inventor or the 
patent examiner during prosecution of the application that led to the ’137 patent. The 
language was discussed, however, during prosecution of a continuation application to the 
’137 patent, which eventually issued as United States Patent No. 6,460,040 (“the ’040 
patent”). The patent examiner reviewing the application leading to the ’040 patent rejected 
a claim as being indefinite for using the phrase “aesthetically pleasing.” In response to 
this rejection, the inventor argued that the phrase is definite, but ultimately deleted it, 
stating in part that it is “not intended to identify qualities separate and apart from the 
remainder of this claim element” and is “superfluous and unnecessary.” 
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B 
Datamize sued Plumtree Software, Inc. (“Plumtree”) for infringing the ’137 patent, 
and Plumtree responded by moving for summary judgment on the ground that the ’137 
patent is invalid for indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. . . . 
Concluding that the phrase “aesthetically pleasing” in claim 1 is “hopelessly 
indefinite,” the district court granted Plumtree’s motion for summary judgment of 
invalidity. Since claim 1 is the ’137 patent’s sole independent claim, the court’s grant of 
summary judgment of indefiniteness as to claim 1 invalidated each claim in the ’137 
patent. 
Datamize appeals the grant of summary judgment of invalidity for indefiniteness. We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 
Discussion 
A 
 “A determination of claim indefiniteness is a legal conclusion that is drawn from the 
court’s performance of its duty as the construer of patent claims.” Thus, . . . we exercise de 
novo review over the conclusion that a claim is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2.  
B 
 [T]he purpose of the definiteness requirement is to ensure that the claims delineate 
the scope of the invention using language that adequately notifies the public of the 
patentee’s right to exclude. 
According to the Supreme Court, “the statutory requirement of particularity and 
distinctness in claims is met only when the claims clearly distinguish what is claimed from 
what went before in the art and clearly circumscribe what is foreclosed from future 
enterprise.” The definiteness requirement, however, does not compel absolute clarity. 
Only claims “not amenable to construction” or “insolubly ambiguous” are indefinite. 
Thus, the definiteness of claim terms depends on whether those terms can be given any 
reasonable meaning. Furthermore, a difficult issue of claim construction does not ipso 
facto result in a holding of indefiniteness. “If the meaning of the claim is discernible, even 
though the task may be formidable and the conclusion may be one over which reasonable 
persons will disagree, we have held the claim sufficiently clear to avoid invalidity on 
indefiniteness grounds.” In this regard it is important to note that an issued patent is 
entitled to a statutory presumption of validity. See 35 U.S.C. § 282. “By finding claims 
indefinite only if reasonable efforts at claim construction prove futile, we accord respect 
to the statutory presumption of validity and we protect the inventive contribution of 
patentees, even when the drafting of their patents has been less than ideal.” In this way 
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we also follow the requirement that clear and convincing evidence be shown to invalidate 
a patent.  
. . . 
C 
With these principles in mind, we proceed to the question at hand: whether the ’137 
patent’s use of “aesthetically pleasing” meets the standards articulated in our case law 
concerning definiteness. We begin our analysis by noting our agreement with the district 
court’s understanding that the ordinary meaning of “aesthetically pleasing” includes 
“having beauty that gives pleasure or enjoyment” or, in other words, “beautiful.” We also 
recognize that the district court’s opinion presents a reasoned and detailed analysis of 
both the intrinsic evidence, including the specification of the ’137 patent and the 
prosecution history of the ’040 patent, and the extrinsic evidence in the form of Datamize’s 
expert testimony. Datamize, however, argues that the district court erred by considering 
the phrase “aesthetically pleasing” divorced from the context of claim 1. 
Datamize is right to point out that the phrase “aesthetically pleasing” should be 
considered in the context of claim 1. . . . “Aesthetically pleasing” is used three times in 
claim 1. The first use of “aesthetically pleasing” relates to the look and feel of custom 
interface screens on kiosks: 
providing a plurality of pre-defined interface screen element types, each element 
type defining a form of element available for presentation on said custom interface 
screens, wherein each said element type permits limited variation in its on-screen 
characteristics in conformity with a desired uniform and aesthetically pleasing 
look and feel for said interface screens on all kiosks of said kiosk system, 
The second use relies on the first use for antecedent basis and similarly relates to the look 
and feel of interface screens: 
each element type having a plurality of attributes associated therewith, wherein 
each said element type and its associated attributes are subject to pre-defined 
constraints providing element characteristics in conformance with said uniform 
and aesthetically pleasing look and feel for said interface screens, 
The third use provides a slightly different context, relating to the aggregate layout of 
elements on the interface screen: 
assigning values to the attributes associated with each of said selected elements 
consistent with said pre-defined constraints, whereby the aggregate layout of said 
plurality of selected elements on said interface screen under construction will be 
aesthetically pleasing and functionally operable for effective delivery of 
information to a kiosk user; 
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Thus, in the context of claim 1, “aesthetically pleasing” relates to the look and feel of 
custom interface screens on kiosks, and the aggregate layout of elements on an interface 
screen is apparently one example or aspect of the interface screens that may be 
“aesthetically pleasing.” 
This context, while helpful in terms of identifying the components of the claimed 
invention that must be “aesthetically pleasing,” does not suggest or provide any 
meaningful definition for the phrase “aesthetically pleasing” itself. Merely understanding 
that “aesthetically pleasing” relates to the look and feel of interface screens, or more 
specifically to the aggregate layout of elements on interface screens, fails to provide one 
of ordinary skill in the art with any way to determine whether an interface screen is 
“aesthetically pleasing.” 
Datamize, however, contends that when construed in the context of claim 1, the phrase 
“aesthetically pleasing” applies to the process of defining a “desired” result and not the 
actual result itself. Datamize believes a reasonable construction of “aesthetically pleasing” 
in the context of the claims involves the intent, purpose, wish, or goal of a person 
practicing the invention: that person simply must intend to create an “aesthetically 
pleasing” interface screen; whether that person actually succeeds is irrelevant. In other 
words, Datamize suggests we adopt a construction of “aesthetically pleasing” that only 
depends on the subjective opinion of a person selecting features to be included on an 
interface screen. Indeed, Datamize argues that the district court erred by requiring an 
objective definition for the phrase “aesthetically pleasing.” Citing our decision in 
Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1575–76 (Fed. Cir. 1986), 
Datamize maintains that a claim term need not be subject to a single, objective definition 
to be definite but rather may include a subjective element. According to Datamize, 
subjective terms are permissible so long as one of ordinary skill in the art would 
understand their scope. In this regard, Datamize implies that “aesthetically pleasing” 
includes “words of degree” that are not fatally imprecise. Datamize also contends that the 
existence of aesthetic constraints in a computer program, as opposed to purely functional 
constraints, would be circumstantial evidence of a person’s subjective “desire” to achieve 
an “aesthetically pleasing” look and feel for an interface screen. Related to these 
arguments, Datamize believes that the person practicing the invention is the “system 
creator,” defined by Datamize as the person who creates the authoring software. 
According to Datamize, the appropriate inquiry would focus on whether a system creator 
makes aesthetic choices to limit or constrain the possible on-screen characteristics of 
screen elements since these choices would reflect a subjective intent to create an 
“aesthetically pleasing” look and feel for an interface screen.  
Datamize’s proposed construction of “aesthetically pleasing” in the context of claim 1 
is not reasonable for several reasons. First and foremost, the plain meaning of the claim 
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language requires that the look and feel of interface screens actually be “aesthetically 
pleasing.” The first use of “aesthetically pleasing” in claim 1 clearly sets forth two 
requirements for the look and feel of interface screens: the look and feel must be (1) 
uniform and (2) “aesthetically pleasing.” That the uniform and “aesthetically pleasing” 
look and feel must also be “desired” does not alter that fact. 
Furthermore, in Orthokinetics we did not conclude, as Datamize suggests, that the 
absence of an objective definition for a claim term does not render the phrase indefinite. 
In that case we concluded that the phrase “so dimensioned” in the following limitation is 
not indefinite: “wherein said front leg portion is so dimensioned as to be insertable 
through the space between the doorframe of an automobile and one of the seats thereof.” 
We noted that based on expert testimony it was undisputed that one of ordinary skill in 
the art would easily have been able to determine the appropriate dimensions that the 
claim language required. One desiring to build and use the invention, a travel chair, “must 
measure the space between the selected automobile's doorframe and its seat and then 
dimension the front legs of the travel chair so they will fit in that particular space in that 
particular automobile.” The fact that the claims were intended to cover the use of the 
invention with various types of automobiles made no difference; we concluded that the 
phrase “so dimensioned” is as accurate as the subject matter permits since automobiles 
are of various sizes. Thus, in Orthokinetics we recognized that an objective definition 
encompassed by the claim term “so dimensioned” could be applied to innumerable 
specific automobiles. 
In stark contrast to Orthokinetics, here Datamize has offered no objective definition 
identifying a standard for determining when an interface screen is “aesthetically 
pleasing.” In the absence of a workable objective standard, “aesthetically pleasing” does 
not just include a subjective element, it is completely dependent on a person’s subjective 
opinion. To the extent Datamize argues that such a construction of “aesthetically 
pleasing” does not render the phrase indefinite, we disagree. The scope of claim language 
cannot depend solely on the unrestrained, subjective opinion of a particular individual 
purportedly practicing the invention. Some objective standard must be provided in order 
to allow the public to determine the scope of the claimed invention. Even if the relevant 
perspective is that of the system creator, the identity of who makes aesthetic choices fails 
to provide any direction regarding the relevant question of how to determine whether 
that person succeeded in creating an “aesthetically pleasing” look and feel for interface 
screens. A purely subjective construction of “aesthetically pleasing” would not notify the 
public of the patentee’s right to exclude since the meaning of the claim language would 
depend on the unpredictable vagaries of any one person’s opinion of the aesthetics of 
interface screens. While beauty is in the eye of the beholder, a claim term, to be definite, 
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requires an objective anchor. Thus, even if we adopted a completely subjective 
construction of “aesthetically pleasing,” this would still render the ’137 patent invalid. 
. . . 
Datamize also argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the phrase 
“aesthetically pleasing” to distinguish aesthetic constraints from purely functional 
constraints. To support this argument, Datamize first points to the Supreme Court’s use 
of the phrase “aesthetically pleasing”: “to qualify for design patent protection, a design 
must present an aesthetically pleasing appearance that is not dictated by function alone, and 
must satisfy the other criteria of patentability.” Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, 
Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989). According to Datamize, “if the term ‘aesthetically pleasing’ 
is sufficiently definite for courts to apply in determining whether something qualifies for 
design patent protection, then it is also sufficiently definite for a trier of fact to apply in 
determining infringement.” Datamize also points to Mr. Rosenblatt’s declaration, which 
it believes shows that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand “aesthetically 
pleasing” to distinguish functionality from aesthetics. Datamize maintains that 
infringement could be shown by looking to constraints imposed by the system creator: 
aesthetic constraints, such as limitations in terms of size and placement of on-screen 
elements, would be objective evidence of the infringer’s “desire” to achieve a “uniform 
and aesthetically pleasing look and feel.” 
We reject Datamize’s attempt to rely on an understanding of the phrase “aesthetically 
pleasing” derived from design patent law. Use of the phrase “aesthetically pleasing” in 
design patent law relates to the threshold question of patentability. See Bonito Boats, 489 
U.S. at 148. A design patent protects a particular ornamental, or “aesthetically pleasing” 
as opposed to functional, design. In contrast, a utility patent protects “any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof,” 35 U.S.C. § 101, the scope of which is defined by the patent’s 
written claims. In light of this basic difference between design patent law and utility 
patent law, it is clear that the understanding of “aesthetically pleasing” used in design 
patent law bears no reasonable relationship to utility patent law generally. Furthermore, 
Datamize has not pointed to any discussion in the ’137 patent indicating that 
“aesthetically pleasing” means “aesthetic rather than functional” as opposed to its 
ordinary meaning of beautiful in the context of this patent in particular. Thus, while 
creative, Datamize’s argument fails.  
We also reject Datamize’s more general argument, based on its expert’s declaration, 
that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the phrase “aesthetically pleasing” 
to distinguish aesthetic constraints from purely functional constraints. Datamize’s 
argument, as well as its citation to its expert’s declaration, improperly ignores the plain 
meaning of the claim language. Furthermore, its proposed construction would 
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improperly eliminate the word “pleasing” from the phrase “aesthetically pleasing.” We 
would subvert the definiteness requirement if we allowed a word to be eliminated from 
a phrase when the phrase cannot be given a reasonable meaning except in the absence of 
that word. Furthermore, because the phrase “aesthetically pleasing” does not simply 
distinguish aesthetic constraints from purely functional constraints, Datamize’s 
argument, again based on its expert’s declaration, that infringement could be shown by 
determining whether aesthetic constraints are imposed by the system creator is irrelevant. 
Conclusion 
“Aesthetically pleasing,” as it is used in the only independent claim of the ’137 patent, 
fails to “particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the patentee 
regards as his invention.” We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary 
judgment of invalidity of all claims of the ’137 patent. 
Context & Application 
1. How does the requirement of definiteness further the goals of patent law? 
2. In Datamize, the challenged claim was deemed indefinite under the “insolubly 
ambiguous” test. How often do you think that happened? In other words, do you think 
the outcome in Datamize was typical or an outlier? Was “not insolubly ambiguous” a 
difficult standard for patent drafters to meet?  
3. The court tells us that during the prosecution of the ’040 patent, the inventor 
deleted the phrase “aesthetically pleasing” because it was “not intended to identify 
qualities separate and apart from the remainder of this claim element” and was  
“superfluous and unnecessary.” If that is true, why do you think that language was 
included in the first place? 
4. In a famous copyright case, the Supreme Court said that “it would be a dangerous 
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of 
the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.” 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). Is Datamize an example of 
this “aesthetic nondiscrimination” principle? Or is there something else going on? 
5.  Was the invention claimed in Datamize “useful” under § 101? Is it the kind of 
innovation that should be protected by utility patents or would it fit better in a different 
regime, such as copyright or design patent?  
6. In Datamize, the Federal Circuit also suggests that “aesthetically pleasing” (or 
“ornamental”) is the opposite of “functional.” Do you agree? Can you think of any 
examples of visual designs that are both aesthetically appealing and functional? 
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7. One word of warning: Neither Datamize nor the Federal Circuit gets design patent 
law quite right in this decision. Despite the quoted dicta from Bonito Boats, designs are not 
currently required to be “aesthetically pleasing” to get a design patent. Seiko Epson Corp. 
v. Nu-Kote Int’l, Inc., 190 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Nor need the design be 
aesthetically pleasing. The ‘ornamental’ requirement of the design statute means that the 
design must not be governed solely by function, i.e., that this is not the only possible form 
of the article that could perform its function.”). For more on this topic, see Chapter 12. 
8. In Datamize, the Federal Circuit also says that “the purpose of the definiteness 
requirement is to ensure that the claims delineate the scope of the invention using 
language that adequately notifies the public of the patentee’s right to exclude.” Who does 
(or should) count as the relevant “public” here? If “public” means “the general consuming 
public of the United States,” cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A), the court could require the 
parties to go out and do surveys to determine what regular people think about the patent 
claims. But as you’ve seen, that’s not what courts do. What does that tell us about who the 
relevant “public” might be in this context? What “public” should patent law care about?  
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. 
572 U.S. 898 (2014) 
Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Patent Act requires that a patent specification “conclude with one or more claims 
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant 
regards as the invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. This case, involving a heart-rate monitor 
used with exercise equipment, concerns the proper reading of the statute’s clarity and 
precision demand. According to the Federal Circuit, a patent claim passes the § 112, ¶ 2 
threshold so long as the claim is “amenable to construction,” and the claim, as construed, 
is not “insolubly ambiguous.” We conclude that the Federal Circuit’s formulation, which 
tolerates some ambiguous claims but not others, does not satisfy the statute’s definiteness 
requirement. In place of the “insolubly ambiguous” standard, we hold that a patent is 
invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the 
patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled 
in the art about the scope of the invention. Expressing no opinion on the validity of the 
patent-in-suit, we remand, instructing the Federal Circuit to decide the case employing 
the standard we have prescribed. 
I 
Authorized by the Constitution “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Inventors the exclusive Right to their Discoveries,” Art. I, 
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§ 8, cl. 8, Congress has enacted patent laws rewarding inventors with a limited monopoly. 
“That monopoly is a property right,” and “like any property right, its boundaries should 
be clear.” Thus, when Congress enacted the first Patent Act in 1790, it directed that patent 
grantees file a written specification “containing a description of the thing or things 
invented or discovered,” which “shall be so particular” as to “distinguish the invention 
or discovery from other things before known and used.”  
The patent laws have retained this requirement of definiteness even as the focus of 
patent construction has shifted. Under early patent practice in the United States, we have 
recounted, it was the written specification that “represented the key to the patent.” 
Eventually, however, patent applicants began to set out the invention’s scope in a separate 
section known as the “claim.” The Patent Act of 1870 expressly conditioned the receipt of 
a patent on the inventor’s inclusion of one or more such claims, described with 
particularity and distinctness.  
The 1870 Act’s definiteness requirement survives today, largely unaltered. Section 112 
of the Patent Act of 1952, applicable to this case, requires the patent applicant to conclude 
the specification with “one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly 
claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112, 
¶ 2. A lack of definiteness renders invalid “the patent or any claim in suit.” § 282, ¶ 2. 
II 
A 
The patent in dispute, U.S. Patent No. 5,337,753 (’753 patent), issued to Dr. Gregory 
Lekhtman in 1994 and assigned to respondent Biosig Instruments, Inc., concerns a heart-
rate monitor for use during exercise. Previous heart-rate monitors, the patent asserts, were 
often inaccurate in measuring the electrical signals accompanying each heartbeat 
(electrocardiograph or ECG signals). The inaccuracy was caused by electrical signals of a 
different sort, known as electromyogram or EMG signals, generated by an exerciser’s 
skeletal muscles when, for example, she moves her arm, or grips an exercise monitor with 
her hand. These EMG signals can “mask” ECG signals and thereby impede their detection.  
Dr. Lekhtman’s invention claims to improve on prior art by eliminating that 
impediment. The invention focuses on a key difference between EMG and ECG 
waveforms: while ECG signals detected from a user’s left hand have a polarity opposite 
to that of the signals detected from her right hand, EMG signals from each hand have the 
same polarity. The patented device works by measuring equalized EMG signals detected 
at each hand and then using circuitry to subtract the identical EMG signals from each 
other, thus filtering out the EMG interference. 
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As relevant here, the ’753 patent describes a heart-rate monitor contained in a hollow 
cylindrical bar that a user grips with both hands, such that each hand comes into contact 
with two electrodes, one “live” and one “common.” The device is illustrated in figure 1 of 
the patent, reproduced in the Appendix to this opinion. 
Claim 1 of the ’753 patent, which contains the limitations critical to this dispute, refers 
to a “heart rate monitor for use by a user in association with exercise apparatus and/or 
exercise procedures.” The claim “comprises,” among other elements, an “elongate 
member” (cylindrical bar) with a display device; “electronic circuitry including a 
difference amplifier”; and, on each half of the cylindrical bar, a live electrode and a 
common electrode “mounted in spaced relationship with each other.” The claim sets forth 
additional elements, including that the cylindrical bar is to be held in such a way that each 
of the user’s hands “contacts” both electrodes on each side of the bar. Further, the EMG 
signals detected by the two electrode pairs are to be “of substantially equal magnitude 
and phase” so that the difference amplifier will “produce a substantially zero EMG signal” 
upon subtracting the signals from one another.  
B 
The dispute between the parties arose in the 1990’s, when Biosig allegedly disclosed 
the patented technology to StairMaster Sports Medical Products, Inc. According to Biosig, 
StairMaster, without ever obtaining a license, sold exercise machines that included 
Biosig’s patented technology, and petitioner Nautilus, Inc., continued to do so after 
acquiring the StairMaster brand. In 2004, based on these allegations, Biosig brought a 
patent infringement suit against Nautilus in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York. 
. . . The District Court ultimately construed the term to mean “there is a defined 
relationship between the live electrode and the common electrode on one side of the 
cylindrical bar and the same or a different defined relationship between the live electrode 
and the common electrode on the other side of the cylindrical bar,” without any reference 
to the electrodes’ width.  
Nautilus moved for summary judgment, arguing that the term “spaced relationship,” 
as construed, was indefinite under § 112, ¶ 2. The District Court granted the motion. Those 
words, the District Court concluded, “did not tell the court or anyone what precisely the 
space should be,” or even supply “any parameters” for determining the appropriate 
spacing.  
The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded. A claim is indefinite, the majority opinion 
stated, “only when it is ‘not amenable to construction’ or ‘insolubly ambiguous.’” Under 
that standard, the majority determined, the ’753 patent survived indefiniteness review.  




Although the parties here disagree on the dispositive question—does the ’753 patent 
withstand definiteness scrutiny—they are in accord on several aspects of the § 112, ¶ 2 
inquiry. First, definiteness is to be evaluated from the perspective of someone skilled in 
the relevant art. Second, in assessing definiteness, claims are to be read in light of the 
patent’s specification and prosecution history. Third, “definiteness is measured from the 
viewpoint of a person skilled in [the] art at the time the patent was filed.”  
The parties differ, however, in their articulations of just how much imprecision § 112, 
¶ 2 tolerates. In Nautilus’ view, a patent is invalid when a claim is “ambiguous, such that 
readers could reasonably interpret the claim's scope differently.” Biosig and the Solicitor 
General would require only that the patent provide reasonable notice of the scope of the 
claimed invention.  
Section 112, we have said, entails a “delicate balance.” On the one hand, the 
definiteness requirement must take into account the inherent limitations of language. 
Some modicum of uncertainty, the Court has recognized, is the “price of ensuring the 
appropriate incentives for innovation.” One must bear in mind, moreover, that patents 
are “not addressed to lawyers, or even to the public generally,” but rather to those skilled 
in the relevant art. 
At the same time, a patent must be precise enough to afford clear notice of what is 
claimed, thereby “apprising the public of what is still open to them.” Otherwise there 
would be “a zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may enter only at 
the risk of infringement claims.” And absent a meaningful definiteness check, we are told, 
patent applicants face powerful incentives to inject ambiguity into their claims.  
To determine the proper office of the definiteness command, therefore, we must 
reconcile concerns that tug in opposite directions. Cognizant of the competing concerns, 
we read § 112, ¶ 2 to require that a patent’s claims, viewed in light of the specification and 
prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with 
reasonable certainty. The definiteness requirement, so understood, mandates clarity, 
while recognizing that absolute precision is unattainable. The standard we adopt accords 
with opinions of this Court stating that “the certainty which the law requires in patents is 
not greater than is reasonable, having regard to their subject-matter.”  
B 
In resolving Nautilus’ definiteness challenge, the Federal Circuit asked whether the 
’753 patent’s claims were “amenable to construction” or “insolubly ambiguous.” Those 
formulations can breed lower court confusion . . . . It cannot be sufficient that a court can 
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ascribe some meaning to a patent’s claims; the definiteness inquiry trains on the 
understanding of a skilled artisan at the time of the patent application, not that of a court 
viewing matters post hoc. To tolerate imprecision just short of that rendering a claim 
“insolubly ambiguous” would diminish the definiteness requirement’s public-notice 
function and foster the innovation-discouraging “zone of uncertainty,” against which this 
Court has warned. 
Appreciating that “terms like ‘insolubly ambiguous’ may not be felicitous,” Biosig 
argues the phrase is a shorthand label for a more probing inquiry that the Federal Circuit 
applies in practice. The Federal Circuit’s fuller explications of the term “insolubly 
ambiguous,” we recognize, may come closer to tracking the statutory prescription. But 
although this Court does not “micromanage the Federal Circuit’s particular word choice” 
in applying patent-law doctrines, we must ensure that the Federal Circuit’s test is at least 
“probative of the essential inquiry.” Falling short in that regard, the expressions 
“insolubly ambiguous” and “amenable to construction” permeate the Federal Circuit’s 
recent decisions concerning § 112, ¶ 2’s requirement. We agree with Nautilus and its amici 
that such terminology can leave courts and the patent bar at sea without a reliable 
compass. 
. . . 
For the reasons stated, we vacate the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Context & Application 
1. How—and if so, how much—did Nautilus actually change the law? One way to 
think about this: Do you think Datamize would (or should) come out differently if it were 
decided today? 
2. Is definiteness a question of law or fact? The Federal Circuit says it “is a question 
of law that we review de novo, subject to a determination of underlying facts, which we 
review for substantial evidence.” Guangdong Alison Hi-Tech Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm’n, 936 
F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2019). How does that compare to enablement and written 
description?   
3. In Nautilus, the Court states that some level of uncertainty must be tolerated in 
patent claims due to “the inherent limitations of language.” But what if inventions weren’t 
claimed using words? What if certain types of inventions were claimed using models? Or 
pictures? Could—and should—we require more certainty then? 
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4. In Nautilus, the Court says that “patents are not addressed to lawyers, or even to 
the public generally, but rather to those skilled in the relevant art.” What happens if the 
actual inventor doesn’t know what a claim term means? In Leupold & Stevens, Inc. v. 
Lightforce USA, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 3d 886, 899 (D. Or. 2020), the accused infringer argued 
that certain claim terms were indefinite because “the inventor of the [asserted] patent 
admitted that he does not know how ‘transversely to’ and ‘transversely of’ differ, and 
does not know what ‘rotatable transversely of’ means as used in the claims.” The court 
rejected that argument: 
As a general matter, “[i]nventor testimony, obtained in the context of litigation, 
should not be used to invalidate issued claims under section 112, paragraph 2.” 
Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Indeed, as the 
Federal Circuit has explained in the context of claim construction, an inventor’s 
testimony may be “limited by the fact that an inventor understands the invention 
but may not understand the claims, which are typically drafted by the attorney 
prosecuting the patent applications.” Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Wright Med. 
Tech., Inc., 540 F.3d 1337, 1346–47 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
Remember that while an inventor is, by definition, skilled in the art, that does not mean 
his or her point of view is controlling. After all, the POSITA is not a real person, but a 
hypothetical person, like the “reasonable person” in tort law. That means we can’t go out 
and survey anyone to determine what a term means to a POSITA or rest determinations 
of indefiniteness on the perspective of any particular person—even the inventor. 
D. Best Mode 
Finally, the specification must “set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor 
or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). According to the 
Federal Circuit: 
[A] proper best mode analysis has two components. The first is whether, at the 
time the inventor filed his patent application, he knew of a mode of practicing his 
claimed invention that he considered to be better than any other. This part of the 
inquiry is wholly subjective, and resolves whether the inventor must disclose any 
facts in addition to those sufficient for enablement. If the inventor in fact 
contemplated such a preferred mode, the second part of the analysis compares 
what he knew with what he disclosed—is the disclosure adequate to enable one 
skilled in the art to practice the best mode or, in other words, has the inventor 
“concealed” his preferred mode from the “public”? Assessing the adequacy of the 
disclosure, as opposed to its necessity, is largely an objective inquiry that depends 
upon the scope of the claimed invention and the level of skill in the art. 
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Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 927–28 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Why is best-mode 
disclosure required? As Lee Petherbridge and Jason Rantanen explain: 
The policy purpose of the best mode requirement has been something of an 
enigma. Courts have reasoned, and commentators have repeated, that its purpose 
is to allow competitors to compete fairly with the patentee following the expiration 
of the patent. The underlying concern is that a strategically minded patent 
applicant can make an enabling disclosure of an invention it has conceived and at 
the same time keep secret details crucial to the practice of the most commercially 
valuable forms of the invention. When this happens, the public receives less than 
it bargained for in conferring a patent, and patentees that withhold best modes 
might obtain a de facto extension of their patent terms, thereby distorting the 
incentive structure Congress imposed with the patent system. 
In Memoriam Best Mode, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 125, 126 (2012) (footnotes omitted). Before 
the enactment of the AIA, many argued that the best mode requirement should be 
eliminated entirely: 
[O]pponents cited several reasons for abolishing best mode. First, they argued that 
best mode “significantly increased the expense and complexity of litigation” 
because it required extensive discovery into the inventor's subjective belief 
regarding whether she had a preferred implementation of the invention at the time 
of the patent application’s filing. As a result, they claimed, best mode imposed an 
unnecessary cost on inventors. Second, opponents contended that best mode 
violations were difficult to prove because the doctrine is “inherently subjective” 
and “the best mode contemplated at the time of the invention may not be the best 
mode for practicing or using the invention years later” when the patent might 
wind up challenged in court. Third, best mode was noted as inconsistent with 
international norms, as the requirement was unique to American law. This 
imposed a burden on foreign applicants seeking patent protection in the U.S., as 
well as requiring domestic inventors to make a more detailed disclosure compared 
to foreign inventors who did not desire U.S. patent protection. 
Brian J. Love & Christopher B. Seaman, Best Mode Trade Secrets, 15 YALE J. L. & TECH. 1, 8–
9 (2013) (footnotes omitted). 
When it passed the AIA, Congress retained the best mode requirement in 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112(a). But Congress amended 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(3)(A) to specify that “the failure to 
disclose the best mode shall not be a basis on which any claim of a patent may be canceled 
or held invalid or otherwise unenforceable.” So: 
Technically, the Act still conditions a patent’s issuance on describing any best 
mode in the application. However, this provision is nearly toothless. An examiner 
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who can somehow detect that an inventor knew of a preferred embodiment, but 
failed to adequately detail it in the application, can respond with a rejection on this 
ground. But once a patent issues, failure to describe best mode cannot be used to 
invalidate the grant. 
Derek E. Bambauer, Paths or Fences: Patents, Copyrights, and the Constitution, 104 IOWA L. 
REV. 1017, 1069 (2019). 
Context & Application 
1. How is best mode similar to and different from the enablement requirement?  
2. What do you think of the changes Congress made to best mode in the AIA? If it 
was a compromise, was it a good one? 
3. While courts can no longer invalidate issued patents for failure to disclose the best 
mode, patent examiners must still evaluate patent applications for compliance with the 
best mode requirement. See MPEP § 2165(II). How easy (or difficult) do you think it would 
be for a patent examiner to tell if an application complied with the standard set forth in 
Chemcast? See Ryan Vacca, Patent Reform and Best Mode: A Signal to the Patent Office or A 
Step Toward Elimination?, 75 ALB. L. REV. 279, 293–95 (2012) (arguing that “the risk of 







In order to be patentable, an invention must be new. This requirement, generally 
referred to as “novelty” is codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102. The requirement that a patentee 
disclose something new is part of the patent bargain. According to the Supreme Court: 
“Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent 
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already 
available.” Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). Instead, patents are meant to 
encourage the creation and disclosure of new information, which is supposed to enter the 
public domain at the end of the patent term. 
How do the USPTO and the courts determine if an invention is new? This inquiry can 
be broken down into two main questions. First, what is the date as of which the 
invention’s novelty is measured? While the filing date of the patent at the USPTO serves 
as a simple starting point for measuring novelty, in many instances the applicant can rely 
on other actions to establish an earlier date. Second, what are the events or materials 
against which the invention’s novelty is judged the invention? We call these events or 
materials the “prior art.” If something is “anticipated by the prior art,” it is not novel. 
One important wrinkle to the novelty determination is that § 102 was amended in the 
2011 America Invents Act (“AIA”). Therefore, there is a different set of novelty rules for 
patents with an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013. Because patent terms run 
for 20 years from filing, there are patents in force that are governed by the (old) pre-AIA 
version of § 102 and there are other patents in force, as well as applications being filed or 
examined, that are governed by the (new) AIA version of § 102. Some components of pre-
AIA novelty are diminishing in importance as patents governed by the pre-AIA version 
of § 102 expire, such as the laws and doctrines that determined who among rivals was the 
first to invent under 35 USC § 102(g). Other parts of the statute remain similar in content, 
although form and priority dates may be different. 
This chapter will focus on the AIA regime, the law that applies to patents filed today. 
Today, section 102(a) provides: 
(a) Novelty; Prior Art— A person shall be entitled to a patent unless— 
(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in 
public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing 
date of the claimed invention; or 
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(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in 
an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122 (b), in 
which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and 
was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention. 
Even though the statutory language is new, older cases are still relevant to how the AIA 
is interpreted. For example, the principle that things in “public use” should not be 
patentable is an idea that long predates the AIA. Indeed, by the time the AIA was enacted, 
“public use” was a well-established term of art in patent law. When Congress uses a term 
of art in drafting a statute, courts generally presume that Congress knew about and 
adopted the specialized meaning. See F.A.A. v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 292 (2012). Therefore, 
pre-AIA cases interpreting the phrase “public use”—including the two nineteenth-
century cases that follow—remain relevant today.  
This chapter begins with a discussion of the AIA and its determination of the novelty 
date and then the categories of prior art. Next, the chapter discusses exceptions to prior 
art before comparing novelty pre- and post-AIA. 
A. Prior Art: Timing 
To determine what counts as prior art, it is necessary to assign a date to the claimed 
invention and a date to each piece of prior art. This section explains the timing provisions 
under the AIA which apply to new patent applications. 
The current (AIA) version of § 102 applies to patents with an effective filing date on 
or after March 16, 2013. One of the goals of the AIA was to make U.S. law more consistent 
with foreign patent laws by switching from a system that measured novelty as of the date 
of invention to a system that measures novelty as of the date of filing the patent 
application. In other words, U.S. law has moved from a first-to-invent system to a first-to-
file system of awarding priority. If two inventors simultaneously come up with the same 
idea, it is now ordinarily the first one to the patent office that is entitled to the patent. 
Patent applicants therefore generally want to claim earlier filing dates. However, “first-
to-file” is not an entirely accurate description, either. As you will see, the AIA actually 
grants priority to the first inventor to disclose-and-then-file-within-a-year. But more on 
that later. 
Another international piece of novelty analysis involves provisions in various 
international treaties, such as the TRIPS Agreement (the part of WTO Agreement that 
governs intellectual property standards). The TRIPS Agreement requires countries to 
allow patent applicants to claim priority to earlier, foreign applications. As a result, filing 
a patent application in one country allows a patent holder to claim that date as their 
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“effective filing date” in other member countries, with a year (or sometimes more) of grace 
period to file. When a U.S. patent application claims priority to a foreign application, it is 
analyzed for novelty as of its effective filing date, which is not necessarily the date of 
application in the USPTO. The AIA defines the effective filing date of an application that 
is not a reissue as:  
(A) if subparagraph (B) does not apply, the actual filing date of the patent or the 
application for the patent containing a claim to the invention; or 
(B) the filing date of the earliest application for which the patent or application is 
entitled, as to such invention, to a right of priority under section 119, 365(a), 365(b), 
386(a), or 386(b) or to the benefit of an earlier filing date under section 120, 121, 
365(c), or 386(c). 
35 U.S.C. § 100(i). The pre-AIA novelty provisions, discussed later in this chapter, look to 
prior art that predates the date of invention, rather than the filing date. 
One note about language: courts often discuss the day one year prior to the effective 
filing date as “the critical date” and, under pre-AIA caselaw, the year before the filing date 
was called a “grace period.” Conceptually, the idea was that an inventor had a period of 
time after they—or someone else—disclosed the invention to file a patent application. 
These terms are still used sometimes in practice and by courts, although the structure and 
the language of the AIA makes them an imperfect fit.  
B. Prior Art: Categories 
Section 102 describes a number of different categories of prior art. Each category 
represents a different type of prior art. Some of these categories are more straightforward 
than others, as you’ll see in the cases below. Also, note that the two paragraphs of § 102(a) 
differ on the date as of which references are counted as prior art. So, the categories listed 
in § 102(a)(1) are printed publications, public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the 
public. These count as prior art as of the date of publication, use, or sale when those 
happen “before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.” But § 102(a)(2) is 
different. It covers patents or published patent applications filed any time prior to the 
applicant’s effective filing date, even though they may only be published or issue later. 
That means that sometimes, these applications are only made public after the patent 
applicant has filed for a patent. In a sense, then, the types of prior art listed in § 102(a)(2) 
aren’t publicly known prior to the applicant’s filing. We turn to the various types of prior 
art now.   
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1. Patented or Described in a Printed Publication 
The first categories of prior art identified by § 102(a)(1) are patents and printed 
publications. For printed publications, the inquiry can include a determination of whether  
something is (1) printed and (2) published. 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Barry 
891 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
CHEN, Circuit Judge. 
This is a consolidated appeal from two related decisions of the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeals Board in inter partes review (IPR) 
proceedings. The Board concluded that the petitioner, Medtronic, Inc., had not proven 
that the challenged patent claims are unpatentable. 
We affirm-in-part and vacate-in-part. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s 
determination that the challenged claims would not have been [invalid] over two 
references: (1) U.S. Patent Application No. 2005/0245928 (the ’928 Application); and (2) a 
book chapter which appears in MASTERS TECHNIQUES IN ORTHOPAEDIC SURGERY: THE 
SPINE (2d ed.) (MTOS). However, we vacate the Board’s conclusion that certain other 
references, i.e., a video entitled “Thoracic Pedicle Screws for Idiopathic Scoliosis” and 
slides entitled “Free Hand Thoracic Screw Placement and Clinical Use in Scoliosis and 
Kyphosis Surgery” (Video and Slides), were not prior art because the Board did not fully 
consider all the factors for determining whether the Video and Slides were publicly 
accessible. We thus remand for further proceedings. 
Background 
Medtronic manufactures surgical systems and tools used in spinal surgeries. In 
February 2014, spine surgeon Dr. Mark Barry sued Medtronic for patent infringement in 
the Eastern District of Texas. Barry alleged that Medtronic’s products infringed a group 
of Barry’s patents, including U.S. Patent Nos. 7,670,358 (the ’358 Patent) and 7,776,072 (the 
’072 Patent). Medtronic then petitioned for, and the Board instituted, IPR proceedings for 
all claims in both patents. 
. . . 
Medtronic submitted the following prior art references relevant to the issues raised in 
this appeal: (1) the ’928 Application; (2) MTOS; and (3) Video and Slides. . . .  
Medtronic distributed a video demonstration and a related slide presentation to spinal 
surgeons at various industry meetings and conferences in 2003. These video and slide sets 
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depict derotation surgeries that use pedicle screws and other instrumentation to correct 
scoliosis. The Video consists of a narrated derotation surgery performed in 2001 by Dr. 
Lenke, who testified as Medtronic’s expert in this case. The Slides include information 
about the use of pedicle screws in derotation surgeries, including numerous pictures from 
surgeries performed and x-rays of preoperative and post-operative spines. The Board 
found that the Video and Slides, although presented at three different meetings in 2003, 
were not publicly accessible and therefore were not “printed publications,” in accordance 
with 35 U.S.C. § 102.2. As a result, the Board, in its final decisions, refused to consider 
these materials as prior art in its evaluation of the ’358 and ’072 Patents. 
Discussion 
On appeal, the parties dispute whether the Video and Slides constitute printed 
publications within the meaning of [the pre-AIA version of] § 102. 
A CD containing the Video was distributed at three separate programs in 2003: (1) a 
meeting of the “Spinal Deformity Study Group” (SDSG) in Scottsdale, Arizona, on April 
10-13, 2003 (the Scottsdale program); (2) the Advanced Concepts in Spinal Deformity 
Surgery meeting in Colorado Springs, Colorado, on May 18-19, 2003 (the Colorado 
Springs program); and (3) the Spinal Deformity Study Symposium meeting in St. Louis, 
Missouri, on November 13-15, 2003 (the St. Louis program). Binders containing relevant 
portions of the Slides were also distributed at the Colorado Springs and St. Louis 
programs.  
The earliest of the three 2003 programs, the Scottsdale program, was limited to SDSG 
members. Medtronic’s witness, David Poley, described SDSG as “a gathering of experts 
within the field of spinal deformity.” About 20 SDSG members attended the Scottsdale 
program. The other two programs were open to other surgeons. Medtronic sponsored 
these programs as medical education courses. Approximately 20 and 55 surgeons 
attended the Colorado Springs and St. Louis programs, respectively.  
Medtronic argues that the Board committed legal error in concluding that the Video 
and Slides were not sufficiently accessible to the public. According to Medtronic, the 
Board’s sole basis for this conclusion rested on its faulty assumption that the materials 
were distributed only to members of the SDSG. Medtronic points out two problems with 
this assumption. First, it argues that the Board improperly ignored evidence that the 
Video and Slides were distributed at programs that were not limited to SDSG members. 
Second, Medtronic contends that, even if the assumption were correct, a reference need 
only be accessible to the “interested public” to satisfy the public accessibility requirement, 
and that, members of the SDSG fall squarely within that category. 
According to Barry, the Board correctly found that “members of the Spinal Deformity 
Study Group, who received the Video and Slides, were experts voted into membership by 
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an executive board based on their qualifications and ability to conduct research.” Because 
the slides were only available to experts who are part of a group limited to members only, 
and not those of ordinary skill, Barry argues that the Video and Slides were not publicly 
accessible to ordinarily skilled artisans. 
. . . “The printed publication provision of § 102(b) was designed to prevent withdrawal 
by an inventor of that which was already in the possession of the public.” . . . 
The determination of whether a document is a “printed publication” under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(b) “involves a case-by-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
reference’s disclosure to members of the public.” In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 
(Fed. Cir. 2004). “Because there are many ways in which a reference may be disseminated 
to the interested public, ‘public accessibility’ has been called the touchstone in 
determining whether a reference constitutes a ‘printed publication’ bar under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(b).” “A reference will be considered publicly accessible if it was ‘disseminated or 
otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in 
the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence can locate it.’” Id. 
The issue of a reference’s public accessibility often arises in the context of references 
stored in libraries. In such cases, we generally inquire whether the reference was 
sufficiently indexed or cataloged. Here, we encounter a different question: whether the 
distribution of certain materials to groups of people at one or more meetings renders such 
materials printed publications under [pre-AIA § 102(b)]. We have stated that a printed 
publication “need not be easily searchable after publication if it was sufficiently 
disseminated at the time of its publication.” Suffolk Techs., LLC v. AOL Inc., 752 F.3d 1358, 
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (concluding that an electronic newsgroup post was sufficiently 
disseminated where the newsgroup was populated by those of ordinary skill in the art 
and “dialogue with the intended audience was the entire purpose of the newsgroup 
postings,” even though the post was non-indexed and non-searchable). The parties here 
do not allege that the Video and Slides were stored somewhere for public access after the 
conferences. Thus, the question becomes whether such materials were sufficiently 
disseminated at the time of their distribution at the conferences. A survey of previous 
cases involving distribution of materials at meetings provides factors relevant to this case. 
For example, in Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. AB Fortia (MIT), a paper that 
was orally presented at a conference to a group of cell culturists interested in the subject 
matter was considered a “printed publication.” 774 F.2d 1104, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In that 
case, between 50 and 500 persons having ordinary skill in the art were told of the existence 
of the paper and informed of its contents by the oral presentation. We took note that the 
document itself was disseminated without restriction to at least six persons. Thus, 
whether the copies were freely distributed to interested members of the public was a key 
consideration in our analysis. 
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We highlighted a similar consideration concerning expectations of confidentiality as 
part of the public-accessibility inquiry in Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 561 F.3d 
1319 (Fed. Cir. 2009). There, the issue pertained to whether a set of research papers 
distributed by a doctor to certain colleagues and two commercial entities rendered the 
documents printed publications. We concluded that such documents were not publicly 
accessible. As for the doctor’s presentation of his work to his university and hospital 
colleagues, we noted that the record contained clear evidence that the academic norms 
gave rise to an expectation that disclosures would remain confidential. Likewise, we held 
that the doctor giving the research papers to two companies in an attempt to 
commercialize the technology did not make the documents accessible to the public. In so 
concluding, we emphasized the importance of an expectation of confidentiality between 
the doctor and each of the two commercial entities. The mere fact that there was no legal 
obligation of confidentiality was insufficient by itself to show that the doctor’s expectation 
of confidentiality was unreasonable.  
In re Klopfenstein is also instructive in its identification of the relevant factors. The 
reference in dispute in that case was a printed slide presentation that was displayed 
prominently for three days at a conference to a wide variety of participants. The reference 
was shown with no stated expectation that the information would not be copied or 
reproduced by those viewing it. But copies were never distributed to the public and never 
indexed. Under such a scenario, we identified the relevant factors to include: (1) “the 
length of time the display was exhibited,” (2) “the expertise of the target audience” (to 
determine how easily those who viewed the material could retain the information), 
(3) “the existence (or lack thereof) of reasonable expectations that the material displayed 
would not be copied,” and (4) “the simplicity or ease with which the material displayed 
could have been copied.” After reviewing these factors, we determined that the reference 
was sufficiently publicly accessible to count as a “printed publication” for the purposes of 
[pre-AIA § 102(b)].  
These decisions illustrate some common considerations about materials that are 
distributed at meetings or conferences. As relevant to this case, the size and nature of the 
meetings and whether they are open to people interested in the subject matter of the 
material disclosed are important considerations. Another factor is whether there is an 
expectation of confidentiality between the distributor and the recipients of the materials. 
Even if there is no formal, legal obligation of confidentiality, it still may be relevant to 
determine whether any policies or practices associated with a particular group meeting 
would give rise to an expectation that disclosures would remain confidential. 
The record does not show that the Board fully considered all of the relevant factors. 
As a threshold matter, the Board did not address the potentially-critical difference 
between the SDSG meeting in Arizona and the programs in Colorado Springs and St. 
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Louis, which were not limited to members of the SDSG but instead were attended by at 
least 75 other surgeons, collectively. Also, Medtronic’s expert, Dr. Lenke, testified that the 
materials were distributed without restrictions at the Colorado Springs and St. Louis 
programs. Although the Board found that disclosure to a small group of experts in the 
members-only SDSG meeting was insufficient to compel a finding that the Video and 
Slides were publicly available, its analysis was silent on the distribution that occurred in 
the two non-SDSG programs. 
Further, even if the Board were correct in its assumption that Medtronic only gave the 
Video and Slides to the SDSG members, it did not address whether the disclosures would 
remain confidential. The Board found that SDSG members were experts voted into 
membership by an executive board based on their qualifications and research, but the 
relatively exclusive nature of the SDSG membership is only one factor in the public 
accessibility analysis. It may be relevant, for example, to consider the purpose of the 
meetings and to determine whether the SDSG members were expected to maintain the 
confidentiality of received materials or would be permitted to share or even publicize the 
insights gained and materials collected at the meetings.  
Accordingly, whether dissemination of the Video and Slides to a set of supremely-
skilled experts in a technical field precludes finding such materials to be printed 
publications warrants further development in the record. The expertise of the target 
audience can be a factor in determining public accessibility. See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 
at 1350–51 (“The expertise of the intended audience can help determine how easily those 
who viewed it could retain the displayed material.”). But this factor alone is not 
dispositive of the inquiry. Distributing materials to a group of experts, does not, without 
further basis, render those materials publicly accessible or inaccessible, simply by virtue 
of the relative expertise of the recipients. The nature of those meetings, as well as any 
restrictions on public disclosures, expectations of confidentiality, or, alternatively, 
expectations of sharing the information gained, can bear important weight in the overall 
inquiry. 
For these reasons, we vacate the Board’s finding that the Video and Slides are not 
printed publications and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Context & Application 
1. In addition to the video and slides, Medtronic submitted that “(1) U.S. Patent 
Application No. 2005/0245928 (the ’928 Application); and (2) a book chapter which 
appears in MASTERS TECHNIQUES IN ORTHOPAEDIC SURGERY: THE SPINE (2d ed.) (MTOS)” 
qualified as prior art. Which category of 102(a) does each fall into? 
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2. As information is increasingly distributed electronically, the PTO and the courts 
have had to evaluate more ephemeral and less tangible distribution modes as “printed 
publications.” In Medtronic, the court discussed numerous precedents to reason its way to 
its holding. One of those, In re Klopfenstein, involved a presentation about cereal 
preparation methods given at a meeting of the American Association of Cereal Chemists. 
In that case, the court catalogued prior cases:  
Cronyn involved college students’ presentations of their undergraduate theses to 
a defense committee made up of four faculty members. Their theses were later 
catalogued in an index in the college’s main library. The index was made up of 
thousands of individual cards that contained only a student’s name and the title 
of his or her thesis. The index was searchable by student name and the actual 
theses themselves were neither included in the index nor made publicly accessible. 
We held that because the theses were only presented to a handful of faculty 
members and “had not been cataloged or indexed in a meaningful way,” they were 
not sufficiently publicly accessible for the purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).  
In Hall, this court determined that a thesis filed and indexed in a university library 
did count as a “printed publication.” The Hall court arrived at its holding after 
taking into account that copies of the indexed thesis itself were made freely 
available to the general public by the university more than one year before the 
filing of the relevant patent application in that case. But the court in Hall did not 
rest its holding merely on the indexing of the thesis in question. Instead, it used 
indexing as a factor in determining “public accessibility.”  
In MIT, a paper delivered orally to the First International Cell Culture Congress 
was considered a “printed publication.” In that case, as many as 500 persons 
having ordinary skill in the art heard the presentation, and at least six copies of 
the paper were distributed. The key to the court’s finding was that actual copies 
of the presentation were distributed. The court did not consider the issue of 
indexing. The MIT court determined the paper in question to be a “printed 
publication” but did not limit future determinations of the applicability of the 
“printed publication” bar to instances in which copies of a reference were actually 
offered for distribution.   
Finally, the Wyer court determined that an Australian patent application kept on 
microfilm at the Australian Patent Office was “sufficiently accessible to the public 
and to persons skilled in the pertinent art to qualify as a ‘printed publication.’” 
The court so found even though it did not determine whether or not there was 
“actual viewing or dissemination” of the patent application. It was sufficient for 
the court’s purposes that the records of the application were kept so that they 
could be accessible to the public. According to the Wyer court, the entire purpose 
 CHAPTER 6  
252 
of the “printed publication” bar was to “prevent withdrawal” of disclosures 
“already in the possession of the public” by the issuance of a patent.  
In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 
1161 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898–99 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. 
AB Fortia, 774 F.2d 1104, 1108–10 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 (C.C.P.A. 
1981)). Does Medtronic appear to be consistent with these precedents? Should the changing 
nature of information-sharing and the technologies through which it is accomplished 
inform courts’ determinations of what is a printed publication? If you were university 
counsel advising professors about patents and presentations, how would you advise 
them? 
3. Medtronic and the cases cited in the previous note are all based on the pre-AIA 
version of § 102. Nonetheless, the general consensus is that the use of mostly identical 
terminology for prior art categories indicates congressional intent for the doctrinal 
development surrounding these terms to remain good law.  
4.  Patents are generally published documents, and so it may seem strange that they 
comprise their own category. Usually, patents do count as printed publications. In fact, 
most countries publish applications 18 months post-filing, making those count as prior art 
as well. In limited circumstances, however, patents do not count as publications, such as 
when they are issued by a foreign country that does not make patents publicly accessible. 
For example, if a foreign country has a utility model patent system (a registration system 
that allows for lower protection and a lower obviousness standard), it might not make the 
patents publicly accessible such that they would be considered a printed publication. 
When this is the case, only its claims constitute prior art, not the entire disclosure of the 
document. See, e.g., Reeves Bros. v. United States Laminating Corp., 282 F. Supp. 118 (E.D.N.Y. 
1966) (holding that the structure of the utility model patent was sufficiently similar to 
utility patents to count as a patent under § 102, though the document was not published). 
Moreover, as noted above, patents and published applications are prior art as of their 
filing dates under § 102(a)(2). 
2. Public Use 
A claimed invention is not patentable if it was “in public use . . . before the effective 
filing date of the claimed invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). So what is a “public use” for 
the purposes of patent law? The answer may surprise you. 
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City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co. 
97 U.S. 126 (1877) 
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court. 
This suit was brought by the American Nicholson Pavement Company against the city 
of Elizabeth, N. J., George W. Tubbs, and the New Jersey Wood-Paving Company, a 
corporation of New Jersey, upon a patent issued to Samuel Nicholson, dated Aug. 20, 
1867, for a new and improved wooden pavement, being a second reissue of a patent issued 
to said Nicholson Aug. 8, 1854. . . . 
. . . 
The bill charges that the defendants infringed this patent by laying down wooden 
pavements in the city of Elizabeth, N.J., constructed in substantial conformity with the 
process patented, and prays an account of profits, and an injunction. 
The defendants answered in due course . . . [and, among other things,] averred that 
the alleged invention of Nicholson was in public use, with his consent and allowance, for 
six years before he applied for a patent, on a certain avenue in Boston called the Mill-dam; 
and contended that said public use worked an abandonment of the pretended invention. 
. . . 
The next question to be considered is, whether Nicholson’s invention was in public 
use or on sale, with his consent and allowance, for more than two years prior to his 
application for a patent, within the meaning of the sixth, seventh, and fifteenth sections of 
the act of 1836, as qualified by the seventh section of the act of 1839, which were the acts 
in force in 1854, when he obtained his patent. It is contended by the appellants that the 
pavement which Nicholson put down by way of experiment, on Mill-dam Avenue in 
Boston, in 1848, was publicly used for the space of six years before his application for a 
patent, and that this was a public use within the meaning of the law. 
To determine this question, it is necessary to examine the circumstances under which 
this pavement was put down, and the object and purpose that Nicholson had in view. It 
is perfectly clear from the evidence that he did not intend to abandon his right to a patent. 
He had filed a caveat in August, 1847, and he constructed the pavement in question by 
way of experiment, for the purpose of testing its qualities. The road in which it was put 
down, though a public road, belonged to the Boston and Roxbury Mill Corporation, which 
received toll for its use; and Nicholson was a stockholder and treasurer of the corporation. 
The pavement in question was about seventy-five feet in length, and was laid adjoining 
to the toll-gate and in front of the toll-house. It was constructed by Nicholson at his own 
expense, and was placed by him where it was, in order to see the effect upon it of heavily 
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loaded wagons, and of varied and constant use; and also to ascertain its durability, and 
liability to decay. Joseph L. Lang, who was toll-collector for many years, commencing in 
1849, familiar with the road before that time, and with this pavement from the time of its 
origin, testified as follows: “Mr. Nicholson was there almost daily, and when he came he 
would examine the pavement, would often walk over it, cane in hand, striking it with his 
cane, and making particular examination of its condition. He asked me very often how 
people liked it, and asked me a great many questions about it. I have heard him say a 
number of times that this was his first experiment with this pavement, and he thought 
that it was wearing very well. The circumstances that made this locality desirable for the 
purpose of obtaining a satisfactory test of the durability and value of the pavement were: 
that there would be a better chance to lay it there; he would have more room and a better 
chance than in the city; and, besides, it was a place where most everybody went over it, 
rich and poor. It was a great thoroughfare out of Boston. It was frequently travelled by 
teams having a load of five or six tons, and some larger. As these teams usually stopped 
at the toll-house, and started again, the stopping and starting would make as severe a trial 
to the pavement as it could be put to.” 
This evidence is corroborated by that of several other witnesses in the cause; the result 
of the whole being that Nicholson merely intended this piece of pavement as an 
experiment, to test its usefulness and durability. Was this a public use, within the meaning 
of the law? 
An abandonment of an invention to the public may be evinced by the conduct of the 
inventor at any time, even within the two years named in the law. The effect of the law is, 
that no such consequence will necessarily follow from the invention being in public use 
or on sale, with the inventor’s consent and allowance, at any time within two years before 
his application; but that, if the invention is in public use or on sale prior to that time, it 
will be conclusive evidence of abandonment, and the patent will be void. 
But, in this case, it becomes important to inquire what is such a public use as will have 
the effect referred to. That the use of the pavement in question was public in one sense 
cannot be disputed. But can it be said that the invention was in public use?  The use of an 
invention by the inventor himself, or of any other person under his direction, by way of 
experiment, and in order to bring the invention to perfection, has never been regarded as 
such a use. CURTIS, PATENTS, sect. 381; Shaw v. Cooper, 7 Pet. 292. 
Now, the nature of a street pavement is such that it cannot be experimented upon 
satisfactorily except on a highway, which is always public. 
When the subject of invention is a machine, it may be tested and tried in a building, 
either with or without closed doors. In either case, such use is not a public use, within the 
meaning of the statute, so long as the inventor is engaged, in good faith, in testing its 
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operation. He may see cause to alter it and improve it, or not. His experiments will reveal 
the fact whether any and what alterations may be necessary. If durability is one of the 
qualities to be attained, a long period, perhaps years, may be necessary to enable the 
inventor to discover whether his purpose is accomplished. And though, during all that 
period, he may not find that any changes are necessary, yet he may be justly said to be 
using his machine only by way of experiment; and no one would say that such a use, 
pursued with a bona fide intent of testing the qualities of the machine, would be a public 
use, within the meaning of the statute. So long as he does not voluntarily allow others to 
make it and use it, and so long as it is not on sale for general use, he keeps the invention 
under his own control, and does not lose his title to a patent. 
It would not be necessary, in such a case, that the machine should be put up and used 
only in the inventor’s own shop or premises. He may have it put up and used in the 
premises of another, and the use may inure to the benefit of the owner of the 
establishment. Still, if used under the surveillance of the inventor, and for the purpose of 
enabling him to test the machine, and ascertain whether it will answer the purpose 
intended, and make such alterations and improvements as experience demonstrates to be 
necessary, it will still be a mere experimental use, and not a public use, within the meaning 
of the statute. 
Whilst the supposed machine is in such experimental use, the public may be 
incidentally deriving a benefit from it. If it be a grist-mill, or a carding-machine, customers 
from the surrounding country may enjoy the use of it by having their grain made into 
flour, or their wool into rolls, and still it will not be in public use, within the meaning of 
the law. 
But if the inventor allows his machine to be used by other persons generally, either 
with or without compensation, or if it is, with his consent, put on sale for such use, then it 
will be in public use and on public sale, within the meaning of the law. 
If, now, we apply the same principles to this case, the analogy will be seen at once. 
Nicholson wished to experiment on his pavement. He believed it to be a good thing, but 
he was not sure; and the only mode in which he could test it was to place a specimen of it 
in a public roadway. He did this at his own expense, and with the consent of the owners 
of the road. Durability was one of the qualities to be attained. He wanted to know whether 
his pavement would stand, and whether it would resist decay. Its character for durability 
could not be ascertained without its being subjected to use for a considerable time. He 
subjected it to such use, in good faith, for the simple purpose of ascertaining whether it 
was what he claimed it to be. Did he do any thing more than the inventor of the supposed 
machine might do, in testing his invention? The public had the incidental use of the 
pavement, it is true; but was the invention in public use, within the meaning of the statute? 
We think not. The proprietors of the road alone used the invention, and used it at 
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Nicholson’s request, by way of experiment. The only way in which they could use it was 
by allowing the public to pass over the pavement. 
Had the city of Boston, or other parties, used the invention, by laying down the 
pavement in other streets and places, with Nicholson’s consent and allowance, then, 
indeed, the invention itself would have been in public use, within the meaning of the law; 
but this was not the case. Nicholson did not sell it, nor allow others to use it or sell it. He 
did not let it go beyond his control. He did nothing that indicated any intent to do so. He 
kept it under his own eyes, and never for a moment abandoned the intent to obtain a 
patent for it. 
. . . 
It is sometimes said that an inventor acquires an undue advantage over the public by 
delaying to take out a patent, inasmuch as he thereby preserves the monopoly to himself 
for a longer period than is allowed by the policy of the law; but this cannot be said with 
justice when the delay is occasioned by a bona fide effort to bring his invention to 
perfection, or to ascertain whether it will answer the purpose intended. His monopoly 
only continues for the allotted period, in any event; and it is the interest of the public, as 
well as himself, that the invention should be perfect and properly tested, before a patent 
is granted for it. Any attempt to use it for a profit, and not by way of experiment, for a 
longer period than two years before the application, would deprive the inventor of his 
right to a patent. 
Egbert v. Lippman 
104 U.S. 333 (1881) 
MR. JUSTICE WOODS delivered the opinion of the court. 
This suit was brought for an alleged infringement of the complainant’s reissued 
letters-patent, No. 5216, dated Jan. 7, 1873, for an improvement in corset-springs. 
The original letters bear date July 17, 1866, and were issued to Samuel H. Barnes. The 
reissue was made to the complainant, under her then name, Frances Lee Barnes, executrix 
of the original patentee. 
The specification for the reissue declares:— 
“This invention consists in forming the springs of corsets of two or more metallic 
plates, placed one upon another, and so connected as to prevent them from sliding 
off each other laterally or edgewise, and at the same time admit of their playing or 
sliding upon each other, in the direction of their length or longitudinally, whereby 
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their flexibility and elasticity are greatly increased, while at the same time much 
strength is obtained.” 
The second claim is as follows:— 
“A pair of corset-springs, each member of the pair being composed of two or more 
metallic plates, placed one on another, and fastened together at their centres, and 
so connected at or near each end that they can move or play on each other in the 
direction of their length.” 
The bill alleges that Barnes was the original and first inventor of the improvement covered 
by the reissued letters-patent, and that it had not, at the time of his application for the 
original letters, been for more than two years in public use or on sale, with his consent or 
allowance. . . .  
We have . . . to consider whether the defense that the patented invention had, with the 
consent of the inventor, been publicly used for more than two years prior to his 
application for the original letters, is sustained by the testimony in the record. 
The [statutes in effect at the relevant times] render letters-patent invalid if the 
invention which they cover was in public use, with the consent and allowance of the 
inventor, for more than two years prior to his application. . . . 
. . . 
The evidence on which the defendants rely to establish a prior public use of the 
invention consists mainly of the testimony of the complainant. 
She testifies that Barnes invented the improvement covered by his patent between 
January and May, 1855; that between the dates named the witness and her friend Miss 
Cugier were complaining of the breaking of their corset-steels. Barnes, who was present, 
and was an intimate friend of the witness, said he thought he could make her a pair that 
would not break. At their next interview he presented her with a pair of corset-steels 
which he himself had made. The witness wore these steels a long time. In 1858 Barnes 
made and presented to her another pair, which she also wore a long time. When the 
corsets in which these steels were used wore out, the witness ripped them open and took 
out the steels and put them in new corsets. This was done several times. 
It is admitted . . . that these steels embodied the invention afterwards patented by 
Barnes and covered by the reissued letters-patent on which this suit is brought. 
Joseph H. Sturgis, another witness for complainant, testifies that in 1863 Barnes spoke 
to him about two inventions made by himself, one of which was a corset-steel, and that 
he went to the house of Barnes to see them. Before this time, and after the transactions 
testified to by the complainant, Barnes and she had intermarried. Barnes said his wife had 
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a pair of steels made according to his invention in the corsets which she was then wearing, 
and if she would take them off he would show them to witness. Mrs. Barnes went out, 
and returned with a pair of corsets and a pair of scissors, and ripped the corsets open and 
took out the steels. Barnes then explained to witness how they were made and used. 
. . . 
We observe, in the first place, that to constitute the public use of an invention it is not 
necessary that more than one of the patented articles should be publicly used. The use of 
a great number may tend to strengthen the proof, but one well-defined case of such use is 
just as effectual to annul the patent as many. For instance, if the inventor of a mower, a 
printing-press, or a railway-car makes and sells only one of the articles invented by him, 
and allows the vendee to use it for two years, without restriction or limitation, the use is 
just as public as if he had sold and allowed the use of a great number. 
We remark, secondly, that, whether the use of an invention is public or private does 
not necessarily depend upon the number of persons to whom its use is known. If an 
inventor, having made his device, gives or sells it to another, to be used by the donee or 
vendee, without limitation or restriction, or injunction of secrecy, and it is so used, such 
use is public, even though the use and knowledge of the use may be confined to one 
person. 
We say, thirdly, that some inventions are by their very character only capable of being 
used where they cannot be seen or observed by the public eye. An invention may consist 
of a lever or spring, hidden in the running gear of a watch, or of a rachet, shaft, or cog-
wheel covered from view in the recesses of a machine for spinning or weaving. 
Nevertheless, if its inventor sells a machine of which his invention forms a part, and 
allows it to be used without restriction of any kind, the use is a public one. So, on the other 
hand, a use necessarily open to public view, if made in good faith solely to test the 
qualities of the invention, and for the purpose of experiment, is not a public use within 
the meaning of the statute. Elizabeth v. Pavement Company, 97 U.S. 126; Shaw v. Cooper, 7 
Pet. 292. 
Tested by these principles, we think the evidence of the complainant herself shows 
that for more than two years before the application for the original letters there was, by 
the consent and allowance of Barnes, a public use of the invention, covered by them. He 
made and gave to her two pairs of corset-steels, constructed according to his device, one 
in 1855 and one in 1858. They were presented to her for use. He imposed no obligation of 
secrecy, nor any condition or restriction whatever. They were not presented for the 
purpose of experiment, nor to test their qualities. . . . The invention was at the time 
complete, and there is no evidence that it was afterwards changed or improved. The donee 
of the steels used them for years for the purpose and in the manner designed by the 
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inventor. They were not capable of any other use. She might have exhibited them to any 
person, or made other steels of the same kind, and used or sold them without violating 
any condition or restriction imposed on her by the inventor. 
According to the testimony of the complainant, the invention was completed and put 
into use in 1855. The inventor slept on his rights for eleven years. Letters-patent were not 
applied for till March, 1866. In the mean time, the invention had found its way into 
general, and almost universal, use. A great part of the record is taken up with the 
testimony of the manufacturers and venders of corset-steels, showing that before he 
applied for letters the principle of his device was almost universally used in the 
manufacture of corset-steels. It is fair to presume that having learned from this general 
use that there was some value in his invention, he attempted to resume, by his application, 
what by his acts he had clearly dedicated to the public. 
 “An abandonment of an invention to the public may be evinced by the conduct of the 
inventor at any time, even within the two years named in the law. The effect of the law is 
that no such consequence will necessarily follow from the invention being in public use 
or on sale, with the inventor’s consent and allowance, at any time within the two years 
before his application; but that, if the invention is in public use or on sale prior to that 
time, it will be conclusive evidence of abandonment, and the patent will be void.” Elizabeth 
v. Pavement Company, supra. 
We are of opinion that the defense of two years’ public use, by the consent and 
allowance of the inventor, before he made application for letters-patent, is satisfactorily 
established by the evidence. 
MR. JUSTICE MILLER dissenting. 
The sixth section of the act of July 4, 1836, c. 357, makes it a condition of the grant of a 
patent that the invention for which it was asked should not, at the time of the application 
for a patent, “have been in public use or on sale with the consent or allowance” of the 
inventor or discoverer. Section fifteen of the same act declares that it shall be a good 
defense to an action for infringement of the patent, that it had been in public use or on 
sale with the consent or allowance of the patentee before his application. This was 
afterwards modified by the seventh section of the act of March 3, 1839, c. 88, which 
declares that no patent shall be void on that ground unless the prior use has been for more 
than two years before the application. 
This is the law under which the patent of the complainant is held void by the opinion 
just delivered. The previous part of the same section requires that the invention must be 
one “not known or used by others” before the discovery or invention made by the 
applicant. In this limitation, though in the same sentence as the other, the word “public” 
is not used, so that the use by others which would defeat the applicant, if without his 
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consent, need not be public; but where the use of his invention is by his consent or 
allowance, it must be public or it will not have that affect. 
The reason of this is undoubtedly that, if without his consent others have used the 
machine, composition, or manufacture, it is strong proof that he was not the discoverer or 
first inventor. In that case he was not entitled to a patent. If the use was with his consent 
or allowance, the fact that such consent or allowance was first obtained is evidence that 
he was the inventor, and claimed to be such. In such case, he was not to lose his right to a 
patent, unless the use which he permitted was such as showed an intention of abandoning 
his invention to the public. It must, in the language of the act, be in public use or on sale. 
If on sale, of course the public who buy can use it, and if used in public with his consent, 
it may be copied by others. In either event there is an end of his exclusive right of use or 
sale. 
The word public is, therefore, an important member of the sentence. A private use 
with consent, which could lead to no copy or reproduction of the machine, which taught 
the nature of the invention to no one but the party to whom such consent was given, which 
left the public at large as ignorant of this as it was before the author’s discovery, was no 
abandonment to the public, and did not defeat his claim for a patent. If the little steep 
spring inserted in a single pair of corsets, and used by only one woman, covered by her 
outer-clothing, and in a position always withheld from public observation, is a public use 
of that piece of steel, I am at a loss to know the line between a private and a public use. 
The opinion argues that the use was public, because, with the consent of the inventor 
to its use, no limitation was imposed in regard to its use in public. It may be well imagined 
that a prohibition to the party so permitted against exposing her use of the steel spring to 
public observation would have been supposed to be a piece of irony. An objection quite 
the opposite of this suggested by the opinion is, that the invention was incapable of a 
public use. That is to say, that while the statute says the right to the patent can only be 
defeated by a use which is public, it is equally fatal to the claim, when it is permitted to 
be used at all, that the article can never be used in public. 
I cannot on such reasoning as this eliminate from the statute the word public, and 
disregard its obvious importance in connection with the remainder of the act, for the 
purpose of defeating a patent otherwise meritorious. 
Context & Application 
1. It might seem like Elizabeth would have been a helpful precedent for Egbert. Do 
you think that Elizabeth shaped how Egbert’s attorneys elicited (and made arguments 
based on) her testimony? Why did Elizabeth ultimately end up being unhelpful for Egbert? 
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2. Kara Swanson has argued that “it was not that Samuel ‘slept on his rights,’” but 
that Frances wielded those rights, publicly and successfully, which better explains the 
Supreme Court’s broad definition of ‘public’” in Egbert. Kara W. Swanson, Getting A Grip 
on the Corset: Gender, Sexuality, and Patent Law, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 57, 73 (2011). 
Gender roles in Victorian America were understood by what is often referred to 
by historians, although not by Victorians themselves, as the “ideology of separate 
spheres.” This ideology . . . . described a sex-segregated society in which men 
engaged in commerce, the business of earning a livelihood, in the public sphere, 
and then retreated to the domestic sphere, where their wives and daughters, 
angels of the home, used their feminine nature to provide a welcoming private life. 
The public sphere and its activities and relationships were masculine; the private 
sphere and its activities and relationships were feminine. This ideology did not 
reflect reality for most American men and women, but as an ideology, it was 
enormously influential in these decades in shaping how men and women enacted 
their gender roles. 
Id. at 89–90. The corset itself helped to police the boundary between these spheres, 
“through its physical effects” (i.e., actually making women weaker) and through “cultural 
meanings” (such as defining the idealized feminine shape). See id. at 91. Swanson argues 
that while the decision in Egbert suggests that “the majority was motivated by a suspicion 
that Samuel had acted unfairly in delaying his application,” id. at 109, that view might be 
better understood “as reflecting the gender assumptions of the Court, at work even as the 
Justices surprisingly placed Frances in the public realm.” Id. at 110. According to Swanson: 
The Court assumed that Samuel as a male inventor was commercially savvy and 
economically rational in his actions. There is no indication in the record, however, 
that Samuel felt that his invention had increased in commercial worth during the 
1850s, or that he paid particular attention to developments in corset technology. 
Rather, he appears to have been an underemployed, dreamy tinkerer, with many 
unrelated ideas, and no personal or financial resources to realize any of them. It 
was Frances, as a consumer of corsets, who testified that she had owned multiple 
pairs during the decade in question, and she who was in a position to appreciate 
the value of Samuel’s invention. Her estimation may have motivated her marriage, 
after eight years’ intimacy, to a man she described as poor, sick, and depressed. It 
was after the marriage that Samuel decided to test the steels on a “very stout lady.” 
It may well have been at Frances’s initiative that he did so, and also at her urging 
that he finally “nerved himself” to patent the invention three years after their 
marriage. Less than two months after receiving the patent, Samuel was dead, 
leaving a written will despite his apparent lack of worldly goods, and Frances 
moved quickly to go into business and to maximize the value of his estate. 
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Frances showed every sign of being a savvy businesswoman both before and after 
her re-marriage to Wesley Egbert in 1870. Ironically, while there was no evidence 
that Frances moved to exploit Samuel’s invention or to reveal it to the public in 
any way before he filed his application, after his death, she brought her corseted 
self firmly into the public sphere, engaging in all the activities which the Court 
suggested she might have earlier—exhibiting the steels, making others, and selling 
them. After eleven years of merely experiencing the private benefit of durable 
corset steels, by the time she testified as a litigant, she was using her commercial 
exploitation of Samuel’s steels to support herself and her new husband. In 1881, 
Frances, as a businesswoman, was unquestionably engaged in the public use of 
Samuel’s steels, while between 1855 and 1863, she had kept them, as far as the 
record reveals, as an undisclosed element of her personal wardrobe. The Supreme 
Court’s opinion thus involved a temporal sleight of hand, shifting Frances and her 
corset nunc pro tunc, and also a transposition of Frances’s ambition (a masculine 
trait with no place in the private feminine sphere of home and hearth) to the 
hapless Samuel. 
. . . Frances was not unique as a female business owner and patentee in corset 
manufacture, but in the facts of Egbert, she becomes unique as a woman who made 
a transition from an intimate friend of the inventor, who wore his personal gift of 
a reinforced pair of corset steels, to a manufacturer of corset steels and enforcer of 
the Barnes patent. . . . Frances remains singular as a donee who became a patent 
owner and litigator. This transition moved Frances from a relationship in which 
male and female actions could be understood through the prevailing gender 
ideology of the time, into a role in which she acted in the public sphere directly, 
without the mediation of a man, and in unspoken defiance of the separate spheres 
ideology. 
Id. at 110–11. Do you think this case would have come out differently if Samuel and 
Frances had been married at the time he started making corset-springs? Or if Wesley had 
been the one to lead the effort to commercialize the patent? 
3. These cases mention a two-year statutory bar to patenting. In 1939, Congress 
changed this “grace period” from two years to one. Act of Aug. 5, 1939 ch. 450, § 1, 53 Stat. 
1212. See also 2A CHISUM ON PATENTS § 6.02 (2020). While the AIA restructured § 102, 
public use remains invalidating and the doctrinal developments preceding these notes 
remain good law. 
4. If you’re ever in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, you can see “the only street in the 
country paved entirely in accordance with . . . Nicholson pavement.” Jenna Solomon, 
Pittsburgh’s Wood-Paved Roslyn Place, PENNSYLVANIA HERITAGE, Winter 2020, at 40, 41. 
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Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc.  
793 F.2d 1261(Fed. Cir. 1986) 
BALDWIN, Circuit Judge. 
This is an appeal from the judgment of the United States District Court for the District 
of Delaware . . . holding claims 3-5 and 9 of Moleculon Research Corporation’s U.S. Patent 
No. 3,655,201 (’201 patent) valid and infringed by certain of the well-known Rubik’s Cube 
puzzles. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand. 
Background 
Moleculon, as assignee of the ’201 patent which issued to Larry D. Nichols, sued CBS 
Inc., as successor to the Ideal Toy Corporation, alleging infringement of claims 3, 4, 5, 6, 
and 9 of the ’201 patent.  
A puzzle enthusiast since childhood, Nichols, in the summer of 1957, conceived of a 
three-dimensional puzzle capable of rotational movement. He envisioned an assembly of 
eight cubes attached in a 2 x 2 x 2 arrangement, with each of the six faces of the composite 
cube distinguished by a different color and the individual cubes being capable of rotation 
in sets of four around one of three mutually perpendicular axes. 
During the period 1957-1962, while doing graduate work in organic chemistry, 
Nichols constructed several paper models of his puzzle, making cubes of heavy file-card 
type paper and affixing small magnets to the inside of the cubes. Although these models 
confirmed the feasibility of Nichols’ conception, they lacked durability. A few close 
friends, including two roommates and a colleague in the chemistry department, had 
occasion to see one of these paper models in Nichols’ room and Nichols explained its 
operation to at least one of them. 
In 1962, Nichols accepted employment as a research scientist at Moleculon. In 1968, 
Nichols constructed a working wood block prototype of his puzzle which he usually kept 
at home but on occasion brought into his office. In January 1969, Dr. Obermayer, the 
president of Moleculon, entered Nichols’ office and happened to see the model sitting on 
his desk. Obermayer expressed immediate interest in the puzzle and Nichols explained 
its workings. Obermayer asked whether Nichols intended to commercialize the puzzle. 
When Nichols said no, Obermayer suggested that Moleculon try to do so. In March 1969, 
Nichols assigned all his rights in the puzzle invention to Moleculon in return for a share 
of any proceeds of commercialization. On March 7, 1969, Moleculon sent Parker Brothers 
an actual model and a description of the cube puzzle. In the next three years, Moleculon 
contacted between fifty and sixty toy and game manufacturers, including Ideal. Ideal 
responded to the effect that it did not currently have an interest in marketing the puzzle. 
Moleculon itself did not succeed in marketing the Nichols cube. 
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On March 3, 1970, Nichols filed on behalf of Moleculon a patent application covering 
his invention. The ’201 patent issued on April 11, 1972. 
The subject matter of the ’201 patent, in its preferred embodiment, is a cube puzzle 
composed of eight smaller cubelets that may be rotated in groups of four adjacent cubes, 
and a method by which the sets of cubes may be rotated, first to randomize, and then to 
restore a predetermined pattern on the six faces of the composite cube. . . .  
Opinion 
CBS argues that the subject matter of the ’201 patent was in “public use” and “on sale” 
by Nichols, prior to the March 3, 1969 critical date (i.e., one year prior to filing of the patent 
application), thus rendering the patent invalid under [pre-AIA] section 102(b). 
A 
CBS labels as public use Nichols’ displaying of the models to other persons (such as 
his colleagues at school) without any mention of secrecy. CBS ascribes only commercial 
purpose and intent to Obermeyer’s use of the wood model and argues that a conclusion 
of barring public use under § 102(b) is compelled. We disagree. 
This is what the district court had to say: 
The essence of “public use” is the free and unrestricted giving over of an invention 
to a member of the public or the public in general. What I see here, by contrast, is 
the inventor’s private use of his own invention for his own enjoyment. “Private 
use of one’s own invention is permissible.”  
While it is true that Nichols explained his puzzle to a few close colleagues who 
inquired about it and allowed Obermayer to in fact use it, the personal 
relationships and other surrounding circumstances were such that Nichols at all 
times retained control over its use as well as over the distribution of information 
concerning it. He never used the puzzle or permitted it used in a place or at a time 
when he did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy and of confidentiality. In 
these respects, I consider the exposure to Obermayer in Nichols’ office no different 
than the exposure of Nichols’ close friends in his home . . . . 
. . . 
The district court distinguished Egbert because here Nichols had not given over the 
invention for free and unrestricted use by another person. Based on the personal 
relationships and surrounding circumstances, the court found that Nichols at all times 
retained control over the puzzle’s use and the distribution of information concerning it. 
The court characterized Nichols’ use as private and for his own enjoyment. We see neither 
legal error in the analysis nor clear error in the findings. 
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As for Obermayer’s brief use of the puzzle, the court found that Nichols retained 
control even though he and Obermayer had not entered into any express confidentiality 
agreement. The court held, and we agree, that the presence or absence of such an 
agreement is not determinative of the public use issue. . . . 
. . . 
CBS had the burden at trial to prove public use with facts supported by clear and 
convincing evidence. We think the district court’s characterization of the evidence of 
record is entirely apt and we see no ground for reversal. Moreover, we agree with the 
district court that its conclusion on public use is consistent with the policies underlying 
the bar.  
CBS further argues in connection with public use that the district court erred when it 
found no evidence of commercially motivated activity by Nichols prior to the critical date. 
Although CBS attempts to paint a picture of commercialization from the discussions 
between Obermayer and Nichols, we see only the brush strokes of speculation. The record 
lacks hard evidence. Discussion between employer and employee does not by itself 
convert an employee’s private pursuit into commercial enterprise with the employer. CBS 
also makes much of a February 6, 1969 phone call by Obermayer to Parker Brothers to see 
if the latter was interested in receiving a submission of a puzzle idea from an outside 
inventor. Nothing concerning the nature or workings of Nichols’ puzzle was disclosed. 
Obermayer simply inquired whether and how an outsider could submit a puzzle for 
Parker Brothers’ consideration. We agree with the district court that those facts do not 
show commercialization. Thus this case differs from other cases where commercial 
activity was said to violate the policies of section 102(b).  
B 
CBS argues that the claimed invention was on sale within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(b) because Nichols orally agreed prior to the critical date (e.g., during a January 1969 
conversation between Nichols and Obermayer) to assign “all his rights in the puzzle 
invention” to Moleculon. According to CBS, Nichols not only assigned the right to apply 
for a patent on the invention but also conveyed title in his single wooden model. 
Although the formal written assignment occurred after the critical date, the district 
court held that even if there were an earlier oral agreement, an assignment or sale of the 
rights in the invention and potential patent rights is not a sale of “the invention” within 
the meaning of section 102(b). We agree. . . . 
. . . 
Accordingly, we sustain the district court’s determination that the claims are not 
invalid under section 102(b). . . . 
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Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co.  
153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946) 
HAND, Circuit Judge. 
[John Meduna filed a patent application on August 6, 1942 for a process for 
conditioning metal surfaces to better bond with spray metal, useful for building up worn, 
metal parts of machines. The patent, issued on May 25, 1943, was assigned to Metallizing 
Engineering, which sued defendants for infringement. The district court held the patent 
not invalid and infringed and defendants appealed.] 
The only question which we find necessary to decide is as to Meduna’s public use of 
the patented process more than one year before August 6, 1942. The district judge made 
findings about this, which are supported by the testimony and which we accept. . . . The 
kernel of them is the following: “the inventor’s main purpose in his use of the process 
prior to August 6, 1941, and especially in respect to all jobs for owners not known to him, 
was commercial, and an experimental purpose in connection with such use was 
subordinate only.” Upon this finding he concluded as matter of law that, since the use 
before the critical date—August 6, 1941—was not primarily for the purposes of 
experiment, the use was not excused for that reason. Moreover, he also concluded that the 
use was not public but secret, and for that reason that its predominantly commercial 
character did prevent it from invalidating the patent. For the last he relied upon our 
decisions in Peerless Roll Leaf Co. v. Griffin & Sons, 29 F.2d 646, and Gillman v. Stern, 114 
F.2d 28. We think that his analysis of Peerless Roll Leaf Co. v. Griffin & Sons, was altogether 
correct, and that he had no alternative but to follow that decision; on the other hand, we 
now think that we were then wrong and that the decision must be overruled for reasons 
we shall state. Gillman v. Stern, supra, was, however, rightly decided. 
. . . 
In the lower courts we may begin with the often cited decision in Macbeth-Evans Glass 
Co. v. General Electric Co., 6 Cir., 246 F. 695, which concerned a process patent for making 
illuminating glass. The patentee had kept the process as secret as possible, but for ten 
years had sold the glass, although this did not, so far as appears, disclose the process. The 
court held the patent invalid for two reasons, as we understand them: the first was that 
the delay either indicated an intention to abandon, or was of itself a forfeiture, because of 
the inconsistency of a practical monopoly by means of secrecy and of a later legal 
monopoly by means of a patent. Judge Warrington seems to have been construing [the 
phrase “public use”] and to hold that the sales were such a use. In Allinson Manufacturing 
Co. v. Ideal Filter Co., 8 Cir., 21 F.2d 22, the patent was for a machine for purifying gasoline: 
the machine was kept secret, but the gasoline had been sold for a period of six years before 
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the application was filed. As in Macbeth-Evans, the court apparently invalidated the patent 
on two grounds: one was that the inventor had abandoned the right to a patent, or had 
forfeited it by his long delay. We are disposed however to read the latter part as holding 
that the sale of gasoline was a “prior use” of the machine, notwithstanding its 
concealment. . . . 
Coming now to our own decisions . . . the first was Grasselli Chemical Co. v. National 
Aniline & Chemical Co., 2 Cir., 26 F.2d 305, in which the patent was for a process which had 
been kept secret, but the product had been sold upon the market for more than two years. 
We held that, although the process could not have been discovered from the product, the 
sales constituted a “prior use,” relying upon Egbert v. Lippmann, and Hall v. Macneale. 
There was nothing in this inconsistent with what we are now holding. But in Peerless, 
where the patent was for a machine, which had been kept secret, but whose output had 
been freely sold on the market, we sustained the patent on the ground that “the sale of the 
product was irrelevant, since no knowledge could possibly be acquired of the machine in 
that way. In this respect the machine differs from a process . . . or from any other invention 
necessarily contained in a product.” So far as we can now find, there is nothing to support 
this distinction in the authorities, and we shall try to show that we misapprehended the 
theory on which the prior use by an inventor forfeits his right to a patent. . . . In Gillman, 
it was not the inventor, but a third person who used the machine secretly and sold the 
product openly, and there was therefore no question either of abandonment or forfeiture 
by the inventor. The only issue was whether a prior use which did not disclose the 
invention to the art was within the statute; and it is well settled that it is not. As in the case 
of any other anticipation, the issue of invention must then be determined by how much 
the inventor has contributed any new information to the art.  
From the foregoing it appears that in Peerless, we confused two separate doctrines: 
(1) The effect upon his right to a patent of the inventor’s competitive exploitation of his 
machine or of his process; (2) the contribution which a prior use by another person makes 
to the art. Both do indeed come within the phrase, “prior use”; but the first is a defence 
for quite different reasons from the second. It had its origin—at least in this country—in 
Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1, 7 L.Ed. 327, [holding] that it is a condition upon an inventor’s 
right to a patent that he shall not exploit his discovery competitively after it is ready for 
patenting; he must content himself with either secrecy, or legal monopoly. It is true that 
for the limited period of two years he was allowed to do so, possibly in order to give him 
time to prepare an application; and even that has been recently cut down by half. But if 
he goes beyond that period of probation, he forfeits his right regardless of how little the 
public may have learned about the invention; just as he can forfeit it by too long 
concealment, even without exploiting the invention at all. . . . 
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It is indeed true that an inventor may continue for more than a year to practice his 
invention for his private purposes of his own enjoyment and later patent it. But that is, 
properly considered, not an exception to the doctrine, for he is not then making use of his 
secret to gain a competitive advantage over others; he does not thereby extend the period 
of his monopoly. Besides, as we have seen, even that privilege has its limits, for he may 
conceal it so long that he will lose his right to a patent even though he does not use it at 
all. With that question we have not however any concern here. 
Judgment reversed; complaint dismissed. 
Context & Application 
1. What distinguishes Moleculon from Metallizing Engineering? Neither inventor 
intended for their uses to be public. Is the result in Metallizing Engineering consistent with 
the stated purpose of the novelty requirement: to stop things that are in the public domain 
from being withdrawn and protected by a patent? And if not, what is the court’s 
justification for invalidating a patent based on secret, non-informing uses? 
3. On Sale 
The next category of prior art is the “on sale” bar. The statute provides that a claimed 
invention is not patentable if it was “on sale . . . before the effective filing date of the 
claimed invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). Just as the “public use” category of prior art 
forced courts to ascertain whether particular uses are sufficiently “public” to fall within 
the scope of the statute, the “on sale” category has raised some thorny questions about 
what exactly it means for something to be sold. In 1998, the Supreme Court addressed 
some of the questions that arise from the several steps—advertisement, offer, 
development, construction—associated with selling products and processes. 
Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,  
525 U.S. 55 (1998) 
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Section 102(b) of the Patent Act of 1952 provides that no person is entitled to patent an 
“invention” that has been “on sale” more than one year before filing a patent application. 
We granted certiorari to determine whether the commercial marketing of a newly 
invented product may mark the beginning of the 1-year period even though the invention 
has not yet been reduced to practice.  
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I 
On April 19, 1982, petitioner, Wayne Pfaff, filed an application for a patent on a 
computer chip socket. Therefore, April 19, 1981, constitutes the critical date for purposes 
of the on-sale bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b); if the 1-year period began to run before that date, 
Pfaff lost his right to patent his invention. 
Pfaff commenced work on the socket in November 1980, when representatives of 
Texas Instruments asked him to develop a new device for mounting and removing 
semiconductor chip carriers. In response to this request, he prepared detailed engineering 
drawings that described the design, the dimensions, and the materials to be used in 
making the socket. Pfaff sent those drawings to a manufacturer in February or March 1981. 
Prior to March 17, 1981, Pfaff showed a sketch of his concept to representatives of 
Texas Instruments. On April 8, 1981, they provided Pfaff with a written confirmation of a 
previously placed oral purchase order for 30,100 of his new sockets for a total price of 
$91,155. In accord with his normal practice, Pfaff did not make and test a prototype of the 
new device before offering to sell it in commercial quantities.  
The manufacturer took several months to develop the customized tooling necessary 
to produce the device, and Pfaff did not fill the order until July 1981. The evidence 
therefore indicates that Pfaff first reduced his invention to practice in the summer of 1981. 
The socket achieved substantial commercial success before Patent No. 4,491,377 (the ’377 
patent) issued to Pfaff on January 1, 1985.  
After the patent issued, petitioner brought an infringement action against respondent, 
Wells Electronics, Inc., the manufacturer of a competing socket. Wells prevailed on the 
basis of a finding of no infringement. When respondent began to market a modified 
device, petitioner brought this suit, alleging that the modifications infringed six of the 
claims in the ’377 patent. 
. . . 
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding all six claims invalid. Four of the claims (1, 6, 
7, and 10) described the socket that Pfaff had sold to Texas Instruments prior to April 8, 
1981. Because that device had been offered for sale on a commercial basis more than one 
year before the patent application was filed on April 19, 1982, the court concluded that 
those claims were invalid under § 102(b). That conclusion rested on the court’s view that 
as long as the invention was “substantially complete at the time of sale,” the 1-year period 
began to run, even though the invention had not yet been reduced to practice. The other 
two claims (11 and 19) described a feature that had not been included in Pfaff ‘s initial 
design, but the Court of Appeals concluded as a matter of law that the additional feature 
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was not itself patentable because it was an obvious addition to the prior art. Given the 
court’s § 102(b) holding, the prior art included Pfaff’s first four claims. 
Because other courts have held or assumed that an invention cannot be “on sale” 
within the meaning of § 102(b) unless and until it has been reduced to practice and 
because the text of § 102(b) makes no reference to “substantial completion” of an 
invention, we granted certiorari. 
II 
The primary meaning of the word “invention” in the Patent Act unquestionably refers 
to the inventor’s conception rather than to a physical embodiment of that idea. The statute 
does not contain any express requirement that an invention must be reduced to practice 
before it can be patented. Neither the statutory definition of the term in § 100 nor the basic 
conditions for obtaining a patent set forth in § 101 make any mention of “reduction to 
practice.” The statute’s only specific reference to that term is found in § 102(g), which sets 
forth the standard for resolving priority contests between two competing claimants to a 
patent. [Ed. note: Section 102(g) governed disputes regarding who was the first to invent 
the subject matter of a claimed invention; because the AIA replaced the first-to-invent 
regime with a first-to-file regime, there is no longer an equivalent provision in Section 
102.] That subsection provides:   
In determining priority of invention there shall be considered not only the 
respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also 
the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to 
practice, from a time prior to conception by the other. 
Thus, assuming diligence on the part of the applicant, it is normally the first inventor to 
conceive, rather than the first to reduce to practice, who establishes the right to the patent. 
It is well settled that an invention may be patented before it is reduced to practice. In 
1888, this Court upheld a patent issued to Alexander Graham Bell even though he had 
filed his application before constructing a working telephone. Chief Justice Waite’s 
reasoning in that case merits quoting at length: 
It is quite true that when Bell applied for his patent he had never actually 
transmitted telegraphically spoken words so that they could be distinctly heard 
and understood at the receiving end of his line, but in his specification he did 
describe accurately and with admirable clearness his process, that is to say, the 
exact electrical condition that must be created to accomplish his purpose, and he 
also described, with sufficient precision to enable one of ordinary skill in such 
matters to make it, a form of apparatus which, if used in the way pointed out, 
would produce the required effect, receive the words, and carry them to and 
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deliver them at the appointed place. The particular instrument which he had, and 
which he used in his experiments, did not, under the circumstances in which it 
was tried, reproduce the words spoken, so that they could be clearly understood, 
but the proof is abundant and of the most convincing character, that other 
instruments, carefully constructed and made exactly in accordance with the 
specification, without any additions whatever, have operated and will operate 
successfully. A good mechanic of proper skill in matters of the kind can take the 
patent and, by following the specification strictly, can, without more, construct an 
apparatus which, when used in the way pointed out, will do all that it is claimed 
the method or process will do . . . . 
“The law does not require that a discoverer or inventor, in order to get a patent for a 
process, must have succeeded in bringing his art to the highest degree of perfection. It is 
enough if he describes his method with sufficient clearness and precision to enable those 
skilled in the matter to understand what the process is, and if he points out some 
practicable way of putting it into operation.” The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1888).  
When we apply the reasoning of The Telephone Cases to the facts of the case before us 
today, it is evident that Pfaff could have obtained a patent on his novel socket when he 
accepted the purchase order from Texas Instruments for 30,100 units. At that time he 
provided the manufacturer with a description and drawings that had “sufficient clearness 
and precision to enable those skilled in the matter” to produce the device. The parties 
agree that the sockets manufactured to fill that order embody Pfaff’s conception as set 
forth in claims 1, 6, 7, and 10 of the ’377 patent. We can find no basis in the text of § 102(b) 
or in the facts of this case for concluding that Pfaff’s invention was not “on sale” within 
the meaning of the statute until after it had been reduced to practice. 
III 
Pfaff nevertheless argues that longstanding precedent, buttressed by the strong 
interest in providing inventors with a clear standard identifying the onset of the 1-year 
period, justifies a special interpretation of the word “invention” as used in § 102(b). [T]his 
nontextual argument should be rejected. 
As we have often explained, most recently in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, 
Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989), the patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that 
encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in 
technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time. The balance 
between the interest in motivating innovation and enlightenment by rewarding invention 
with patent protection on the one hand, and the interest in avoiding monopolies that 
unnecessarily stifle competition on the other, has been a feature of the federal patent laws 
since their inception. As this Court explained in 1871: 
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Letters patent are not to be regarded as monopolies . . . but as public franchises 
granted to the inventors of new and useful improvements for the purpose of 
securing to them, as such inventors, for the limited term therein  mentioned, the 
exclusive right and liberty to make and use and vend to others to be used their 
own inventions, as tending to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, 
and as matter of compensation to the inventors for their labor, toil, and expense in 
making the inventions, and reducing the same to practice for the public benefit, as 
contemplated by the Constitution and sanctioned by the laws of Congress.  
Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516 , 11 Wall. 516, 533-534, 20 L. Ed. 33. 
Consistent with these ends, § 102 of the Patent Act serves as a limiting provision, both 
excluding ideas that are in the public domain from patent protection and confining the 
duration of the monopoly to the statutory term.  
We originally held that an inventor loses his right to a patent if he puts his invention 
into public use before filing a patent application. “His voluntary act or acquiescence in the 
public sale and use is an abandonment of his right” Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1, 24 (1829) 
(Story, J.). A similar reluctance to allow an inventor to remove existing knowledge from 
public use undergirds the on-sale bar. 
Nevertheless, an inventor who seeks to perfect his discovery may conduct extensive 
testing without losing his right to obtain a patent for his invention -- even if such testing 
occurs in the public eye. The law has long recognized the distinction between inventions 
put to experimental use and products sold commercially. In 1878, we explained why 
patentability may turn on an inventor’s use of his product. 
It is sometimes said that an inventor acquires an undue advantage over the public 
by delaying to take out a patent, inasmuch as he thereby preserves the monopoly 
to himself for a longer period than is allowed by the policy of the law; but this 
cannot be said with justice when the delay is occasioned by a bona fide effort to 
bring his invention to perfection, or to ascertain whether it will answer the purpose 
intended. His monopoly only continues for the allotted period, in any event; and 
it is the interest of the public, as well as himself, that the invention should be 
perfect and properly tested, before a patent is granted for it. Any attempt to use it 
for a profit, and not by way of experiment, for a longer period than two years before the 
application, would deprive the inventor of his right to a patent.  
Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126. 
The patent laws therefore seek both to protect the public’s right to retain knowledge 
already in the public domain and the inventor’s right to control whether and when he 
may patent his invention. The Patent Act of 1836 was the first statute that expressly 
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included an on-sale bar to the issuance of a patent. Like the earlier holding in Pennock, that 
provision precluded patentability if the invention had been placed on sale at any time 
before the patent application was filed. In 1839, Congress ameliorated that requirement 
by enacting a 2-year grace period in which the inventor could file an application.  
In Andrews v. Hovey, 123 U.S. 267, 274 (1887), we noted that the purpose of that 
amendment was “to fix a period of limitation which should be certain”; it required the 
inventor to make sure that a patent application was filed “within two years from the 
completion of his invention.” In 1939, Congress reduced the grace period from two years 
to one year.  
Petitioner correctly argues that these provisions identify an interest in providing 
inventors with a definite standard for determining when a patent application must be 
filed. A rule that makes the timeliness of an application depend on the date when an 
invention is “substantially complete” seriously undermines the interest in certainty. 
More-over, such a rule finds no support in the text of the statute. Thus, petitioner’s 
argument calls into question the standard applied by the Court of Appeals, but it does not 
persuade us that it is necessary to engraft a reduction to practice element into the meaning 
of the term “invention” as used in § 102(b). 
The word “invention” must refer to a concept that is complete, rather than merely one 
that is “substantially complete.” It is true that reduction to practice ordinarily provides 
the best evidence that an invention is complete. But just because reduction to practice is 
sufficient evidence of completion, it does not follow that proof of reduction to practice is 
necessary in every case. Indeed, both the facts of the Telephone Cases and the facts of this 
case demonstrate that one can prove that an invention is complete and ready for patenting 
before it has actually been reduced to practice.  
We conclude, therefore, that the on-sale bar applies when two conditions are satisfied 
before the critical date. First, the product must be the subject of a commercial offer for sale. 
An inventor can both understand and control the timing of the first commercial marketing 
of his invention. The experimental use doctrine, for example, has not generated concerns 
about indefiniteness, and we perceive no reason why unmanageable uncertainty should 
attend a rule that measures the application of the on-sale bar of § 102(b) against the date 
when an invention that is ready for patenting is first marketed commercially. In this case 
the acceptance of the purchase order prior to April 8, 1981, makes it clear that such an 
offer had been made, and there is no question that the sale was commercial rather than 
experimental in character. 
Second, the invention must be ready for patenting. That condition may be satisfied in 
at least two ways: by proof of reduction to practice before the critical date; or by proof that 
prior to the critical date the inventor had prepared drawings or other descriptions of the 
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invention that were sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art to  practice 
the invention. In this case the second condition of the on-sale bar is satisfied because the 
drawings Pfaff sent to the manufacturer before the critical date fully disclosed the 
invention. 
The evidence in this case thus fulfills the two essential conditions of the on-sale bar. 
As succinctly stated by Learned Hand: 
It is a condition upon an inventor’s right to a patent that he shall not exploit his 
discovery competitively after it is ready for patenting; he must content himself 
with either secrecy, or legal monopoly.  
Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520 (2d. Cir. 1946). 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals finds support not only in the text of the statute 
but also in the basic policies underlying the statutory scheme, including § 102(b). When 
Pfaff accepted the purchase order for his new sockets prior to April 8, 1981, his invention 
was ready for patenting. The fact that the manufacturer was able to produce the socket 
using his detailed drawings and specifications demonstrates this fact. Furthermore, those 
sockets contained all the elements of the invention claimed in the ’377 patent. Therefore, 
Pfaff’s ’377 patent is invalid because the invention had been on sale for more than one 
year in this country before he filed his patent application. Accordingly, the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. 
855 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
DYK, Circuit Judge. 
Helsinn Healthcare is the owner of the four patents-in-suit directed to intravenous 
formulations of palonosetron for reducing, or reducing the likelihood of, chemotherapy-
induced nausea and vomiting (“CINV”). 
Helsinn brought suit against Teva Pharmaceuticals alleging that the filing of Teva’s 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) constituted an infringement of various 
claims of those patents. Teva defended, inter alia, on the ground that the asserted claims 
were invalid under the on-sale bar provision of 35 U.S.C. § 102. The district court found 
that the patents in suit were not invalid. With respect to three of the patents, which are 
governed by the pre-Leahy-Smith America In-vents Act (“pre-AIA”) version of § 102, the 
district court concluded that there was a commercial offer for sale before the critical date, 
but that the invention was not ready for patenting before the critical date. With respect to 
the fourth patent, which is governed by the AIA version of § 102, the district court 
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concluded that there was no commercial offer for sale because the AIA changed the 
relevant standard, and that, in any event, the invention was not ready for patenting before 
the critical date. 
We reverse. The asserted claims of the patents-in-suit were subject to an invalidating 
contract for sale prior to the critical date of January 30, 2002, and the AIA did not change 
the statutory meaning of “on sale” in the circumstances involved here. The asserted claims 
were also ready for patenting prior to the critical date. 
Background 
Helsinn owns four patents, U.S. Patent 7,947,724; 7,947,725; 7,960,424; and 8,598,219, 
directed to reducing the likelihood of CINV. CINV is a serious side effect of chemotherapy 
treatment. 
The use of palonosetron to treat CINV was not new. . . . The patents in suit purport to 
disclose novel intravenous formulations using unexpectedly low concentrations of 
palonosetron that were not taught by the prior art. All four of the patents in suit claim 
priority to a provisional patent application filed on January 30, 2003. The critical date for 
the on-sale bar is one year earlier, January 30, 2002. The significance of the critical date is 
that a sale of the invention before that date can be invalidating. 
. . .  
The claims of the patents-in-suit to some extent all express the same concepts in 
different terms. . . . It is undisputed that each asserted claim covers the 0.25 mg dose of 
palonosetron. In order to simplify the relevant discussion, we refer to the patents as 
covering the 0.25 mg dose. 
In 1998, Helsinn acquired a license under the ’333 patent from Roche Palo Alto LLC to 
palonosetron and all intellectual property resulting from ongoing palonosetron research. 
Roche and its predecessor, Syntex (USA) Inc., had already conducted Phase I and Phase 
II clinical trials. A Phase II trial—Study 2330—found that the 0.25 mg dose “was effective 
in suppressing chemotherapy-induced emesis for 24 hours.” Helsinn then submitted 
safety and efficacy protocols for Phase III clinical trials to FDA in early 2000, proposing to 
study two dosages—0.25 mg and 0.75 mg. By early 2001 the Phase III trials were ongoing 
but not yet completed. 
On April 6, 2001, almost two years before applying for a patent, Helsinn and MGI 
Pharma, Inc., an oncology-focused pharmaceutical company that markets and distributes 
in the United States, entered into two agreements: (1) a License Agreement and (2) a 
Supply and Purchase Agreement. . . .  
Under the terms of the License Agreement, MGI agreed to pay $11 million in initial 
payments to Helsinn, plus additional future royalties on distribution of “products” in the 
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United States. The parties agree that the “products” covered by the License Agreement 
were 0.25 mg and 0.75 mg doses of palonosetron. 
Under the Supply and Purchase Agreement, MGI agreed to purchase exclusively from 
Helsinn, and Helsinn agreed to supply MGI’s requirements of the 0.25 mg and 0.75 mg 
palonosetron products, or whichever of the two dosages were approved for sale by FDA. 
The agreement required MGI to submit purchase forecasts to Helsinn and to place firm 
orders at least 90 days before delivery. It also specified that such orders would be “subject 
to written acceptance and confirmation by [Helsinn] before becoming binding.” But, in 
the event that Helsinn were unable to meet MGI’s firm orders and to the extent they fell 
within the previously forecasted amount, Helsinn would then be obligated to designate a 
third party manufacturer to supply MGI with the product. The agreement specified price 
(29% of the gross sales price by MGI with a minimum of $28.50 per vial), method of 
payment (wire transfer within 30 days of receipt of an invoice), and method of delivery 
(DDU—which means delivery duty unpaid). 
The License Agreement made reference to the ongoing clinical trials and stated that in 
the event that the results were unfavorable and FDA did not approve the sale of either 
dosage of the product, Helsinn could terminate the agreement. If the License Agreement 
were terminated, the Supply and Purchase Agreement would “terminate automatically.” 
All of the above information about the transaction was publicly disclosed with two 
exceptions. The two features of the agreements that were not publicly disclosed were the 
price terms and the specific dosage formulations covered by the agreements—that is the 
0.25 and 0.75 mg doses. 
Helsinn admitted at oral argument that the agreement was binding as of its effective 
date, April 6, 2001, and that it would cover either or both of the 0.25 and 0.75 mg doses, 
subject to FDA approval. Helsinn also agreed that, if the Phase III trials were successful 
and the products were approved by FDA, then the agreement obligated MGI to purchase 
and Helsinn to supply the approved doses. But if FDA did not approve either dose, then 
the agreement likewise would terminate automatically with the License Agreement. As 
Helsinn stated [at oral argument], in such a scenario “both parties could accept that fact 
and walk away.” 
After the signing of the agreements, and still before the critical date, Helsinn prepared 
[a] preliminary statistical analysis of the earliest Phase III trial on January 7, 2002. The data 
showed that 81% of patients who received the 0.25 mg dose of palonosetron experienced 
relief from CINV for 24 hours. After the critical date of January 30, 2002, Helsinn 
submitted its preliminary Phase III data to FDA in early February. In September 2002, 
after the successful completion of all Phase III trials, Helsinn filed its New Drug 
Application for the 0.25 mg dose, but did not seek FDA approval of the 0.75 mg dose. On 
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January 30, 2003, Helsinn filed a provisional patent application covering the 0.25 mg dose 
(and also the 0.75 mg dose). FDA issued approval for the 0.25 dose on July 2003. [Helsinn 
then applied for and received four patents, all of which cover the 0.25 mg dose, are listed 
in FDA’s “Orange Book,” and claim priority to the January 30, 2003 date of the provisional 
application.] 
In 2011, Teva filed an ANDA seeking FDA approval to market a generic 0.25 mg 
palonosetron product. Teva’s ANDA filing included a Paragraph IV certification that the 
claims of the patents-in-suit were invalid and/or not infringed. Helsinn then brought suit 
. . . . 
Discussion 
I 
We first address whether the invention of the ’724, ’725, and ’424 patents was subject 
to a sale or offer for sale prior to the critical date. We recently had occasion to address the 
pre-AIA on-sale bar en banc in Medicines Co. v. Hospira, Inc., 827 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
There we established a framework for determining whether there is an offer for sale. We 
explained that the question must be “analyzed under the law of contracts as generally 
understood” and “must focus on those activities that would be understood to be 
commercial sales and offers for sale ‘in the commercial community.’” While 
acknowledging that it is not of “talismanic significance” to our inquiry, “[a]s a general 
proposition, we will look to the Uniform Commercial Code (‘UCC’) to define whether a 
communication or series of communications rises to the level of a commercial offer for 
sale.” A sale occurs when there is a “contract between parties to give and to pass rights of 
property for consideration which the buyer pays or promises to pay the seller for the thing 
bought or sold.” 
In Medicines we also pointed to other factors that are important to this analysis, but 
noted that, like the UCC itself, none is determinative individually. We noted that the 
absence of the passage of title, the confidential nature of a transaction, and the absence of 
commercial marketing of the invention all counsel against applying the on-sale bar. We 
deemed these factors important because they helped shed light on whether a transaction 
would be understood “in the commercial community” to constitute a commercial offer for 
sale. But those additional factors are not at issue in this case. . . . 
We agree with the district court that there was a sale for purposes of pre-AIA § 102(b) 
prior to the critical date because there was a sale of the invention under the law of 
contracts as generally understood. 
Helsinn admits that the Supply and Purchase Agreement was binding as of its 
effective date, April 6, 2001, and that, if FDA approved the 0.25 mg dose and/or the 0.75 
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mg dose of palonosetron, the agreement obligated Helsinn to sell and MGI to purchase 
those products. The Supply and Purchase Agreement bears all the hallmarks of a 
commercial contract for sale. It obligated MGI to purchase exclusively from Helsinn and 
obligated Helsinn to supply MGI’s requirements of the 0.25 and 0.75 mg doses if approved 
by FDA. 
The agreement here included other specific terms, such as price, method of payment, 
and method of delivery. Even though MGI’s firm orders pursuant to the agreement were 
ostensibly “subject to written acceptance and confirmation by [Helsinn] before becoming 
binding,” Helsinn was nonetheless obligated to meet or designate a third party 
manufacturer to meet MGI’s firm orders. The public 8-K filing described the Supply and 
Purchase Agreement as obligating Helsinn to supply MGI’s “requirements of finished 
product.” . . . [T]he fact that an agreement covered one party’s requirements as opposed 
to a specified quantity does not prevent application of the on-sale bar. 
. . . Helsinn argues that the Supply and Purchase Agreement is not invalidating 
because at the critical date it was uncertain whether FDA would approve the 0.25 mg dose, 
and FDA approval was a condition precedent to the sale. 
There can be no real dispute that an agreement contracting for the sale of the claimed 
invention contingent on regulatory approval is still a commercial sale as the commercial 
community would understand that term. The UCC expressly provides that a “purported 
present sale of future goods operates as a contract to sell.” UCC § 2-105(2) (defining 
“future goods” as “goods which are not both existing and identified”). This is true 
irrespective of whether those future goods have yet to receive necessary regulatory 
approval. A contract for sale that includes a condition precedent is a valid and enforceable 
contract. Indeed, conditions precedent such as regulatory approval are a basic feature of 
contract law. 
It has been implicit in our prior opinions that the absence of FDA or other regulatory 
approval before the critical date does not prevent a sale or offer for sale from triggering 
the on-sale bar. For instance, in Enzo, we applied the on-sale bar even though the contract 
for sale covered the buyer’s reasonable requirements for “perform[ing] all preclinical and 
clinical studies,” by definition before FDA approval, because the “claimed invention, the 
polynucleotide probe, is a tangible item or product that can be sold or offered for sale.” . . .  
. . . 
It is clear that the Supply and Purchase Agreement constituted a commercial sale or 
offer for sale for purposes of § 102(b) as to the asserted claims of the ’724, ’725, and ’424 
patents. 
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II 
We next address whether the AIA changed the meaning of the on-sale bar under 35 
U.S.C. § 102 so that there was no qualifying sale as to the ’219 patent. . . .   
Before the AIA, § 102(b) barred the patentability of an invention that was “patented 
or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale 
in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent.” 35 
U.S.C. § 102(b). Under that earlier provision, we concluded that, although confidentiality 
weighs against application of the on-sale bar, that fact alone is not determinative. For 
instance, in In re Caveney, a British company offered to sell the claimed invention to an 
American company that would be its exclusive seller in the United States before the 
critical date. The court rejected the argument that a sale or offer for sale did not trigger the 
on-sale bar when it had been “kept secret from the trade,” concluding that “sales or offers 
by one person of a claimed invention bar another party from obtaining a patent if the sale 
or offer to sell is made over a year before the latter’s filing date.”  
By enacting the AIA, Congress amended § 102 to bar the patentability of an “invention 
[that] was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or 
otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.” 
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). 
Teva and various amici assert that by reenacting the existing statutory term, “on sale,” 
Congress did not change the meaning of the on-sale bar or disturb settled law. Helsinn, 
the government, and other amici argue that the AIA changed the law by adding the 
“otherwise available to the public” phrase. They argue that the on-sale bar now does not 
encompass secret sales and requires that a sale make the invention available to the public 
in order to trigger application of the on-sale bar. Apart from the additional statutory 
language, this argument primarily relies on floor statements made by individual members 
of Congress. While recognizing that such floor statements are typically not reliable as 
indicators of congressional intent, they argue that here we should look to the floor 
statements to determine the meaning of the provision. These floor statements include 
material such as the following: 
Subsection 102(a) was drafted in part to do away with precedent under current 
law that private offers for sale or private uses or secret processes practiced in the 
United States that result in a product or service that is then made public may be 
deemed patent-defeating prior art. That will no longer be the case. 
157 Cong. Rec. 3415 (2011) (remarks of Sen. Leahy). 
The current on-sale bar imposes penalties not demanded by any legitimate public 
interest. There is no reason to fear “commercialization” that merely consists of a 
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secret sale or offer for sale but that does not operate to disclose the invention to the 
public. The present bill’s new section 102(a) precludes extreme results such as 
these. 
157 Cong. Rec. 3424 (2011) (remarks of Sen. Kyl).  
. . . 
The floor statements do not identify any sale cases that would be overturned by the 
amendments. Even if the floor statements were intended to overrule . . . secret or 
confidential sale cases . . . , that would have no effect here since those cases were 
concerned entirely with whether the existence of a sale or offer was public. Here, the 
existence of the sale—i.e., the Supply and Purchase Agreement between Helsinn and 
MGI—was publicly announced in MGI’s 8-K filing with the SEC. The 8-K filing also 
included a copy of the contract for sale as an attachment, albeit partially redacted. Detailed 
information about palonosetron, its benefits and uses in treating CINV were also 
disclosed. The statements disclosed the chemical structure of palonosetron and specified 
that the covered products were “pharmaceutical preparations for human use in 
[intravenous] dosage form, containing [palonosetron] as an active ingredient.” And, as 
described above, the agreements disclosed all the pertinent details of the transaction other 
than the price and dosage levels. 
Helsinn argues that the AIA did more than overrule the “secret sale” cases, and relies 
on the “otherwise available to the public” language in the statute and the floor statements. 
Helsinn argues that those statements suggest that the on-sale bar does not apply unless 
the sale “discloses the invention to the public” before the critical date. 157 Cong. Rec. 3424 
(2011). It urges that since the 0.25 mg dose was not disclosed, the invention was not 
disclosed and the on-sale bar does not apply. The suggestion is that Congress required 
that the details of the claimed invention be publicly disclosed before the on-sale bar is 
triggered. 
Requiring such disclosure as a condition of the on-sale bar would work a foundational 
change in the theory of the statutory on-sale bar. Indeed, the seminal Supreme Court 
decision in Pennock addressed exactly such a situation—the public sale of an item but the 
withholding from “the public the secrets of [the] invention.” Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 
1, 19 (1829). Failing to find such a sale invalidating . . . “would materially retard the 
progress of science and the useful arts, and give a premium to those who should be least 
prompt to communicate their discoveries.”  
So too under our cases, an invention is made available to the public when there is a 
commercial offer or contract to sell a product embodying the invention and that sale is 
made public. Our cases explicitly rejected a requirement that the details of the invention 
be disclosed in the terms of sale. 
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A primary rationale of the on-sale bar is that publicly offering a product for sale that 
embodies the claimed invention places it in the public domain, regardless of when or 
whether actual delivery occurs. The patented product need not be on hand or even 
delivered prior to the critical date to trigger the on-sale bar. And, as previously noted, we 
have never required that a sale be consummated or an offer accepted for the invention to 
be in the public domain and the on-sale bar to apply, nor have we distinguished sales 
from mere offers for sale. We have also not required that members of the public be aware 
that the product sold actually embodies the claimed invention. For instance, in Abbott 
Laboratories v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 182 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1999), at the time of the 
sale, neither party to the transaction knew whether the product sold embodied the 
claimed invention and had no easy way to determine what the product was.  
Thus, our prior cases have applied the on-sale bar even when there is no delivery, 
when delivery is set after the critical date, or, even when, upon delivery, members of the 
public could not ascertain the claimed invention. There is no indication in the floor 
statements that these members intended to overrule these cases. In stating that the 
invention must be available to the public they evidently meant that the public sale itself 
would put the patented product in the hands of the public. Senator Kyl himself seems to 
have agreed with this proposition, stating explicitly that “once a product is sold on the 
market, any invention that is inherent to the product becomes publicly available prior art 
and cannot be patented.” 157 Cong. Rec. 3423 (2011). There are no floor statements 
suggesting that the sale or offer documents must themselves publicly disclose the details 
of the claimed invention before the critical date. If Congress intended to work such a 
sweeping change to our on-sale bar jurisprudence and “wished to repeal these prior cases 
legislatively, it would do so by clear language.”  
We conclude that, after the AIA, if the existence of the sale is public, the details of the 
invention need not be publicly disclosed in the terms of sale. For the reasons already 
stated, the Supply and Purchase Agreement between Helsinn and MGI constituted a sale 
of the claimed invention—the 0.25 mg dose—before the critical date, and therefore both 
the pre-AIA and AIA on-sale bars apply. We do not find that distribution agreements will 
always be invalidating under § 102. We simply find that this particular Supply and 
Purchase Agreement is. 
. . .  
We hold that the asserted claims . . . are invalid under the on-sale bar. 
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Context & Application 
1. In another portion of the opinion, the Helsinn court stated:  
At oral argument for the first time, Helsinn contended that applying the on-sale 
bar would be unfair because it would distinguish between vertically-integrated 
manufacturers that have in-house distribution capacity and smaller entities like 
Helsinn that must contract for distribution services from a third party. Helsinn 
asserts that Medicines stands for the proposition that we should not allow 
commercial activities to be invalidating if those same activities could be performed 
in-house without triggering the on-sale bar. Such a broad principle would largely 
eviscerate the on-sale bar provision except as to sales to end users; that was not 
the holding of Medicines. There we concluded that “stockpiling,” including 
purchases from a supplier, “does not trigger the on-sale bar.” We also expressed 
concern over a policy of “penalizing a company for relying, by choice or by 
necessity, on the confidential services of a contract manufacturer.” But the concern 
that Medicines focused on is not applicable here. Helsinn did not contract for MGI’s 
confidential marketing or distribution services as Medicines contracted for Ben 
Venue’s confidential manufacturing services. Instead, the Supply and Purchase 
Agreement between Helsinn and MGI unambiguously contemplated the sale by 
Helsinn of MGI’s requirements of the claimed invention. 
The argument Helsinn is making here is about treating disaggregated entities engaged in 
different parts of innovation similarly to in-house innovation in a large company. In 
Innovation and the Firm: A New Synthesis, Peter Lee explains how some see a large role for 
“patents in promoting technology transactions between separate entities, thus facilitating 
vertical disintegration.” 70 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1439-40 (2018). Lee goes on to explain that 
this vertical disintegration is not seen as frequently as one might expect; in contrast, one 
often sees vertical integration in innovation-heavy markets. He posits that one reason is 
that valuable information and resources, such as the tacit knowledge a company develops 
surrounding how to practice a patent and the scientists involved in development, add 
value beyond that contained in the patent document. Id. at 1455-87. 
C. Exceptions under § 102(b) 
The effective filing date of a patent is not always the date against which prior art is 
measured. Under the AIA, prior art includes everything before the effective filing date, 
but some of that prior art will be excluded and not count for novelty purposes, if it meets 
certain requirements. This section will walk through a number of scenarios to 
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demonstrate when a disclosure will be considered prior art under the AIA and when it 
will be excluded. 
Section 102(b) lists the disclosures that are excluded from the scope of the prior art: 
(1) Disclosures made 1 year or less before the effective filing date of the claimed 
invention.—A disclosure made 1 year or less before the effective filing date of a 
claimed invention shall not be prior art to the claimed invention under subsection 
(a)(1) if— 
(A) the disclosure was made by the inventor or joint inventor or by another 
who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor 
or a joint inventor; or 
(B) the subject matter disclosed had, before such disclosure, been publicly 
disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor or another who obtained the subject 
matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor. 
(2) Disclosures appearing in applications and patents.—A disclosure shall not be 
prior art to a claimed invention under subsection (a)(2) if— 
(A) the subject matter disclosed was obtained directly or indirectly from the 
inventor or a joint inventor; 
(B) the subject matter disclosed had, before such subject matter was effectively 
filed under subsection (a)(2), been publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint 
inventor or another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or 
indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; or 
(C) the subject matter disclosed and the claimed invention, not later than the 
effective filing date of the claimed invention, were owned by the same person or 
subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person. 
Let us break these down a bit. Section 102(b)(1)(A) says that if the inventor is the originator 
of the disclosure, and it is made in the year prior to the effective filing date, then it will 
not count as prior art. The timeline below represents this exclusion: 
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Section 102(b)(1)(A) provides that publications and acts by the inventor in the year leading 
up to filing will not count as invalidating prior art. This means that disclosures under 
section 102(a)(1) (i.e., when the invention is described in a patent, printed publication, in 
public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public) originating with the inventor (i.e., 
the disclosure is by the inventor or joint inventor or by another who obtained the subject 
matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor) are excepted 
from the prior art. Skipping ahead to 102(b)(1)(C), disclosures that are commonly owned 
by the owner of the inventor before the effective filing date of a patent are also excepted 
from the prior art. 
Section 102(b)(1)(B) addresses which disclosures made by third parties can be 
excepted from prior art. In the figure below, acts by the inventor/applicant are above the 
timeline. Acts by third parties are below it. To illustrate: 
 
As shown above, there has been a third-party disclosure before the effective filing date. 
However, one of the inventor disclosures predates the third-party disclosure, therefore 
excepting it from the prior art. Thus, the disclosure shown below the line would be prior 
art if the inventor was not able to point to an earlier disclosure. And, of course, that earlier, 
inventor disclosure must still be within one year, or else it will count as prior art. The 
figure also depicts one inventor disclosure after the third-party disclosure; this disclosure 
would not result in the exclusion of the third-party disclosure from the scope of the prior 
art. 
The set of exceptions in section 102(b)(2) relate to the disclosures in § 102(a)(2), namely 
published applications and issued patents. Remember that under § 102(a)(2) patents and 
published applications are prior art as of their effective filing dates. (They also count as 
printed publications as of their publication dates.)  
Section 102(b)(2)(A) provides that any patents filed that describe the invention and 
originate with the inventor will not count as prior art against the invention. This could 
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include applications for related technologies, for example, that an inventor or company 
might file within months of each other. 
 
 Section 102(b)(2)(B) is the reason that the AIA is not a true first-to-file system, but 
instead may better be described as a first-to-disclose-and-file system. This is because an 
inventor’s disclosure, such as a publication, for example, can knock a competitor’s filed 
patent out of the prior art. This section provides that 102(a)(2) disclosures (patent 
applications that are later published or issued) are not prior art if the subject matter was 
previously “publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor or another who obtained 
the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor.” 
As illustrated below: 
 
The third party filed before our inventor in the illustration above, and yet their filing 
will not count as invalidating prior art. That is because our inventor disclosed the 
invention before the third party. Does this mean that both are entitled to patents? No. 
Look at the situation from the third party’s perspective, and you will see that the 
inventor’s disclosure will count as § 102(a)(1) prior art against the third party’s 
application. You may want to keep these timelines in mind when we return to the pre-
AIA grace period in Section E, below. 
D. Prior Art: Standards for Anticipation 
Sections A and B demonstrated how courts determine whether certain materials or 
acts fit within the prior art categories of § 102(a). But that is not the end of the inquiry. 
Now we turn to the substance of prior art references, and the question of anticipation. The 
basic explanation of anticipation is as follows:  
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Section 102 embodies the concept of novelty—if a device or process has been 
previously invented (and disclosed to the public), then it is not new, and therefore 
the claimed invention is “anticipated” by the prior invention. 
Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). A prior art reference 
anticipates an invention if it (1) includes every element of a claimed invention (2) such 
that a person of skill in the art would understand from the reference how to make or use 
the invention. The Federal Circuit has explained the “all elements rule” this way:  
Anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 requires the presence in a single prior art 
disclosure of each and every element of a claimed invention. . . . That which would 
literally infringe if later in time anticipates if earlier than the date of invention. 
Lewmar Marine, Inc. v. Barient, Inc., 827 F.2d 744 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The second requirement, 
that a person of skill in the art would understand how to make or use the invention, is 
described as follows: 
Because the hallmark of anticipation is prior invention, the prior art reference . . . 
must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the 
document, but must also disclose those elements “arranged as in the claim.” 
Net MoneyIN, 545 at 1369. Contrast this with the § 112 enablement requirement for 
patentability. It requires that a person of skill in the art be able to make or use the invention 
based on the disclosure, whereas section 112 requires that a person of skill in the art be 
able to make and use the invention based on its disclosure. Why might there be a lower 
standard to invalidate a patent based on prior art references than the standard for 
disclosure of an invention? The next cases demonstrate how courts apply the all elements 
rule and how they treat prior art that inherently discloses an invention. 
Marrin v. Griffin 
 599 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
DYK, Judge: 
Appellants Jeffrey and Claudia Griffin (“the Griffins”) appeal from a judgment of 
the . . . district court grant[ing] summary judgment, finding the Griffins’ United States 
Patent No. 5,154,448 invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated.  
On appeal, the Griffins’ primary contention is that the trial court improperly failed to 
treat the “for permitting” language in the preamble as a claim limitation. We affirm. 
 NOVELTY  
287 
Background 
In July of 1990, Jeffrey and Claudia Griffin conceived of the idea of using a scratch-off 
label to mark beverage containers and cups so that attendees of a gathering or party could 
keep track of their beverage cups. The Griffins filed a patent application in April 1991, and 
the ’448 patent, entitled “Scratch–Off Marking Label,” issued on October 13, 1992. Claim 
1 of the patent, which is representative of the four disputed claims, reads as follows: 
1. A scratch-off label for permitting a user to write thereon without the use of a 
marking implement, comprising: 
a permanent base having a colored near side which is normally visible to the user 
and having a far side; and 
a coating of scratch-off non-transparent material having a color which contrasts 
with the color of the near side of the permanent base, which coating is applied 
directly onto the near side of the permanent base with sufficient thickness so as to 
obscure the color of the permanent base, and which when scratched off reveals the 
color of the near side of the permanent base.  
. . . 
Michael Marrin formed a company, Upardi, Inc., to manufacture the labels, and 
containers with the labels . . . . On June 5, 2002, the Griffins entered into a license 
agreement with Upardi. The relationship between Michael Marrin and the Griffins broke 
down swiftly . . . . On April 11, 2006, the Griffins notified Michael Marrin that the license 
was terminated. In January 2007, Michael Marrin and Etch–It, Inc., a company Michael 
Marrin had created to market and sell scratch-off labels, filed an action for declaratory 
relief against the Griffins . . . seeking a determination, inter alia, that the Griffins ’448 
patent was invalid. 
[The suit was consolidated with a state court claim of patent infringement brought by 
the Griffins against the Marrins and subsequently removed. The district court ruled on 
summary judgment that the ’448 patent was invalid as anticipated.] 
Discussion 
The Griffins’ main argument on appeal is that the preamble’s “for permitting” 
language should have been construed as a limitation on the scope of the claims and that 
the asserted prior art therefore does not anticipate. The Griffins acknowledge that the 
prior art disclosed scratch-off devices. However, the Griffins contend that the prior art did 
not disclose the ability of a user of a scratch-off device to write without the use of a 
marking implement, which was disclosed in the preamble to the claims of the ’448 patent. 
The district court ruled that the “for permitting” language in the preamble was not a claim 
limitation based on its findings that (1) the preamble language added in the amendment 
 CHAPTER 6  
288 
only added a statement of a purpose or an intended use for the invention, and (2) the 
patentee did not demonstrate clear reliance on the preamble during prosecution to 
distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. We agree. 
The preamble language indicates that the intended use of the scratch-off labels was 
“for permitting a user to write thereon without the use of a marking implement.” But use 
descriptions such as this are rarely treated as claim limitations. . . . “Preamble language 
that merely states the purpose or intended use of an invention is generally not treated as 
limiting the scope of the claim.” For apparatus claims, such as those in the ’448 patent, 
generally patentability “depends on the claimed structure, not on the use or purpose of 
that structure.” Here, the preamble language only added an intended use, namely, that 
the scratch-off layer may be used for writing. . . . 
. . . 
The Griffins also now argue that the asserted prior art fails to anticipate additional 
limitations from the body of the claims—namely, that the patented device includes a 
scratch-off coating that contrasts with the color of the device's permanent base. The law 
of anticipation is clear: “A prior art reference anticipates a patent claim if the reference 
discloses, either expressly or inherently, all of the limitations of the claim.” We agree with 
the district court that all of the limitations present in the claims of the ’448 patent were 
present in the prior art references. In particular, the Malinovitz patent taught scratch-off 
technologies for parking cards. The side-by-side comparison below of the prior art 
Malinovitz patent and the Griffins patent is sufficient to demonstrate that the Griffins 
patent does not include any limitations that were not in the Malinovitz patent.  
 
Griffins Patent Malinovitz (parking card) Patent 
“a permanent base” 
 
Teaches a “base card” that the removable 
coating is applied to. The base card’s 
surface is not removed when the coating is 
scratched off.  
“a coating of scratch off non-transparent 
material” 
 
The scratch off coating must be non-
transparent since the coating “covers” dates 
which are only revealed when removed.  
“having a color which contrasts with the 
color of the near side of the permanent 
base” 
“The friable removable coating is of a 
different color, usually silver, than the 
underlying color of the card....” 
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Thus, we reject the Griffins’ argument that the asserted prior art fails to disclose 
additional limitations present in the body of the claims of the Griffins patent. 
In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation 
301 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
PROST, Judge: 
Brassica Protection Products LLC and Johns Hopkins University (collectively 
“Brassica”) appeal from the decision . . . granting summary judgment that U.S. Patent 
Nos. 5,725,895; 5,968,567; and 5,968,505 are invalid as anticipated by the prior art. We 
affirm the district court’s ruling. 
Background 
The three patents-in-suit relate to growing and eating sprouts to reduce the level of 
carcinogens in animals, thereby reducing the risk of developing cancer. Specifically, the 
patents describe methods of preparing food products that contain high levels of 
substances that induce Phase 2 enzymes. These enzymes are part of the human body’s 
mechanism for detoxifying potential carcinogens. Thus, they have a chemoprotective 
effect against cancer. Foods that are rich in glucosinolates, such as certain cruciferous 
sprouts, have high Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential. The inventors of the patents-in-
suit recognized that the Phase 2 enzyme-inducing agents (or their glucosinolate 
precursors) are far more concentrated in certain sprouts (such as broccoli and cauliflower 
but not cabbage, cress, mustard or radish) that are harvested before the two-leaf stage 
than in corresponding adult plants. However, glucosinolate levels in cruciferous plants 
can be highly variable. According to the inventors, it is therefore desirable to select the 
seeds of those cruciferous plants which, when germinated and harvested before the two-
leaf stage, produce sprouts that contain high levels of the desired enzyme-inducing 
potential. 
The ’895 patent was filed on September 15, 1995, and claims, inter alia, “A method of 
preparing a food product rich in glucosinolates, comprising germinating cruciferous 
seeds, with the exception of cabbage, cress, mustard and radish seeds, and harvesting 
sprouts prior to the 2-leaf stage, to form a food product comprising a plurality of sprouts.” 
The ’567 patent is a continuation of the ’895 application and it claims a “method of 
preparing a human food product” from sprouts. The ’505 patent is a divisional of the ’895 
application and it claims a “method of increasing the chemoprotective amount of Phase 2 
enzymes in a mammal,” as well as a “method of reducing the level of carcinogens in a 
mammal,” by creating a “food product” from sprouts and then “administering said food 
product” to a mammal. 
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The three patents-in-suit are owned by Johns Hopkins University and exclusively 
licensed to Brassica Protection Products LLC. Johns Hopkins and Brassica sued Sunrise 
Farms [and others in various district courts and the cases were consolidated] . . . for 
pretrial proceedings. 
Discussion 
Anticipation is a question of fact, and is determined by first construing the claims and 
then comparing the properly construed claims to the prior art . . . . 
I 
Brassica contends that the district court erroneously construed the claims by failing to 
treat the preamble of claim 1 of the ’895 patent as a limitation of the claims. . . . 
No litmus test defines when a preamble limits claim scope. Whether to treat a 
preamble as a limitation is a determination “resolved only on review of the entirety of the 
patent to gain an understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to 
encompass by the claim.” In general, a preamble limits the claimed invention if it recites 
essential structure or steps, or if it is “necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality” to the 
claim. Clear reliance on the preamble during prosecution to distinguish the claimed 
invention from the prior art may indicate that the preamble is a claim limitation because 
the preamble is used to define the claimed invention. 
In this case, both the specification and prosecution history indicate that the phrase 
“rich in glucosinolates” helps to define the claimed invention and is, therefore, a limitation 
of claim 1 of the ’895 patent. The specification, for example, states that “this invention 
relates to the production and consumption of foods which are rich in cancer 
chemoprotective compounds.” A stated object of the invention is “to provide food 
products and food additives that are rich in cancer chemoprotective compounds.” The 
specification therefore indicates that the inventors believed their invention to be making 
food products that are rich in chemoprotective compounds, [i.e.,] food products “rich in 
glucosinolates.” In addition, during reexamination of the ’895 patent the patentee argued 
as follows: 
Claim 1 of the patent, for example, is directed to “a method of preparing a food 
product rich in glucosinolates, and harvesting sprouts prior to the 2–leaf stage, to 
form a food product comprising a plurality of sprouts.” Although “rich in 
glucosinolates” is recited in the preamble of the claim, the pertinent case law holds 
that the preamble is given weight if it breathes life and meaning into the claim. 
Accordingly, the cited prior art does not anticipate the claims because it does not 
explicitly teach a method of preparing a food product comprising cruciferous 
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sprouts that are rich in glucosinolates or contain high levels of Phase 2 inducer 
activity. 
This language shows a clear reliance by the patentee on the preamble to persuade the 
Patent Office that the claimed invention is not anticipated by the prior art. As such, the 
preamble is a limitation of the claims. 
II 
In order to prove that a claim is anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), defendants must 
present clear and convincing evidence that a single prior art reference discloses, either 
expressly or inherently, each limitation of the claim. 
Brassica argues that the prior art does not expressly or inherently disclose the claim 
limitations of “preparing a food product rich in glucosinolates” or “identifying seeds 
which produce cruciferous sprouts . . . containing high Phase 2 enzyme-inducing 
potential.” According to Brassica, the prior art merely discusses growing and eating 
sprouts without mention of any glucosinolates or Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential, and 
without specifying that particular sprouts having these beneficial characteristics should 
be assembled into a “food product.” Moreover, Brassica argues, the prior art does not 
inherently disclose these limitations because “at most, one following the prior art would 
have a possibility or probability of producing a food product high in Phase 2 enzyme-
inducing potential” and the “fact that one following the prior art might have selected 
seeds meeting the limitations of the claims is not sufficient to establish inherent 
anticipation.” 
It is well settled that a prior art reference may anticipate when the claim limitations 
not expressly found in that reference are nonetheless inherent in it. “Under the principles 
of inherency, if the prior art necessarily functions in accordance with, or includes, the 
claimed limitations, it anticipates.” MEHL/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 
1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding anticipation of a method of hair depilation by an article 
teaching a method of skin treatment but recognizing the disruption of hair follicles). 
“Inherency is not necessarily coterminous with the knowledge of those of ordinary skill 
in the art. Artisans of ordinary skill may not recognize the inherent characteristics or 
functioning of the prior art.” MEHL/Biophile, 192 F.3d at 1365. 
Brassica does not claim to have invented a new kind of sprout, or a new way of 
growing or harvesting sprouts. Rather, Brassica recognized that some sprouts are rich in 
glucosinolates and high in Phase 2 enzyme-inducing activity while other sprouts are not. 
But the glucosinolate content and Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential of sprouts 
necessarily have existed as long as sprouts themselves, which is certainly more than one 
year before the date of application at issue here. See, e.g., KAREN CROSS WHYTE, THE 
COMPLETE SPROUTING COOKBOOK 4 (1973) (noting that in “2939 B.C., the Emperor of China 
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recorded the use of health giving sprouts”). Stated differently, a sprout’s glucosinolate 
content and Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential are inherent characteristics of the sprout. 
It matters not that those of ordinary skill heretofore may not have recognized these 
inherent characteristics of the sprouts. 
Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner is particularly instructive in this regard. In that case, 
the claim at issue recited: 
A titanium base alloy consisting essentially by weight of about 0.6% to 0.9% nickel, 
0.2% to 0.4% molybdenum, up to 0.2% maximum iron, balance titanium, said alloy 
being characterized by good corrosion resistance in hot brine environments. 
The prior art disclosed a titanium base alloy having the recited components of the claim, 
but the prior art did not disclose that such an alloy was “characterized by good corrosion 
resistance in hot brine environments.” We nevertheless held that the claim was 
anticipated by the prior art, because “it is immaterial, on the issue of their novelty, what 
inherent properties the alloys have or whether these applicants discovered certain 
inherent properties.” Titanium Metals explained the rationale behind this common-sense 
conclusion: 
The basic provision of Title 35 applicable here is § 101, providing in relevant part: 
“Whoever invents or discovers any new composition of matter, or any new 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.” 
Counsel never came to grips with the real issues: (1) what do the claims cover and 
(2) is what they cover new? Under the laws Congress wrote, they must be 
considered. Congress has not seen fit to permit the patenting of an old alloy, 
known to others through a printed publication, by one who has discovered its 
corrosion resistance or other useful properties, or has found out to what extent one 
can modify the composition of the alloy without losing such properties. 
Brassica has done nothing more than recognize properties inherent in certain prior art 
sprouts, just like the corrosion resistance properties inherent to the prior art alloy in 
Titanium Metals. While Brassica may have recognized something quite interesting about 
those sprouts, it simply has not invented anything new. 
. . . 
In summary, the prior art inherently contains the claim limitations that Brassica relies 
upon to distinguish its claims from the prior art. While Brassica may have recognized 
something about sprouts that was not known before, Brassica’s claims do not describe a 
new method. 
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Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s summary judgment that the 
claims at issue are anticipated by the prior art. The prior art indisputably includes 
growing, harvesting and eating particular sprouts which Brassica has recognized as being 
rich in glucosinolates and high in Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential. But the 
glucosinolate content and Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential of these sprouts are 
inherent properties of the sprouts put there by nature, not by Brassica. Brassica simply 
has not claimed anything that is new and its claims are therefore invalid. 
E. Comparing Novelty Pre- and Post-AIA  
You have now read a number of cases that were decided under the pre-AIA novelty 
standards, so you have seen that much of the doctrine from before the AIA is still 
considered controlling. However, the structure of the earlier act was different, and 
because the patent system awarded priority to the first inventor—as opposed to the first 
filer—there were complicated factual determinations for the PTO and courts to make. In 
this section, we will start by looking at the pre-AIA version of § 102 and then we will 
compare it to the AIA. 
Here is the pre-AIA version of § 102: 
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless — 
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or 
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention 
thereof by the applicant for patent, or 
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a 
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior 
to the date of the application for patent in the United States . . . 
These provisions are fairly similar to those under AIA § 102(a). There are two notable 
differences. First, pre-AIA § 102 limited the geographic scope of the “known or used by 
others” and “in public use or on sale” categories to the United States; the AIA, on the other 
hand, accords a worldwide scope to the public use and sale categories.  
Second, the pre-AIA § 102(a) refers to acts that occur “before the invention” by the 
applicant. This section is keyed towards acts by third parties that happen before the 
invention date—namely, disclosures that demonstrate the applicant was not the first to 
invent. In contrast, pre-AIA § 102(b) keys all activities to the critical date—one year prior 
to the filing date. This section is referred to as a statutory bar, and grants the “grace 
period” referred to in the cases we read, above. It means that disclosures in the year prior 
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to filing—whether originating with the inventor or made by a third party—will not count 
against the novelty of the invention. Under pre-AIA § 102(b), there is no need for the 
inventor to show that they have disclosed before a third-party disclosure. All activity 
within the grace period is excepted. The reason for this is that, while the AIA uses prior 
disclosure to prove priority, before the AIA, priority as between multiple applicants went 
to the first to have invented. 
The next two provisions are also statutory bars, and also relate to acts by the inventor 
that can lead to invalidation, if: 
(c) he has abandoned the invention,  
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented, or was the subject of 
an inventor’s certificate, by the applicant or his legal representatives or assigns in 
a foreign country prior to the date of the application for patent in this country on 
an application for patent or inventor’s certificate filed more than twelve months 
before the filing of the application in the United States, 
These provisions are fairly straightforward, pertaining to abandonment and foreign 
filings more than one year prior to U.S. filing. We include the remainder of the statute, 
below. 
(e) the invention was described in — (1) an application for patent, published under 
section 122(b), by another filed in the United States before the invention by the 
applicant for patent or (2) a patent granted on an application for patent by another 
filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent, except 
that an international application filed under the treaty defined in section 351(a) 
shall have the effects for the purposes of this subsection of an application filed in 
the United States only if the international application designated the United States 
and was published under Article 21(2) of such treaty in the English language; or 
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or 
(g) (1) during the course of an interference conducted under section 135 or section 
291, another inventor involved therein establishes, to the extent permitted in 
section 104, that before such person’s invention thereof the invention was made 
by such other inventor and not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed, or (2) before 
such person’s invention thereof, the invention was made in this country by another 
inventor who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining 
priority of invention under this subsection, there shall be considered not only the 
respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also 
the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to 
practice, from a time prior to conception by the other. 
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Section 102(g) describes the proceedings for interferences, which was at the heart of the 
first to invent system. These proceedings, at the USPTO, involved dual—or more—claims 
to a patent, in which inventors would produce evidence of the date on which each claimed 
to have conceived of the invention. Whoever was able to prove the earliest date, and that 
from the time before their competitor conceived of the invention, they worked with 
reasonable diligence towards reducing the invention to practice, would prevail, gaining 
entitlement to a patent. 
The pre-AIA novelty, statutory bar, and priority provisions are important for more 
than merely historical reasons. There are still patents very much in force that were filed 
under the pre-AIA provisions. However, with each year that passes, more of these patents 







To be patentable, an invention must not only be new, it must be new enough. This 
general principle—that a patentable invention must be more than merely novel—has been 
a part of U.S. patent law for a long time, though the name and precise contours of this 
requirement have changed. Even today, the requirement goes by different names; some 
say “nonobvious,” some “unobvious,” and other variations abound. In this chapter, we’ll 
learn how this requirement evolved and how it is applied and understood today. 
A. From “Invention” to “Nonobviousness” 
This section will trace the development of this doctrine from its the nineteenth century 
origins to the Supreme Court’s first decisions under the Patent Act of 1952.  
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood 
52 U.S. 248 (1850) 
Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court. 
This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Ohio. 
The suit was brought against the defendants for the alleged infringement of a patent 
for a new and useful improvement in making door and other knobs of all kinds of clay 
used in pottery, and of porcelain. 
The improvement consists in making the knobs of clay or porcelain, and in fitting them 
for their application to doors, locks, and furniture, and various other uses to which they 
may be adapted; but more especially in this, that of having the cavity in the knob in which 
the screw or shank is inserted, and by which it is fastened, largest at the bottom and in the 
form of dovetail, or wedge reversed, and a screw formed therein by pouring in metal in a 
fused state; and, after referring to drawings of the article thus made, the patentees 
conclude as follows: “What we claim as our invention, and desire to secure by letters 
patent, is the manufacturing of knobs, as stated in the foregoing specifications, of potter’s 
clay, or any kind of clay used in pottery, and shaped and finished by moulding, turning, 
burning, and glazing; and also of porcelain.” 
. . . 
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The court . . . charged the jury that [the patent would be invalid] if knobs of the same 
form and for the same purposes as that claimed by the patentees, made of metal or other 
material, had been before known and used; and if the spindle and shank, in the form used 
by them, had been before known and used, and had been attached to the metallic knob by 
means of a cavity in the form of dovetail and infusion of melted metal, the same as the 
mode claimed by the patentees, in the attachment of the shank and spindle to their knob; 
and the knob of clay was simply the substitution of one material for another, the spindle 
and shank being the same as before in common use, and also the mode of connecting them 
by dovetail to the knob the same as before in common use, and no more ingenuity or skill 
required to construct the knob in this way than that possessed by an ordinary mechanic 
acquainted with the business . . . . 
This instruction, it is claimed, is erroneous, and one for which a new trial should be 
granted. 
The instruction assumes, and, as was admitted on the argument, properly assumes, 
that knobs of metal, wood, &c., connected with a shank and spindle, in the mode and by 
the means used by the patentees in their manufacture, had been before known, and were 
in public use at the date of the patent; and hence the only novelty which could be claimed 
on their part was the adaptation of this old contrivance to knobs of potter’s clay or 
porcelain; in other words, the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the 
place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still 
more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter’s 
clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different 
question would arise; as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob 
of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which 
resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent. 
The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the 
purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new 
manufacture, and none the less so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the 
means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well 
known. 
But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor 
the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is 
securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use; and the only 
thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in 
connection with this arrangement. 
Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the 
metallic shank in this well-known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in 
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the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical 
device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed 
happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement 
consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously 
employed in making the knob. 
But this, of itself, can never be the subject of a patent. . . . 
. . . 
Now if the foregoing view of the improvement claimed in this patent be correct,  . . . 
there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential 
elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skilful 
mechanic, not that of the inventor. 
We think, therefore, that the judgment is, and must be, affirmed. 
Context & Application 
1. What is the source of the Hotchkiss “invention” requirement? Does it come from 
the statute or was it a judge-made doctrine? 
2. At the end of Hotchkiss, the Supreme Court suggests that something must be the 
work of an “inventor,” not a “mechanic” to be patentable. What do you think it meant by 
that? Are “inventors” and “skillful mechanics” mutually exclusive categories? 
3. The Court mentions that Hotchkiss was on appeal from the Circuit Court of the 
United States for the District of Ohio. Before 1891, patent cases were appealable directly 
to the Supreme Court. After that, all the appeals went to the regional circuits until 1982, 
when Congress created the Federal Circuit. What benefits can you see to each of these 
allocations of appellate jurisdiction? What are the potential costs?  
4. Following Hotchkiss, the novelty-plus requirement was generally referred to as a 
requirement of “invention” or sometimes, “patentable novelty” or “inventive genius.” 
Which of these terms, if any, seem to best capture what the Court was concerned about in 
Hotchkiss? 
x x x 
Fast forward almost 100 years. In 1941, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Cuno 
Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp. The asserted claims were directed to 
“improvements in lighters, commonly found in automobiles, for cigars, cigarettes and 
pipes.” The Supreme Court held they were not patentable: 
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We may concede that the functions performed by Mead’s combination were new 
and useful. But that does not necessarily make the device patentable. Under the 
statute, the device must not only be “new and useful”, it must also be an 
“invention” or “discovery.” Since Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, decided in 1851, it has 
been recognized that if an improvement is to obtain the privileged position of a 
patent more ingenuity must be involved than the work of a mechanic skilled in 
the art. “Perfection of workmanship, however much it may increase the 
convenience, extend the use, or diminish expense, is not patentable.” The principle 
of the Hotchkiss case applies to the adaptation or combination of old or well known 
devices for new uses. That is to say the new device, however useful it may be, must 
reveal the flash of creative genius not merely the skill of the calling. If it fails, it has not 
established its right to a private grant on the public domain.  
Tested by that principle Mead’s device was not patentable. We cannot conclude 
that his skill in making this contribution reached the level of inventive genius 
which the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, authorizes Congress to reward. He merely 
incorporated the well-known thermostat into the old “wireless” lighter to produce 
a more efficient, useful and convenient article. A new application of an old device 
may not be patented if the “result claimed as new is the same in character as the 
original result” even though the new result had not before been contemplated. 
Certainly the use of a thermostat to break a circuit in a “wireless” cigar lighter is 
analogous to or the same in character as the use of such a device in electric heaters, 
toasters, or irons, whatever may be the difference in detail of design. Ingenuity 
was required to effect the adaptation, but no more than that to be expected of a 
mechanic skilled in the art. 
314 U.S. 84, 90–92 (1941) (emphasis added). Is this a fair reading of Hotchkiss? What does 
Cuno suggest the basis is for Hotchkiss’s novelty-plus requirement? 
Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp. 
340 U.S. 147 (1950) 
Mr. Justice JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Two courts below have concurred in holding three patent claims to be valid, and it is 
stipulated that, if valid, they have been infringed. The issue, for the resolution of which 
we granted certiorari, is whether they applied correct criteria of invention. We hold that 
they have not, and that by standards appropriate for a combination patent these claims 
are invalid. 
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Stated without artifice, the claims assert invention of a cashier’s counter equipped 
with a three-sided frame, or rack, with no top or bottom, which, when pushed or pulled, 
will move groceries deposited within it by a customer to the checking clerk and leave 
them there when it is pushed back to repeat the operation. It is kept on the counter by 
guides. That the resultant device works as claimed, speeds the customer on his way, 
reduces checking costs for the merchant, has been widely adopted and successfully used, 
appear beyond dispute. 
The District Court explicitly found that each element in this device was known to prior 
art. “However,” it found, “the conception of a counter with an extension to receive a 
bottomless self-unloading tray with which to push the contents of the tray in front of the 
cashier was a decidedly novel feature and constitutes a new and useful combination.” 
The Court of Appeals regarded this finding of invention as one of fact, sustained by 
substantial evidence, and affirmed it as not clearly erroneous. . . . 
. . . 
While this Court has sustained combination patents, it never has ventured to give a 
precise and comprehensive definition of the test to be applied in such cases. The 
voluminous literature which the subject has excited discloses no such test. It is agreed that 
the key to patentability of a mechanical device that brings old factors into cooperation is 
presence or lack of invention. In course of time the profession came to employ the term 
“combination” to imply its presence and the term “aggregation” to signify its absence, 
thus making antonyms in legal art of words which in ordinary speech are more nearly 
synonyms. However useful as words of art to denote in short form that an assembly of 
units has failed or has met the examination for invention, their employment as tests to 
determine invention results in nothing but confusion. The concept of invention is 
inherently elusive when applied to combination of old elements. This, together with the 
imprecision of our language, have counselled courts and text writers to be cautious in 
affirmative definitions or rules on the subject. 
. . . 
Neither court below has made any finding that old elements which made up this 
device perform any additional or different function in the combination than they perform 
out of it. This counter does what a store counter always has done—it supports 
merchandise at a convenient height while the customer makes his purchases and the 
merchant his sales. The three-sided rack will draw or push goods put within it from one 
place to another—just what any such a rack would do on any smooth surface—and the 
guide rails keep it from falling or sliding off from the counter, as guide rails have ever 
done. Two and two have been added together, and still they make only four. 
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Courts should scrutinize combination patent claims with a care proportioned to the 
difficulty and improbability of finding invention in an assembly of old elements. The 
function of a patent is to add to the sum of useful knowledge. Patents cannot be sustained 
when, on the contrary, their effect is to subtract from former resources freely available to 
skilled artisans. A patent for a combination which only unites old elements with no 
change in their respective functions, such as is presented here, obviously withdraws what 
already is known into the field of its monopoly and diminishes the resources available to 
skillful men. This patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has 
merely brought together segments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a 
monopoly. 
The Court of Appeals and the respondent both lean heavily on evidence that this 
device filled a long-felt want and has enjoyed commercial success. But commercial success 
without invention will not make patentability. The courts below concurred in finding that 
every element here claimed (except extension of the counter) was known to prior art. 
When, for the first time, those elements were put to work for the supermarket type of 
stores, although each performed the same mechanical function for them that it had been 
known to perform, they produced results more striking, perhaps, than in any previous 
utilization. To bring these devices together and apply them to save the time of customer 
and checker was a good idea, but scores of progressive ideas in business are not 
patentable, and we conclude on the findings below that this one was not. 
. . . The defect that we find in this judgment is that a standard of invention appears to 
have been used that is less exacting than that required where a combination is made up 
entirely of old components. It is on this ground that the judgment below is reversed. 
Reversed. 
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK agrees, concurring. 
It is worth emphasis that every patent case involving validity presents a question 
which requires reference to a standard written into the Constitution. Article I, § 8, contains 
a grant to the Congress of the power to permit patents to be issued. But unlike most of the 
specific powers which Congress is given, that grant is qualified. The Congress does not 
have free reign, for example, to decide that patents should be easily or freely given. The 
Congress acts under the restraint imposed by the statement of purpose in Art. I, § 8. The 
purpose is “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” The means for 
achievement of that end is the grant for a limited time to inventors of the exclusive right 
to their inventions. 
Every patent is the grant of a privilege of exacting tolls from the public. The Framers 
plainly did not want those monopolies freely granted. The invention, to justify a patent, 
had to serve the ends of science—to push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and the 
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like; to make a distinctive contribution to scientific knowledge. That is why through the 
years the opinions of the Court commonly have taken “inventive genius” as the test. It is 
not enough that an article is new and useful. The Constitution never sanctioned the 
patenting of gadgets. Patents serve a higher end—the advancement of science. An 
invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of 
such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will 
recognize it as an advance. Mr. Justice Bradley stated in Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 
192, 200, the consequences of a looser standard:  
It was never the object of those laws to grant a monopoly for every trifling device, 
every shadow of a shade of an idea, which would naturally and spontaneously 
occur to any skilled mechanic or operator in the ordinary progress of 
manufactures. Such an indiscriminate creation of exclusive privileges tends rather 
to obstruct than to stimulate invention. It creates a class of speculative schemers 
who make it their business to watch the advancing wave of improvement, and 
gather its foam in the form of patented monopolies, which enable them to lay a 
heavy tax upon the industry of the country, without contributing anything to the 
real advancement of the arts. It embarrasses the honest pursuit of business with 
fears and apprehensions of concealed liens and unknown liabilities to lawsuits and 
vexatious accountings for profits made in good faith. 
. . .  
The attempts through the years to get a broader, looser conception of patents than the 
Constitution contemplates have been persistent. The Patent Office, like most 
administrative agencies, has looked with favor on the opportunity which the exercise of 
discretion affords to expand its own jurisdiction. And so it has placed a host of gadgets 
under the armour of patents—gadgets that obviously have had no place in the 
constitutional scheme of advancing scientific knowledge. A few that have reached this 
Court show the pressure to extend monopoly to the simplest of devices: 
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 248: Doorknob made of clay rather than metal or 
wood, where different shaped door knobs had previously been made of clay. 
Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 20 Wall. 498: Rubber caps put on wood pencils to 
serve as erasers. 
Union Paper Collar Co. v. Van Dusen, 23 Wall. 530: Making collars of parchment 
paper where linen paper and linen had previously been used.  
Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37: A method for preserving fish by freezing them in a 
container operating in the same manner as an ice cream freezer. 
. . . 
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The patent involved in the present case belongs to this list of incredible patents which 
the Patent Office has spawned. The fact that a patent as flimsy and as spurious as this one 
has to be brought all the way to this Court to be declared invalid dramatically illustrates 
how far our patent system frequently departs from the constitutional standards which are 
supposed to govern. 
Context & Application 
1. What is a “combination patent,” as that term is used in Great A&P? 
2. The Court says that the commercial embodiment of (i.e., the product covered by) 
the patent at issue in Great A&P had “been widely adopted and successfully used.” Why 
wasn’t that enough to make the patent valid? What factors, other than “invention,” might 
make a product successful in the marketplace? 
3. The concurrence suggests that we can’t trust the USPTO to correctly delineate the 
contours of patentability. Why not? Are there any reasons to think the USPTO might 
actually do a good job? And are there any reasons to think that courts would do better? 
4.  In Great A&P, the court starts by saying that three lower courts had held the 
asserted claims “to be valid.” But, based on the law today, it’s more accurate to say that 
those lower courts had held the patents to be “not invalid.” Because patents are entitled 
to a presumption of validity, see 35 U.S.C. § 282, and because the party challenging a 
patent’s validity bears the burden of proof, a court never actually decides that a patent-
in-suit “is valid.” Instead, the question before the court is whether or not the challenger 
has proved that the patent is invalid. See Durango Assocs., Inc. v. Reflange, Inc., 843 F.2d 
1349, 1356 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“A patent should not be declared ‘valid’ by a court because 
other challengers may be able to prove invalidity using different evidence.”). See also Ball 
Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“To 
the extent that the district court declared the patent ‘valid,’ or all the claims of the patent 
‘valid,’ we vacate that declaration. Aside from the fact that courts do not declare patents 
to be valid, and only declare that they have not been proved to be invalid . . . .”). This is 
not just a semantic distinction. Patent owners often assert the same patent claims against 
multiple parties. A patent owner can’t just pick the weakest target to sue first and then, if 
they prevail on the issue of validity, use that judgment to estop other accused infringers 
from challenging the patent. As a matter of due process, each accused infringer is entitled 
to its own opportunity to challenge the patent. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of 
Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971). But once a court holds a patent claim invalid, it 
should be invalid against the world. See id. Should patent validity be a one-way ratchet? 
Can you see any good reasons for this asymmetry? Any potential problems?  
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x x x 
The opinion in Great A&P was briefed and decided while the Patent Act of 1952 was 
drafted. See Giles S. Rich, Congressional Intent - or, Who Wrote the Patent Act of 1952, 1 
PATENT PROCUREMENT AND EXPLOITATION: PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL RIGHTS 61, 70 
(1963). According to Giles Sutherland Rich, a patent attorney who helped draft the 1952 
Act (and who was later appointed to the C.C.P.A.):  
The Patent Act was written basically . . . by patent lawyers drawn from the Patent 
Office, from industry, from private practice, and from some government 
departments. They, in turn, drew upon the combined judgment of organizations 
of patent lawyers in a most remarkable way. They got the bill together, refined it, 
and presented it to the legislature to be enacted. 
Id. at 73. Do you think this is a common or uncommon method for drafting federal 
statutes? How, if at all, should this drafting process affect the way we think about or 
interpret the 1952 Act? If a new patent statute were drafted today, which additional 
stakeholders do you think should be at the table? 
One of the other drafters of the 1952 Act was Patent Office Examiner-in-Chief P. J. 
Federico. In his official commentary on the 1952 Act, Federico stated: 
Patentable novelty or invention (section 103). The Committee Report state[s], in 
the general part, that one of the two “major changes or innovations” in the new 
statute consisted in “incorporating a requirement for invention in section 103.” 
Section 103 states that “A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not 
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the 
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are 
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the 
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said 
subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in 
which the invention was made.” 
In form this section is a limitation on section 102 and it should more logically have 
been made part of section 102, but it was made a separate section to prevent 102 
from becoming too long and involved and because of its importance. 
Commentary on the New Patent Act, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 161, 180 (1993), 
reprinted from Title 35, United States Code Annotated (1954 ed.). Even after the enactment 
of § 103, “[t]he problem of what is obvious and hence not patentable is still of necessity 
one of judgment,” noting that “[t]he statute does not purport to categorize the particular 
criteria according to which the judgment is to be exercised . . . .” Id. at 184.  
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Thus, the question of how to apply this new provision—and what it might mean for 
the Hotchkiss “invention” standard—was left to the courts. It took over a decade for that 
question to reach the Supreme Court. On a single day in 1966, the Court decided its first 
three § 103 cases. The first one, Graham v. John Deere, included an extensive analysis of the 
constitutional framework, judicial development, and legislative action regarding what we 
now call “nonobviousness.” We’ll read that analysis first, then consider the Court’s 
application of its new framework in the notes. 
Graham v. John Deere Co. 
383 U.S. 1 (1966) 
Mr. Justice CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court. 
After a lapse of 15 years, the Court again focuses its attention on the patentability of 
inventions under the standard of Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and under the 
conditions prescribed by the laws of the United States. Since our last expression on patent 
validity, Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., the Congress has for the first 
time expressly added a third statutory dimension to the two requirements of novelty and 
utility that had been the sole statutory test since the Patent Act of 1793. This is the test of 
obviousness, i.e., whether “the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are 
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention 
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. 
Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.” 35 
U.S.C. § 103 (1964 ed.). 
The questions, involved in each of the companion cases before us, are what effect the 
1952 Act had upon traditional statutory and judicial tests of patentability and what 
definitive tests are now required. We have concluded that the 1952 Act was intended to 
codify judicial precedents embracing the principle long ago announced by this Court in 
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, and that, while the clear language of § 103 places emphasis on an 
inquiry into obviousness, the general level of innovation necessary to sustain patentability 
remains the same. 
. . . 
II 
At the outset it must be remembered that the federal patent power stems from a 
specific constitutional provision which authorizes the Congress “To promote the Progress 
of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their . . . Discoveries.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.1 The clause is both a grant of power and a limitation. 
This qualified authority, unlike the power often exercised in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
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centuries by the English Crown, is limited to the promotion of advances in the “useful 
arts.” It was written against the backdrop of the practices—eventually curtailed by the 
Statute of Monopolies—of the Crown in granting monopolies to court favorites in goods 
or businesses which had long before been enjoyed by the public. The Congress in the 
exercise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated 
constitutional purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the 
innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby. Moreover, Congress may not 
authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from 
the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available. Innovation, 
advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent 
requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must “promote the 
Progress of . . . useful Arts.” This is the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may 
not be ignored. And it is in this light that patent validity “requires reference to a standard 
written into the Constitution.” Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., supra 
(concurring opinion). 
Within the limits of the constitutional grant, the Congress may, of course, implement 
the stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy which in its judgment best 
effectuates the constitutional aim. This is but a corollary to the grant to Congress of any 
Article I power. Within the scope established by the Constitution, Congress may set out 
conditions and tests for patentability. It is the duty of the Commissioner of Patents and of 
the courts in the administration of the patent system to give effect to the constitutional 
standard by appropriate application, in each case, of the statutory scheme of the Congress. 
Congress quickly responded to the bidding of the Constitution by enacting the Patent 
Act of 1790 during the second session of the First Congress. It created an agency in the 
Department of State headed by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Department of 
War and the Attorney General, any two of whom could issue a patent for a period not 
exceeding 14 years to any petitioner that “hath invented or discovered any useful art, 
manufacture, or device, or any improvement therein not before known or used” if the 
board found that ‘the invention or discovery (was) sufficiently useful and important.” 1 
Stat. 110. This group, whose members administered the patent system along with their 
other public duties, was known by its own designation as “Commissioners for the 
Promotion of Useful Arts.” 
Thomas Jefferson, who as Secretary of State was a member of the group, was its 
moving spirit and might well be called the “first administrator of our patent system.” See 
Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC. 237, 238 (1936). He was not 
only an administrator of the patent system under the 1790 Act, but was also the author of 
the 1793 Patent Act. In addition, Jefferson was himself an inventor of great note. His 
unpatented improvements on plows, to mention but one line of his inventions, won 
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acclaim and recognition on both sides of the Atlantic. Because of his active interest and 
influence in the early development of the patent system, Jefferson’s views on the general 
nature of the limited patent monopoly under the Constitution, as well as his conclusions 
as to conditions for patentability under the statutory scheme, are worthy of note. 
Jefferson, like other Americans, had an instinctive aversion to monopolies. It was a 
monopoly on tea that sparked the Revolution and Jefferson certainly did not favor an 
equivalent form of monopoly under the new government. His abhorrence of monopoly 
extended initially to patents as well. From France, he wrote to Madison urging a Bill of 
Rights provision restricting monopoly, and as against the argument that limited 
monopoly might serve to incite “ingenuity,” he argued forcefully that “the benefit even 
of limited monopolies is too doubtful to be opposed to that of their general suppression.” 
. . . 
Jefferson’s philosophy on the nature and purpose of the patent monopoly is expressed 
in a letter to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 1813), a portion of which we set out in the margin.2  
2 “Stable ownership is the gift of social law, and is given late in the progress of 
society. It would be curious then, if an idea, the fugitive fermentation of an 
individual brain, could, of natural right, be claimed in exclusive and stable 
property. If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of 
exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an 
individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the 
moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every one, and the 
receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no one 
possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives 
an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who 
lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. That ideas should 
freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual 
instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been 
peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, 
expansible over all space, without lessening their density in any point, and like the 
air in which we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of 
confinement or exclusive appropriation. Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a 
subject of property. Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from 
them, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but 
this may or may not be done, according to the will and convenience of the society, 
without claim or complaint from anybody.” VI WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 
at 180–181 (Washington ed.). 
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He rejected a natural-rights theory in intellectual property rights and clearly recognized 
the social and economic rationale of the patent system. The patent monopoly was not 
designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a 
reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge. The grant of an exclusive right to 
an invention was the creation of society—at odds with the inherent free nature of 
disclosed ideas—and was not to be freely given. Only inventions and discoveries which 
furthered human knowledge, and were new and useful, justified the special inducement 
of a limited private monopoly. Jefferson did not believe in granting patents for small 
details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices. His writings evidence his insistence 
upon a high level of patentability. 
III 
The difficulty of formulating conditions for patentability was heightened by the 
generality of the constitutional grant and the statutes implementing it, together with the 
underlying policy of the patent system that “the things which are worth to the public the 
embarrassment of an exclusive patent,” as Jefferson put it, must outweigh the restrictive 
effect of the limited patent monopoly. The inherent problem was to develop some means 
of weeding out those inventions which would not be disclosed or devised but for the 
inducement of a patent. 
This Court formulated a general condition of patentability in 1851 in Hotchkiss v. 
Greenwood. The patent involved a mere substitution of materials—porcelain or clay for 
wood or metal in doorknobs—and the Court condemned it . . . . 
Hotchkiss, by positing the condition that a patentable invention evidence more 
ingenuity and skill than that possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the 
business, merely distinguished between new and useful innovations that were capable of 
sustaining a patent and those that were not. The Hotchkiss test laid the cornerstone of the 
judicial evolution suggested by Jefferson and left to the courts by Congress. The language 
in the case, and in those which followed, gave birth to “invention” as a word of legal art 
signifying patentable inventions. Yet, as this Court has observed, “the truth is, the word 
‘invention’ cannot be defined in such manner as to afford any substantial aid in 
determining whether a particular device involves an exercise of the inventive faculty or 
not.” Its use as a label brought about a large variety of opinions as to its meaning both in 
the Patent Office, in the courts, and at the bar. The Hotchkiss formulation, however, lies 
not in any label, but in its functional approach to questions of patentability. In practice, 
Hotchkiss has required a comparison between the subject matter of the patent, or patent 
application, and the background skill of the calling. It has been from this comparison that 
patentability was in each case determined. 
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IV 
The pivotal section around which the present controversy centers is § 103. It provides: 
§ 103. Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter 
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or 
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the 
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject 
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to 
a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. 
Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was 
made. 
The section is cast in relatively unambiguous terms. Patentability is to depend, in addition 
to novelty and utility, upon the “non-obvious” nature of the “subject matter sought to be 
patented” to a person having ordinary skill in the pertinent art. 
The first sentence of this section is strongly reminiscent of the language in Hotchkiss. 
Both formulations place emphasis on the pertinent art existing at the time the invention 
was made and both are implicitly tied to advances in that art. The major distinction is that 
Congress has emphasized “nonobviousness” as the operative test of the section, rather 
than the less definite “invention” language of Hotchkiss that Congress thought had led to 
“a large variety” of expressions in decisions and writings. In the title itself the Congress 
used the phrase “Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter,” thus focusing 
upon “nonobviousness” rather than “invention.” . . . 
It is undisputed that this section was . . . a statutory expression of an additional 
requirement for patentability, originally expressed in Hotchkiss. It also seems apparent 
that Congress intended by the last sentence of § 103 to abolish the test it believed this 
Court announced in the controversial phrase “flash of creative genius,” used in Cuno 
Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp. 
. . . 
We believe that this legislative history, as well as other sources, shows that the revision 
was not intended by Congress to change the general level of patentable invention. We 
conclude that the section was intended merely as a codification of judicial precedents 
embracing the Hotchkiss condition, with congressional directions that inquiries into the 
obviousness of the subject matter sought to be patented are a prerequisite to patentability. 
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V 
Approached in this light, the § 103 additional condition, when followed realistically, 
will permit a more practical test of patentability. The emphasis on non-obviousness is one 
of inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures. 
While the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law, the § 103 condition, which 
is but one of three conditions, each of which must be satisfied, lends itself to several basic 
factual inquiries. Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; 
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the 
level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the 
obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary 
considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., 
might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject 
matter sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these 
inquiries may have relevancy. See Note, Subtests of “Nonobviousness”: A Nontechnical 
Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1964).  
This is not to say, however, that there will not be difficulties in applying the 
nonobviousness test. What is obvious is not a question upon which there is likely to be 
uniformity of thought in every given factual context. The difficulties, however, are 
comparable to those encountered daily by the courts in such frames of reference as 
negligence and scienter, and should be amenable to a case-by-case development. We 
believe that strict observance of the requirements laid down here will result in that 
uniformity and definiteness which Congress called for in the 1952 Act. 
. . . 
Although we conclude here that the inquiry which the Patent Office and the courts 
must make as to patentability must be beamed with greater intensity on the requirements 
of § 103, it bears repeating that we find no change in the general strictness with which the 
overall test is to be applied. . . . 
Context & Application 
1. In Graham, the Supreme Court lays out a framework for analyzing § 103 cases but 
doesn’t tell us how to apply that framework. The Court did, however, apply its own 
framework three in three cases decided that day—Graham v. John Deere Co., the Cook 
Chemical cases, and United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966).  
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a.  Graham v. John Deere Co. 
This case involved “the validity of a single patent on a ‘Clamp for vibrating Shank 
Plows.’ The invention, a combination of old mechanical elements, involves a device 
designed to absorb shock from plow shanks as they plow through rocky soil and thus to 
prevent damage to the plow.” Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 4 (1966). The Court 
provided the following illustration: 
 
The Court analyzed the issue of nonobviousness as follows: 
The sole element in patent ’798 which petitioners argue [makes the invention 
nonobvious] before us is the interchanging of the shank and hinge plate and the 
consequences flowing from this arrangement. The contention is that this 
arrangement—which petitioners claim is not disclosed in the prior art—permits 
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the shank to flex under stress for its entire length. As we have sketched (see sketch, 
“Graham ’798 Patent” in Appendix, Fig. 2), when the chisel hits an obstruction the 
resultant force (A) pushes the rear of the shank upward and the shank pivots 
against the rear of the hinge plate at (C). The natural tendency is for that portion 
of the shank between the pivot point and the bolted connection (i.e., between C 
and D) to bow downward and away from the hinge plate. The maximum distance 
(B) that the shank moves away from the plate is slight—for emphasis, greatly 
exaggerated in the sketches. This is so because of the strength of the shank and the 
short—nine inches or so—length of that portion of the shank between (C) and (D). 
On the contrary, in patent ’811 (see sketch, “Graham ’811 Patent” in Appendix, 
Fig. 2), the pivot point is the upper plate at point (c); and while the tendency for 
the shank to bow between points (c) and (d) is the same as in ’798, the shank is 
restricted because of the underlying hinge plate and cannot flex as freely. In 
practical effect, the shank flexes only between points (a) and (c), and not along the 
entire length of the shank, as in ’798.  
The patent owner argued “that this difference in flex, though small, effectively absorbs 
the tremendous forces of the shock of obstructions whereas prior art arrangements failed.” 
According to the Court, this difference was not enough to make the improvement 
patentable: 
We assume that the prior art does not disclose such an arrangement as petitioners 
claim in patent ’798. Still we do not believe that the argument on which petitioners’ 
contention is bottomed supports the validity of the patent. The tendency of the 
shank to flex is the same in all cases. If free-flexing, as petitioners now argue, is the 
crucial difference above the prior art, then it appears evident that the desired result 
would be obtainable by not boxing the shank within the confines of the hinge. The 
only other effective place available in the arrangement was to attach it below the 
hinge plate and run it through a stirrup or bracket that would not disturb its 
flexing qualities. Certainly a person having ordinary skill in the prior art, given 
the fact that the flex in the shank could be utilized more effectively if allowed to 
run the entire length of the shank, would immediately see that the thing to do was 
what Graham did, i.e., invert the shank and the hinge plate. 
. . . 
We find no nonobvious facets in the ’798 arrangement. The wear and repair claims 
were sufficient to overcome the patent examiner's original conclusions as to the 
validity of the patent. However, some of the prior art, notably Glencoe, was not 
before him. There the hinge plate is below the shank but, as the courts below 
found, all of the elements in the ’798 patent are present in the Glencoe structure. 
Furthermore, even though the position of the shank and hinge plate appears 
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reversed in Glencoe, the mechanical operation is identical. The shank there pivots 
about the underside of the stirrup, which in Glencoe is above the shank. In other 
words, the stirrup in Glencoe serves exactly the same function as the heel of the 
hinge plate in ’798. The mere shifting of the wear point to the heel of the ’798 hinge 
plate from the stirrup of Glencoe—itself a part of the hinge plate—presents no 
operative mechanical distinctions, much less nonobvious differences. 
Thus, the court concluded that the ’798 patent was invalid as obvious. 
b. The Cook Chemical cases 
These consolidated cases, Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chemical Co. and Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. 
Cook Chemical Co., involved “a finger-operated sprayer with a ‘hold-down’ cap of the type 
commonly seen on grocers’ shelves inserted in bottles of insecticides and other liquids 
prior to shipment.” Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 4 (1966). The sprayer 
was invented by “an officer of Cook Chemical, Scoggin,” so the court refers to it as “the 
Scoggins patent.” See id. at 28. After describing the patented invention and prior art in 
detail, the Court focused on what it called the “distinguishing features” in Scoggins’ 
claims—“the space between the skirt of the overcap and the container cap” and “[t]he 
substitution of a rib built into a collar”: 
As to the space between the skirt of the overcap and the container cap, the District 
Court found: “Certainly without a space so described, there could be no inner seal 
within the cap, but such a space is not new or novel, but it is necessary to the 
formation of the seal within the hold-down cap.” 
“To me this language is descriptive of an element of the patent but not a part of 
the invention. It is too simple, really, to require much discussion. In this device the 
hold-down cap was intended to perform two functions—to hold down the sprayer 
head and to form a solid tight seal between the shoulder and the collar below. In 
assembling the element it is necessary to provide this space in order to form the 
seal.” 
The court correctly viewed the significance of that feature. We are at a loss to 
explain the Examiner’s allowance on the basis of such a distinction. Scoggin was 
able to convince the Examiner that Mellon’s cap contacted the bottle neck while 
his did not. . . . Moreover, the space so strongly asserted by Cook Chemical appears 
quite plainly on the Livingstone device, a reference not cited by the Examiner. 
The substitution of a rib built into a collar likewise presents no patentable 
difference above the prior art. It was fully disclosed and dedicated to the public in 
the Livingstone patent. Cook Chemical argues, however, that Livingstone is not in 
the pertinent prior art because it relates to liquid containers having pouring spouts 
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rather than pump sprayers. Apart from the fact that respondent made no such 
objection to similar references cited by the Examiner, so restricted a view of the 
applicable prior art is not justified. The problems confronting Scoggin and the 
insecticide industry were not insecticide problems; they were mechanical closure 
problems. Closure devices in such a closely related art as pouring spouts for liquid 
containers are at the very least pertinent references.  
The Court included this drawing, figure 3 from the Scoggins patent (U.S. Patent No. 
2,870,943), in the appendix to its decision: 
 
The Court also rejected Cook Chemical’s arguments about certain secondary 
considerations:  
Cook Chemical insists, however, that the development of a workable shipper-
sprayer eluded Calmar, who had long and unsuccessfully sought to solve the 
problem. And, further, that the long-felt need in the industry for a device such as 
Scoggin’s together with its wide commercial success supports its patentability. 
These legal inferences or subtests do focus attention on economic and motivational 
rather than technical issues and are, therefore, more susceptible of judicial 
treatment than are the highly technical facts often present in patent litigation. Such 
inquiries may lend a helping hand to the judiciary which, as Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter observed, is most ill-fitted to discharge the technological duties cast 
upon it by patent legislation. They may also serve to “guard against slipping into 
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use of hindsight” and to resist the temptation to read into the prior art the 
teachings of the invention in issue.  
However, these factors do not, in the circumstances of this case, tip the scales of 
patentability. The Scoggin invention, as limited by the Patent Office and accepted 
by Scoggin, rests upon exceedingly small and quite non-technical mechanical 
differences in a device which was old in the art. . . . To us, the limited claims of the 
Scoggin patent are clearly evident from the prior art as it stood at the time of the 
invention. 
Therefore, the Court concluded that the invention claimed in the Scoggin patent was 
invalid as obvious. 
c. United States v. Adams 
In a third case decided the same day as John Deere, the Court considered the validity 
of U.S. Patent No. 2,322,210, which was directed to a nonrechargable electric battery. See 
United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 42 (1966). According to the Court, the claimed battery 
“comprises two electrodes—one made of magnesium, the other of cuprous chloride—
which are placed in a container. The electrolyte, or battery fluid, used may be either plain 
or salt water.” As the Court explained: 
The specifications of the patent state that the object of the invention is to provide 
constant voltage and current without the use of acids, conventionally employed in 
storage batteries, and without the generation of dangerous fumes. Another object 
is “to provide a battery which is relatively light in weight with respect to capacity” 
and which “may be manufactured and distributed to the trade in a dry condition 
and rendered serviceable by merely filling the container with water.” 
At that point, batteries were not new. But the Adams battery had several advantages over 
the prior art: 
The Adams invention was the first practical, water-activated, constant potential 
battery which could be fabricated and stored indefinitely without any fluid in its 
cells. It was activated within 30 minutes merely by adding water. Once activated, 
the battery continued to deliver electricity at a voltage which remained essentially 
constant regardless of the rate at which current was withdrawn. Furthermore, its 
capacity for generating current was exceptionally large in comparison to its size 
and weight. The battery was also quite efficient in that substantially its full 
capacity could be obtained over a wide range of currents. . . . [T]hese chemical 
reactions were highly exothermic, liberating large quantities of heat during 
operation. . . . Relatively high temperatures would not damage the battery. 
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Consequently, the battery was operable from 65 below zero Fahrenheit to 200 
Fahrenheit. 
After describing the patented invention and prior art in detail, the Court analyzed the 
issue of nonobviousness as follows: 
We conclude the Adams battery was also nonobvious. . . . [T]he operating 
characteristics of the Adams battery have been shown to have been unexpected 
and to have far surpassed then-existing wet batteries. Despite the fact that each of 
the elements of the Adams battery was well known in the prior art, to combine 
them as did Adams required that a person reasonably skilled in the prior art must 
ignore that (1) batteries which continued to operate on an open circuit and which 
heated in normal use were not practical; and (2) water-activated batteries were 
successful only when combined with electrolytes detrimental to the use of 
magnesium. These long-accepted factors, when taken together, would, we believe, 
deter any investigation into such a combination as is used by Adams. This is not 
to say that one who merely finds new uses for old inventions by shutting his eyes 
to their prior disadvantages thereby discovers a patentable innovation. We do say, 
however, that known disadvantages in old devices which would naturally 
discourage the search for new inventions may be taken into account in 
determining obviousness. 
Nor are these the only factors bearing on the question of obviousness. We have 
seen that at the time Adams perfected his invention noted experts expressed 
disbelief in it. Several of the same experts subsequently recognized the significance 
of the Adams invention, some even patenting improvements on the same system. 
Furthermore, in a crowded art replete with a century and a half of advancement, 
the Patent Office found not one reference to cite against the Adams application. 
Does this analysis suggest any other secondary considerations that might be relevant to 
the question of nonobviousness? 
2. In Graham, the Court says that, in evaluating the issue of obviousness,  courts may 
utilize “secondary considerations” in order “to give light to the circumstances 
surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.” 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 
(1966). The court lists three such considerations: 
• Commercial success,  
• Long felt but unsolved needs; and  
• Failure of others. 
In doing so, the Court cites a student note, Richard L. Robbins, Note, Subtests of 
“Nonobviousness”: A Nontechnical Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1964). 
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That note suggested additional considerations, including “commercial acquiescence” as 
evidenced by licensing, “simultaneous solution” of a problem, and “professional 
approval.” Id. at 1178–82. Indeed, since Graham, courts have used other factors in 
analyzing issues of obviousness, including: 
• Industry praise;  
• Copying;  
• Unexpected results; 
• Licensing by the patentee; and 
• Simultaneous invention. 
Which way do (or should) each of these factors cut? Do any of these strike you as more or 
less useful in the ultimate inquiry—i.e., in determining whether a claimed invention 
would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art?  
5. In a case decided later in the same year as Graham, the C.C.P.A. stated that: “We 
think the proper way to apply the 103 obviousness test to a case like this is to first picture 
the inventor as working in his shop with the prior art references—which he is presumed 
to know—hanging on the walls around him.” In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 
1966). Do you think most (if any) inventors actually work this way? Are they likely to be 
aware of everything in the prior art? If not, why did the C.C.P.A. frame the test this way? 
(Remember that the person of skill, from whose perspective obviousness is judged, is a 
hypothetical person, not a real person.) In any case, how does this “Winslow tableau” 
approach, which is still used today, affect how you think about the framework set forth 
in Graham? 
A. Nonobviousness Today 
In this section, we’ll explore how the requirement of nonobviousness is understood 
and applied today. First, we’ll read the Supreme Court’s most recent decision on 
nonobviousness and see some examples of how the Federal Circuit has interpreted and 
applied that precedent. Then, we’ll explore the way courts have handled two of the 
Graham factors, namely: (1) What is the scope and content of the prior art? and (2) What is 
the level of skill in the art? Notice that one difference between novelty and 
nonobviousness is that a successful novelty challenge must be based on a single reference, 
while a successful nonobviousness challenge may (but need not be) based on multiple 
references. 
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1. The Modern Framework 
The next case involves U.S. Patent No. 6,237,565 (referred to in the case as “the Engelau 
patent.” Here is figure 1 of the Engelau patent: 
 
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc. 
550 U.S. 398 (2007) 
Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Teleflex Incorporated and its subsidiary Technology Holding Company—both 
referred to here as Teleflex—sued KSR International Company for patent infringement. 
The patent at issue, United States Patent No. 6,237,565, is entitled “Adjustable Pedal 
Assembly With Electronic Throttle Control.” The patentee is Steven J. Engelgau, and the 
patent is referred to as “the Engelgau patent.” Teleflex holds the exclusive license to the 
patent. 
Claim 4 of the Engelgau patent describes a mechanism for combining an electronic 
sensor with an adjustable automobile pedal so the pedal’s position can be transmitted to 
a computer that controls the throttle in the vehicle’s engine. When Teleflex accused KSR 
of infringing the Engelgau patent by adding an electronic sensor to one of KSR’s 
previously designed pedals, KSR countered that claim 4 was invalid under the Patent Act 
because its subject matter was obvious.  
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Section 103(a) forbids issuance of a patent when “the differences between the subject 
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole 
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary 
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” 
. . . 
Seeking to resolve the question of obviousness with more uniformity and consistency, 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has employed an approach referred to by the 
parties as the “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test (TSM test), under which a patent 
claim is only proved obvious if “some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art 
teachings” can be found in the prior art, the nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a 
person having ordinary skill in the art. KSR challenges that test, or at least its application 
in this case. Because the Court of Appeals addressed the question of obviousness in a 
manner contrary to § 103 and our precedents, we granted certiorari. We now reverse. 
I 
A 
In car engines without computer-controlled throttles, the accelerator pedal interacts 
with the throttle via cable or other mechanical link. . . . 
In the 1990’s it became more common to install computers in cars to control engine 
operation. Computer-controlled throttles open and close valves in response to electronic 
signals, not through force transferred from the pedal by a mechanical link. Constant, 
delicate adjustments of air and fuel mixture are possible. The computer’s rapid processing 
of factors beyond the pedal’s position improves fuel efficiency and engine performance. 
For a computer-controlled throttle to respond to a driver’s operation of the car, the 
computer must know what is happening with the pedal. A cable or mechanical link does 
not suffice for this purpose; at some point, an electronic sensor is necessary to translate 
the mechanical operation into digital data the computer can understand. 
Before discussing sensors further we turn to the mechanical design of the pedal itself. 
In the traditional design a pedal can be pushed down or released but cannot have its 
position in the footwell adjusted by sliding the pedal forward or back. As a result, a driver 
who wishes to be closer or farther from the pedal must either reposition himself in the 
driver’s seat or move the seat in some way. In cars with deep footwells these are imperfect 
solutions for drivers of smaller stature. To solve the problem, inventors, beginning in the 
1970’s, designed pedals that could be adjusted to change their location in the footwell. 
Important for this case are two adjustable pedals disclosed in U.S. Patent Nos. 5,010,782 
(filed July 28, 1989) (Asano) and 5,460,061 (filed Sept. 17, 1993) (Redding). The Asano 
patent reveals a support structure that houses the pedal so that even when the pedal 
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location is adjusted relative to the driver, one of the pedal’s pivot points stays fixed. The 
pedal is also designed so that the force necessary to push the pedal down is the same 
regardless of adjustments to its location. The Redding patent reveals a different, sliding 
mechanism where both the pedal and the pivot point are adjusted. 
We return to sensors. Well before Engelgau applied for his challenged patent, some 
inventors had obtained patents involving electronic pedal sensors for computer-
controlled throttles. These inventions, such as the device disclosed in U.S. Patent No. 
5,241,936 (’936), taught that it was preferable to detect the pedal's position in the pedal 
assembly, not in the engine. The ’936 patent disclosed a pedal with an electronic sensor 
on a pivot point in the pedal assembly. U.S. Patent No. 5,063,811 (Smith) taught that to 
prevent the wires connecting the sensor to the computer from chafing and wearing out, 
and to avoid grime and damage from the driver’s foot, the sensor should be put on a fixed 
part of the pedal assembly rather than in or on the pedal's footpad. 
In addition to patents for pedals with integrated sensors inventors obtained patents 
for self-contained modular sensors. A modular sensor is designed independently of a 
given pedal so that it can be taken off the shelf and attached to mechanical pedals of 
various sorts, enabling the pedals to be used in automobiles with computer-controlled 
throttles. One such sensor was disclosed in U.S. Patent No. 5,385,068 (’068). In 1994, 
Chevrolet manufactured a line of trucks using modular sensors “attached to the pedal 
assembly support bracket, adjacent to the pedal and engaged with the pivot shaft about 
which the pedal rotates in operation.”  
The prior art contained patents involving the placement of sensors on adjustable 
pedals as well. For example, U.S. Patent No. 5,819,593 (Rixon) discloses an adjustable 
pedal assembly with an electronic sensor for detecting the pedal’s position. In the Rixon 
pedal the sensor is located in the pedal footpad. The Rixon pedal was known to suffer 
from wire chafing when the pedal was depressed and released. 
This short account of pedal and sensor technology leads to the instant case. 
B 
KSR, a Canadian company, manufactures and supplies auto parts, including pedal 
systems. Ford Motor Company hired KSR in 1998 to supply an adjustable pedal system 
for various lines of automobiles with cable-actuated throttle controls. KSR developed an 
adjustable mechanical pedal for Ford and obtained U.S. Patent No. 6,151,986 (’986) for the 
design. In 2000, KSR was chosen by General Motors Corporation (GMC or GM) to supply 
adjustable pedal systems for Chevrolet and GMC light trucks that used engines with 
computer-controlled throttles. To make the ’986 pedal compatible with the trucks, KSR 
merely took that design and added a modular sensor. 
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Teleflex is a rival to KSR in the design and manufacture of adjustable pedals. As noted, 
it is the exclusive licensee of the Engelgau patent. Engelgau filed the patent application 
on August 22, 2000, as a continuation of a previous application for U.S. Patent No. 
6,109,241, which was filed on January 26, 1999. He has sworn he invented the patent’s 
subject matter on February 14, 1998. The Engelgau patent discloses an adjustable 
electronic pedal described in the specification as a “simplified vehicle control pedal 
assembly that is less expensive, and which uses fewer parts and is easier to package within 
the vehicle.” Claim 4 of the patent, at issue here, describes: 
A vehicle control pedal apparatus comprising: 
a support adapted to be mounted to a vehicle structure; 
an adjustable pedal assembly having a pedal arm moveable in for[e] and aft 
directions with respect to said support; 
a pivot for pivotally supporting said adjustable pedal assembly with respect to 
said support and defining a pivot axis; and 
an electronic control attached to said support for controlling a vehicle system; 
said apparatus characterized by said electronic control being responsive to said 
pivot for providing a signal that corresponds to pedal arm position as said pedal 
arm pivots about said pivot axis between rest and applied positions wherein the 
position of said pivot remains constant while said pedal arm moves in fore and aft 
directions with respect to said pivot. 
We agree with the District Court that the claim discloses “a position-adjustable pedal 
assembly with an electronic pedal position sensor attached to the support member of the 
pedal assembly. Attaching the sensor to the support member allows the sensor to remain 
in a fixed position while the driver adjusts the pedal.”  
Before issuing the Engelgau patent the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
rejected one of the patent claims that was similar to, but broader than, the present claim 
4. The claim did not include the requirement that the sensor be placed on a fixed pivot 
point. The PTO concluded the claim was an obvious combination of the prior art disclosed 
in Redding and Smith . . . . [According to the PTO,] Redding provided an example of an 
adjustable pedal, and Smith explained how to mount a sensor on a pedal’s support 
structure, and the rejected patent claim merely put these two teachings together. 
Although the broader claim was rejected, claim 4 was later allowed because it 
included the limitation of a fixed pivot point, which distinguished the design from 
Redding’s. Engelgau had not included Asano among the prior art references, and Asano 
was not mentioned in the patent’s prosecution. Thus, the PTO did not have before it an 
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adjustable pedal with a fixed pivot point. The patent issued on May 29, 2001, and was 
assigned to Teleflex. 
C 
Under the controlling cases from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
however, the District Court was . . . . required also to apply the TSM test. The District 
Court held KSR had satisfied the test. It reasoned (1) the state of the industry would lead 
inevitably to combinations of electronic sensors and adjustable pedals, (2) Rixon provided 
the basis for these developments, and (3) Smith taught a solution to the wire-chafing 
problems in Rixon, namely, locating the sensor on the fixed structure of the pedal. This 
could lead to the combination of Asano, or a pedal like it, with a pedal position sensor. 
The conclusion that the Engelgau design was obvious was supported, in the District 
Court’s view, by the PTO’s rejection of the broader version of claim 4. Had Engelgau 
included Asano in his patent application, it reasoned, the PTO would have found claim 4 
to be an obvious combination of Asano and Smith, as it had found the broader version an 
obvious combination of Redding and Smith. . . . The District Court granted summary 
judgment for KSR. 
With principal reliance on the TSM test, the Court of Appeals reversed. It ruled the 
District Court had not been strict enough in applying the test, having failed to make 
“findings as to the specific understanding or principle within the knowledge of a skilled 
artisan that would have motivated one with no knowledge of the invention to attach an 
electronic control to the support bracket of the Asano assembly.” The Court of Appeals 
held that the District Court was incorrect that the nature of the problem to be solved 
satisfied this requirement because unless the “prior art references addressed the precise 
problem that the patentee was trying to solve,” the problem would not motivate an 
inventor to look at those references.  
Here, the Court of Appeals found, the Asano pedal was designed to solve the 
“constant ratio problem”—that is, to ensure that the force required to depress the pedal is 
the same no matter how the pedal is adjusted—whereas Engelgau sought to provide a 
simpler, smaller, cheaper adjustable electronic pedal. As for Rixon, the court explained, 
that pedal suffered from the problem of wire chafing but was not designed to solve it. In 
the court’s view Rixon did not teach anything helpful to Engelgau’s purpose. Smith, in 
turn, did not relate to adjustable pedals and did not “necessarily go to the issue of 
motivation to attach the electronic control on the support bracket of the pedal assembly.” 
When the patents were interpreted in this way, the Court of Appeals held, they would not 
have led a person of ordinary skill to put a sensor on the sort of pedal described in Asano. 
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That it might have been obvious to try the combination of Asano and a sensor was 
likewise irrelevant, in the court's view, because “‘obvious to try’ has long been held not to 
constitute obviousness.’” 
The Court of Appeals also faulted the District Court’s consideration of the PTO’s 
rejection of the broader version of claim 4. The District Court’s role, the Court of Appeals 
explained, was not to speculate regarding what the PTO might have done had the 
Engelgau patent mentioned Asano. Rather, the court held, the District Court was obliged 
first to presume that the issued patent was valid and then to render its own independent 
judgment of obviousness based on a review of the prior art. The fact that the PTO had 




We begin by rejecting the rigid approach of the Court of Appeals. Throughout this 
Court’s engagement with the question of obviousness, our cases have set forth an 
expansive and flexible approach inconsistent with the way the Court of Appeals applied 
its TSM test here. To be sure, Graham recognized the need for “uniformity and 
definiteness.” Yet the principles laid down in Graham reaffirmed the “functional 
approach” of Hotchkiss. To this end, Graham set forth a broad inquiry and invited courts, 
where appropriate, to look at any secondary considerations that would prove instructive.  
Neither the enactment of § 103 nor the analysis in Graham disturbed this Court’s earlier 
instructions concerning the need for caution in granting a patent based on the 
combination of elements found in the prior art. For over a half century, the Court has held 
that a “patent for a combination which only unites old elements with no change in their 
respective functions obviously withdraws what already is known into the field of its 
monopoly and diminishes the resources available to skillful men.” Great Atlantic & Pacific 
Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp. . . . The combination of familiar elements according 
to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable 
results. Three cases decided after Graham illustrate the application of this doctrine. 
In United States v. Adams, a companion case to Graham, the Court considered the 
obviousness of a “wet battery” that varied from prior designs in two ways: It contained 
water, rather than the acids conventionally employed in storage batteries; and its 
electrodes were magnesium and cuprous chloride, rather than zinc and silver chloride. 
The Court recognized that when a patent claims a structure already known in the prior 
art that is altered by the mere substitution of one element for another known in the field, 
the combination must do more than yield a predictable result. It nevertheless rejected the 
Government’s claim that Adams’ battery was obvious. The Court relied upon the 
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corollary principle that when the prior art teaches away from combining certain known 
elements, discovery of a successful means of combining them is more likely to be 
nonobvious. When Adams designed his battery, the prior art warned that risks were 
involved in using the types of electrodes he employed. The fact that the elements worked 
together in an unexpected and fruitful manner supported the conclusion that Adams’ 
design was not obvious to those skilled in the art. 
In Anderson's–Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969), the Court 
elaborated on this approach. The subject matter of the patent before the Court was a device 
combining two pre-existing elements: a radiant-heat burner and a paving machine. The 
device, the Court concluded, did not create some new synergy: The radiant-heat burner 
functioned just as a burner was expected to function; and the paving machine did the 
same. The two in combination did no more than they would in separate, sequential 
operation. In those circumstances, “while the combination of old elements performed a 
useful function, it added nothing to the nature and quality of the radiant-heat burner 
already patented,” and the patent failed under § 103.  
Finally, in Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976), the Court derived from the 
precedents the conclusion that when a patent “simply arranges old elements with each 
performing the same function it had been known to perform” and yields no more than 
one would expect from such an arrangement, the combination is obvious.  
The principles underlying these cases are instructive when the question is whether a 
patent claiming the combination of elements of prior art is obvious. When a work is 
available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt 
variations of it, either in the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can 
implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, 
if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the 
art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the 
technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill. A court must 
ask whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements 
according to their established functions. 
Following these principles may be more difficult in other cases than it is here because 
the claimed subject matter may involve more than the simple substitution of one known 
element for another or the mere application of a known technique to a piece of prior art 
ready for the improvement. Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated 
teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the design community or 
present in the marketplace; and the background knowledge possessed by a person having 
ordinary skill in the art, all in order to determine whether there was an apparent reason 
to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue. To facilitate 
review, this analysis should be made explicit. As our precedents make clear, however, the 
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analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the 
challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a 
person of ordinary skill in the art would employ. 
B 
When it first established the requirement of demonstrating a teaching, suggestion, or 
motivation to combine known elements in order to show that the combination is obvious, 
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals captured a helpful insight. As is clear from cases 
such as Adams, a patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by 
demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art. 
Although common sense directs one to look with care at a patent application that claims 
as innovation the combination of two known devices according to their established 
functions, it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of 
ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new 
invention does. This is so because inventions in most, if not all, instances rely upon 
building blocks long since uncovered, and claimed discoveries almost of necessity will be 
combinations of what, in some sense, is already known. 
Helpful insights, however, need not become rigid and mandatory formulas; and when 
it is so applied, the TSM test is incompatible with our precedents. The obviousness 
analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, 
and motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the 
explicit content of issued patents. The diversity of inventive pursuits and of modern 
technology counsels against limiting the analysis in this way. In many fields it may be that 
there is little discussion of obvious techniques or combinations, and it often may be the 
case that market demand, rather than scientific literature, will drive design trends. 
Granting patent protection to advances that would occur in the ordinary course without 
real innovation retards progress and may, in the case of patents combining previously 
known elements, deprive prior inventions of their value or utility. 
C 
The flaws in the analysis of the Court of Appeals relate for the most part to the court’s 
narrow conception of the obviousness inquiry reflected in its application of the TSM test. 
In determining whether the subject matter of a patent claim is obvious, neither the 
particular motivation nor the avowed purpose of the patentee controls. What matters is 
the objective reach of the claim. If the claim extends to what is obvious, it is invalid under 
§ 103. One of the ways in which a patent’s subject matter can be proved obvious is by 
noting that there existed at the time of invention a known problem for which there was 
an obvious solution encompassed by the patent’s claims. 
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The first error of the Court of Appeals in this case was to foreclose this reasoning by 
holding that courts and patent examiners should look only to the problem the patentee 
was trying to solve. The Court of Appeals failed to recognize that the problem motivating 
the patentee may be only one of many addressed by the patent’s subject matter. The 
question is not whether the combination was obvious to the patentee but whether the 
combination was obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the art. Under the correct 
analysis, any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and 
addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner 
claimed. 
The second error of the Court of Appeals lay in its assumption that a person of 
ordinary skill attempting to solve a problem will be led only to those elements of prior art 
designed to solve the same problem. The primary purpose of Asano was solving the 
constant ratio problem; so, the court concluded, an inventor considering how to put a 
sensor on an adjustable pedal would have no reason to consider putting it on the Asano 
pedal. Common sense teaches, however, that familiar items may have obvious uses 
beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able 
to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle. Regardless of 
Asano’s primary purpose, the design provided an obvious example of an adjustable pedal 
with a fixed pivot point; and the prior art was replete with patents indicating that a fixed 
pivot point was an ideal mount for a sensor. The idea that a designer hoping to make an 
adjustable electronic pedal would ignore Asano because Asano was designed to solve the 
constant ratio problem makes little sense. A person of ordinary skill is also a person of 
ordinary creativity, not an automaton. 
The same constricted analysis led the Court of Appeals to conclude, in error, that a 
patent claim cannot be proved obvious merely by showing that the combination of 
elements was “obvious to try.” When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a 
problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of 
ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical 
grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but 
of ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was 
obvious to try might show that it was obvious under § 103. 
The Court of Appeals, finally, drew the wrong conclusion from the risk of courts and 
patent examiners falling prey to hindsight bias. A factfinder should be aware, of course, 
of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant upon 
ex post reasoning. Rigid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common 
sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it. 
. . . 
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III 
When we apply the standards we have explained to the instant facts, claim 4 must be 
found obvious. We agree with and adopt the District Court’s recitation of the relevant 
prior art and its determination of the level of ordinary skill in the field. . . . A person having 
ordinary skill in the art could have combined Asano with a pedal position sensor in a 
fashion encompassed by claim 4, and would have seen the benefits of doing so. 
B 
The District Court was correct to conclude that, as of the time Engelgau designed the 
subject matter in claim 4, it was obvious to a person of ordinary skill to combine Asano 
with a pivot-mounted pedal position sensor. There then existed a marketplace that created 
a strong incentive to convert mechanical pedals to electronic pedals, and the prior art 
taught a number of methods for achieving this advance. The Court of Appeals considered 
the issue too narrowly by, in effect, asking whether a pedal designer writing on a blank 
slate would have chosen both Asano and a modular sensor similar to the ones used in the 
Chevrolet truckline and disclosed in the ’068 patent. The District Court employed this 
narrow inquiry as well, though it reached the correct result nevertheless. The proper 
question to have asked was whether a pedal designer of ordinary skill, facing the wide 
range of needs created by developments in the field of endeavor, would have seen a 
benefit to upgrading Asano with a sensor. 
In automotive design, as in many other fields, the interaction of multiple components 
means that changing one component often requires the others to be modified as well. 
Technological developments made it clear that engines using computer-controlled 
throttles would become standard. As a result, designers might have decided to design 
new pedals from scratch; but they also would have had reason to make pre-existing pedals 
work with the new engines. Indeed, upgrading its own pre-existing model led KSR to 
design the pedal now accused of infringing the Engelgau patent. 
For a designer starting with Asano, the question was where to attach the sensor. The 
consequent legal question, then, is whether a pedal designer of ordinary skill starting with 
Asano would have found it obvious to put the sensor on a fixed pivot point. The prior art 
discussed above leads us to the conclusion that attaching the sensor where both KSR and 
Engelgau put it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill. 
The ’936 patent taught the utility of putting the sensor on the pedal device, not in the 
engine. Smith, in turn, explained to put the sensor not on the pedal's footpad but instead 
on its support structure. And from the known wire-chafing problems of Rixon, and 
Smith’s teaching that “the pedal assemblies must not precipitate any motion in the 
connecting wires,” the designer would know to place the sensor on a nonmoving part of 
the pedal structure. The most obvious nonmoving point on the structure from which a 
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sensor can easily detect the pedal's position is a pivot point. The designer, accordingly, 
would follow Smith in mounting the sensor on a pivot, thereby designing an adjustable 
electronic pedal covered by claim 4. 
Just as it was possible to begin with the objective to upgrade Asano to work with a 
computer-controlled throttle, so too was it possible to take an adjustable electronic pedal 
like Rixon and seek an improvement that would avoid the wire-chafing problem. 
Following similar steps to those just explained, a designer would learn from Smith to 
avoid sensor movement and would come, thereby, to Asano because Asano disclosed an 
adjustable pedal with a fixed pivot. 
. . . 
Like the District Court, finally, we conclude Teleflex has shown no secondary factors 
to dislodge the determination that claim 4 is obvious. Proper application of Graham and 
our other precedents to these facts therefore leads to the conclusion that claim 4 
encompassed obvious subject matter. As a result, the claim fails to meet the requirement 
of § 103. 
. . . 
We build and create by bringing to the tangible and palpable reality around us new 
works based on instinct, simple logic, ordinary inferences, extraordinary ideas, and 
sometimes even genius. These advances, once part of our shared knowledge, define a new 
threshold from which innovation starts once more. And as progress beginning from 
higher levels of achievement is expected in the normal course, the results of ordinary 
innovation are not the subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws. Were it otherwise 
patents might stifle, rather than promote, the progress of useful arts. See U.S. Const., Art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 8. These premises led to the bar on patents claiming obvious subject matter 
established in Hotchkiss and codified in § 103. Application of the bar must not be confined 
within a test or formulation too constrained to serve its purpose. 
KSR provided convincing evidence that mounting a modular sensor on a fixed pivot 
point of the Asano pedal was a design step well within the grasp of a person of ordinary 
skill in the relevant art. Its arguments, and the record, demonstrate that claim 4 of the 
Engelgau patent is obvious. In rejecting the District Court’s rulings, the Court of Appeals 
analyzed the issue in a narrow, rigid manner inconsistent with § 103 and our precedents. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 
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Context & Application 
1. Is the TSM test dead after KSR? Or only mostly dead? Why do you think the 
Federal Circuit developed the TSM test in the first place? 
2. What is the “obvious to try” test? Why did the Federal Circuit reject it? What is the 
status of “obvious to try” after KSR? 
3. In KSR, the Supreme Court says that factfinders must be able to use “common 
sense” in analyzing whether a claimed invention is obvious, and that “[a] person of 
ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” What evidence 
can or should courts and the USPTO use to determine what constitutes ordinary 
creativity? To demonstrate that something is a matter of common sense?  
4. For one example of how common sense might come into play in the § 103 analysis, 
consider this recent concurrence: 
[W]hen the record shows a finite number of identified, predictable solutions to a 
design need that existed at the relevant time, which a person of ordinary skill in 
the art had a good reason to pursue, common sense can supply a motivation to 
combine. . . . [W]e [have] explained that a person of ordinary skill provided with 
a simple design choice to address a problem is presumed to have a good reason to 
pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. 
Obviousness is particularly apparent where the alleged novelty of the patent is not 
related to the differences between a finite number of identified, predictable 
solutions, identified in the prior art. Because the use of a look-up table and an 
ordered list was only one of a number of finite, predictable solutions, it would 
have been obvious to use a technique that was known to one of ordinary skill in 
the art. The Board erred by requiring FanDuel to supply a specific motivation to 
use a look-up table and ordered list in this particular context when that choice 
would have been a simple alternative design choice to a skilled artisan. 
Fanduel, Inc. v. Interactive Games LLC, 966 F.3d 1334, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (Dyk, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted). Is this a 
good approach for addressing issues of common sense? Can you imagine problems for 
which making “a simple alternative design choice” might not result in an obvious 
solution? 
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Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA 
699 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
MOORE, Circuit Judge. 
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. appeals from the decision . . . granting 
judgment as a matter of law that . . . the asserted claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,047,781 (’781 
patent), 6,085,851 (’851 patent), and 6,068,069 (’069 patent) are invalid for obviousness . . . . 
For the reasons set forth below, we reverse. 
Background 
The patents-in-suit, which share a common specification, are directed to an improved 
apparatus for conducting offshore drilling. We described the process of offshore drilling 
in detail in our opinion resolving the first appeal in this case, and repeat this description 
only to the extent necessary for this appeal. See Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. 
v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Transocean I). 
The process of creating a borehole in the seafloor requires lowering several 
components to the seabed from a derrick on the ocean surface. These include the drill bit, 
the casings that form the wall of the borehole, and a device called a blowout preventer. 
Id. The components are lowered on a “drill string,” which is made up of a series of pipe 
sections (“tubular members”). The drill string is assembled on the derrick, with pipe 
sections being added to the top of the string one by one to extend it to the seafloor. 
The drill bit is the first component to be lowered. Once enough pipe sections have 
been added to the drill string to lower the drill bit to the seabed, a “top drive” on the 
derrick rotates the drill string to create a borehole. Additional pipe sections are added to 
the drill string as the bit drills deeper into the seabed. Once the drill creates a portion of 
the borehole, the derrick retracts the drill bit to the surface, removing each section of the 
drill string piece by piece. A section of casing is then lowered into the borehole, with the 
drill string again being constructed on the derrick, one pipe section at a time. The next 
step is lowering the blowout preventer to the seabed, again with the drill string being 
assembled piece by piece. The process of drilling and lowering casing into the borehole 
then repeats until the hole is the desired depth. Each time a component is lowered to the 
seafloor, a drill string must be assembled and disassembled. 
Conventional drilling rigs use a derrick with a single drawworks and thus can only 
raise or lower one component at a time. Transocean sought to improve the efficiency of 
this time-consuming process using the “dual-activity” drilling apparatus disclosed in the 
patents-in-suit. The patents recite a derrick with both a main and an auxiliary advancing 
station, each of which can separately assemble drill strings and lower components to the 
seafloor. Each advancing station has a drawworks for raising and lowering the drill string 
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and a top drive for rotating the drill string. While the auxiliary advancing station drills 
and cases the first portion of the borehole, the main advancing station lowers the blowout 
preventer. The auxiliary advancing station then retracts the drill string and supports the 
main advancing station by preparing lengths of drill string in advance. Transocean’s 
patents disclose a pipe handling system, also called a transfer assembly, which allows the 
transfer of casing, drill string, and other components between the two advancing stations 
and from the advancing stations to storage areas.  
. . .  
. . . [A] jury found that Maersk failed to prove that the asserted claims would have 
been obvious . . . . The jury made specific findings that the prior art failed to disclose every 
element of the asserted claims and that each of seven objective factors indicated 
nonobviousness. . . . The district court, however, granted Maersk’s motions for judgment 
as a matter of law (JMOL) that the asserted claims are invalid as obvious . . . .  
Discussion 
We review a district court’s grant or denial of JMOL under the law of the regional 
circuit. The Fifth Circuit reviews the grant or denial of JMOL de novo. JMOL is 
appropriate only if “the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in 
favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a 
contrary verdict.” We have interpreted the Fifth Circuit’s JMOL standard to mean that the 
jury's determination must be supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is 
“such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 
In determining whether a jury's finding is supported by substantial evidence, “we must 
presume that the jury resolved all factual disputes in favor of the prevailing party.”  
I 
A patent is invalid as obvious “if the differences between the subject matter sought to 
be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been 
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to 
which said subject matter pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Obviousness is a question of law 
with several underlying factual inquiries: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the 
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue; (3) the level of ordinary skill in 
the field of the invention; and (4) objective considerations such as commercial success, 
long felt but unsolved need, and the failure of others. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 
383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966); see also KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). Patent 
invalidity must be established by clear and convincing evidence.  
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A 
In Transocean I, we expressly held that the Horn and Lund references teach every 
limitation of the asserted claims. Claim 17 of the ’069 patent, which is exemplary of the 
claims at issue on appeal, recites: 
A multi-activity drilling assembly operable to be supported from a position above 
the surface of a body of water for conducting drilling operations to the seabed and 
into the bed of the body of water, said multi-activity drilling assembly including: 
a drilling superstructure operable to be mounted upon a drilling deck for 
simultaneously supporting drilling operations for a well and operations auxiliary 
to drilling operations for the well; 
a first tubular advancing station connected to said drilling superstructure for 
advancing tubular members to the seabed and into the bed of body of water; 
a second tubular advancing station connected to said drilling superstructure for 
advancing tubular members simultaneously with said first tubular advancing 
station to the seabed and into the body of water to the seabed; and 
an assembly positioned adjacent to said first and second tubular advancing 
stations operable to transfer tubular assemblies between said first tubular 
advancing station and said second tubular advancing station to facilitate 
simultaneous drilling operations auxiliary to said drilling operations, wherein 
drilling activity can be conducted for the well from said drilling superstructure by 
said first or second tubular advancing stations and auxiliary drilling activity can 
be simultaneously conducted for the well from said drilling superstructure by the 
other of said first or second tubular advancing stations. 
As we explained in Transocean I, Horn discloses a drilling rig with a single derrick that 
supports two advancing stations, each of which can advance tubular members to the 
seabed. Although Horn fails to disclose a pipe transfer assembly that can move tubular 
members between the two advancing stations, Lund teaches this limitation. We also 
explained that Horn provides a motivation to combine the teachings of these two 
references to arrive at the claimed invention, stating that “of other obvious advantages, 
there is the possibility of concentrating common auxiliary equipment.” We concluded that 
these references “present a prima facie case of obviousness.” Transocean I thus establishes 
as law of the case that Horn and Lund teach every limitation of the asserted claims and 
provide a motivation to combine their respective teachings. It was thus erroneous for the 
district court to permit the jury to engage in fact finding regarding whether Lund and 
Horn disclose all of the claim elements. 
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The establishment of a prima facie case, however, is not a conclusion on the ultimate 
issue of obviousness. . . . The prima facie inquiry is based on the first three Graham 
factors—the scope and content of the prior art, the differences between the prior art and 
the claims, and the level of ordinary skill in the art—which the Supreme Court described 
as the background against which the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter 
is determined. A party is also free to introduce evidence relevant to the fourth Graham 
factor, objective evidence of nonobviousness, which may be sufficient to disprove or rebut 
a prima facie case of obviousness. 
As we have repeatedly held, “evidence rising out of the so-called ‘secondary 
considerations’ must always when present be considered en route to a determination of 
obviousness.” Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
Objective evidence of nonobviousness is an important component of the obviousness 
inquiry because “evidence of secondary considerations may often be the most probative 
and cogent evidence in the record. It may often establish that an invention appearing to 
have been obvious in light of the prior art was not.” This objective evidence must be 
“considered as part of all the evidence, not just when the decisionmaker remains in doubt 
after reviewing the art.” Thus, in order to determine obviousness, the decisionmaker must 
be able to consider all four Graham factors. Although we held in Transocean I that Maersk 
presented a prima facie case of obviousness, it was not error to allow the jury to consider 
the strength of that prima facie case in making the ultimate determination of obviousness. 
When the ultimate question of obviousness is put to the jury, the jury must be able to 
review all of the evidence of obviousness. Hence it was not error for the court to allow the 
jury to weigh the strength of the prima facie case together with the objective evidence in 
order to reach a conclusion on the ultimate question of obviousness. 
B 
Although we held in Transocean I that Horn and Lund establish a prima facie case that 
the asserted claims would have been obvious, we reversed the district court's grant of 
summary judgment because the court failed to consider Transocean’s objective evidence 
of nonobviousness. On the summary judgment record, Transocean presented evidence of 
industry praise, commercial success, industry skepticism, and copying. We stated that, “if 
all of the factual disputes regarding the objective evidence resolve in favor of Transocean, 
it has presented a strong basis for rebutting the prima facie case” of obviousness. 
On remand, the jury made express findings on seven types of objective evidence of 
nonobviousness: commercial success, industry praise, unexpected results, copying, 
industry skepticism, licensing, and long-felt but unsolved need. The jury found that each 
of these considerations supported the nonobviousness of Transocean’s claims. In granting 
Maersk’s motion for JMOL of obviousness, however, the district court concluded that the 
record evidence fails to support these findings. We disagree. As detailed below, 
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Transocean presented substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that 
each of the seven objective factors supports the nonobviousness of Transocean's claims. 
1 
The district court rejected the jury’s finding that commercial success supports 
nonobviousness. The court found that sales of Transocean’s dual-activity rigs are “due 
primarily to various litigations,” and thus they “are not a result of a free market.” The 
court also found that, at the time Transocean’s patents issued, the drilling industry was 
“fully aware of the possibilities of a dual string rig as prior art” and that Transocean's 
patent application on this technology had been rejected in Europe as lacking 
inventiveness. Maersk contends that Transocean failed to tie its commercial success 
evidence to the claimed combination of two advancing stations with a pipe transfer 
assembly. Maersk also argues that unclaimed features of Transocean’s rigs, such as 
increased size and capacity, are responsible for any commercial success. 
As an initial matter, the district court erred by considering proceedings before the 
European Patent Office in its commercial success analysis. Transocean needed to show 
both commercial success and that a nexus exists between that success and the merits of 
the claimed invention. It is irrelevant to the commercial success analysis, however, that a 
foreign patent office rejected Transocean's patent application on the dual-activity 
technology. The district court’s analysis seems to have been clouded by its view that the 
asserted claims would have been obvious over the prior art. This is precisely the sort of 
hindsight bias that evaluation of objective evidence is intended to avoid. See, e.g., Graham. 
Transocean presented sufficient evidence of both commercial success and nexus to the 
features of the claimed invention. It showed, for example, that its dual-activity drilling 
rigs commanded a market premium over single-activity rigs. Transocean points to two 
contracts it signed on the same day with Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, one for a dual-
activity drilling rig and one for a single-activity rig. Transocean charged a roughly 12% 
premium for the dual-activity rig. Transocean introduced other contracts that provided 
for reduced daily rates if the dual-activity feature on the rig was not available. 
Transocean's damages expert, Mr. Bratic, testified that the average reduction in this 
circumstance is 10%. 
Transocean also presented evidence that some customers expressly require dual-
activity rigs. For example, a Maersk employee testified at trial that Maersk added dual-
activity to its new drilling rig design based on market surveys showing customer demand 
for this feature. Testimony by Maersk’s own employee shows that customers request the 
dual-activity feature specifically based on the efficiency gains it provides by “involving 
two well centers in drilling the wells.” The Maersk employee stated that “many operators 
do require dual activity ... for flexibility and for improved efficiency.” Maersk sought to 
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“incorporate the same efficiency improvement features as used by our competition” by 
incorporating Transocean’s “dual-activity” technology, which Maersk distinguished from 
the “dual drilling” disclosed in the prior art. Transocean also offered testimony that dual-
activity rigs account for an increasing percentage of the rigs sold and that they have 
become the industry standard.  
From this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that Transocean’s dual-activity 
rigs have been a commercial success and that this success has a nexus to the features 
claimed in the patents. We thus conclude that substantial evidence supports the jury’s 
finding that commercial success weighs in favor of nonobviousness. 
2 
The jury found that Transocean’s dual-activity rigs received industry praise and 
achieved unexpectedly superior results, and that these factors supported nonobviousness. 
The district court rejected the jury’s findings, reasoning that Transocean presented no 
statistical data to support these conclusions. 
Maersk contends that any praise or unexpected and superior results are due to 
unclaimed features of Transocean’s rig or elements from the prior art. Maersk argues that 
Transocean's evidence of praise for dual-activity rigs is no different from praise for the 
dual-drilling technology taught in the prior art. With dual-activity rigs, only one of two 
advancing stations actually drills, whereas dual-drilling involves using both advancing 
stations to simultaneously drill two wells. 
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the jury’s findings on industry praise 
and unexpected results. Transocean presented numerous documents showing industry 
praise for the unexpected increase in drilling efficiency made possible using Transocean’s 
patented dual-activity technology. . . . 
Transocean also relied on an article in Offshore Magazine stating that multi-
functionality (i.e., dual-activity) is “critical to [the] future.” This article specifically 
describes the features of Transocean’s dual-activity rigs: “a modified derrick and drill 
floor will allow for the makeup of drillstring and bottom hole assemblies separate from 
the drilling line where other functions such as casing installation may be underway.” The 
article states that the dual-activity operation will “allow for 20–40% faster tripping of 
drillstrings.” Transocean cites a second Offshore Magazine article, which praises the 
development of Transocean’s dual-activity drillship as one of the fifty key events or 
technologies in history that shaped the offshore drilling industry. The article notes the 
ability of the rig to reduce drilling time and costs by “conducting drilling operations 
simultaneously rather than sequentially via two full capability drilling rigs.” This is quite 
an impressive accolade, and the jury was free to credit it as such. 
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Additionally, one of the named inventors of the patents-in-suit, Mr. Scott, testified that 
industry members doubted whether the claimed dual-activity feature would increase 
drilling efficiency. BP, for example, doubted whether dual-activity would cut costs so it 
had its own efficiency engineers analyze one of Transocean’s dual-activity drilling rigs. 
BP concluded that the rig could lead to even greater efficiency and cost savings than 
Transocean suggested.  
This is substantial evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that 
Transocean's claimed dual-activity apparatus produced unexpected efficiency gains and 
that this benefit garnered praise in the drilling industry. Transocean's evidence also links 
both the industry praise and the unexpected efficiency gains directly to the claimed dual-
activity feature. The first Offshore Magazine article, for example, expressly attributes 
improved efficiency to a derrick that can prepare drill string separate from the drilling 
line, as described in Transocean's patents. This description clearly distinguishes 
Transocean’s dual-activity technology from the dual-drilling technology described in the 
prior art. We conclude that the district court erred by determining that the jury lacked 
substantial evidence to find that industry praise and unexpected results support 
nonobviousness. 
3 
The district court failed to address the jury’s finding that copying of the claimed 
invention supported nonobviousness. Maersk argues that Transocean’s copying evidence 
is not tied to the novel features of its invention. We disagree. Transocean points to an 
internal Maersk document stating “we have to incorporate the same efficiency 
improvement features as used by our competition,” and that “this feature is generally 
described as ‘dual-activity.’” The Maersk document describes the features of dual-activity 
drilling, which it distinguishes from the “dual drilling” disclosed by Horn. The document 
states that Transocean’s drillships are probably the “best known examples of dual activity 
vessels.”  
Transocean also presented evidence that Maersk was aware of Transocean’s patents 
during the time Maersk was designing its accused rig. For example, a Maersk employee 
testified that he became aware of Transocean’s patents “early on in the design 
development phase” of building the accused rig. Another Maersk employee stated that he 
became aware of the patents-in-suit during the design of the accused rig, but concluded 
that the patents were “not necessarily something that could be seen as protected” based 
on the prior art. A third Maersk employee stated that Maersk discussed Transocean’s 
patents with customers in the United States and told them that Maersk did not infringe 
because the patents are invalid in view of the prior art.  
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This evidence shows that Maersk was aware of Transocean’s patents and its drillships 
embodying the patents while Maersk designed its accused rig. The evidence also shows 
that Maersk decided to incorporate the claimed dual-activity feature anyway because it 
believed Transocean’s patents were invalid over the prior art. Moreover, Maersk’s internal 
document expressly ties its copying to the novel “dual-activity” features of Transocean’s 
invention, which it distinguishes from the “dual drilling” taught in the prior art. This is 
substantial evidence that supports the jury’s finding of copying. 
4 
The jury found that industry skepticism supports nonobviousness. Although the 
district court admitted that “it may be argued that a few in the market were skeptical,” 
the court nonetheless concluded that Transocean presented insufficient evidence of 
industry skepticism to support the jury’s finding. The court did not credit Transocean's 
evidence that people in the industry were skeptical of dual-activity rigs due to fears of 
“clashing,” which occurs when the two drill strings collide with one another. The court 
reasoned that literature predating the filing of the patents-in-suit stated that concerns over 
clashing were unfounded. Maersk echoes this argument, pointing to a brochure by Horn 
dismissing concerns about clashing. 
We conclude that the jury’s fact finding was supported by substantial evidence. 
Transocean proffered testimony regarding skepticism by two named inventors of the 
patents-in-suit, Mr. Scott and Mr. Herrmann. They testified that even though they 
personally did not believe clashing was a concern, industry experts and Transocean’s 
customers were skeptical of the claimed dual-activity feature due to fears of clashing. Mr. 
Herrmann recounted several occasions when industry experts stated that clashing would 
prevent dual-activity drilling from working and he stated that some people are still 
concerned with clashing even today. Mr. Scott recounted similar experiences.  
This evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that members of the 
drilling industry were skeptical of Transocean’s dual-activity rigs. Although Maersk 
presented evidence that it contends dispels concerns over clashing, Transocean’s evidence 
indicates that skepticism persists nonetheless. A reasonable jury could accept 
Transocean’s evidence of skepticism even if the evidence could also support a contrary 
conclusion. We thus conclude that the district court erred by rejecting the jury’s finding 
that skepticism supports nonobviousness. 
5 
The jury found that Transocean established that its licenses to customers and 
competitors were due to the merits of the claimed invention and thus support 
nonobviousness. The district court did not directly address licensing, but found that 
Transocean’s sales of its dual-activity technology were due primarily to litigation or threat 
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of litigation, and thus seems not to have credited Transocean’s licensing evidence. Maersk 
similarly contends that Transocean’s licenses do not support nonobviousness because 
they are attributable to the threat of litigation. Maersk also argues that Transocean’s 
licenses are not tied to the asserted claims because they convey rights not only to the 
patents-in-suit, but also to foreign counterparts and other patents that are not part of this 
case. 
Transocean counters that the royalties paid under the licenses exceed any litigation 
costs, and thus are an accurate reflection of the value of the claimed invention. For 
example, Transocean introduced evidence at trial of a royalty payment by Noble Drilling 
(U.S.) Inc. totaling nearly $500,000 for one month of operations for one dual-activity rig. 
Transocean contends that large, sophisticated companies would not pay royalties 
exceeding the cost of litigation if the royalty did not reflect the value of the licensed 
technology. Transocean also offered testimony that at least three companies licensed its 
dual-activity drilling patents despite being under no threat of litigation. For example, 
Transocean’s in-house counsel testified that both Shell and Pride Global, Limited, 
approached Transocean seeking to license its dual-activity technology 
We conclude that Transocean presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find that 
Transocean’s licensing supports nonobviousness. From Transocean’s testimony regarding 
the value of the licenses relative to litigation costs and regarding licenses with companies 
under no apparent threat of litigation, a reasonable jury could have found that the licenses 
reflect the value of the claimed invention and are not solely attributable to litigation. As a 
result, the district court erred by holding that the jury lacked substantial evidence to 
support its finding regarding licensing. 
6 
The jury found that Transocean’s invention provided a solution to a long-felt but 
unsolved need, and that this supports nonobviousness. The district court disagreed, 
finding that there was no long-felt but unresolved need because the prior art already 
disclosed dual string drilling technology. According to the court, no substantial demand 
existed for dual string drilling technology until deepwater drilling became more prevalent 
around the year 2000. On appeal, Maersk similarly argues that Transocean failed to 
present evidence linking any unmet need to the claimed features of the asserted claims. 
We disagree. Transocean presented evidence at trial that its dual-activity technology 
satisfied a long-felt need for greater drilling efficiency. Transocean proffered testimony 
by two of the named inventors that the drilling industry had been operating in deepwater 
since the 1970s. One of Transocean’s expert witnesses similarly testified that companies 
began to move towards deepwater drilling in the 1970s and that the drilling industry is 
always seeking greater efficiency from its rigs. The expert concluded that Transocean’s 
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dual-activity technology thus fulfilled a long-felt but unsolved need for a drilling rig that 
could operate efficiently in deep water. 
Two of the named inventors testified that, prior to the claimed invention, the industry 
had been searching for ways to increase efficiency by building sections of drill string 
“offline,” out of the path of the well conducting the drilling. These efforts were 
unsuccessful, however, and left an unsolved need for an efficient method of building the 
long drill strings needed for deepwater drilling without interrupting operations on the 
drilling well. 
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that long-felt but 
unsolved need supports nonobviousness. From this testimony, a reasonable jury could 
conclude that Transocean’s patents fulfilled a need in the drilling industry for a more 
efficient way to drill in deep water by allowing offline building of drill string and also 
including an auxiliary advancing station capable of lowering drilling components to the 
seabed. The district court erred by concluding that the jury lacked substantial evidence to 
support its finding on long-felt need. 
C 
We held in Transocean I that Horn and Lund teach each limitation of the asserted 
claims, provide a motivation to combine their teachings, and thus make out a prima facie 
case of obviousness. In granting Maersk’s motion for JMOL of obviousness, the district 
court concluded that the objective evidence of nonobviousness was “insufficient, as a 
matter of law, to overcome Maersk’s prima facie case of obviousness.” We disagree. 
. . . 
Few cases present such extensive objective evidence of nonobviousness, and thus we 
have rarely held that objective evidence is sufficient to overcome a prima facie case of 
obviousness.  
This, however, is precisely the sort of case where the objective evidence “establishes 
that an invention appearing to have been obvious in light of the prior art was not.” The 
jury found that seven distinct objective factors support nonobviousness and, as discussed 
above, these findings are all supported by substantial evidence. Weighing this objective 
evidence along with all the other evidence relevant to obviousness, we conclude that 
Maersk failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted claims would 
have been obvious. We therefore reverse the district court’s grant of JMOL of obviousness. 
. . . 
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Context & Application 
1. In Transocean, as in many other cases, the Federal Circuit refers to what the 
Supreme Court calls “secondary” considerations as “objective” evidence (or “indicia”) of 
nonobviousness. What does each court’s word choice tell us about the value they place 
upon this type of evidence?  
2. The Federal Circuit also says that “evidence rising out of the so-called ‘secondary 
considerations’ must always when present be considered en route to a determination of 
obviousness,” relying on one of its own pre-KSR decisions. Is this consistent with KSR?  
3. In Transocean, we also see that the Federal Circuit requires a patent owner to show 
a “nexus” between the secondary consideration and the claimed invention. Is this a good 
rule? Are you satisfied with the evidence that the patent owner used to prove such a nexus 
in this case? Which pieces of evidence in support of the secondary factors did you find 
more or less persuasive in this case? 
4. Congress revised § 103 in 2012, as part of the AIA. It now says: 
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the 
claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the 
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the 
claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date 
of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the 
claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in 
which the invention was made. 
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2018) (emphasis added). You may have noticed that some of the prior 
decisions we’ve read refer to “§ 103(a)” but now, there are no subheadings. You can also 
see that the statute now refers to “the effective filing date” as opposed to “the time the 
invention was made.” Can you see why the latter change was necessary to comport with 
the other changes in the AIA? Do any of these changes affect the substance of the cases 
we’ve read so far? 
B/E Aerospace, Inc. v. C&D Zodiac, Inc. 
962 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2020) 
REYNA, Circuit Judge. 
B/E Aerospace, Inc. appeals a final written decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board that found certain claims of B/E’s aircraft lavatory-related patents obvious. . . . We 
conclude that the Board’s final determination of obviousness is correct. . . . On that basis 
we affirm the Board’s final written decision. 
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Background 
This appeal arises from an inter partes review (“IPR”) proceeding. Petitioner, C&D 
Zodiac, Inc. (“Zodiac”), challenged two patents owned by B/E Aerospace, Inc. (“B/E”), 
U.S. Patent No. 9,073,641 (“the ’641 patent”) and U.S. Patent No. 9,440,742 (“the ’742 
patent”). 
The technology involved in this appeal is simple. The challenged patents relate to 
space-saving technologies for aircraft enclosures such as lavatory enclosures, closets, and 
galleys. Each patent contains a two-page written description that teaches an enclosure 
with contoured walls designed to “reduce or eliminate the gaps and volumes of space 
required between lavatory enclosures and adjacent structures.” In other words, the 
patents are directed to space-saving modifications to the walls of aircraft enclosures; they 
are not directed to the structures contained within those walls.  
The parties agree that, for purposes of this appeal, the challenged patents and claims 
are not materially different and that claim 1 of the ’641 patent is representative of the 
challenged claims. 
Claim 1 of the ’641 patent provides: 
1. An aircraft lavatory for a cabin of an aircraft of a type that includes a forward-
facing passenger seat that includes an upwardly and aftwardly inclined seat back 
and an aft-extending seat support disposed below the seat back, the lavatory 
comprising: 
a lavatory unit including a forward wall portion and defining an enclosed interior 
lavatory space, said forward wall portion configured to be disposed proximate to 
and aft of the passenger seat and including an exterior surface having a shape that 
is substantially not flat in a vertical plane; and 
wherein said forward wall portion is shaped to substantially conform to the shape 
of the upwardly and aftwardly inclined seat back of the passenger seat, and 
includes a first recess configured to receive at least a portion of the upwardly and 
aftwardly inclined seat back of the passenger seat therein, and further includes a 
second recess configured to receive at least a portion of the aft-extending seat 
support therein when at least a portion of the upwardly and aftwardly inclined 
seat back of the passenger seat is received within the first recess. 
This appeal focuses on the “first recess” and “second recess” limitations . . . . 
A 
In its petition, Zodiac defined the “Admitted Prior Art” as certain portions of the 
challenged patents, including Figure 1. As shown below, Figure 1 of the Admitted Prior 
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Art discloses a flat, forward-facing lavatory wall immediately behind a passenger seat that 
has a rear seat leg extending toward the back of the plane (referred to as an “aft-extending 
seat support”). 
 
Betts discloses an airplane passenger seat with a tilting backrest. Behind the seat is a 
coat closet that has luggage space along the floor and an overhead coat compartment. 
Rather than a flat forward-facing wall, Betts discloses a contoured forward-facing wall to 
receive the tilted backrest. The “lower portion 30 of the coat compartment 18” of Betts 
“slants rearwardly to provide a space for seatback 12 to be tilted rearwardly.” The “top 32 
of storage space 16 also slants rearwardly so as not to interfere with seatback 12 when 
tilted.” 
B 
In its final written decision, the Board concluded that Zodiac had proven that the 
challenged claims would have been “obvious over the Admitted Prior Art and Betts.” The 
Board determined that Betts’s contoured wall design met the “first recess” claim 
limitation. The Board also found that skilled artisans (airplane interior designers) would 
have been motivated to modify the flat forward-facing wall of the lavatory in the 
Admitted Prior Art with Betts’s contoured, forward-facing wall because skilled artisans 
were interested in adding space to airplane cabins, and Betts’s design added space by 
permitting the seat to be moved further aft.  
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The Board found that a skilled artisan would have found it “obvious to further modify 
the Admitted Prior Art/Betts combination to include the ‘second recess’ to receive 
passenger seat supports.” The Board used two separate approaches presented by Zodiac 
to reach that conclusion. 
First, Zodiac argued that “the logic of using a recess to receive the seat back applies 
equally to using another recess to receive the aft extending seat support.” The Board found 
Zodiac’s arguments and testimony “credible and convincing.” The Board agreed with 
Zodiac that creating a recess in the wall to receive the seat support was an obvious 
solution to a known problem. The Board relied on the testimony of Zodiac’s expert, Mr. 
Anderson, who opined that the addition of a second recess “is nothing more than the 
application of a known technology (i.e., Betts) for its intended purpose with a predictable 
result (i.e., to position the seat as far back as possible). Mr. Anderson explained that a 
skilled artisan “would be motivated to modify an enclosure, such as a lavatory, to include 
a second recess to receive aft facing seat supports”; that this “modification is nothing more 
than the application of known technology for its intended purpose”; and that the “result 
of such a modification is predictable, allowing the seat to be positioned further aft in an 
aircraft.”  
Second, the Board found that Zodiac “established a strong case of obviousness based 
on the Admitted Prior Art and Betts, coupled with common sense and the knowledge of 
a person of ordinary skill in the art. Relying on the testimony of Mr. Anderson, the Board 
found that recesses configured to receive seat supports “were known in the art” and that 
“it would have been a matter of common sense” to incorporate a second recess in the 
Admitted Prior Art/Betts combination.  
Analysis 
B/E . . . argues that the Board’s obviousness determination is erroneous because it 
improperly incorporated a second recess limitation not disclosed in the prior art. . . . 
A 
The Board found that Zodiac established a “strong case of obviousness.” We agree. 
There is no dispute that Betts’s contoured wall design meets the “first recess” claim 
limitation. Nor do the parties dispute that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to 
modify the Admitted Prior Art with Betts’s contoured wall because skilled artisans were 
interested in maximizing space in airplane cabins. Only the “second recess” limitation is 
at issue. 
We find no error in the Board’s conclusion that—under both approaches it 
employed—“it would have been obvious to further modify the Admitted Prior Art/Betts 
combination to include the claimed ‘second recess’ to receive passenger seat supports.”  
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First, we affirm the Board’s conclusion that the challenged claims would have been 
obvious because modifying the Admitted Prior Art/Betts combination to include a second 
recess was nothing more than the predictable application of known technology. The prior 
art yields a predictable result, the “second recess,” because a person of skill in the art 
would have applied a variation of the first recess and would have seen the benefit of doing 
so. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc. The Board’s conclusion is supported by substantial 
evidence, namely the expert testimony of Mr. Anderson, who opined: 
A person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that as a seat is moved further 
aft the seat support necessarily is also moved further aft. As the seat is moved aft 
the feet of the seat support may come into contact with the lower section of the 
wall. Creating one or more recesses to accommodate whatever portion(s) of the 
seat support that would contact the forward wall of the enclosure is the obvious 
solution to this known problem. 
Second, we also affirm the Board's conclusion that the challenged claims would have 
been obvious because “it would have been a matter of common sense” to incorporate a 
second recess in the Admitted Prior Art/Betts combination. B/E asserts that the Board 
legally erred by relying on “an unsupported assertion of common sense” to “fill a hole in 
the evidence formed by a missing limitation in the prior art.” B/E argues that the Board 
acted contrary to our precedent in Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 832 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016), because the Board failed to provide a “reasoned explanation and record 
evidence to support its position.” We disagree. 
In KSR, the Supreme Court opined that common sense serves a critical role in 
determining obviousness. As the Court explained, common sense teaches that familiar 
items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person 
of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of 
a puzzle. The Court held that “rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense” are 
inconsistent with our case law.  
After KSR, we recognized that courts must “consider common sense, common 
wisdom, and common knowledge in analyzing obviousness.” Arendi. However, we 
cautioned that common sense cannot be used as a “wholesale substitute for reasoned 
analysis and evidentiary support, especially when dealing with a limitation missing from 
the prior art references specified.” Likewise, in Perfect Web Techs, Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., we 
reiterated that “common sense has long been recognized to inform the analysis of 
obviousness if explained with sufficient reasoning.” 587 F.3d 1324, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
Here, the Board’s invocation of common sense was properly accompanied by 
reasoned analysis and evidentiary support. The Board dedicated more than eight pages 
of analysis to the “second recess” limitation and relied on Mr. Anderson’s detailed expert 
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testimony. The Board noted Mr. Anderson’s opinion that a “person of ordinary skill in the 
art would recognize that as a seat is moved further aft the seat support necessarily is also 
moved further aft.” The Board also cited Mr. Anderson’s opinion that “lower recesses 
were a well-known solution to provide space for seat supports where a recess for a seat 
back in the forward wall of the enclosure unit permitted the seat to be located further aft.”  
In Perfect Web, we affirmed a district court’s invocation of common sense to supply a 
missing claim limitation. The missing limitation was step D of steps A-D of a method for 
delivering a predetermined quantity of emails. The record showed that the technology 
was simple and that “step (D) merely involves repeating earlier steps” until success is 
achieved. We also determined that the district court “adequately explained its invocation 
of common sense.” 
Here, just like in Perfect Web, the evidence shows that the technology of the claimed 
invention is simple. The patents relate to contoured walls that “reduce or eliminate the 
gaps and volumes of space required between lavatory enclosures and adjacent 
structures.” The missing claim limitation (the “second recess”) involves repetition of an 
existing element (the “first recess”) until success is achieved.  
We find no error in the Board’s conclusion that a skilled artisan would have used 
common sense to incorporate a second recess in the Admitted Prior Art/Betts 
combination. We therefore affirm the Board’s obviousness conclusion under both of its 
approaches. 
Context & Application 
1. What do B/E Aerospace and the Perfect Web case cited therein teach us about the 
role of “common sense” post-KSR? What types of evidence has the Federal Circuit 
accepted on this issue?  
2.  How would Transocean and B/E Aerospace come out under the Federal Circuit’s 
TSM test (at least, as that test was described in KSR)? In other words, how much did KSR 
really change the law? 
3. Pharmaceuticals raise difficult questions with respect to § 103. You’ve already seen 
that hindsight bias is a concern in this area. But what if, as Rebecca Eisenberg has argued, 
chemical and pharmaceutical inventions often “appear less obvious in hindsight than they 
seemed ex ante”? See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Pharma’s Nonobvious Problem, 12 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 375, 378 (2008). These inventions also get analyzed differently. As 
Nicholson Price has explained: 
To determine whether new chemicals—including pharmaceuticals—are obvious, 
the Federal Circuit has adopted a doctrine known as “lead compound analysis.” 
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Essentially, if you want to show that a new chemical is obvious, you do two things: 
First, you find a close relative that is already known and second, you argue that 
the inventive step from that prior art compound to the new compound would be 
an obvious step for a PHOSITA to take. This is hard. Under the lead compound 
analysis framework, the prior art must essentially contain each step rather plainly 
to demonstrate prima facie obviousness. To show that a chemist of ordinary skill 
would select that chemical as a “lead compound”—“a compound in the prior art 
that would be most promising to modify”—structural similarity is necessary but 
insufficient; the field must know something about the putative lead compound, 
such as activity, solubility, or toxicity, that makes it a promising lead. Once a lead 
compound (or a small set of lead compounds) is identified, you must show that 
“prior art would have supplied one of ordinary skill in the art with a reason or 
motivation to modify a lead compound to make the claimed compound with a 
reasonable expectation of success.” This is a lot to ask of the prior art. 
W. Nicholson Price II, The Cost of Novelty, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 769, 786–87 (2020). What do 
you think of this approach? 
2. Other Factual Issues  
Graham tells us that: “Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be 
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; 
and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved.” This section will explore in 
more detail what courts count as prior art for the purposes of § 103 and then will discuss 
how courts have determined the level of ordinary skill in the art. 
Circuit Check Inc. v. QXQ Inc. 
795 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
MOORE, Circuit Judge. 
Circuit Check, Inc. appeals from . . . judgment as a matter of law after a jury verdict 
that claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,592,796; 7,695,766; and 7,749,566 are invalid as obvious. 
We reverse the court’s judgment . . . and remand. 
Background 
Manufacturers of circuit boards, which are used in various electronic devices, use 
circuit board testers to test circuit boards before the boards are integrated into finished 
products. Many testers require an interface plate, which is a plastic grid with holes that 
permit connections between the tester and the circuit board. In order to align circuit 
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boards during testing, it is advantageous to mark certain holes on the interface plate. Prior 
art methods of marking interface plates included placing Mylar masks on the surface of 
the interface plate, painting the surface of interface plates, and making shallow drill marks 
on interface plates. 
The patents at issue claim systems and methods related to marking interface plates. 
Claim 1 of the ’796 patent is representative: 
1. An indicator interface plate configured to provide readily visible identification 
of predetermined holes, the plate comprising: 
a surface including a plurality of holes having visually discernable markings to 
allow a user to visually determine which of said plurality of holes are to be 
populated, wherein a region of the plate said plurality of holes have a first 
predetermined indicia covering the surface surrounding said plurality of holes, 
the plate further comprising: a second removable indicia overlying said first 
predetermined indicia, said second indicia being different from said first 
predetermined indicia, wherein said second indicia is removed from areas of said 
plate adjacent each of said predetermined holes, said predetermined holes are 
visually identifiable to a user by the appearance of the first indicia. 
Circuit Check sued QXQ, Inc., alleging that QXQ’s interface plates infringed its 
patents. QXQ stipulated to infringement and the parties stipulated that three references 
describing interface plate marking techniques were prior art to the patents: the TTCI 
Specifications; the Plexus Specification; and the method depicted in Figure 1 of the ’796 
patent and described in its specification (collectively, the “stipulated prior art”). These 
documents disclosed several marking techniques, such as painting near the hole or 
drilling near the hole and painting over the drill mark. QXQ concedes in its briefing that 
the stipulated prior art does not disclose an interface plate comprising “a second 
removable indicia overlying said first predetermined indicia ... wherein said second 
indicia is removed from areas of said plate adjacent each of said predetermined holes.”  
At trial, QXQ argued that three additional references—rock carvings, engraved 
signage, and a machining technique known as Prussian Blue (collectively, the “disputed 
prior art”)—disclose the limitation not present in the stipulated prior art and constitute 
analogous prior art. Circuit Check argued that the references were not analogous. With 
respect to rock carvings, in which a varnish is applied to rocks and then scrapped off to 
make designs, Circuit Check presented testimony that a skilled artisan at the time of the 
invention would not have considered rock carvings to have been reasonably pertinent to 
the marking problem. With respect to engraved signage, in which the top layer of a multi-
layer product is removed to expose a bottom layer, Circuit Check presented testimony 
that engraved signage was not relevant to the problem solved by the patents. And with 
 NONOBVIOUSNESS  
349 
respect to Prussian Blue, a machining technique whereby dye is applied to a workpiece 
and then removed by a scribe or drill, Circuit Check presented testimony that Prussian 
Blue could not be used to make the claimed invention and had no connection to the 
problem solved by the patents.  
. . . The jury found the asserted claims not invalid for obviousness. . . . 
After the jury verdict, QXQ filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law that the 
asserted claims are invalid as obvious. The district court granted QXQ’s motion, 
acknowledging that QXQ’s “obviousness argument is not premised on citing specific 
examples of prior art in the applicable field, nor does it rely on nuanced discussion about 
the level of ordinary skill in that particular field.” It found that although there was no 
doubt that rock carvings “are not technically pertinent to the ‘field’ of circuit testers,” and 
“witnesses credibly testified that Prussian Blue dye had not been used on alignment 
plates,” “any layman” would have understood that interface plates could be marked 
using the techniques described in the disputed prior art. It further noted that “any vandal 
who has ‘keyed’ a car knows that stripping the paint with a key will result in the 
underlying metal color showing through.” It found that none of the objective 
considerations affected its conclusion that the asserted claims would have been obvious. 
With respect to claims 5 and 11 of the ’796 patent, the court determined that even though 
QXQ did not present evidence that the additional limitations of the claims would have 
been obvious, those additional limitations were too trivial to support nonobviousness. 
Circuit Check appeals. . . . 
Discussion 
Judgment as a matter of law is permitted on an issue following jury trial if “the court 
finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find 
for the party on that issue.” We review a district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of 
law after a jury verdict de novo. Under Seventh Circuit law, we can overturn a jury’s 
decision only if no rational jury could have come to the same conclusion. In reviewing a 
jury’s obviousness verdict, “we first presume that the jury resolved the underlying factual 
disputes in favor of the verdict winner and leave those presumed findings undisturbed if 
they are supported by substantial evidence. Then we examine the legal conclusion de 
novo to see whether it is correct in light of the presumed jury fact findings.”  
A patent is invalid for obviousness “if the differences between the subject matter 
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would 
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill 
in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). “Obviousness 
is a question of law based on underlying factual findings.” The underlying factual 
inquiries include: (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) the differences between the 
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prior art and the claims at issue, (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art, and (4) any 
relevant objective considerations, such as commercial success, long felt but unsolved 
needs, and the failure of others. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
By finding the claims nonobvious, the jury presumably found that the disputed prior 
art is not analogous and therefore not within the scope of the prior art. Substantial 
evidence supports the jury's presumed finding. To be considered within the prior art for 
purposes of the obviousness analysis, a reference must be analogous. Whether a reference 
is analogous art is a question of fact. Prior art is analogous if it is from the same field of 
endeavor or if it is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem the inventor is trying to 
solve.  
The jury was instructed that “the field of the invention is circuit board testers and test 
fixtures used in the manufacture of electronics.” The disputed prior art—rock carvings, 
engraved signage, and Prussian Blue—is not part of the field of circuit board testers and 
test figures. Therefore, the disputed prior art can be analogous only if it is reasonably 
pertinent to the particular problem solved by the inventor. Although “familiar items may 
have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes,” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 
398 (2007), a reference is only reasonably pertinent when it “logically would have 
commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his problem,” In re Clay, 966 
F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The jury heard testimony that a person of ordinary skill in 
the art would not have thought about rock carvings, engraved signage, or Prussian Blue 
in considering how to mark interface plates. The jury was entitled to weigh this testimony, 
find that an ordinarily skilled artisan would not find that the disputed prior art “logically 
would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention,” and thus find the disputed prior 
art not analogous. See In re Clay, 966 F.2d at 659. 
Just because keying a car, for example, is within the common knowledge of 
humankind does not mean that keying a car is analogous art. An alleged infringer should 
not be able to transform all systems and methods within the common knowledge into 
analogous prior art simply by stating that anyone would have known of such a system or 
method. The question is not whether simple concepts such as rock carvings, engraved 
signage, or Prussian Blue dye are within the knowledge of lay people or even within the 
knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Rather, the question is whether an 
inventor would look to this particular art to solve the particular problem at hand. Here, 
Circuit Check put forward evidence that an inventor would not have considered the 
disputed prior art when trying to improve marking. It is not hard to arrive at that 
conclusion. Even though an inventor may be aware of rock carvings, it is not surprising 
that the inventor would not have looked to rock carvings to improve the process of 
painting small dots on interface plates for expensive circuit board testers. And, even 
though an inventor may work in an office with engraved signage, the inventor would not 
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necessarily have considered using the techniques disclosed in engraved signage to solve 
the problem of marking circuit board tester interface plates. Finally, even though an 
inventor in this case was aware of Prussian Blue, it is not surprising that one of skill in the 
art would not consider using a machining technique that employed removable dye on 
interface plates where such dye could fall into and interfere with the underlying 
electronics of the circuit board testers. Because the jury’s presumed finding that the 
disputed references are not analogous is supported by substantial evidence, the only 
references within the scope of the prior art are the stipulated prior art. 
. . . 
Whatever doubts we have about these patents, the jury verdict was supported by 
substantial evidence. We therefore reverse the district court’s grant of judgment as a 
matter of law and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Context & Application 
1. In Circuit Check, the Federal Circuit tells us that just because something “is within 
the common knowledge of humankind” does not mean that thing qualifies as analogous 
art. Why not? Should it count? 
2. How can a court know what “an inventor would look” at “to solve the particular 
problem at hand”? Also, is the Federal Circuit’s focus on “the problem at hand” consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR? 
3. In Circuit Check, the Federal Circuit notes that on certain issues, it has to follow the 
regional circuit—in this case, the Seventh Circuit—case law. The Federal Circuit applies 
its own law to questions that are “unique to U.S. patent law.” Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 
887, 892 (Fed. Cir. 2007). For other legal questions, it applies the law of the relevant 
regional circuit. See id. So, if an appeal involved claims for both patent and trademark 
infringement, which circuit’s law should the Federal Circuit apply to each claim on 
appeal? 
Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entertainment, Inc. 
637 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
LOURIE, Circuit Judge. 
MGA Entertainment, Inc.; Wal–Mart Stores, Inc.; and Toys “R” Us, Inc. (collectively, 
“MGA”) appeal from the summary judgment decision . . . that the asserted claims of U.S. 
Patent 7,264,242 (“the ’242 patent”) were infringed and were not invalid for obviousness. 
Because the district court correctly found no genuine issues of material fact regarding 
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infringement based on its construction of the claim term “movable,” we affirm the court’s 
grant of summary judgment of literal infringement. The district court, however, erred in 
several of its factual findings underlying its nonobviousness determination. We therefore 
vacate the court's grant of summary judgment of nonobviousness and remand. 
Background 
I 
Innovention Toys, LLC brought suit against MGA for infringement of the ’242 patent, 
which claims a chess-like, light-reflecting board game and methods of playing the same. 
The disclosed game includes a chess-styled playing surface, laser sources positioned to 
project light beams over the playing surface when “fired,” mirrored and non-mirrored 
playing pieces used to direct the lasers' beams, and non-mirrored “key playing pieces” 
equivalent to the king pieces in chess. To play the game, players take turns either moving 
a playing piece to an unoccupied, adjacent square or rotating (reorienting) a piece within 
a square. After moving or rotating a piece, a player then fires his laser, and if the laser's 
beam strikes the non-mirrored surface of a playing piece, that piece is eliminated from the 
game. To win the game, a player must direct his laser beam to strike, or illuminate, his 
opponent’s non-mirrored key playing piece, ending the game.  
All the asserted claims . . . include a “key playing pieces” limitation in which the key 
pieces are “movable.” Claim 31 is representative: 
A board game for two opposing players or teams of players comprising: 
a game board, movable playing pieces having at least one mirrored surface, 
movable key playing pieces having no mirrored surfaces, and a laser source, 
wherein alternate turns are taken to move playing pieces for the purpose of 
deflecting laser beams, so as to illuminate the key playing piece of the opponent.  
MGA counterclaimed, denying infringement and alleging, inter alia, that the ’242 patent 
was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103. In making its obviousness argument, MGA relied on 
the combination of (1) two articles describing computer-based, chess-like strategy games, 
Laser Chess and Advanced Laser Chess (collectively, “the Laser Chess references”); and 
(2) U.S. Patent 5,145,182 (“the Swift patent”) describing a physical, chess-like, laser-based 
strategy game. 
The Laser Chess game is described in an article entitled “Laser ChessTM First Prize 
$5,000.00 Winner Atari ST Programming Contest,” published in the April 1987 edition of 
Compute!. Advanced Laser Chess is described in an article published in the Summer 1989 
edition of Compute!'s Amiga Resource. Both articles disclose chess-like computer games 
with virtual lasers and mirrored and non-mirrored pieces, which are moved or rotated by 
players during alternating turns on a virtual, chess-like playing board. The goal of each 
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game is to manipulate one’s laser beam using the various game pieces to eliminate the 
other player’s non-mirrored king piece by striking it with the laser beam. In Laser Chess, 
a player's king piece may move squares during game play: “The king can capture any 
opposing piece by moving onto its square.” Similarly, in Advanced Laser Chess “Kings 
possess the ability to capture other pieces by moving on top of them.”  
The Swift patent discloses a physical (rather than electronic) strategy game in which 
players take turns placing mirrored game pieces onto squares of a chess-styled game 
board. The players position the pieces so as to direct their laser’s beam towards the 
opposing player’ scoring module and away from their own. A player scores when his 
laser beam, having been deflected around the game board, strikes his opponent's scoring 
module. The scoring modules are mounted to the frame of the game board, and thus are 
not physically capable of movement on the game board. 
MGA’s accused game, Laser Battle, is a physical board game for playing a chess-like 
strategy game. Players take turns moving or rotating mirrored playing pieces so as to 
direct a laser beam to strike the opposing player's non-mirrored Tower playing piece to 
win the game. According to the rules of Laser Battle, in “Classic Game Play,” the Tower 
pieces are placed on the board at the beginning of the game at one of various standard 
positions. Although the Towers are physically capable of movement on the game board, 
the rules provide that they “should always remain in their original positions on the 
board.” However, the standard starting configuration illustrated in the rules show that 
the Tower pieces can be placed at different locations on the board, and the rules state that 
during “Advanced Game Play,” the Towers need not remain in their standard positions.  
II 
The district court . . . granted Innovention’s motion for summary judgment of 
nonobviousness. The court first found that the Laser Chess references were non-
analogous art because they described electronic, rather than real-world, laser games. The 
district court then held that, because MGA had provided no evidence to support a finding 
as to the level of ordinary skill in the art, MGA’s obviousness argument could be pursued 
only on the basis of what would have been obvious to a layperson. The court then decided 
that because MGA had not provided any evidence that a layperson would have known of 
the Laser Chess articles or would have had any reason to modify the teachings of the Laser 
Chess references, MGA had failed to state a prima facie case of obviousness.  
Finally, the court found that Innovention had demonstrated several secondary 
considerations of nonobviousness. These included (1) commercial success based on the 
sale of 140,000 games by Innovention, a small company with minimal marketing 
capabilities, and evidence that fans had started clubs and tournaments around the world; 
(2) long-felt need based on the game's sudden success and media praise; and (3) industry 
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praise based on, inter alia, the game’s nomination for Outstanding Technology of the Year 
by the International Academy of Science and its being one of five finalists for the Toy 
Industry Association’s 2007 Game of the Year award. In light of its summary judgment 
rulings, the district court granted Innovention’s motion for a permanent injunction . . . . 
MGA appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 
Discussion 
This court reviews a district court’s decision on summary judgment de novo, 
reapplying the same standard applied by the district court. Summary judgment is 
appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
. . . 
II 
Under the Patent Act, “a patent may not be obtained if the differences between the 
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as 
a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Although 
the ultimate determination of obviousness under § 103 is a question of law, it is based on 
several underlying factual findings, including (1) the scope and content of the prior art; 
(2) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; (3) the differences between the claimed 
invention and the prior art; and (4) evidence of secondary factors, such as commercial 
success, long-felt need, and the failure of others. Graham v. John Deere Co. A patent is 
presumed valid, 35 U.S.C. § 282, and this presumption can be overcome only by clear and 
convincing evidence to the contrary.  
MGA argues that, rather than being nonobvious, the asserted claims would have been 
obvious based on the combination of the Laser Chess references, which teach the claimed 
game in electronic form, and the Swift patent, which teaches a physical laser-based game. 
According to MGA, the district court erred both (1) in concluding that because the ’242 
patent relates to a physical game, the Laser Chess articles were non-analogous art; and (2) 
in assuming that a person of skill in the art was a layperson rather than, as put forth by 
Innovention, a mechanical engineer with knowledge of optics. Finally, MGA argues, 
Innovention’s unsupported and conclusory assertions of secondary considerations fail to 
overcome MGA’s prima facie case of obviousness. 
Innovention responds that the Laser Chess references in combination with the Swift 
patent fail to teach or suggest every limitation of the asserted claims, and thus MGA has 
failed to state a prima facie case of obviousness. Specifically, Innovention argues that 
Swift, as MGA admits, fails to disclose movable key pieces and that the Laser Chess 
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references fail to disclose any physical, non-virtual game components. Accordingly, 
Innovention argues that the Laser Chess references are non-analogous art because they 
are neither within the inventors’ field of endeavor, i.e., a non-virtual, three-dimensional, 
laser board game, nor reasonably pertinent to it. Innovention also argues that because 
MGA offered no evidence as to the level of skill in the art, the skill level defaults to that of 
a layperson, and that its evidence of secondary considerations provides further evidence 
that the claimed invention would not have been obvious. 
We conclude that the district court clearly erred in several of the factual findings 
underlying its obviousness analysis. The district court erred in finding that the Laser 
Chess references fail to qualify as analogous art. The court also erred in concluding that 
the level of skill in the art is that of a layperson. We address each in turn. 
A 
A reference qualifies as prior art for a determination under § 103 when it is analogous 
to the claimed invention. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992). “Two separate tests 
define the scope of analogous art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, 
regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the 
inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular 
problem with which the inventor is involved.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). “A reference is reasonably pertinent if it is one which, because of the matter with 
which it deals, logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in 
considering his problem.” Clay, 966 F.2d at 659. “If a reference disclosure has the same 
purpose as the claimed invention, the reference relates to the same problem, and that fact 
supports use of that reference in an obviousness rejection.” Id. Whether a prior art 
reference is “analogous” is a question of fact. Id. at 658. 
Innovention argues that the Laser Chess articles are non-analogous art because the 
’242 patent’s inventors were concerned with making a non-virtual, three-dimensional, 
laser-based board game, a project that involves mechanical engineering and optics, not 
computer programming. The district court appears to have agreed, finding that the Laser 
Chess references were non-analogous art since each discloses “an electronic version of the 
’242 patent.” The court, however, failed to consider whether a reference disclosing an 
electronic, laser-based strategy game, even if not in the same field of endeavor, would 
nonetheless have been reasonably pertinent to the problem facing an inventor of a new, 
physical, laser-based strategy game. In this case, the district court clearly erred in not 
finding the Laser Chess references to be analogous art based on this test as a matter of 
law.  
The ’242 patent and the Laser Chess references are directed to the same purpose: 
detailing the specific game elements comprising a chess-like, laser-based strategy game. 
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Specifically, the ′242 patent describes (1) the game’s components, including the game 
board, and various types of playing pieces; (2) the game's specific rules, including how 
the pieces may move on the game board during a player’s turn; and (3) the game’s 
ultimate objective, namely, illuminating an opponent’s key playing piece with a laser 
beam. The specification even distinguishes prior art patents based on these game 
elements, stating that U.S. Patent 3,516,671 lacks “the unique elements and rules of the 
[’242 patent’s] invention,” and U.S. Patent 6,702,286 contemplates a game in which the 
objective is not to “illuminate playing pieces,” but rather “to maneuver one’s pieces to 
flank (or surround) those of the opposing player.” 
The Laser Chess references likewise describe specific playing pieces, rules, and 
objectives to create a chess-like, laser-based strategy game. Both Laser Chess and 
Advanced Laser Chess disclose, for example, (1) various game pieces, each with unique 
capabilities; (2) rules for each player's turn; and (3) an ultimate objective of eliminating an 
opponent's king piece. 
Accordingly, the ’242 patent and the Laser Chess references relate to the same goal: 
designing a winnable yet entertaining strategy game. The ’242 patent’s specification 
confirms that game design was one objective facing its inventors. In particular, the 
specification states that “strategy games may differ in a variety of ways,” such as in board 
layout, the number and types of playing pieces, and the manner in which each piece 
moves on the game board, and that “each of these variations affects the strategy of the 
play and the degree of skill required to play the game.” The specification thus admonishes 
that if the game elements “are overly simplistic, the game is too easy, will usually end in 
a draw or a predictable manner, and quickly become uninteresting for the average 
player.” Conversely, according to the specification, if the game elements “are overly 
complicated, the game takes too long to learn and is frustrating and uninteresting for the 
average player.”  
The specific combination of game elements disclosed and claimed in the ’242 patent 
thus deals with the problem of game design, and game elements from any strategy game, 
regardless how implemented, “logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s 
attention in considering this problem.” Clay, 966 F.2d at 659. Basic game elements remain 
the same regardless of the medium in which they are implemented: whether molded in 
plastic by a mechanical engineer or coded in software by a computer scientist. And, as 
MGA’s evidence shows, inventors of numerous prior art patents contemplated the 
implementation of their strategy games in both physical and electronic formats. For 
example, the Swift patent states that “although the preferred embodiment is played by 
two players, obvious modifications of the game allow for a single player playing against 
a computer.” Thus, because no reasonable jury could find that the Laser Chess references 
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do not qualify as analogous prior art, and the district court erred in not so concluding as 
a matter of law. 
Because of its error, the district court failed to properly consider the scope and content 
of the relevant prior art as well as the differences between that art and the claimed 
invention, including whether one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated 
to combine the teachings of the Laser Chess references with the Swift patent in light of the 
standard articulated in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. We therefore remand these 
factual determinations to the district court to consider in the first instance. Furthermore, 
should the district court conclude that MGA has made out a prima facie case of 
obviousness based on the Laser Chess articles and the Swift patent, the court must then 
determine whether Innovention’s secondary considerations overcome MGA’s prima facie 
case. 
B 
A determination of obviousness requires a factual finding of the level of ordinary skill 
in the art. Yet, a district court’s failure to make a correct finding on the level of skill 
constitutes reversible error only where it affects the ultimate conclusion under § 103. For 
example, no reversal is necessary where a district court makes a determination that an 
invention would have been obvious to one having the lowest level of skill, i.e., a layperson, 
because what is obvious to a layperson is necessarily obvious to one with a higher level 
of skill in the field of the invention. Conversely, no reversal is necessary where a district 
court makes a determination of nonobviousness based on a finding of the highest possible 
level of skill in the relevant art, as fewer inventions are obvious to a person with a lower 
level of skill than to one with a higher level of skill. A less sophisticated level of skill 
generally favors a determination of nonobviousness, and thus the patentee, while a higher 
level of skill favors the reverse.  
In this case, the district court found that MGA had failed to provide any evidence of 
the level of skill in the art, and thus concluded that MGA’s obviousness argument could 
be pursued only on the basis of what is obvious to a layperson. In so concluding, the 
district court erred. While MGA is permitted to argue that any level of skill, and thus the 
skill of a layperson, would suffice to support a holding of obviousness, the factual record 
in this case does not support such a finding. Here, Innovention conceded to the district 
court that the level of ordinary skill in the art was greater than that of a layperson. 
Specifically, Innovention asserted that the development of a three-dimensional game 
would not, in fact, be easy for the average layperson, as it took Innovention’s game 
creators, a Ph.D. in mechanical engineering and two mechanical engineering students, a 
year and a half to develop and finalize Innovention’s game and that Innovention’s patent 
reveals that the claimed invention requires an understanding of geometrical optics. The 
district court appeared to agree, stating that “it seems some knowledge of mechanical 
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engineering or optics is required.” The district court thus clearly erred in basing its 
obviousness analysis on what would have been obvious to a layperson notwithstanding 
evidence in the record and its apparent factual finding that one of ordinary skill in the art 
would possess a higher level of skill in the art. 
Because the district court found nonobviousness based on an inappropriately low 
level of skill in the art, the error was not harmless. Accordingly, on remand, the district 
court must make a finding on the level of skill in the art and base its obviousness analysis 
on that level of skill. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment 
of literal infringement, and we vacate and remand the district court's grant of summary 
judgment of nonobviousness. 
Context & Application 
1. What are the two tests for analogous art? What do the cases we’ve read  tell us 
about what it means for an invention to be in the same “field of endeavor” as something 
else? What do they tell us about whether a reference would be “reasonably pertinent”? 
2. Why do you think courts have limited the scope of prior art that can be used in 
analyzing validity under § 103? In other words, why not use the full scope of things that 
count as prior art under § 102 when analyzing validity under § 103? 
3. What does the Federal Circuit say was wrong with the District Court’s analysis in 
Innovention Toys? Who got it right—are these the kinds of references you think should be 
considered analogous art? 
4.  Would you consider a toothbrush to be analogous art for a hairbrush? In In re Bigio, 
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ruled that a reference directed to a 
toothbrush was from the same field of invention as a claimed design for a hair brush 
because both were “hand-held brushes having a handle segment and a bristle substrate 
segment.” See 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Federal Circuit affirmed: 
Bigio argues that the “field of endeavor” test for analogous art is unworkable 
because the lack of clear guidelines leaves the application of this test to an 
examiner's subjective judgment. To the contrary, the field of endeavor test is 
neither wholly subjective nor unworkable. This test for analogous art requires the 
PTO to determine the appropriate field of endeavor by reference to explanations 
of the invention’s subject matter in the patent application, including the 
embodiments, function, and structure of the claimed invention.  
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. . . 
[T]he Board determined that the [toothbrush] reference fell within the scope of arts 
analogous to the claimed invention. Because substantial evidence supports the 
Board’s factual findings regarding the function and structure of the toothbrush art, 
this court affirms those findings. 
Id. at 1325–26. Judge Newman dissented: 
The toothbrush art is not analogous to the hair brush art. Bigio’s patent application 
is directed to a hair brush, and his claims are limited to a hair brush. A brush for 
hair has no more relation to a brush for teeth than does hair resemble teeth. 
The mode and mechanics of brushing teeth cannot reasonably be viewed as 
analogous to the mode and mechanics of brushing hair. To state the obvious: teeth 
require a brush that penetrates around the edges of relatively large and hard 
substrates, a brush that administers a soapy abrasive, a brush that works in the 
up-and-down and circular motion needed to scrub teeth; a brush for hair must 
serve entirely different shapes and textures and purposes. Neither the PTO nor my 
colleagues on this panel points to any ground on which a person seeking to design 
an improved hairbrush would deem the toothbrush art to be a source of usable 
technology, and thus “analogous,” whereby that source is relevant to a 
determination of obviousness. 
Id. at 1327 (Newman, J., dissenting). Which side—the majority or dissent—do you find 
more convincing? Also note that the case cited by Judge Newman talks about whether the 
use of a certain field or technology “would be suggested or motivated or taught, by 
sources in the prior art.” How, if at all, might the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR affect 
the strength of that precedent? 
3. What is the relationship between § 112 and § 103? According to the Federal Circuit: 
To render a claim obvious, the prior art, taken as a whole, must enable a skilled 
artisan to make and use the claimed invention. In general, a prior art reference 
asserted under § 103 does not necessarily have to enable its own disclosure, i.e., be 
“self-enabling,” to be relevant to the obviousness inquiry. . . . 
But even though a non-enabling reference can play a role in an obviousness 
analysis, the evidence of record must still establish that a skilled artisan could have 
made the claimed invention. . . . 
In the absence of . . . other supporting evidence to enable a skilled artisan to make 
the claimed invention, a standalone § 103 reference must enable the portions of its 
disclosure being relied upon. In this context the reference must necessarily enable 
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the relied-upon portion of its own disclosure—the same standard applied to 
anticipatory references.  
Raytheon Techs. Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 993 F.3d 1374, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2021). What do the 
cases we’ve read so far suggest about what kinds of “other supporting evidence” could 
(or should) be used in this context? 
4. What role does the level of skill in the art play in a § 103 analysis? The Federal 
Circuit has said:  
[T]he level of skill in the art is a prism or lens through which a judge, jury, or the 
Board views the prior art and the claimed invention. This reference point prevents 
these factfinders from using their own insight or, worse yet, hindsight, to gauge 
obviousness. Skill in the art does not act as a bridge over gaps in substantive 
presentation of an obviousness case, but instead supplies an important guarantee 
of objectivity in the process.  
Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
5. What happens if a court (or the PTAB) does not make a specific finding as to the 
level of skill in the art? The Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that is not always a fatal 
error: 
Genzyme’s third argument is that the Board erred by not making an explicit 
finding as to the level of skill of a person of ordinary skill as part of its obviousness 
analysis. This court has explained that the failure to make explicit findings 
regarding the level of skill in the art does not constitute reversible error when “the 
prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown.”  
Here the Board’s failure to make an explicit finding as to the level of skill is not 
reversible error because both parties proposed nearly identical language to 
describe a person of ordinary skill. Both proposed that such a person is a medical 
doctor or a Ph.D. in a biology-related field, has experience in lysosomal diseases, 
and has experience developing drugs and treatments for patients. Genzyme has 
not shown that there are any meaningful differences between its proposed 
definition of a person of ordinary skill and Biomarin’s, or that the outcome of this 
case would have been different based on which definition the Board used. The 
Board’s failure to make a specific finding as to the level of skill is therefore not 
reversible error. 
Genzyme Therapeutic Prod. Ltd. P’ship v. Biomarin Pharm. Inc., 825 F.3d 1360, 1371–72 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016). And if the parties don’t raise the issue, the court is not necessarily required to 
raise it sua sponte: 
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Failure to address the level of skill in the art is not error when the parties do not 
put such a determination at issue and when the level of an artisan’s skill is evident 
from the prior art and patent. While it is preferable that the fact finder specify the 
level of skill it has found to apply to the invention at issue, “the absence of specific 
findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error where 
the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not 
shown.”  
Rudolph Techs., Inc. v. Camtek, Ltd., 666 F. App’x 925, 931 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
6. What happens when people research in teams? Pre-AIA § 103(c) created a “safe 
harbor” of sorts for certain researchers. As Margo Bagley has explained: 
Prior to [2004], the joint collaboration of coworkers for the same employer could 
not be used as prior art for obviousness against later work, but that protection did 
not extend to the collaborations of coworkers from different organizations, such 
as those in university-industry joint research agreements. The CREATE Act 
eliminated the “same/different” organization distinction by disqualifying from the 
state of the art for determining obviousness information that is the work of 
researchers from different research organizations if there had been a pre-existing 
agreement for research collaboration. 
Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. 
REV. 217, 237 (2006).  
In enacting the CREATES Act, Congress rejected “the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit’s 1995 OddzOn v. Just Toys decision.” Id. at 236. In OddzOn, the Federal Circuit held 
that, under the pre-2004 version of § 103(c), “subject matter derived from another not only 
is itself unpatentable to the party who derived it under § 102(f), but, when combined with 
other prior art, may make a resulting obvious invention unpatentable to that party under 
a combination of §§ 102(f) and 103.” OddzOn Prod., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 
1403–04 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Can you see why this was a problem for some joint researchers?  
Following the 2004 enactment of the CREATES Act, § 103(c) read as follows: 
(1) Subject matter developed by another person, which qualifies as prior art only 
under one or more of subsections (e), (f), and (g) of section 102 of this title, shall 
not preclude patentability under this section where the subject matter and the 
claimed invention were, at the time the claimed invention was made, owned by 
the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person. 
(2) For purposes of this subsection, subject matter developed by another person 
and a claimed invention shall be deemed to have been owned by the same person 
or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person if-- 
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(A) the claimed invention was made by or on behalf of parties to a joint research 
agreement that was in effect on or before the date the claimed invention was made; 
(B) the claimed invention was made as a result of activities undertaken within the 
scope of the joint research agreement; and 
(C) the application for patent for the claimed invention discloses or is amended to 
disclose the names of the parties to the joint research agreement. 
(3) For purposes of paragraph (2), the term “joint research agreement” means a 
written contract, grant, or cooperative agreement entered into by two or more 
persons or entities for the performance of experimental, developmental, or 
research work in the field of the claimed invention. 
When Congress passed the AIA, however, it eliminated § 103(c). Can you see why? (Hint: 
Review hw the AIA defines what counts as prior art under § 102 (b)(2)(C) and § 102(c).) 
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8. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 
The patent statute provides that each patent “specification shall conclude with one or 
more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the 
inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). Claims perform 
a vital role in the modern patent system: for utility patents, they define the boundaries of 
the patentee’s legal rights. As a result, claims form the foundation for analyses of validity 
and infringement. Because of their importance, patent applicants, patentees, and accused 
infringers frequently engage in disputes about their meaning. The process by which these 
disputes are resolved is referred to as claim construction. That is the focus of this chapter. 
The problems of claim construction are similar to those that arise in other areas, like 
the interpretation of statutes and contracts. Claim construction does, however, present 
some unique twists on these familiar problems. Some of this is due to the technical nature 
of the underlying inventions, which is unfamiliar to many of the potential decision-
makers. Some of it is due to the novelty of the underlying inventions, which makes it more 
likely that the words used in the patent will lack settled definitions. And some of it is due 
to the back-and-forth between the inventor and the patent examiner that produces claim 
language. As you read the material in this chapter, consider whether the problems that 
arise fit within familiar patterns from other areas of the law—and are accordingly 
amenable to familiar solutions—or instead appear distinct from other areas, justifying 
special treatment. 
A. Interpreting Claims 
1. The Phillips Framework 
In Phillips v. AWH Corp., the Federal Circuit established the framework that governs 
claim construction disputes today. See 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Circ. 2005) (en banc). The focus 
of the case is on the weight that courts should place on the various sources used to resolve 
claim construction questions. In particular, Phillips addressed some tension in prior 
Federal Circuit cases regarding the role of the patent document itself as compared to other 
sources like dictionaries. As you read the case, consider how you might apply its 
framework to resolve debates about the meaning of patent language claiming inventions 
in fields of technology with which you are not familiar. 
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Phillips v. AWH Corp. 
415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) 
BRYSON, Circuit Judge. 
Edward H. Phillips invented modular, steel-shell panels that can be welded together 
to form vandalism-resistant walls. The panels are especially useful in building prisons 
because they are load-bearing and impact-resistant, while also insulating against fire and 
noise. Mr. Phillips obtained a patent on the invention, U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798, and he 
subsequently entered into an arrangement with AWH Corporation, Hopeman Brothers, 
Inc., and Lofton Corporation (collectively “AWH”) to market and sell the panels. That 
arrangement ended in 1990. In 1991, however, Mr. Phillips received a sales brochure from 
AWH that suggested to him that AWH was continuing to use his . . . patented technology 
without his consent. . . . 
In February 1997, Mr. Phillips brought suit in the United States District Court for the 
District of Colorado charging AWH with . . . infringement of claims 1, 21, 22, 24, 25, and 
26 of the ’798 patent. . . .  
. . . 
This court agreed to rehear the appeal en banc and vacated the judgment of the panel. 
We . . . reverse the portion of the court’s judgment addressed to the issue of infringement. 
I 
Claim 1 of the ’798 patent is representative of the asserted claims with respect to the 
use of the term “baffles.” It recites: 
Building modules adapted to fit together for construction of fire, sound and impact 
resistant security barriers and rooms for use in securing records and persons, 
comprising in combination, an outer shell . . . , sealant means . . . and further 
means disposed inside the shell for increasing its load bearing capacity comprising 
internal steel baffles extending inwardly from the steel shell walls. 
. . . [W]e must determine the correct construction of the structural term “baffles,” as 
used in the ’798 patent. 
II 
The first paragraph of section 112 of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 112, states that the 
specification 
shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process 
of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any 
person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the same . . . . 
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The second paragraph of section 112 provides that the specification 
shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly 
claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention. 
Those two paragraphs of section 112 frame the issue of claim interpretation for us. The 
second paragraph requires us to look to the language of the claims to determine what “the 
applicant regards as his invention.” On the other hand, the first paragraph requires that 
the specification describe the invention set forth in the claims. The principal question that 
this case presents to us is the extent to which we should resort to and rely on a patent’s 
specification in seeking to ascertain the proper scope of its claims. 
This is hardly a new question. The role of the specification in claim construction has 
been an issue in patent law decisions in this country for nearly two centuries. . . .  
A 
 It is a “bedrock principle” of patent law that “the claims of a patent define the 
invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” That principle has been 
recognized since at least 1836, when Congress first required that the specification include 
a portion in which the inventor “shall particularly specify and point out the part, 
improvement, or combination, which he claims as his own invention or discovery.” Act 
of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119. In the following years, the Supreme Court made 
clear that the claims are “of primary importance, in the effort to ascertain precisely what 
it is that is patented.” Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876). Because the patentee is 
required to “define precisely what his invention is,” the Court explained, it is “unjust to 
the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe it in a manner different from the 
plain import of its terms.”  
 We have frequently stated that the words of a claim “are generally given their 
ordinary and customary meaning,” [which] is the meaning that the term would have to a 
person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the 
effective filing date of the patent application.  
The inquiry into how a person of ordinary skill in the art understands a claim term 
provides an objective baseline from which to begin claim interpretation. That starting 
point is based on the well-settled understanding that inventors are typically persons 
skilled in the field of the invention and that patents are addressed to and intended to be 
read by others of skill in the pertinent art.  
 Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term 
not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in 
the context of the entire patent, including the specification. This court explained . . . : 
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It is the person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention through whose eyes 
the claims are construed. Such person is deemed to read the words used in the 
patent documents with an understanding of their meaning in the field, and to have 
knowledge of any special meaning and usage in the field. The inventor’s words 
that are used to describe the invention—the inventor’s lexicography—must be 
understood and interpreted by the court as they would be understood and 
interpreted by a person in that field of technology. Thus the court starts the 
decisionmaking process by reviewing the same resources as would that person, 
viz., the patent specification and the prosecution history. 
B 
In some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person of 
skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such 
cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of 
commonly understood words. In such circumstances, general purpose dictionaries may 
be helpful. In many cases that give rise to litigation, however, determining the ordinary 
and customary meaning of the claim requires examination of terms that have a particular 
meaning in a field of art. Because the meaning of a claim term as understood by persons 
of skill in the art is often not immediately apparent, and because patentees frequently use 
terms idiosyncratically, the court looks to “those sources available to the public that show 
what a person of skill in the art would have understood disputed claim language to 
mean.” Those sources include “the words of the claims themselves, the remainder of the 
specification, the prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant 
scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the state of the art.” 
1 
 [T]he claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular 
claim terms.  
To begin with, the context in which a term is used in the asserted claim can be highly 
instructive. To take a simple example, the claim in this case refers to “steel baffles,” which 
strongly implies that the term “baffles” does not inherently mean objects made of steel. . . .  
 Other claims of the patent in question, both asserted and unasserted, can also be 
valuable sources of enlightenment as to the meaning of a claim term. Because claim terms 
are normally used consistently throughout the patent, the usage of a term in one claim 
can often illuminate the meaning of the same term in other claims. Differences among 
claims can also be a useful guide in understanding the meaning of particular claim terms. 
For example, the presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation gives rise 
to a presumption that the limitation in question is not present in the independent claim. 
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2 
 The claims, of course, do not stand alone. Rather, they are part of “a fully integrated 
written instrument,” consisting principally of a specification that concludes with the 
claims. For that reason, claims “must be read in view of the specification, of which they 
are a part.” [T]he specification “is always highly relevant to the claim construction 
analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed 
term.” 
. . . 
The importance of the specification in claim construction derives from its statutory 
role. The close kinship between the written description and the claims is enforced by the 
statutory requirement that the specification describe the claimed invention in “full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms.” 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1. In light of the statutory directive that the 
inventor provide a “full” and “exact” description of the claimed invention, the 
specification necessarily informs the proper construction of the claims. In Renishaw, this 
court summarized that point succinctly: 
Ultimately, the interpretation to be given a term can only be determined and 
confirmed with a full understanding of what the inventors actually invented and 
intended to envelop with the claim. The construction that stays true to the claim 
language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention 
will be, in the end, the correct construction. 
158 F.3d at 1250. 
Consistent with that general principle, our cases recognize that the specification may 
reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the 
meaning it would otherwise possess. In such cases, the inventor’s lexicography governs. 
In other cases, the specification may reveal an intentional disclaimer, or disavowal, of 
claim scope by the inventor. In that instance as well, the inventor has dictated the correct 
claim scope, and the inventor’s intention, as expressed in the specification, is regarded as 
dispositive. 
The pertinence of the specification to claim construction is reinforced by the manner 
in which a patent is issued. The Patent and Trademark Office determines the scope of 
claims in patent applications not solely on the basis of the claim language, but upon giving 
claims their broadest reasonable construction “in light of the specification as it would be 
interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.” Indeed, the rules of the PTO require that 
application claims must “conform to the invention as set forth in the remainder of the 
specification and the terms and phrases used in the claims must find clear support or 
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antecedent basis in the description so that the meaning of the terms in the claims may be 
ascertainable by reference to the description.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(d)(1). . . . 
3 
 In addition to consulting the specification, we have held that a court “should also 
consider the patent’s prosecution history, if it is in evidence.” The prosecution history, 
which we have designated as part of the “intrinsic evidence,” consists of the complete 
record of the proceedings before the PTO and includes the prior art cited during the 
examination of the patent. Like the specification, the prosecution history provides 
evidence of how the PTO and the inventor understood the patent. Furthermore, like the 
specification, the prosecution history was created by the patentee in attempting to explain 
and obtain the patent. Yet because the prosecution history represents an ongoing 
negotiation between the PTO and the applicant, rather than the final product of that 
negotiation, it often lacks the clarity of the specification and thus is less useful for claim 
construction purposes. Nonetheless, the prosecution history can often inform the meaning 
of the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and 
whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution, making the claim 
scope narrower than it would otherwise be. 
C 
Although we have emphasized the importance of intrinsic evidence in claim 
construction, we have also authorized district courts to rely on extrinsic evidence, which 
“consists of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert 
and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.” However, while extrinsic 
evidence “can shed useful light on the relevant art,” we have explained that it is “less 
significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim 
language.” 
Within the class of extrinsic evidence, the court has observed that dictionaries and 
treatises can be useful in claim construction. We have especially noted the help that 
technical dictionaries may provide to a court “to better understand the underlying 
technology” and the way in which one of skill in the art might use the claim terms. Because 
dictionaries, and especially technical dictionaries, endeavor to collect the accepted 
meanings of terms used in various fields of science and technology, those resources have 
been properly recognized as among the many tools that can assist the court in determining 
the meaning of particular terminology to those of skill in the art of the invention. Such 
evidence, we have held, may be considered if the court deems it helpful in determining 
“the true meaning of language used in the patent claims.”  
We have also held that extrinsic evidence in the form of expert testimony can be useful 
to a court for a variety of purposes, such as to provide background on the technology at 
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issue, to explain how an invention works, to ensure that the court’s understanding of the 
technical aspects of the patent is consistent with that of a person of skill in the art, or to 
establish that a particular term in the patent or the prior art has a particular meaning in 
the pertinent field. However, conclusory, unsupported assertions by experts as to the 
definition of a claim term are not useful to a court. Similarly, a court should discount any 
expert testimony “that is clearly at odds with the claim construction mandated by the 
claims themselves, the written description, and the prosecution history, in other words, 
with the written record of the patent.” 
We have viewed extrinsic evidence in general as less reliable than the patent and its 
prosecution history in determining how to read claim terms, for several reasons. First, 
extrinsic evidence by definition is not part of the patent and does not have the 
specification’s virtue of being created at the time of patent prosecution for the purpose of 
explaining the patent’s scope and meaning. Second, while claims are construed as they 
would be understood by a hypothetical person of skill in the art, extrinsic publications 
may not be written by or for skilled artisans and therefore may not reflect the 
understanding of a skilled artisan in the field of the patent. Third, extrinsic evidence 
consisting of expert reports and testimony is generated at the time of and for the purpose 
of litigation and thus can suffer from bias that is not present in intrinsic evidence. The 
effect of that bias can be exacerbated if the expert is not one of skill in the relevant art or 
if the expert’s opinion is offered in a form that is not subject to cross-examination. Fourth, 
there is a virtually unbounded universe of potential extrinsic evidence of some marginal 
relevance that could be brought to bear on any claim construction question. In the course 
of litigation, each party will naturally choose the pieces of extrinsic evidence most 
favorable to its cause, leaving the court with the considerable task of filtering the useful 
extrinsic evidence from the fluff. Finally, undue reliance on extrinsic evidence poses the 
risk that it will be used to change the meaning of claims in derogation of the “indisputable 
public records consisting of the claims, the specification and the prosecution history,” 
thereby undermining the public notice function of patents.  
 In sum, extrinsic evidence may be useful to the court, but it is unlikely to result in a 
reliable interpretation of patent claim scope unless considered in the context of the 
intrinsic evidence. Nonetheless, because extrinsic evidence can help educate the court 
regarding the field of the invention and can help the court determine what a person of 
ordinary skill in the art would understand claim terms to mean, it is permissible for the 
district court in its sound discretion to admit and use such evidence. In exercising that 
discretion, and in weighing all the evidence bearing on claim construction, the court 
should keep in mind the flaws inherent in each type of evidence and assess that evidence 
accordingly. 




 The critical language of claim 1 of the ’798 patent—“further means disposed inside 
the shell for increasing its load bearing capacity comprising internal steel baffles 
extending inwardly from the steel shell walls”—imposes three clear requirements with 
respect to the baffles. First, the baffles must be made of steel. Second, they must be part of 
the load-bearing means for the wall section. Third, they must be pointed inward from the 
walls. Both parties, stipulating to a dictionary definition, also conceded that the term 
“baffles” refers to objects that check, impede, or obstruct the flow of something. The 
intrinsic evidence confirms that a person of skill in the art would understand that the term 
“baffles,” as used in the ’798 patent, would have that generic meaning. 
The other claims of the ’798 patent specify particular functions to be served by the 
baffles. For example, dependent claim 2 states that the baffles may be “oriented with the 
panel sections disposed at angles for deflecting projectiles such as bullets able to penetrate 
the steel plates.” The inclusion of such a specific limitation on the term “baffles” in claim 
2 makes it likely that the patentee did not contemplate that the term “baffles” already 
contained that limitation. Independent claim 17 . . . states that baffles are placed 
“projecting inwardly from the outer shell at angles tending to deflect projectiles that 
penetrate the outer shell.” That limitation would be unnecessary if persons of skill in the 
art understood that the baffles inherently served such a function. Dependent claim 6 . . . 
stat[es] that “the internal baffles of both outer panel sections overlap and interlock at 
angles providing deflector panels extending from one end of the module to the other.” If 
the baffles recited in claim 1 were inherently placed at specific angles, or interlocked to 
form an intermediate barrier, claim 6 would be redundant. 
The specification further supports the conclusion that persons of ordinary skill in the 
art would understand the baffles recited in the ’798 patent to be load-bearing objects that 
serve to check, impede, or obstruct flow. At several points, the specification discusses 
positioning the baffles so as to deflect projectiles. The patent states that one advantage of 
the invention over the prior art is that “[t]here have not been effective ways of dealing 
with these powerful impact weapons with inexpensive housing.” While that statement 
makes clear the invention envisions baffles that serve that function, it does not imply that 
in order to qualify as baffles within the meaning of the claims, the internal support 
structures must serve the projectile-deflecting function in all the embodiments of all the 
claims. The specification must teach and enable all the claims, and the section of the 
written description discussing the use of baffles to deflect projectiles serves that purpose 
for claims 2, 6, 17, and 23, which specifically claim baffles that deflect projectiles. 
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The specification discusses several other purposes served by the baffles. For example, 
the baffles are described as providing structural support. . . . The baffle 16 is described as 
a “strengthening triangular baffle.” . . . Figures 4 and 6 do not show the baffles as part of 
an “intermediate interlocking, but not solid, internal barrier.” In those figures, the baffle 
16 simply provides structural support . . . : 
 
Other uses for the baffles are listed in the specification as well. In Figure 7, the 
overlapping flanges “provide for overlapping and interlocking the baffles to produce 
substantially an intermediate barrier wall between the opposite wall faces”: 
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Those baffles thus create small compartments that can be filled with either sound and 
thermal insulation or rock and gravel to stop projectiles. By separating the interwall area 
into compartments, the user of the modules can choose different types of material for each 
compartment, so that the module can be “easily custom tailored for the specific needs of 
each installation.” When material is placed into the wall during installation, the baffles 
obstruct the flow of material from one compartment to another so that this “custom 
tailoring” is possible.  
 . . . We have held that “the fact that a patent asserts that an invention achieves several 
objectives does not require that each of the claims be construed as limited to structures 
that are capable of achieving all of the objectives.” Although deflecting projectiles is one 
of the advantages of the baffles of the ’798 patent, the patent does not require that the 
inward extending structures always be capable of performing that function. Accordingly, 
we conclude that a person of skill in the art would not interpret the disclosure and claims 
of the ’798 patent to mean that a structure extending inward from one of the wall faces is 
a “baffle” if it is at an acute or obtuse angle, but is not a “baffle” if it is disposed at a right 
angle.  
B 
 Invoking the principle that “claims should be so construed, if possible, as to sustain 
their validity,” AWH argues that the term “baffles” should be given a restrictive 
meaning . . . . 
While we have acknowledged the maxim that claims should be construed to preserve 
their validity, we have not applied that principle broadly, and we have certainly not 
endorsed a regime in which validity analysis is a regular component of claim construction. 
Instead, we have limited the maxim to cases in which “the court concludes, after applying 
all the available tools of claim construction, that the claim is still ambiguous.” In such 
cases, we have looked to whether it is reasonable to infer that the PTO would not have 
issued an invalid patent, and that the ambiguity in the claim language should therefore 
be resolved in a manner that would preserve the patent’s validity. 
. . .  
In this case, . . . the claim term at issue is not ambiguous. Thus, it can be construed 
without the need to consider whether one possible construction would render the claim 
invalid while the other would not. The doctrine of construing claims to preserve their 
validity, a doctrine of limited utility in any event, therefore has no applicability here. 
MAYER, Circuit Judge, with whom NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, joins, dissenting. 
Now more than ever I am convinced of the futility, indeed the absurdity, of this court’s 
persistence in adhering to the falsehood that claim construction is a matter of law devoid 
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of any factual component. Because any attempt to fashion a coherent standard under this 
regime is pointless, as illustrated by our many failed attempts to do so, I dissent. 
. . . 
In the name of uniformity, Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (en banc), held that claim construction does not involve subsidiary or underlying 
questions of fact and that we are, therefore, unbridled by either the expertise or efforts of 
the district court. What we have wrought, instead, is the substitution of a black box, as it 
so pejoratively has been said of the jury, with the black hole of this court. Out of this void 
we emit “legal” pronouncements by way of “interpretive necromancy”; these rulings 
resemble reality, if at all, only by chance. Regardless, and with a blind eye to the 
consequences, we continue to struggle under this irrational and reckless regime, trying 
every alternative—dictionaries first, dictionaries second, never dictionaries, etc., etc., etc. 
. . . 
While this court may persist in the delusion that claim construction is a purely legal 
determination, unaffected by underlying facts, it is plainly not the case. Claim 
construction is, or should be, made in context: a claim should be interpreted both from the 
perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art and in view of the state of the art at the time 
of invention. These questions, which are critical to the correct interpretation of a claim, 
are inherently factual. They are hotly contested by the parties, not by resort to case law as 
one would expect for legal issues, but based on testimony and documentary evidence. 
During so called Markman “hearings,” which are often longer than jury trials, parties battle 
over experts offering conflicting evidence regarding who qualifies as one of ordinary skill 
in the art; the meaning of patent terms to that person; the state of the art at the time of the 
invention; contradictory dictionary definitions and which would be consulted by the 
skilled artisan; the scope of specialized terms; the problem a patent was solving; what is 
related or pertinent art; whether a construction was disallowed during prosecution; how 
one of skill in the art would understand statements during prosecution; and on and on. In 
order to reconcile the parties’ inconsistent submissions and arrive at a sound 
interpretation, the district court is required to sift through and weigh volumes of evidence. 
While this court treats the district court as an intake clerk, whose only role is to collect, 
shuffle and collate evidence, the reality, as revealed by conventional practice, is far 
different. 
. . .   
Eloquent words can mask much mischief. The court’s opinion today is akin to 
rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic—the orchestra is playing as if nothing is amiss, 
but the ship is still heading for Davey Jones’ locker. 
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Context & Application 
1. The dissent mentions “Markman hearings.” This proceeding is named after the case 
that established that there is no Seventh Amendment right to a jury determination of claim 
interpretation. We’ll read more about Markman later in this chapter.  
2. In the Phillips framework, claim terms must be given their “ordinary and 
customary meaning,” which “is the meaning that the term would have to a person of 
ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” The Federal Circuit also 
established a hierarchy of sources for resolving disputes about claim language. Intrinsic 
evidence—that is, evidence from the patent document itself or the process by which it was 
obtained—takes precedence over extrinsic evidence like dictionaries and expert 
testimony. Suppose you had to determine the “ordinary and customary meaning” of a 
claim term “to a person of ordinary skill in the art” of the technology at issue in Phillips 
(i.e., modular wall design). How would you go about doing so? What sources would you 
use? What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of those sources? What if the 
technology at issue was in the field of software or cardiovascular stents or robotics? What 
do your answers suggest about the Phillips framework and the challenges of claim 
construction more generally? 
3. Phillips says that the “starting point” for claim construction “is based on the well-
settled understanding that inventors are typically persons skilled in the field of the 
invention and that patents are addressed to and intended to be read by others of skill in 
the pertinent art.” Who do you think actually reads patents? Who is the intended audience 
for a patent? Does your answer depend on which part of the patent we are focused on: the 
claims or the rest of the specification? For some theoretical perspectives, see Alan Devlin 
The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401 (2010); 
Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621 (2010); 
Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2009). For empirical 
investigations of these questions, see Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Who Reads Patents?, 35 
NATURE BIOTECH. 421 (2017); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful 
Information?, 25 HARVARD J.L & TECH. 531 (2012). 
4. The Federal Circuit has often warned against reading limitations from the 
specification into the claim. The idea is that, while the specification is designed to disclose 
technical information about how to make and use the invention, the claims must define 
the outer boundaries of the patentee’s rights. But the technical disclosure is not 
coextensive with the outer boundaries of the patentee’s rights; as Phillips explains, the 
technical disclosure might focus more narrowly on particular aspects of the invention. The 
patent system must therefore avoid using the technical disclosure in the specification to 
narrow the scope of the claims.  
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At the same time, the court tells us that the claims must be read in light of the 
specification. The idea here is that claim language is often somewhat bare-bones, but the 
specification provides much more detail on the invention. The specification might 
accordingly inform a reader as to how the words in the claims are being used. That is, 
because the claims themselves may well not provide sufficient context for discerning their 
meaning, the patent system should turn to the specification for that context, as would the 
skilled artisans who are the intended audience of the patent document.  
The risk, according to Phillips, is that the context of the specification might appear to 
narrow the scope of the claim, even though the claim might permissibly reach 
embodiments of the invention that are not described in much detail in the specification 
(as an aside, why do you think that might happen?). Does Phillips provide adequate tools 
for mitigating this risk while still permitting adequate flexibility for judges and jurors to 
rely on the specification to learn about the invention and the way skilled artisans might 
understand the claims?  
5. Lawyers and scholars have long debated the suitability of dictionaries for 
resolving disputes about the meanings of words in constitutions, statutes, contracts, and 
other legal texts. Many of the advantages and criticisms of dictionaries apply with equal 
force to claim construction. Should the patent system resolve some of these concerns by 
demanding that patent applicants specify, as part of their applications, which dictionary 
should be used to resolve ambiguities? Note also that some dictionaries are designed to 
be “descriptive” (i.e., to capture the meanings used by speakers of the language) or 
“prescriptive” (i.e., to include only meanings that are “correct,” at least in the view of the 
dictionary’s editors). Which dictionary design do you think would be a more appropriate 
source for claim construction? 
6. Phillips endorses the canon that an inventor may act as her own lexicographer. 
Although lexicographers ordinarily explicitly articulate the definitions they are applying 
to words, this canon of claim construction is most often invoked to support an implicit 
definition drawn from the specification. How does this square with the warning about 
importing limitations from the specification into the claim? 
7. Courts have developed a vast array of canons of claim constructions. Some of these 
are identified in Phillips. Like canons of statutory interpretation, it can seem that there is 
a canon to support any position one may wish to adopt in a particular case. Still, it’s worth 
paying some attention to them because courts frequently assert that they help guide their 
decisions. In addition to the “patentee as lexicographer” canon, another commonly 
invoked canon found in Phillips is that of claim differentiation. This canon states that 
claims should be interpreted so that each claim gets a meaning that is different from the 
meaning accorded to other claims; in other words, two different claims shouldn’t be 
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interpreted to cover exactly the same thing. Can you think of scenarios when it wouldn’t 
make sense to apply this canon? 
8. The dissent focuses on the factual nature of claim construction analysis. Is the 
dissent right to think of this as an essentially factual inquiry? If so, what does that tell you 
about the appropriate procedures and allocations of authority in claim construction? We 
will revisit this question, along with other procedural issues in claim construction, later in 
this chapter. 
2. Special Kinds of Claims 
Some claims are written in specialized formats that come with their own special rules 
of construction. This section focuses on two. First, is the means-plus-function claim, which 
is perhaps the most prominent specialized claim format. A means-plus-function claim 
permits a patentee to claim achieving a particular result without specifying in the claim 
the structures that achieve it. Second, a claim may be written in product-by-process form. 
This kind of claim is used to confine a patentee’s rights to a process used for obtaining a 
specified product.  
a. Means-Plus-Function Claims 
A means-plus-function claim specifies a particular function that must be performed; 
the specification then identifies the structures that perform that function. The construction 
of a means-plus-function term therefore (apparently) countenances greater reliance on the 
specification than the construction of an ordinary claim term. In a part of the Phillips 
opinion omitted from the main text above, the panel concluded that the relevant language 
in the claim did not trigger a “mean-plus-function” analysis. Here is the key portion of 
that analysis: 
We agree with the panel that the term “baffles” is not means-plus-function 
language that invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. To be sure, the claim refers to “means 
disposed inside the shell for increasing its load bearing capacity,” a formulation 
that would ordinarily be regarded as invoking the means-plus-function claim 
format. However, the claim specifically identifies “internal steel baffles” as 
structure that performs the recited function of increasing the shell’s load-bearing 
capacity. In contrast to the “load bearing means” limitation, the reference to 
“baffles” does not use the word “means,” and we have held that the absence of 
that term creates a rebuttable presumption that section 112, ¶ 6, does not apply. 
Means-plus-function claiming applies only to purely functional limitations that do 
not provide the structure that performs the recited function. While the baffles in 
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the ’798 patent are clearly intended to perform several functions, the term “baffles” 
is nonetheless structural; it is not a purely functional placeholder in which 
structure is filled in by the specification. The claims and the specification 
unmistakably establish that the “steel baffles” refer to particular physical 
apparatus. The claim characterizes the baffles as “extending inwardly” from the 
steel shell walls, which plainly implies that the baffles are structures. The 
specification likewise makes clear that the term “steel baffles” refers to particular 
internal wall structures and is not simply a general description of any structure 
that will perform a particular function. Because the term “baffles” is not subject to 
section 112, ¶ 6, we agree with the panel that the district court erred by limiting 
the term to corresponding structures disclosed in the specification and their 
equivalents. . . . 
Why do you think the patent system includes this claim format? As you read the case 
below, think about whether the claim element at issue could have been written as an 
ordinary element, rather than as a means-plus-function element. 
x x x 
Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC 
792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
LINN, Circuit Judge. 
Richard A. Williamson . . . owns U.S. Patent No. 6,155,840 and appeals from the 
stipulated final judgment in favor of defendants . . . . Because the district court correctly 
construed the limitation “distributed learning control module,” we affirm the judgment 
of invalidity of claims 8–12 of the ’840 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. . . . 
I 
A 
The ’840 patent describes methods and systems for “distributed learning” that utilize 
industry standard computer hardware and software linked by a network to provide a 
classroom or auditorium-like metaphor—i.e., a “virtual classroom” environment. The 
objective is to connect one or more presenters with geographically remote audience 
members. The disclosed inventions purport to provide “the benefits of classroom 
interaction without the detrimental effects of complicated hardware or software, or the 
costs and inconvenience of convening in a separate place.” 
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There are three main components of the “distributed learning” system set forth in the 
’840 patent: (1) a presenter computer, (2) audience member computers, and (3) a 
distributed learning server. The distributed learning server implements a “virtual 
classroom” over a computer network, such as the Internet, to facilitate communication 
and interaction among the presenter and audience members. The presenter computer is 
used by the presenter to communicate with the audience members and control 
information that appears on the audience member’s computer screen. An audience 
member’s computer is used to display the presentation and can be used to communicate 
with the presenter and other audience members. 
The ’840 patent includes the following [asserted claim], with disputed terms 
highlighted: 
8. A system for conducting distributed learning among a plurality of computer 
systems coupled to a network, the system comprising: 
a presenter computer system of the plurality of computer systems coupled to the 
network and comprising: 
a content selection control . . . ; and 
a presenter streaming data viewer . . . ; 
an audience member computer system of the plurality of computer systems and 
coupled to the presenter computer system via the network, the audience member 
computer system comprising: 
an audience member streaming data viewer . . . ; and 
a distributed learning server remote from the presenter and audience member 
computer systems of the plurality of computer systems and coupled to the 
presenter computer system and the audience member computer system via the 
network and comprising: 
a streaming data module for providing the streaming data from the remote 
streaming data source selected with the content selection control to the presenter 
and audience member computer systems; and 
a distributed learning control module for receiving communications transmitted 
between the presenter and the audience member computer systems and for 
relaying the communications to an intended receiving computer system and for 
coordinating the operation of the streaming data module. 




 Regarding questions of claim construction, including whether claim language 
invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, the district court’s determinations based on evidence intrinsic 
to the patent as well as its ultimate interpretations of the patent claims are legal questions 
that we review de novo. . . . 
C 
Applicability of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 
 Means-plus-function claiming occurs when a claim term is drafted in a manner that 
invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, which states: 
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for 
performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in 
support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding 
structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof. 
In enacting this provision, Congress struck a balance in allowing patentees to express a 
claim limitation by reciting a function to be performed . . . , while placing specific 
constraints on how such a limitation is to be construed, namely, by restricting the scope 
of coverage to only the structure, materials, or acts described in the specification as 
corresponding to the claimed function and equivalents thereof. 
To determine whether § 112, ¶ 6 applies to a claim limitation, our precedent has long 
recognized the importance of the presence or absence of the word “means.” . . . [T]he use 
of the word “means” in a claim element creates a rebuttable presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 
applies. Applying the converse, . . . the failure to use the word “means” also creates a 
rebuttable presumption—this time that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply. We have not, however, 
blindly elevated form over substance . . . . 
In making the assessment of whether the limitation in question is a means-plus-
function term subject to the strictures of § 112, ¶ 6, our cases have emphasized that the 
essential inquiry is . . . whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of 
ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for 
structure. . . . 
In Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004), 
we applied for the first time a different standard to the presumption flowing from the 
absence of the word “means” and held that “the presumption flowing from the absence 
of the term ‘means’ is a strong one that is not readily overcome,” . . . . In Flo Healthcare 
Solutions, LLC v. Kappos, 697 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012), . . . we raised the bar even 
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further, declaring that “when the claim drafter has not signaled his intent to invoke § 112, 
¶ 6 by using the term ‘means,’ we are unwilling to apply that provision without a showing 
that the limitation essentially is devoid of anything that can be construed as structure.” Our 
opinions . . . have thus established a heightened bar to overcoming the presumption that 
a limitation expressed in functional language without using the word “means” is not 
subject to § 112, ¶ 6. 
[We] conclude that such a heightened burden is unjustified and that we should 
abandon characterizing as “strong” the presumption that a limitation lacking the word 
“means” is not subject to § 112, ¶ 6. That characterization is unwarranted, is uncertain in 
meaning and application, and has the inappropriate practical effect of placing a thumb on 
what should otherwise be a balanced analytical scale. It has shifted the balance struck by 
Congress in passing § 112, ¶ 6 and has resulted in a proliferation of functional claiming 
untethered to § 112, ¶ 6 and free of the strictures set forth in the statute. Henceforth, we 
will apply the presumption . . . without requiring any heightened evidentiary showing 
and expressly overrule the characterization of that presumption as “strong.” We also 
overrule the strict requirement of “a showing that the limitation essentially is devoid of 
anything that can be construed as structure.” 
 The standard is whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary 
skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure. When a 
claim term lacks the word “means,” the presumption can be overcome and § 112, ¶ 6 will 
apply if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to “recite sufficiently definite 
structure” or else recites “function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that 
function.” The converse presumption remains unaffected: “use of the word ‘means’ 
creates a presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 applies.”  
Functional Nature of the Limitation 
We begin with the observation that the claim limitation in question is not merely the 
introductory phrase “distributed learning control module,” but the entire passage 
“distributed learning control module for receiving communications transmitted between 
the presenter and the audience member computer systems and for relaying the 
communications to an intended receiving computer system and for coordinating the 
operation of the streaming data module.” This passage, as lengthy as it is, is nonetheless 
in a format consistent with traditional means-plus-function claim limitations. It replaces 
the term “means” with the term “module” and recites three functions performed by the 
“distributed learning control module.” 
 “Module” is a well-known nonce word that can operate as a substitute for “means” 
in the context of § 112, ¶ 6. . . . “‘[M]odule’ is simply a generic description for software or 
hardware that performs a specified function.” Generic terms such as “mechanism,” 
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“element,” “device,” and other nonce words that reflect nothing more than verbal 
constructs may be used in a claim in a manner that is tantamount to using the word 
“means” because they “typically do not connote sufficiently definite structure” and 
therefore may invoke § 112, ¶ 6. 
Here, the word “module” does not provide any indication of structure because it sets 
forth the same black box recitation of structure for providing the same specified function 
as if the term “means” had been used. Indeed, Williamson himself acknowledges that “the 
term ‘module,’ standing alone is capable of operating as a ‘nonce word’ substitute for 
‘means.’”  
The prefix “distributed learning control” does not impart structure into the term 
“module.” These words do not describe a sufficiently definite structure. Although the 
“distributed learning control module” is described in a certain level of detail in the written 
description, the written description fails to impart any structural significance to the term. 
At bottom, we find nothing in the specification or prosecution history that might lead us 
to construe that expression as the name of a sufficiently definite structure as to take the 
overall claim limitation out of the ambit of § 112, ¶ 6. While Williamson is correct that the 
presence of modifiers can change the meaning of “module,” the presence of these 
particular terms does not provide any structural significance to the term “module” in this 
case. 
While portions of the claim do describe certain inputs and outputs at a very high level 
(e.g., communications between the presenter and audience member computer systems), 
the claim does not describe how the “distributed learning control module” interacts with 
other components in the distributed learning control server in a way that might inform 
the structural character of the limitation-in-question or otherwise impart structure to the 
“distributed learning control module” as recited in the claim. 
Disclosure of Corresponding Structure 
Having found that the “distributed learning control module” is subject to . . . § 112, 
¶ 6, we next determine whether the specification discloses sufficient structure that 
corresponds to the claimed function. We conclude that it does not.  
 Construing a means-plus-function claim term is a two-step process. The court must 
first identify the claimed function. Then, the court must determine what structure, if any, 
disclosed in the specification corresponds to the claimed function. Where there are 
multiple claimed functions, as we have here, the patentee must disclose adequate 
corresponding structure to perform all of the claimed functions. If the patentee fails to 
disclose adequate corresponding structure, the claim is indefinite. 
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The district court identified three claimed functions associated with the “distributed 
learning control module” term: (1) receiving communications transmitted between the 
presenter and the audience member computer systems; (2) relaying the communications 
to an intended receiving computer system; and (3) coordinating the operation of the 
streaming data module. The district court then found that the specification fails to disclose 
structure corresponding to the “coordinating” function. On appeal, it is undisputed that 
the claimed “coordinating” function is associated with the “distributed learning control 
module.” Thus, we must ascertain whether adequate structure corresponding to this 
function is disclosed in the specification. 
 Structure disclosed in the specification qualifies as “corresponding structure” if the 
intrinsic evidence clearly links or associates that structure to the function recited in the 
claim. Even if the specification discloses corresponding structure, the disclosure must be 
of “adequate” corresponding structure to achieve the claimed function. Under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112, ¶¶ 2 and 6, therefore, if a person of ordinary skill in the art would be unable to 
recognize the structure in the specification and associate it with the corresponding 
function in the claim, a means-plus-function clause is indefinite. 
 The . . . specification of the ’840 patent fails to disclose corresponding structure. The 
written description of the ’840 patent makes clear that the distributed learning control 
module cannot be implemented in a general purpose computer, but instead must be 
implemented in a special purpose computer—a general purpose computer programmed 
to perform particular functions pursuant to instructions from program software. A special 
purpose computer is required because the distributed learning control module has 
specialized functions as outlined in the written description. In cases such as this, involving 
a claim limitation that is subject to § 112, ¶ 6 that must be implemented in a special 
purpose computer, this court has consistently required that the structure disclosed in the 
specification be more than simply a general purpose computer or microprocessor. We 
require that the specification disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed function. 
The algorithm may be expressed as a mathematical formula, in prose, or as a flow chart, 
or in any other manner that provides sufficient structure.  
Williamson points to certain disclosures in the specification that, it claims, meet the 
§ 112, ¶ requirements. Williamson argues that the “distributed learning control module” 
controls communications among the various computer systems and that the 
“coordinating” function provides a presenter with streaming media selection 
functionality. These disclosures, however, are merely functions of the “distributed 
learning control module.” The specification does not set forth an algorithm for performing 
the claimed functions. 
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Williamson argues that figures 4 and 5 disclose the required algorithm. This is not the 
case. Figure 4 is a representative display from the presenter computer system under the 
direction of the “distributed learning control module.” 
 
This display includes an address or uniform resource locator or URL field, a channel field, 
an “add this node” button, and a “back” link. This is not a disclosure of an algorithm 
corresponding to the claimed “coordinating” function; it is a description of a presenter 
display interface. 
Figure 5 similarly fails to disclose an algorithm, as it is another representative display 
on the presenter computer system. This display allows the presenter to preview data 
before presenting it to the audience. This figure contains a box listing the sources of data 
and a media window that displays the current feed received from the source of data 
selected in the list box. Again, this figure is a description of a presenter display interface; 
it is not a disclosure of an algorithm corresponding to the claimed functions. . . . 
Because the ’840 patent fails to disclose any structure corresponding to the 
“coordinating” function of the “distributed learning control module,” we affirm the 
judgment that claims 8–16 are invalid for indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. . . . 
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b. Product-by-Process Claims 
Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc. 
566 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
RADER, Circuit Judge. 
Abbott Laboratories . . . markets crystalline cefdinir according to the ’507 patent under 
the trade name Omnicef. . . . Lupin’s generic product contains almost exclusively the 
Crystal B form of crystalline cefdinir (cefdinir monohydrate), whereas Abbott’s Omnicef 
product contains the Crystal A form of crystalline cefdinir (cefdinir anhydrate). Further, 
Lupin makes its products with processes other than those claimed in the ’507 patent. For 
these reasons, Lupin brought the Virginia action to clarify that its proposed product 
would not infringe a valid patent. Abbott counterclaimed for infringement. . . . 
[Abbott also sued Sandoz and Teva for infringement of the ’507 patent in a parallel 
action in Illinois.] 
Both cases arrived at this court on appeal. This court heard the cases together and 
decides them together with this decision. 
II 
Claim 1 claims crystalline cefdinir, using its chemical name, and defining its unique 
characteristics with powder X-ray diffraction (PXRD) angle peaks: 
1. Crystalline 7–[2–(2–a minothiazol–4–yl)–2–hydroxyiminoacetamido]–3–vinyl–
3–cephem.–4–carboxylic acid (syn isomer) which shows the peaks at the 
diffraction angles shown in the following table in its powder X-ray diffraction 
pattern: 
 
In contrast, claims 2–5 claim crystalline cefdinir, without any PXRD peak limitations, but 
with descriptions of processes used to obtain the crystalline cefdinir. Claims 2 and 5 are 
independent: 
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2. Crystalline 7–[2–(2–a minothiazol–4–yl)–2–hydroxyiminoacetamido] –3–vinyl–
3–cephem–4–carboxylic acid (syn isomer) which is obtainable by acidifying a 
solution containing 7–[2–(2–aminothiazol–4–yl)–2–hydroxyiminoacetamido]–3–
vinyl –3–cephem–4–carboxylic acid (syn isomer) at room temperature or under 
warming. 
5. Crystalline 7–[2–(2–aminothiazol–4–yl)–2–hydroxyiminoacetamido]–3–vinyl –
3–cephem–4–carboxylic acid (syn isomer) which is obtainable by dissolving 7–[2–
(2–aminothiazol–4–yl)–2 –hydroxyiminoacetamido]–3–vinyl–3–cephem–4–
carboxylic acid (syn isomer) in an alcohol, continuing to stir the solution slowly 
under warming, then cooling the solution to room temperature and allowing the 
solution to stand. 
These claims use PXRD as a way to claim the structure and characteristics of the 
unique crystalline form. PXRD is a method for identifying and distinguishing different 
crystalline compounds. The method beams X-rays toward a powdered chemical. The 
method then measures the ways the rays reflect or bend upon contact with the chemical. 
The diffraction angles and intensities vary with the type and purity of the test compound. 
A graph then plots the diffraction angle on one axis and the intensity on another. These 
graphs yield a unique “fingerprint” for each crystalline form of a chemical. A more 
sensitive form of X-ray diffraction is single crystal X-ray diffraction (SCXRD). As this 
name suggests, this method uses only a single crystal as a sample. SCXRD does not detect 
intensity, but produces a more precise diffraction angle measurement. 
The ’507 patent was not the first cefdinir patent. Rather, Astellas’ prior art U.S. Patent 
No. 4,559,334 describes the discovery of cefdinir as a compound demonstrating high 
antimicrobial activity. The ’334 patent expired on May 6, 2007. 
The ’507 patent claims priority to Japanese Patent Application No. 62–206199, which 
claimed two crystalline forms of cefdinir, “Crystal A” and “Crystal B.” The JP ’199 
application claimed Crystals A and B very specifically, defining Crystal A by three 
infrared (IR)-absorption wavelengths and sixteen PXRD angles and intensities. In 
contrast, Crystal B featured five IR-absorption wavelengths and twenty-one PXRD 
angles/intensities. 
Despite using the JP ’199 application for priority, the ’507 patent’s specification differs 
significantly. Specifically, Abbott . . . jettisoned the Crystal B disclosure found in the JP 
’199 application and crafted broader claims in its prosecution of the ’507 patent. Because 
the JP ’199 applications defines Crystal A and Crystal B physiochemically rather than 
structurally, the forms actually represent subgenuses of crystalline cefdinir. Thus Crystals 
A and B comprise crystalline forms of varying structures, which in the context of this case 
means varying levels of hydration. 
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III 
Evaluation of a summary judgment of noninfringement requires two steps: claim 
construction, which this court reviews without deference, and comparison of the properly 
construed claims to the accused product, process, or composition of matter, which in the 
context of summary judgment also occurs without deference. Although infringement by 
equivalency is a question of fact, this court may affirm summary judgment “where no 
reasonable fact finder could find equivalence.”  
1 
[The court first concluded that the trial court properly limited “crystalline” in claims 
1–5 to “Crystal A.”] 
2 
[Ed. note: The court, sua sponte, took en banc the issue of how to interpret product-by-
process claims. Chief Judge Michel and Judges Rader, Bryson, Gajarsa, Linn, Dyk, Prost, 
and Moore joined this portion of the opinion.] Claims 2–5 of the ’507 patent begin by 
reciting a product, crystalline cefdinir, and then recite a series of steps by which this 
product is “obtainable.” The Eastern District of Virginia correctly categorized claims 2–5 
as product-by-process claims. On appeal, Abbott argues that the Eastern District erred in 
construing the process steps of claims 2–5 under the rule in Atlantic Thermoplastics that 
“process terms in product-by-process claims serve as limitations in determining 
infringement,” rather than in accordance with Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. 
Genentech, Inc. (“The correct reading of product-by-process claims is that they are not 
limited to product prepared by the process set forth in the claims.”). This court takes this 
opportunity to clarify en banc the scope of product-by-process claims by adopting the rule 
in Atlantic Thermoplastics. 
In Atlantic Thermoplastics, this court considered the scope of product-by-process claim 
26 in the patent at issue: “the molded innersole produced by the method of claim 1.” The 
patentee urged that competing, indistinguishable innersoles made by a different method 
nonetheless infringed claim 26. This court rejected the patentee’s position [and] construed 
product-by-process claims as limited by the process. 
. . . 
The Supreme Court has long emphasized the limiting requirement of process steps in 
product-by-process claims. In BASF, the Court considered a patent [that] claimed 
“artificial alizarine, produced from anthracine or its derivatives by either of the methods 
herein described, or by any other method which will produce a like result.” In turn, the 
specification generally described a method for making artificial alizarine involving 
anthracine or its derivatives. Alizarine had been in use for thousands of years as a red 
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textile dye, traditionally extracted from madder root. Pure alizarine has the chemical 
formula C14H8O4, but “artificial alizarines” available in the market at the time of the 
litigation varied from almost completely pure alizarine, to combinations of alizarine and 
anthrapurpurine, to pure purpurine containing no alizarine whatsoever. The defendant’s 
product contained approximately sixty percent anthrapurpurine. Thus both alizarine and 
artificial alizarines were known in the prior art. The Supreme Court clearly articulated 
some of the scope and validity problems that arise when process limitations of product-
by-process claims are ignored: 
[The defendant’s product] is claimed by the plaintiff to be the artificial alizarine 
described in No. 4,321, and to be physically, chemically, and in coloring properties 
similar to that. But what that is is not defined in No. 4,321, except that it is the 
product of the process described in No. 4,321. Therefore, unless it is shown that 
the process of No. 4,321 was followed to produce the defendant’s article, or unless 
it is shown that that article could not be produced by any other process, the 
defendant’s article cannot be identified as the product of the process of No. 4,321. 
Nothing of the kind is shown. 
If the words of the claim are to be construed to cover all artificial alizarine, 
whatever its ingredients, produced from anthracine or its derivatives by methods 
invented since Graebe and Liebermann invented the bromine process, we then 
have a patent for a product or composition of matter which gives no information 
as to how it is to be identified. Every patent for a product or composition of matter must 
identify it so that it can be recognized aside from the description of the process for making 
it, or else nothing can be held to infringe the patent which is not made by that process. 
. . .  
Thus, . . . this court now restates that “process terms in product-by-process claims serve 
as limitations in determining infringement.” . . . [T]his holding follows this court’s clear 
statement in In re Thorpe that “product by process claims are limited by and defined by 
the process.” 
More recently, the Supreme Court has reiterated the broad principle that “each 
element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the 
patented invention.” Although Warner–Jenkinson specifically addressed the doctrine of 
equivalents, this rule applies to claim construction overall. As applied to product-by-
process claims, Warner–Jenkinson thus reinforces the basic rule that the process terms limit 
product-by-process claims. To the extent that Scripps Clinic is inconsistent with this rule, 
this court hereby expressly overrules Scripps Clinic. 
The dissenting opinions lament the loss of a “right” that has never existed in practice 
or precedent—the right to assert a product-by-process claim against a defendant who does 
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not practice the express limitations of the claim. This court’s en banc decision in no way 
abridges an inventor’s right to stake claims in product-by-process terms. Instead this 
decision merely restates the rule that the defining limitations of a claim—in this case 
process terms—are also the terms that show infringement. 
Thus this court does not question at all whether product-by-process claims are 
legitimate as a matter of form. The legitimacy of this claim form was indeed a relevant 
issue in the nineteenth century . . . [h]owever, this court need not address that settled 
issue. The issue here is only whether such a claim is infringed by products made by 
processes other than the one claimed. This court holds that it is not. 
. . . 
Product-by-process claims, especially for those rare situations when products were 
difficult or impossible to describe, historically presented a concern that the Patent Office 
might deny all product protection to such claims. In the modern context, however, if an 
inventor invents a product whose structure is either not fully known or too complex to 
analyze . . . , this court clarifies that the inventor is absolutely free to use process steps to 
define this product. The patent will issue subject to the ordinary requirements of 
patentability. The inventor will not be denied protection. Because the inventor chose to 
claim the product in terms of its process, however, that definition also governs the 
enforcement of the bounds of the patent right. This court cannot simply ignore as verbiage 
the only definition supplied by the inventor. 
This court’s rule regarding the proper treatment of product-by-process claims in 
infringement litigation carries its own simple logic. Assume a hypothetical chemical 
compound defined by process terms. The inventor declines to state any structures or 
characteristics of this compound. The inventor of this compound obtains a product-by-
process claim: “Compound X, obtained by process Y.” Enforcing this claim without 
reference to its defining terms would mean that an alleged infringer who produces 
compound X by process Z is still liable for infringement. But how would the courts 
ascertain that the alleged infringer’s compound is really the same as the patented 
compound? After all, the patent holder has just informed the public and claimed the new 
product solely in terms of a single process. Furthermore, what analytical tools can confirm 
that the alleged infringer’s compound is in fact infringing, other than a comparison of the 
claimed and accused infringing processes? If the basis of infringement is not the similarity 
of process, it can only be similarity of structure or characteristics, which the inventor has 
not disclosed. Why also would the courts deny others the right to freely practice process 
Z that may produce a better product in a better way? 
In sum, it is both unnecessary and logically unsound to create a rule that the process 
limitations of a product-by-process claim should not be enforced in some exceptional 
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instance when the structure of the claimed product is unknown and the product can be 
defined only by reference to a process by which it can be made. Such a rule would expand 
the protection of the patent beyond the subject matter that the inventor has “particularly 
pointed out and distinctly claimed” as his invention. 
3 
 In this case, Abbott’s plain language argument, that “obtainable by” introduces an 
optional process, even if “obtained by” would introduce limiting process steps, is also 
unavailing. The BASF case, an analogous situation to this case, controls. . . . [The] Supreme 
Court in BASF considered the following claim language: “Artificial alizarine, produced 
from anthracine or its derivatives by either of the methods herein described, or by any other 
method which will produce a like result.” The patentee argued that even though the defendant 
did not make artificial alizarine by “either of the methods herein described,” the claim 
should capture the product because of the “or by another method” language. The 
Supreme Court refused to attach importance to those expansive words: “No. 4,321 
furnishes no test by which to identify the product it covers, except that such product is to 
be the result of the process it describes.” Abbott’s claims 2–5, like those in BASF and like 
product-by-process claims in general, do not furnish any test by which to identify the 
cefdinir crystals except that they are the result of their respectively claimed processes. As 
per BASF, Abbott’s claim cannot capture a product obtained by or obtainable by processes 
other than those explicitly recited in the claims. 
If this court were to strip the process elements from the claims, as Abbott would urge, 
for infringement purposes, there would then be nothing to differentiate independent 
claim 2 from independent claim 5. After all, if those claims are not bound by the process 
terms but only “define” the basic cefdinir compound, then each of the claims recite the 
same thing, over and over again. Though Abbott argues that it merely intends to give 
meaning to the word “obtainable,” it instead seeks to have this court render meaningless 
the explicit process limitations that the applicant chose to define its invention.  
The intrinsic evidence in this case further rebuts Abbott’s contention . . . . In column 2 
of the ’507 patent, under the title heading “The Process for Preparing Crystal A of the 
Compound (I),” the patentee used specific language to describe the very two processes 
that are mirrored in claims 2 and 5. This language is not open-ended, nor does it constitute 
a mere description of the product by reference to the manner in which it can be made . . . . 
By drafting claims 2 and 5 to incorporate these specific processes, Abbott made a 
conscious choice to place process requirements on its claimed product. If Abbott had 
wanted to obtain broader coverage for crystalline cefdinir devoid of any process 
limitations . . . , it could have simply done so (if . . . it is really the product that is the heart 
of the invention, not the process). But it did not. The crystals of claims 2 and 5 are simply 
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not identifiable other than by the processes disclosed in column 2. This court must enforce 
the ways and terms that a party chooses to define its invention. 
The prosecution history also does not support Abbott’s contention that “obtainable 
by” offers merely an optional set of definitional process conditions. During prosecution, 
Abbott faced obviousness rejections based on application claims 6–9, which were process 
claims that mirrored the very process limitations of issued claims 2–5. The PTO refused to 
issue the claims until one set of duplicates was cancelled. Abbott’s action in cancelling 
claims 6–9 demonstrates its acquiescence to the PTO’s view that the process elements of 
claims 2–5 are critical parts of those claims. In addition, in a response to the PTO’s office 
action, Abbott chose to differentiate a cited § 103 reference, Takaya, on the basis that 
Abbott’s claimed processes are different. For these reasons, the applicant’s statement in 
the file wrapper that “the method of preparation . . . is not considered the heart of the 
present invention” should not be afforded undue gravitas. The process limitations cannot 
be haphazardly jettisoned for an infringement analysis when they were so important in 
the patentability analysis. 
In sum, a patentee’s use of the word “obtainable” rather than “obtained by” cannot 
give it a free pass to escape the ambit of the product-by-process claiming doctrine. Claims 
that include such ambiguous language should be viewed extremely narrowly. If this court 
does not require, as a precondition for infringement, that an accused infringer actually use 
a recited process, simply because of the patentee’s choice of the probabilistic suffix “able,” 
the very recitation of that process becomes redundant. This would widen the scope of the 
patentee’s claims beyond that which is actually invented—a windfall to the inventor at 
the expense of future innovation and proper notice to the public of the scope of the 
claimed invention. For all the above reasons, the [trial court] correctly construed the 
process limitations beginning with “obtainable by” in claims 2–5 as limiting the asserted 
claims to products made by those process steps. 
NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, with whom Circuit Judges MAYER and LOURIE join, 
dissenting from en banc Section III.A.2. 
The court today acts en banc to overturn a century of precedent and practice, and holds 
that a new product that is difficult to describe without reference to how it was made, but 
that is nonetheless a new and unobvious product, cannot be protected as a product if its 
description is aided by reference to how it was made. Heretofore a new product whose 
structure was not fully known or not readily described could be patented as a product by 
including in the product description sufficient reference to how it can be made, to 
distinguish the new product from prior art products. Patentability was determined as a 
product, independent of any process reference in the claim, and validity and infringement 
were based on the product itself. This expedient for patenting products whose structure 
was not fully known at the time of filing the patent application has been called the “rule 
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of necessity.” It was pragmatic, fair, and just, for it attuned patent law and practice to the 
realities of invention. 
Today the court rejects this expedient and discards this practice, ruling that all claims 
containing a process term under the rule of necessity now must be construed, for purposes 
of infringement, as limited to use of any process term that was used to assist in defining 
the product. That is, such a product is not patented as a product, however it is produced, 
but is limited to the process by which it was obtained. This is a new restraint on patents 
for new products, particularly today’s complex chemical and biological products whose 
structure may be difficult to analyze with precision. It is a change of law with unknown 
consequences for patent-based innovation. 
LOURIE, Circuit Judge, dissenting from en banc Section III.A.2. 
I respectfully dissent from the court’s en banc holding in Section III.A.2 that product-
by-process claims always require use of the recited process in order to be infringed. 
I agree that there is substantial Supreme Court precedent that holds that product-by-
process claims require use of the recited process for there to be infringement. However, 
many of those cases applied overly broad language to fact situations involving old 
products or used vague language that makes it difficult to determine whether the 
products were old or new. Clearly, however, when a product is old, a product-by-process 
claim cannot be interpreted as a claim to the product made by any means. The product is 
old and unpatentable per se. BASF in fact involved an old product. 
There is arguably a different situation that should apply to chemical-biological 
products today than to mechanical products of more than a century ago. When a product 
is new and the inventor claims it by a process of preparation, I fail to see why the product-
by-process claim should not be interpreted as a product claim that can be infringed even 
when the product is made by means other than that recited in the claim. . . . The Court 
years ago did not have occasion to consider today’s innovations or decide whether a 
distinction should be made between a new chemical-biological product and an old 
product made by a new process. 
And there may be differing results depending upon the exact wording of a claim at 
issue. For example, a claim reading “when made by” might only be infringed when the 
recited process is used by the accused, as it is situational. On the other hand, a claim 
reading “obtainable by” refers to capability, so it might not require use of the process to 
infringe. “Obtained by” is ambiguous. Bright lines have their uses, but judging should 
take account of differing circumstances. In addition, of course, in order to sustain any 
claim for infringement, a patent owner must prove that an accused product is the same as 
that covered by an asserted claim. If the reason a product was claimed by its process was 
that its structure was unknown, then, if, at the time infringement is asserted, there still is 
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no means to ascertain structurally whether the accused product is the same as that 
claimed, the infringement claim fails. However, that should not mean that a new product 
claimed by a process of preparation cannot ever be infringed when made by another 
process. 
It may be that with today’s analytical techniques there is little need for product-by-
process claims. After all, claim 1 of the Abbott patent is a claim to a compound, not only 
by name, but also by certain of its characteristics. A claim to a product defined by its 
characteristics or properties surely is a proper claim. 
However, product-by-process issues still seem to come before us and I would make a 
distinction between old products and new products in interpreting product-by-process 
claims. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the court’s en banc holding. 
B. Institutional Dimensions of Claim Construction 
Claim construction raises an array of difficult questions regarding the allocation of 
authority between judges and juries, trial courts and appellate courts, and the judicial and 
executive branches. These questions have taken their turn in the patent system’s spotlight. 
In this section, we will explore how each of those questions have been resolved and the 
impact they have had on patent process. 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 
517 U.S. 370 (1996) 
Justice SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question here is whether the interpretation of a so-called patent claim, the portion 
of the patent document that defines the scope of the patentee’s rights, is a matter of law 
reserved entirely for the court, or subject to a Seventh Amendment guarantee that a jury 
will determine the meaning of any disputed term of art about which expert testimony is 
offered. We hold that the construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, 
is exclusively within the province of the court. 
I 
[A] patent must describe the exact scope of an invention and its manufacture to 
“secure to the patentee all to which he is entitled, and to apprise the public of what is still 
open to them.” . . . [T]hese objectives are served by two distinct elements of a patent 
document. First, it contains a specification describing the invention “in such full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the 
same.” 35 U.S.C. § 112. Second, a patent includes one or more “claims,” which 
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“particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant regards 
as his invention.” Id. . . . The claim “defines the scope of a patent grant,” and functions to 
forbid not only exact copies of an invention, but products that go to “the heart of an 
invention but avoids the literal language of the claim by making a noncritical change.” . . .  
Characteristically, patent lawsuits charge what is known as infringement, and rest on 
allegations that the defendant “without authority made, used or sold the patented 
invention” . . . . Victory in an infringement suit requires a finding that the patent claim 
“covers the alleged infringer’s product or process,” which in turn necessitates a 
determination of “what the words in the claim mean.”  
Petitioner in this infringement suit, Markman, owns United States Reissue Patent No. 
33,054 for his “Inventory Control and Reporting System for Drycleaning Stores.” The 
patent describes a system that can monitor and report the status, location, and movement 
of clothing in a dry-cleaning establishment. . . .  
Part of the dispute hinged upon the meaning of the word “inventory,” a term found 
in Markman’s independent claim 1, which states that Markman’s product can “maintain 
an inventory total” and “detect and localize spurious additions to inventory.” The case 
was tried before a jury, which heard, among others, a witness produced by Markman who 
testified about the meaning of the claim language. 
After the jury compared the patent to Westview’s device, it found an infringement of 
Markman’s independent claim 1 and dependent claim 10. The District Court nevertheless 
granted Westview’s deferred motion for judgment as a matter of law, one of its reasons 
being that the term “inventory” in Markman’s patent encompasses “both cash inventory 
and the actual physical inventory of articles of clothing.” Under the trial court’s 
construction of the patent, . . . a tracking system for dry cleaners would not infringe 
Markman’s patent unless the product was capable of tracking articles of clothing 
throughout the cleaning process and generating reports about their status and location. 
. . . [T]he District Court directed a verdict on the ground that Westview’s device does not 
have the “means to maintain an inventory total” and thus cannot “detect and localize 
spurious additions to inventory as well as spurious deletions therefrom” . . . .  
Markman appealed, arguing it was error for the District Court to substitute its 
construction of the disputed claim term “inventory” for the construction the jury had 
presumably given it. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed, 
holding the interpretation of claim terms to be the exclusive province of the court and the 
Seventh Amendment to be consistent with that conclusion. Markman sought our review 
on each point, and we granted certiorari. We now affirm. 
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II 
The Seventh Amendment provides that “in Suits at common law, where the value in 
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .” 
Since Justice Story’s day, we have understood that “the right of trial by jury thus 
preserved is the right which existed under the English common law when the 
Amendment was adopted.” In keeping with our longstanding adherence to this 
“historical test,” we ask, first, whether we are dealing with a cause of action that either 
was tried at law at the time of the founding or is at least analogous to one that was. If the 
action in question belongs in the law category, we then ask whether the particular trial 
decision must fall to the jury in order to preserve the substance of the common-law right 
as it existed in 1791. 
A 
As to the first issue, . . . “our analysis is familiar. First we compare the statutory action 
to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts 
of law and equity.” Equally familiar is the descent of today’s patent infringement action 
from the infringement actions tried at law in the 18th century, and there is no dispute that 
infringement cases today must be tried to a jury . . . . 
B 
This conclusion raises the second question, whether a particular issue occurring 
within a jury trial (here the construction of a patent claim) is itself necessarily a jury issue, 
the guarantee being essential to preserve the right to a jury’s resolution of the ultimate 
dispute. In some instances the answer to this second question may be easy because of clear 
historical evidence that the very subsidiary question was so regarded under the English 
practice of leaving the issue for a jury. But when, as here, the old practice provides no 
clear answer, we are forced to make a judgment about the scope of the Seventh 
Amendment guarantee without the benefit of any foolproof test. 
The . . . answer to the second question “must depend on whether the jury must 
shoulder this responsibility as necessary to preserve the substance of the common-law right of 
trial by jury.” “Only those incidents which are regarded as fundamental, as inherent in 
and of the essence of the system of trial by jury, are placed beyond the reach of the 
legislature.” 
The “substance of the common-law right” is, however, a pretty blunt instrument for 
drawing distinctions. We have tried to sharpen it, to be sure, by reference to the distinction 
between substance and procedure. We have also spoken of the line as one between issues 
of fact and law.  
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But the sounder course, when available, is to classify a mongrel practice (like 
construing a term of art following receipt of evidence) by using the historical method, 
much as we do in characterizing the suits and actions within which they arise. Where 
there is no exact antecedent, the best hope lies in comparing the modern practice to earlier 
ones whose allocation to court or jury we do know, seeking the best analogy we can draw 
between an old and the new. 
C 
 “Prior to 1790 nothing in the nature of a claim had appeared either in British patent 
practice or in that of the American states,” and we have accordingly found no direct 
antecedent of modern claim construction in the historical sources. Claim practice did not 
achieve statutory recognition until the passage of the Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 
119, and inclusion of a claim did not become a statutory requirement until 1870, Act of 
July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 201. Although, as one historian has observed, as early as 
1850 “judges were . . . beginning to express more frequently the idea that in seeking to 
ascertain the invention ‘claimed’ in a patent the inquiry should be limited to interpreting 
the summary, or ‘claim,’ the idea that the claim is just as important if not more important 
than the description and drawings did not develop until the Act of 1870 or thereabouts.” 
At the time relevant for Seventh Amendment analogies, in contrast, it was the 
specification, itself a relatively new development, that represented the key to the patent. 
Thus, patent litigation in that early period was typified by so-called novelty actions, 
testing whether “any essential part of the patent had been disclosed to the public before,” 
and “enablement” cases, in which juries were asked to determine whether the 
specification described the invention well enough to allow members of the appropriate 
trade to reproduce it. 
The closest 18th-century analogue of modern claim construction seems, then, to have 
been the construction of specifications, and as to that function the mere smattering of 
patent cases that we have from this period shows no established jury practice sufficient to 
support an argument by analogy that today’s construction of a claim should be a 
guaranteed jury issue. Few of the case reports even touch upon the proper interpretation 
of disputed terms in the specifications at issue, and none demonstrates that the definition 
of such a term was determined by the jury. This absence of an established practice should 
not surprise us, given the primitive state of jury patent practice at the end of the 18th 
century . . . . Although by 1791 more than a century had passed since the enactment of the 
Statute of Monopolies, which provided that the validity of any monopoly should be 
determined in accordance with the common law, patent litigation had remained within 
the jurisdiction of the Privy Council until 1752 and hence without the option of a jury trial. 
Indeed, the state of patent law in the common-law courts before 1800 led one historian to 
observe that “the reported cases are destitute of any decision of importance . . . . At the 
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end of the eighteenth century, therefore, the Common Law Judges were left to pick up the 
threads of the principles of law without the aid of recent and reliable precedents.” Earlier 
writers expressed similar discouragement at patent law’s amorphous character, and, as 
late as the 1830’s, English commentators were irked by enduring confusion in the field. 
Markman seeks to supply what the early case reports lack in so many words by . . . 
arguing that the 18th-century juries must have acted as definers of patent terms just to 
reach the verdicts we know they rendered in patent cases turning on enablement or 
novelty. But the conclusion simply does not follow. There is no more reason to infer that 
juries supplied plenary interpretation of written instruments in patent litigation than in 
other cases implicating the meaning of documentary terms, and we do know that in other 
kinds of cases during this period judges, not juries, ordinarily construed written 
documents. 
The probability that the judges were doing the same thing in the patent litigation of 
the time is confirmed by the fact that as soon as the English reports did begin to describe 
the construction of patent documents, they show the judges construing the terms of the 
specifications. This evidence is in fact buttressed by cases from this Court; when they first 
reveal actual practice, the practice revealed is of the judge construing the patent. See, e.g., 
Winans v. Denmead, 15 How. 330, 338 (1854). These indications of our patent practice are 
the more impressive for being all of a piece with what we know about the analogous 
contemporary practice of interpreting terms within a land patent, where it fell to the 
judge, not the jury, to construe the words. 
D 
Losing, then, on the contention that juries generally had interpretive responsibilities 
during the 18th century, Markman seeks a different anchor for analogy in the more 
modest contention that even if judges were charged with construing most terms in the 
patent, the art of defining terms of art employed in a specification fell within the province 
of the jury. Again, however, Markman has no authority from the period in question, but 
relies instead on the later case of Neilson v. Harford, Webs. Pat. Cas. 328 (Exch. 1841). There, 
an exchange between the judge and the lawyers indicated that although the construction 
of a patent was ordinarily for the court, judges should “leave the question of words of art 
to the jury.” . . . [T]he most we can say is that an English report more than 70 years after 
the time that concerns us indicates an exception to what probably had been occurring 
earlier. In place of Markman’s inference that this exceptional practice existed in 1791 there 
is at best only a possibility that it did, and for anything more than a possibility we have 
found no scholarly authority. 
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III 
Since evidence of common-law practice at the time of the framing does not entail 
application of the Seventh Amendment’s jury guarantee to the construction of the claim 
document, we must look elsewhere to characterize this determination of meaning in order 
to allocate it as between court or jury. We accordingly consult existing precedent and 
consider both the relative interpretive skills of judges and juries and the statutory policies 
that ought to be furthered by the allocation. 
A 
The two elements of a simple patent case, construing the patent and determining 
whether infringement occurred, were characterized by the former patent practitioner, 
Justice Curtis. “The first is a question of law, to be determined by the court, construing 
the letters-patent, and the description of the invention and specification of claim annexed 
to them. The second is a question of fact, to be submitted to a jury.”  
In arguing for a different allocation of responsibility for the first question, Markman 
relies primarily on two cases . . . said to show that evidence of the meaning of patent terms 
was offered to 19th-century juries, and thus to imply that the meaning of a documentary 
term was a jury issue whenever it was subject to evidentiary proof. That is not what 
Markman’s cases show, however. 
. . . 
Bischoff [v. Wethered, 9 Wall. 812 (1870)] does not . . . hold that the use of expert 
testimony about the meaning of terms of art requires the judge to submit the question of 
their construction to the jury. It is instead a case in which the Court drew a line between 
issues of document interpretation and product identification, and held that expert 
testimony was properly presented to the jury on the latter, ultimate issue . . . . The Court 
did not see the decision as bearing upon the appropriate treatment of disputed terms. As 
the opinion emphasized, the Court’s “view of the case is not intended to, and does not, 
trench upon the doctrine that the construction of written instruments is the province of 
the court alone. It is not the construction of the instrument, but the character of the thing 
invented, which is sought in questions of identity and diversity of inventions.” . . . 
If the line drawn . . . is a fine one, it is one that the Court has drawn repeatedly in 
explaining the respective roles of the jury and judge in patent cases, and one understood 
by commentators writing in the aftermath of the cases Markman cites. Walker, for 
example, read Bischoff as holding that the question of novelty is not decided by a 
construction of the prior patent, “but depends rather upon the outward embodiment of 
the terms contained in the prior patent; and that such outward embodiment is to be 
properly sought, like the explanation of latent ambiguities arising from the description of 
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external things, by evidence in pais.” He also emphasized in the same treatise that matters 
of claim construction, even those aided by expert testimony, are questions for the court:  
Questions of construction are questions of law for the judge, not questions of fact 
for the jury. As it cannot be expected, however, that judges will always possess the 
requisite knowledge of the meaning of the terms of art or science used in letters 
patent, it often becomes necessary that they should avail themselves of the light 
furnished by experts relevant to the significance of such words and phrases. The 
judges are not, however, obliged to blindly follow such testimony. 
Virtually the same description of the court’s use of evidence in its interpretive role was 
set out in another contemporary treatise: 
The duty of interpreting letters-patent has been committed to the courts. A patent 
is a legal instrument, to be construed, like other legal instruments, according to its 
tenor. . . . Where technical terms are used, or where the qualities of substances or 
operations mentioned or any similar data necessary to the comprehension of the 
language of the patent are unknown to the judge, the testimony of witnesses may 
be received upon these subjects, and any other means of information be employed. 
But in the actual interpretation of the patent the court proceeds upon its own 
responsibility, as an arbiter of the law, giving to the patent its true and final character and 
force. 
B 
Where history and precedent provide no clear answers, functional considerations also 
play their part in the choice between judge and jury to define terms of art. . . . [W]hen an 
issue “falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact, the 
fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound 
administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the 
issue in question.” So it turns out here, for judges, not juries, are the better suited to find 
the acquired meaning of patent terms. 
 The construction of written instruments is one of those things that judges often do 
and are likely to do better than jurors unburdened by training in exegesis. Patent 
construction in particular “is a special occupation, requiring, like all others, special 
training and practice. The judge, from his training and discipline, is more likely to give a 
proper interpretation to such instruments than a jury; and he is, therefore, more likely to 
be right, in performing such a duty, than a jury can be expected to be.” Such was the 
understanding nearly a century and a half ago, and there is no reason to weigh the 
respective strengths of judge and jury differently in relation to the modern claim; quite 
the contrary, for “the claims of patents have become highly technical in many respects as 
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the result of special doctrines relating to the proper form and scope of claims that have 
been developed by the courts and the Patent Office.” 
 Markman would trump these considerations with his argument that a jury should 
decide a question of meaning peculiar to a trade or profession simply because the question 
is a subject of testimony requiring credibility determinations, which are the jury’s forte. It 
is, of course, true that credibility judgments have to be made about the experts who testify 
in patent cases, and in theory there could be a case in which a simple credibility judgment 
would suffice to choose between experts whose testimony was equally consistent with a 
patent’s internal logic. But our own experience with document construction leaves us 
doubtful that trial courts will run into many cases like that. In the main, we expect, any 
credibility determinations will be subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis 
of the whole document, required by the standard construction rule that a term can be 
defined only in a way that comports with the instrument as a whole. Thus, in these cases 
a jury’s capabilities to evaluate demeanor, to sense the “mainsprings of human conduct,” 
or to reflect community standards, are much less significant than a trained ability to 
evaluate the testimony in relation to the overall structure of the patent. The decisionmaker 
vested with the task of construing the patent is in the better position to ascertain whether 
an expert’s proposed definition fully comports with the specification and claims and so 
will preserve the patent’s internal coherence. We accordingly think there is sufficient 
reason to treat construction of terms of art like many other responsibilities that we cede to 
a judge in the normal course of trial, notwithstanding its evidentiary underpinnings. 
C 
Finally, we see the importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent as an 
independent reason to allocate all issues of construction to the court. “The limits of a 
patent must be known for the protection of the patentee, the encouragement of the 
inventive genius of others and the assurance that the subject of the patent will be 
dedicated ultimately to the public.” Otherwise, a “zone of uncertainty which enterprise 
and experimentation may enter only at the risk of infringement claims would discourage 
invention only a little less than unequivocal foreclosure of the field,” and “the public 
[would] be deprived of rights supposed to belong to it, without being clearly told what it 
is that limits these rights.” It was just for the sake of such desirable uniformity that 
Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as an exclusive appellate 
court for patent cases, observing that increased uniformity would “strengthen the United 
States patent system in such a way as to foster technological growth and industrial 
innovation.”  
Uniformity would, however, be ill served by submitting issues of document 
construction to juries. Making them jury issues would not, to be sure, necessarily leave 
evidentiary questions of meaning wide open in every new court in which a patent might 
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be litigated, for principles of issue preclusion would ordinarily foster uniformity. But 
whereas issue preclusion could not be asserted against new and independent 
infringement defendants even within a given jurisdiction, treating interpretive issues as 
purely legal will promote (though it will not guarantee) intrajurisdictional certainty 
through the application of stare decisis on those questions not yet subject to 
interjurisdictional uniformity under the authority of the single appeals court. 
Accordingly, we hold that the interpretation of the word “inventory” in this case is an 
issue for the judge, not the jury, and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit. 
Context and Application 
1.  The Markman decision proved to be enormously consequential. Because the 
interpretation of patent claims was deemed to be the responsibility of judges, not juries, 
patent litigants began regularly filing pre-trial motions asking for a resolution of these 
disputes regarding claim language. Hearings of those motions, which are known as 
Markman hearings or claim construction hearings, frequently determine the outcome of 
the infringement lawsuit; once the meaning of the claim terms is set, the parties often come 
to an agreement on whether there has been infringement and what, if anything, an 
appropriate settlement would look like. See Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, Teva and 
the Process of Claim Construction, 70 FLA. L. REV. 379, 385 (2018) (describing claim 
construction as “the dispositive issue in the overwhelming majority of cases”). District 
courts that hear large numbers of patent cases have developed local rules regarding the 
timing and procedure of these hearings. See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Patent Local Rules; see also O2 
Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. 467 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (affirming 
the Northern District of California’s reliance on local patent rules). Savvy patent litigators 
focus intently on those local rules as part of the selection of a forum. 
2.  Is this any way to decide whether a judge or jury should resolve disputes about 
claim language? How valuable are those historical practices and analogies in light of the 
significant changes to the patent system, including the introduction of the claims 
themselves? How persuasive are the Court’s assessments of the functional 
considerations? See J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, 
Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. L. REV. 1 (2014) 
(demonstrating that the rate at which the Federal Circuit reversed district court claim 
construction decisions was as high as 44% in the year before Phillips was decided, and as 
low as 16.5% in 2009). 
3.  Even if there is no Seventh Amendment right to have a jury resolve questions of 
claim construction, Congress could mandate by statute that juries do so. Should it? Note 
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that in one area of patent litigation—Hatch-Waxman disputes involving applications to 
manufacture generic version of patented pharmaceuticals—judges resolve all questions 
of validity and infringement without a jury because the statute governing those disputes 
provides for only equitable claims for relief. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e); Sanofi-Synthelabo v. 
Apotex, Inc., 2002 WL 1917871 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
4.  Although Markman settled the question who between judges and juries has 
responsibility for claim construction, other questions persisted. Among the most 
prominent ones was whether claim construction ought to be reviewed by an appellate 
court as a factual decision for clear error or as a legal decision de novo. The Supreme Court 
took up that question in the following case. Before you read it, though, what do you think 
about whether these decisions should be reviewed for clear error or de novo? 
Teva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. 
574 U.S. 318 (2015) 
Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Today’s case involves claim construction with “evidentiary underpinnings.” And, it 
requires us to determine what standard the Court of Appeals should use when it reviews 
a trial judge’s resolution of an underlying factual dispute. . . . 
II 
A 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6) states that a court of appeals “must not . . . 
set aside” a district court’s “findings of fact” unless they are “clearly erroneous.” In our 
view, this rule and the standard it sets forth must apply when a court of appeals reviews 
a district court’s resolution of subsidiary factual matters made in the course of its 
construction of a patent claim. We have made clear that the Rule sets forth a “clear 
command.” “It does not make exceptions or purport to exclude certain categories of 
factual findings from the obligation of a court of appeals to accept a district court’s 
findings unless clearly erroneous.” Accordingly, the Rule applies to both subsidiary and 
ultimate facts. And we have said that, when reviewing the findings of a “‘district court 
sitting without a jury, appellate courts must constantly have in mind that their function is 
not to decide factual issues de novo.’” 
. . . 
Our opinion in Markman neither created, nor argued for, an exception to Rule 52(a). 
The question presented in that case was a Seventh Amendment question: Should a jury or 
a judge construe patent claims? We pointed out that history provides no clear answer.  
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The task primarily involves the construction of written instruments. And that task is better 
matched to a judge’s skills. We consequently held that claim construction falls 
“exclusively within the province of the court,” not that of the jury. 
When describing claim construction we concluded that it was proper to treat the 
ultimate question of the proper construction of the patent as a question of law in the way 
that we treat document construction as a question of law.  But this does not imply an 
exception to Rule 52(a) for underlying factual disputes. We used the term “question of 
law” while pointing out that a judge, in construing a patent claim, is engaged in much the 
same task as the judge would be in construing other written instruments, such as deeds, 
contracts, or tariffs. Construction of written instruments often presents a “question solely 
of law,” at least when the words in those instruments are “used in their ordinary 
meaning.” But sometimes, say, when a written instrument uses “technical words or 
phrases not commonly understood,” those words may give rise to a factual dispute. If so, 
extrinsic evidence may help to “establish a usage of trade or locality.” And in that 
circumstance, the “determination of the matter of fact” will “precede” the “function of 
construction.” This factual determination, like all other factual determinations, must be 
reviewed for clear error. 
[Markman] did not create an exception from the ordinary rule governing appellate 
review of factual matters. . . . A conclusion that an issue is for the judge does not indicate 
that Rule 52(a) is inapplicable. 
While we held in Markman that the ultimate issue of the proper construction of a claim 
should be treated as a question of law, we also recognized that in patent construction, 
subsidiary factfinding is sometimes necessary. Indeed, we referred to claim construction 
as a practice with “evidentiary underpinnings,” a practice that “falls somewhere between 
a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact.” We added that sometimes courts 
may have to make “credibility judgments” about witnesses. In other words, we 
recognized that courts may have to resolve subsidiary factual disputes. And . . . the Rule 
requires appellate courts to review all such subsidiary factual findings under the “clearly 
erroneous” standard. 
. . . 
Finally, practical considerations favor clear error review. We have previously pointed 
out that clear error review is “particularly” important where patent law is at issue because 
patent law is “a field where so much depends upon familiarity with specific scientific 
problems and principles not usually contained in the general storehouse of knowledge 
and experience.” A district court judge who has presided over, and listened to, the entirety 
of a proceeding has a comparatively greater opportunity to gain that familiarity than an 
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appeals court judge who must read a written transcript or perhaps just those portions to 
which the parties have referred. 
B 
Sandoz argues that claim construction mostly consists of construing a set of written 
documents that do not give rise to subsidiary factual disputes. It adds that separating 
“factual” from “legal” questions is often difficult. And Sandoz, like the Federal Circuit 
itself, argues that it is simpler for that appellate court to review the entirety of the district 
court’s claim construction de novo rather than to apply two separate standards. 
But even were we free to ignore the Federal Rule (which we are not), we would not 
find this argument convincing. Courts of appeals have long found it possible to separate 
factual from legal matters. At the same time, the Federal Circuit’s efforts to treat factual 
findings and legal conclusions similarly have brought with them their own 
complexities. . . .   
Finally, the Circuit feared that “clear error” review would bring about less uniformity. 
Neither the Circuit nor Sandoz, however, has shown that (or explained why) divergent 
claim construction stemming from divergent findings of fact (on subsidiary matters) 
should occur more than occasionally. After all, the Federal Circuit will continue to review 
de novo the district court’s ultimate interpretation of the patent claims. And the attorneys 
will no doubt bring cases construing the same claim to the attention of the trial judge; 
those prior cases will sometimes be binding because of issue preclusion, and sometimes 
will serve as persuasive authority. Moreover, it is always possible to consolidate for 
discovery different cases that involve construction of the same claims. And, as we said in 
Markman, subsidiary factfinding is unlikely to loom large in the universe of litigated claim 
construction. 
C 
The dissent argues that claim construction does not involve any “factfinding,” or, if it 
does, claim construction factfinding is akin to the factfinding that underlies our 
interpretation of statutes. Its first, broader contention runs contrary to our recognition in 
Markman that claim construction has “evidentiary underpinnings” and that courts 
construing patent claims must sometimes make “credibility judgments” about witnesses. 
Indeed, . . . this case provides a perfect example of the factfinding that sometimes 
underlies claim construction: The parties here presented the District Court with 
competing fact-related claims by different experts, and the District Court resolved the 
issues of fact that divided those experts. 
. . . 
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Neither do we find factfinding in this context sufficiently similar to the factfinding 
that underlies statutory interpretation. Statutes, in general, address themselves to the 
general public; patent claims concern a small portion of that public. Statutes typically 
(though not always) rest upon congressional consideration of general facts related to a 
reasonably broad set of social circumstances; patents typically (though not always) rest 
upon consideration by a few private parties, experts, and administrators of more narrowly 
circumscribed facts related to specific technical matters. The public, and often an 
adversarial public, typically considers and discusses the relevant general facts before 
Congress enacts a statute; only private parties, experts, and administrators likely consider 
the relevant technical facts before the award of a patent. Given these differences, it is not 
surprising that this Court has never previously compared patent claim construction in 
any here relevant way to statutory construction. . . . [H]owever, the Court has repeatedly 
compared patent claim construction to the construction of other written instruments such 
as deeds and contracts. 
D 
Now that we have set forth why the Federal Circuit must apply clear error review 
when reviewing subsidiary factfinding in patent claim construction, it is necessary to 
explain how the rule must be applied in that context. We recognize that a district court’s 
construction of a patent claim, like a district court’s interpretation of a written instrument, 
often requires the judge only to examine and to construe the document’s words without 
requiring the judge to resolve any underlying factual disputes. As all parties agree, when 
the district court reviews only evidence intrinsic to the patent (the patent claims and 
specifications, along with the patent’s prosecution history), the judge’s determination will 
amount solely to a determination of law, and the Court of Appeals will review that 
construction de novo.  
In some cases, however, the district court will need to look beyond the patent’s 
intrinsic evidence and to consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for example, 
the background science or the meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant 
time period. In cases where those subsidiary facts are in dispute, courts will need to make 
subsidiary factual findings about that extrinsic evidence. These are the “evidentiary 
underpinnings” of claim construction that we discussed in Markman, and this subsidiary 
factfinding must be reviewed for clear error on appeal. 
For example, if a district court resolves a dispute between experts and makes a factual 
finding that, in general, a certain term of art had a particular meaning to a person of 
ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, the district court must then conduct a 
legal analysis: whether a skilled artisan would ascribe that same meaning to that term in 
the context of the specific patent claim under review. That is because “experts may be examined 
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to explain terms of art, and the state of the art, at any given time,” but they cannot be used 
to prove “the proper or legal construction of any instrument of writing.” 
. . . The district judge, after deciding the factual dispute, will then interpret the patent 
claim in light of the facts as he has found them. This ultimate interpretation is a legal 
conclusion. The appellate court can still review the district court’s ultimate construction 
of the claim de novo. But, to overturn the judge’s resolution of an underlying factual 
dispute, the Court of Appeals must find that the judge, in respect to those factual findings, 
has made a clear error.  
 In some instances, a factual finding will play only a small role in a judge’s ultimate 
legal conclusion about the meaning of the patent term. But in some instances, a factual 
finding may be close to dispositive of the ultimate legal question of the proper meaning 
of the term in the context of the patent. Nonetheless, the ultimate question of construction 
will remain a legal question. Simply because a factual finding may be nearly dispositive 
does not render the subsidiary question a legal one. . . . It is analogous to a judge (sitting 
without a jury) deciding whether a defendant gave a confession voluntarily. The answer 
to the legal question about the voluntariness of the confession may turn upon the answer 
to a subsidiary factual question, say, “whether in fact the police engaged in the 
intimidation tactics alleged by the defendant.” An appellate court will review the trial 
judge’s factual determination about the alleged intimidation deferentially (though, after 
reviewing the factual findings, it will review a judge’s ultimate determination of 
voluntariness de novo). An appellate court similarly should review for clear error those 
factual findings that underlie a district court’s claim construction. 
III 
We can illustrate our holding by considering an instance in which Teva, with the 
support of the Solicitor General, argues that the Federal Circuit wrongly reviewed the 
District Court’s factual finding de novo. . . . Teva’s patent claim specifies an active 
ingredient with a “molecular weight of about 5 to 9 kilodaltons.” . . . Sandoz’s basic 
argument [is] that the term “molecular weight” is indefinite or ambiguous. The term 
might refer to the weight of the most numerous molecule, it might refer to weight as 
calculated by the average weight of all molecules, or it might refer to weight as calculated 
by an average in which heavier molecules count for more. The claim, Sandoz argues, does 
not tell us which way we should calculate weight.  
To illustrate, imagine we have a sample of copolymer–1 (the active ingredient) made 
up of 10 molecules: 4 weigh 6 kilodaltons each, 3 weigh 8 kilodaltons each, and 3 weigh 9 
kilodaltons each. Using the first method of calculation, the “molecular weight” would be 
6 kilodaltons, the weight of the most prevalent molecule. Using the second method, the 
molecular weight would be 7.5 (total weight, 75, divided by the number of molecules, 10). 
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Using the third method, the molecular weight would be more than 8, depending upon 
how much extra weight we gave to the heavier molecules. 
Teva argued in the District Court that the term “molecular weight” in the patent meant 
molecular weight calculated in the first way (the weight of the most prevalent molecule, 
or peak average molecular weight). Sandoz, however, argued that figure 1 of the patent 
showed that . . . the patent claim term “molecular weight” did not mean molecular weight 
calculated by the first method. It must mean something else. It is indefinite. 
The District Court did not accept Sandoz’s argument. Teva’s expert testified that a 
skilled artisan would understand that converting data from a chromatogram to molecular 
weight distribution curves like those in figure 1 would cause the peak on each curve to 
shift slightly; this could explain the difference between the value indicated by the peak of 
the curve (about 6.8) and the value in the figure’s legend (7.7). Sandoz’s expert testified 
that no such shift would occur. The District Court credited Teva’s expert’s account, 
thereby rejecting Sandoz’s expert’s explanation. The District Court’s finding about this 
matter was a factual finding—about how a skilled artisan would understand the way in 
which a curve created from chromatogram data reflects molecular weights. Based on that 
factual finding, the District Court reached the legal conclusion that figure 1 did not 
undermine Teva’s argument that molecular weight referred to the first method of 
calculation . . . .  
When the Federal Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decision, it recognized that the 
peak of the curve did not match the 7.7 kilodaltons listed in the legend of figure 1. But the 
Federal Circuit did not accept Teva’s expert’s explanation as to how a skilled artisan 
would expect the peaks of the curves to shift. And it failed to accept that explanation 
without finding that the District Court’s contrary determination was “clearly erroneous.” 
The Federal Circuit should have accepted the District Court’s finding unless it was 
“clearly erroneous.” Our holding today makes clear that, in failing to do so, the Federal 
Circuit was wrong. 
. . . 
We vacate the Federal Circuit’s judgment, and we remand the case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
x x x 
When the USPTO examines utility patent claims before issuance, it reads them 
according to a standard that it calls the “broadest reasonable interpretation.” The AIA 
established several administrative proceedings for reviewing the validity of issued 
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patents, the two most important of which are inter partes review and post-grant review. 
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-319 (establishing inter partes review proceeding); 35 U.S.C. §§ 321-
329 (establishing post grant review proceeding). When the USPTO began administering 
those proceedings, it applied the same “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard. The 
case below evaluated whether the agency had the authority to do so. 
Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee 
136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016) 
Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Leahy–Smith America Invents Act creates a process called “inter partes review.” 
That review process allows a third party to ask the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to 
reexamine the claims in an already-issued patent and to cancel any claim that the agency 
finds to be unpatentable in light of prior art. 
. . .  
[One AIA] provision grants the Patent Office the authority to issue “regulations . . . 
establishing and governing inter partes review under this chapter.” 
Does this provision authorize the Patent Office to issue a regulation stating that the 
agency, in inter partes review, “shall construe a patent claim according to its broadest 
reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears”? 37 
CFR § 42.100(b) (2015). 
. . . We . . . conclude that the . . . provision authorizes the Patent Office to issue the 
regulation before us.  
I 
A 
An inventor obtains a patent by applying to the Patent Office. A patent examiner with 
expertise in the relevant field reviews an applicant’s patent claims, considers the prior art, 
and determines whether each claim meets the applicable patent law requirements. Then, 
the examiner accepts a claim, or rejects it and explains why. 
If the examiner rejects a claim, the applicant can resubmit a narrowed (or otherwise 
modified) claim, which the examiner will consider anew, measuring the new claim against 
the same patent law requirements. If the examiner rejects the new claim, the inventor 
typically has yet another chance to respond with yet another amended claim. Ultimately, 
the Patent Office makes a final decision allowing or rejecting the application. The 
applicant may seek judicial review of any final rejection.  
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For several decades, the Patent Office has also possessed the authority to reexamine—
and perhaps cancel—a patent claim that it had previously allowed. . . . 
In 2011, Congress enacted the statute before us. That statute modifies “inter partes 
reexamination,” which it now calls “inter partes review.” Like inter partes reexamination, 
any third party can ask the agency to initiate inter partes review of a patent claim. But the 
new statute has changed the standard that governs the Patent Office’s institution of the 
agency’s process. Instead of requiring that a request for reexamination raise a “substantial 
new question of patentability,” it now requires that a petition show “a reasonable 
likelihood that” the challenger “would prevail.” 
The new statute provides a challenger with broader participation rights. It creates 
within the Patent Office a Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) composed of 
administrative patent judges, who are patent lawyers and former patent examiners, 
among others. That Board conducts the proceedings, reaches a conclusion, and sets forth 
its reasons. 
The statute sets forth time limits for completing this review. It grants the Patent Office 
the authority to issue rules. Like its predecessors, the statute authorizes judicial review of 
a “final written decision” canceling a patent claim. And, the statute says that the agency’s 
initial decision “whether to institute an inter partes review” is “final and nonappealable.” 
III 
Cuozzo . . . argues that the Patent Office lacked the legal authority to issue its 
regulation requiring the agency, when conducting an inter partes review, to give a patent 
claim “its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in 
which it appears.” 37 CFR § 42.100(b). Instead, Cuozzo contends that the Patent Office 
should, like the courts, give claims their “ordinary meaning . . . as understood by a person 
of skill in the art.” Phillips, 415 F.3d, at 1314. 
The statute, however, contains a provision that grants the Patent Office authority to 
issue “regulations . . . establishing and governing inter partes review under this chapter.” 
35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4). The Court of Appeals held that this statute gives the Patent Office 
the legal authority to issue its broadest reasonable construction regulation. We agree. 
A 
 We interpret Congress’ grant of rulemaking authority in light of our decision in 
Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. 837. Where a statute is clear, the agency must follow the 
statute. But where a statute leaves a “gap” or is “ambiguous,” we typically interpret it as 
granting the agency leeway to enact rules that are reasonable in light of the text, nature, 
and purpose of the statute. The statute contains such a gap: No statutory provision 
unambiguously directs the agency to use one standard or the other. And the statute 
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“expressly . . . authorizes the Patent Office to engage in the process of rulemaking” to 
address that gap. Indeed, the statute allows the Patent Office to issue rules “governing 
inter partes review,” § 316(a)(4), and the broadest reasonable construction regulation is a 
rule that governs inter partes review.  
Both the dissenting judges in the Court of Appeals and Cuozzo believe that other 
ordinary tools of statutory interpretation lead to a different conclusion. The dissenters, for 
example, point to cases in which the Circuit interpreted a grant of rulemaking authority 
in a different statute, § 2(b)(2)(A), as limited to procedural rules. These cases, however, as 
we just said, interpret a different statute. That statute does not clearly contain the Circuit’s 
claimed limitation, nor is its language the same as that of § 316(a)(4). Section 2(b)(2)(A) 
grants the Patent Office authority to issue “regulations” “which . . . shall govern . . . 
proceedings in the Office,” but the statute before us, § 316(a)(4), does not refer to 
“proceedings”—it refers more broadly to regulations “establishing and governing inter 
partes review.” The Circuit’s prior interpretation of § 2(b)(2)(A) cannot magically render 
unambiguous the different language in the different statute before us. 
Cuozzo and its supporting amici believe we will reach a different conclusion if we 
carefully examine the purpose of inter partes review. That purpose, in their view, is to 
modify the previous reexamination procedures and to replace them with a “trial, 
adjudicatory in nature.” They point out that, under the statute, an opposing party can 
trigger inter partes review. Parties can engage in “discovery of relevant evidence,” 
including “depositions, . . . affidavits or declarations” as well as anything “otherwise 
necessary in the interest of justice.” § 316(a)(5). Parties may present “factual evidence and 
expert opinions” to support their arguments. § 316(a)(8). The challenger bears the burden 
of proving unpatentability. § 318(e). And, after oral argument before a panel of three of 
the Board’s administrative patent judges, it issues a final written decision. §§ 6, 316(a)(10), 
318. Perhaps most importantly, a decision to cancel a patent normally has the same effect 
as a district court’s determination of a patent’s invalidity. 
In light of these adjudicatory characteristics, which make these agency proceedings 
similar to court proceedings, Congress, in Cuozzo’s view, must have designed inter partes 
review as a “surrogate for court proceedings.” Cuozzo points to various sources of 
legislative history in support of its argument. And, if Congress intended to create a 
“surrogate” for court proceedings, why would Congress not also have intended the 
agency to use the claim construction standard that district courts apply (namely, the 
ordinary meaning standard), rather than the claim construction standard that patent 
examiners apply (namely, the broadest reasonable construction standard)? 
The problem with Cuozzo’s argument, however, is that, in other significant respects, 
inter partes review is less like a judicial proceeding and more like a specialized agency 
proceeding. Parties that initiate the proceeding need not have a concrete stake in the 
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outcome; indeed, they may lack constitutional standing. As explained above, challengers 
need not remain in the proceeding; rather, the Patent Office may continue to conduct an 
inter partes review even after the adverse party has settled. § 317(a). Moreover, as is the 
case here, the Patent Office may intervene in a later judicial proceeding to defend its 
decision—even if the private challengers drop out. And the burden of proof in inter partes 
review is different than in the district courts: In inter partes review, the challenger (or the 
Patent Office) must establish unpatentability “by a preponderance of the evidence”; in 
district court, a challenger must prove invalidity by “clear and convincing evidence.”  
Most importantly, these features, as well as inter partes review’s predecessors, 
indicate that the purpose of the proceeding is not quite the same as the purpose of district 
court litigation. The proceeding involves what used to be called a reexamination (and, as 
noted above, a cousin of inter partes review, ex parte reexamination, 35 U.S.C. § 302 et seq., 
still bears that name). The name and accompanying procedures suggest that the 
proceeding offers a second look at an earlier administrative grant of a patent. Although 
Congress changed the name from “reexamination” to “review,” nothing convinces us 
that, in doing so, Congress wanted to change its basic purposes, namely, to reexamine an 
earlier agency decision. Thus, in addition to helping resolve concrete patent-related 
disputes among parties, inter partes review helps protect the public’s “paramount interest 
in seeing that patent monopolies . . . are kept within their legitimate scope.” 
Finally, neither the statutory language, its purpose, or its history suggest that 
Congress considered what standard the agency should apply when reviewing a patent 
claim in inter partes review. Cuozzo contends that § 301(d), explaining that the Patent 
Office should “determine the proper meaning of a patent claim,” reinforces its conclusion 
that the ordinary meaning standard should apply. But viewed against a background of 
language and practices indicating that Congress designed a hybrid proceeding, § 301(d)’s 
reference to the “proper meaning” of a claim is ambiguous. It leaves open the question of 
which claim construction standard is “proper.” 
The upshot is, whether we look at statutory language alone, or that language in 
context of the statute’s purpose, we find an express delegation of rulemaking authority, a 
“gap” that rules might fill, and “ambiguity” in respect to the boundaries of that gap. We 
consequently turn to the question whether the Patent Office’s regulation is a reasonable 
exercise of its rulemaking authority. 
B 
 We conclude that the regulation represents a reasonable exercise of the rulemaking 
authority that Congress delegated to the Patent Office. For one thing, construing a patent 
claim according to its broadest reasonable construction helps to protect the public. A 
reasonable, yet unlawfully broad claim might discourage the use of the invention by a 
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member of the public. Because an examiner’s (or reexaminer’s) use of the broadest 
reasonable construction standard increases the possibility that the examiner will find the 
claim too broad (and deny it), use of that standard encourages the applicant to draft 
narrowly. This helps ensure precision while avoiding overly broad claims, and thereby 
helps prevent a patent from tying up too much knowledge, while helping members of the 
public draw useful information from the disclosed invention and better understand the 
lawful limits of the claim.  
For another, past practice supports the Patent Office’s regulation. The Patent Office 
has used this standard for more than 100 years. It has applied that standard in 
proceedings, which, as here, resemble district court litigation. It also applies that standard 
in proceedings that may be consolidated with a concurrent inter partes review.  
Cuozzo makes two arguments in response. First, Cuozzo says that there is a critical 
difference between the Patent Office’s initial examination of an application to determine if 
a patent should issue, and this proceeding, in which the agency reviews an already-issued 
patent. In an initial examination of an application for a patent the examiner gives the claim 
its broadest reasonable construction. But if the patent examiner rejects the claim, then . . . 
the applicant has a right to amend and resubmit the claim. And the examiner and 
applicant may repeat this process at least once more. This system—broad construction 
with a chance to amend—both protects the public from overly broad claims and gives the 
applicant a fair chance to draft a precise claim that will qualify for patent protection. In 
inter partes review, however, the broadest reasonable construction standard may help 
protect certain public interests, but there is no absolute right to amend any challenged 
patent claims. This, Cuozzo says, is unfair to the patent holder.  
The process however, is not as unfair as Cuozzo suggests. The patent holder may, at 
least once in the process, make a motion to do just what he would do in the examination 
process, namely, amend or narrow the claim. § 316(d). This opportunity to amend, 
together with the fact that the original application process may have presented several 
additional opportunities to amend the patent, means that use of the broadest reasonable 
construction standard is, as a general matter, not unfair to the patent holder in any 
obvious way. 
Cuozzo adds that, as of June 30, 2015, only 5 out of 86 motions to amend have been 
granted. But these numbers may reflect the fact that no amendment could save the 
inventions at issue, i.e., that the patent should have never issued at all. 
To the extent Cuozzo’s statistical argument takes aim at the manner in which the 
Patent Office has exercised its authority, that question is not before us. Indeed, in this 
particular case, the agency determined that Cuozzo’s proposed amendment “enlarged,” 
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rather than narrowed, the challenged claims. Cuozzo does not contend that the decision 
not to allow its amendment is “arbitrary” or “capricious,” or “otherwise unlawful.” 
Second, Cuozzo says that the use of the broadest reasonable construction standard in 
inter partes review, together with use of an ordinary meaning standard in district court, 
may produce inconsistent results and cause added confusion. A district court may find a 
patent claim to be valid, and the agency may later cancel that claim in its own review. We 
recognize that that is so. This possibility, however, has long been present in our patent 
system, which provides different tracks—one in the Patent Office and one in the courts—
for the review and adjudication of patent claims. As we have explained above, inter partes 
review imposes a different burden of proof on the challenger. These different evidentiary 
burdens mean that the possibility of inconsistent results is inherent to Congress’ 
regulatory design. 
Moreover, the Patent Office uses the broadest reasonable construction standard in 
other proceedings, . . . which may implicate patents that are later reviewed in district 
court. The statute gives the Patent Office the power to consolidate these other proceedings 
with inter partes review. To try to create uniformity of standards would consequently 
prove difficult. And we cannot find unreasonable the Patent Office’s decision to prefer a 
degree of inconsistency in the standards used between the courts and the agency, rather 
than among agency proceedings.  
Finally, Cuozzo and its supporting amici offer various policy arguments in favor of the 
ordinary meaning standard. The Patent Office is legally free to accept or reject such policy 
arguments on the basis of its own reasoned analysis. Having concluded that the Patent 
Office’s regulation, selecting the broadest reasonable construction standard, is reasonable 
in light of the rationales described above, we do not decide whether there is a better 
alternative as a policy matter. That is a question that Congress left to the particular 
expertise of the Patent Office. 
Context and Application 
1. In 2018, the USPTO changed course. In an inter partes review, the agency now uses 
“the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil 
action . . . , including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary 
meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the 
prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100. The same standard is also 
applied in post-grant review. 37 C.F.R. § 42.200. Having read Cuozzo, which standard do 
you think is better suited to the nature of the proceedings? Should the USPTO continue to 
apply the broadest reasonable construction approach during patent prosecution, or 




Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), a patent is infringed when someone “makes, uses, offers to 
sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United 
States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor” without permission. 
Thus, to analyze infringement, a court must compare the accused product or process to 
the patent. If the claims of the patent, properly construed, encompass the product or 
process, then taking one of the aforementioned actions without permissions is a direct, 
literal infringement of the patent. To put it another way, direct infringement occurs when 
the alleged infringing product or process meets all elements of a utility patent claim. 
However, through common law development and statutory amendment, infringement 
liability can still attach even in some circumstances where these conditions are not met. 
For example, liability can be found under the doctrine of equivalents or for indirect 
infringement. There may also be liability when some components of a patented good, 
some step in a patented process, or some portion of an offer and delivery is made or 
performed abroad. As you read the following sections, think about how the courts try to 
balance fairness concerns for patent holders with certainty concerns for others in the field 
or consumers. What characteristics do courts use to distinguish between situations where 
infringement liability should be expanded beyond direct, literal infringement and those 
where it should not?   
A. Direct, Literal Infringement 
Direct, literal infringement is when a person has engaged in one of the activities 
described in 35 U.S.C. § 271(a): 
Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, 
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports 
into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent 
therefor, infringes the patent. 
35 U.S.C. § 271(a). The direct part of the infringement is that the defendant itself has 
engaged in the activity. The literal part is that the accused device or process “reads on” 
the patent—that is, it meets every limitation as construed during claim construction.  
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Larami Corp. v. Amron 
27 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1280 (E.D. Pa. 1993) 
REED, J. 
This is a patent case concerning toy water guns manufactured by plaintiff Larami 
Corporation (“Larami”). Currently before me is Larami’s motion for partial summary 
judgment of noninfringement of United States Patent No. 4,239,129 (“the ’129 patent”). 
I 
Larami manufactures a line of toy water guns called “SUPER SOAKERS.” This line 
includes five models. All use a hand-operated air pump to pressurize water and a “pinch 
trigger” valve mechanism for controlling the ejection of the pressurized water. All feature 
detachable water reservoirs prominently situated outside and above the barrel of the gun. 
. . . 
Defendants Alan Amron and Talk To Me Products, Inc. (hereinafter referred to 
collectively as “TTMP”) claim that the SUPER SOAKER guns infringe on the ’129 patent 
. . . . The ’129 patent covers a water gun which, like the SUPER SOAKERS, operates by 
pressurizing water housed in a tank with an air pump. In the ’129 patent, the pressure 
enables the water to travel out of the tank through a trigger-operated valve into an outlet 
tube and to squirt through a nozzle. Unlike the SUPER SOAKERS, the ’129 patent also 
contains various electrical features to illuminate the water stream and create noises. Also, 
the water tank in the ’129 patent is not detachable, but is contained within a housing in 
the body of the water gun. 
The “Background of the Invention” contained in the ’129 patent reads as follows: 
Children of all ages, especially boys, through the years have exhibited a fascination 
for water, lights and noise and the subject invention deals with these factors 
embodied in a toy simulating a pistol. 
An appreciable number of U.S. patents have been issued which are directed to 
water pistols but none appear to disclose a unique assemble of components which 
can be utilized to simultaneously produce a jet or stream of water, means for 
illuminating the stream and a noise, or if so desired, one which can be operated 
without employing the noise and stream illuminating means. A reciprocal pump 
is employed to obtain sufficient pressure whereby the pistol can eject a stream an 
appreciable distance in the neighborhood of thirty feet and this stream can be 
illuminated to more or less simulate a lazer beam. 
Larami brought this action seeking a declaration that the “SUPER SOAKER” does not 
infringe the ’129 patent, TTMP counterclaimed for infringement of the ’129 patent. 




A patent owner’s right to exclude others from making, using or selling the patented 
invention is defined and limited by the language in that patent’s claims. Thus, establishing 
infringement requires the interpretation of the “elements” or “limitations” of the claim 
and a comparison of the accused product with those elements as so interpreted. . . . 
. . . 
A patent holder can seek to establish patent infringement in either of two ways: by 
demonstrating that every element of a claim (1) is literally infringed or (2) is infringed 
under the doctrine of equivalents. To put it a different way, because every element of a 
claim is essential and material to that claim, a patent owner must, to meet the burden of 
establishing infringement, “show the presence of every element or its substantial 
equivalent in the accused device.” If even one element of a patent’s claim is missing from 
the accused product, then “there can be no infringement as a matter of law.”  
1 
TTMP claims that SUPER SOAKER 20 literally infringes claim 1 of the ’129 patent. 
Claim 1 describes the water gun as: 
a toy comprising an elongated housing case having a chamber therein for a liquid 
(tank), a pump including a piston having an exposed rod (piston rod) and 
extending rearwardly of said toy facilitating manual operation for building up an 
appreciable amount of pressure in said chamber for ejecting a stream of liquid 
therefrom an appreciable distance substantially forwardly of said toy, and means 
for controlling the ejection. 
U.S. Patent No. 4,239,129 (bracketed words supplied; see Diagram A, the ’129 patent, 
attached hereto). 
Claim 1 requires, among other things, that the toy gun have “an elongated housing 
having a chamber therein for a liquid.” The SUPER SOAKER 20 water gun, in contrast, 
has an external water reservoir (chamber) that is detachable from the gun housing, and 
not contained within the housing. TTMP argues that SUPER SOAKER 20 contains a 
“chamber therein for a liquid” as well as a detachable water reservoir. It is difficult to 
discern from TTMP’s memorandum of law exactly where it contends the “chamber 
therein” is located in SUPER SOAKER 20. Furthermore, after having examined SUPER 
SOAKER 20, I find that it is plain that there is no “chamber” for liquid contained within 
the housing of the water gun. The only element of SUPER SOAKER 20 which could be 
described as a “chamber” for liquid is the external water reservoir located atop the 
housing. Indeed, liquid is located within the housing only when the trigger causes the 
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liquid to pass from the external water reservoir through the tubing in the housing and out 
of the nozzle at the front end of the barrel. SUPER SOAKER 20 itself shows that such a 
transitory avenue for the release of liquid is clearly not a “chamber therein for liquid.” 
Therefore, because the absence of even one element of a patent's claim from the accused 
product means there can be no finding of literal infringement, I find that SUPER SOAKER 
20 does not infringe claim 1 of the ’129 patent as a matter of law. 
. . . 
Accordingly, I conclude that the SUPER SOAKER 20 water gun does not literally 
infringe claim 1 of the ’129 patent. . . . 
Context & Application 
1. Think back to the cases you read on claim construction. Claim construction rulings 
often are determinative to infringement determinations, as terms are construed in ways 
that either include or exclude elements of accused products. At the same time, an overly 
broad construction may result in an invalidity ruling. Was there any construction of 
“therein” that would have reached the external chamber in the accused product?  
2. The Larami case shows how the “all elements” rule is applied in the utility patent 
infringement analysis. It also involves a childhood toy beloved by many—the Super 
Soaker. The Super Soaker was invented by rocket scientist Lonnie Johnson, who worked 
on the Galileo and Cassini satellite programs and in development of the B2 stealth 
bomber. His biography and the story behind the invention are both interesting. On his 
background: 
Born nearly 70 years ago in the segregated South, the African American inventor 
has had to prove himself as a talented and capable scientist. His parents picked 
cotton on his grandfather’s farm and Johnson attended an all-black high school. 
He graduated from Tuskegee University before joining the U.S. Air Force as an 
engineer, then later working for NASA. 
David Kindy, The Accidental Invention of the Super Soaker, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (June 
21, 2019), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/accidental-invention-super-
soaker-180972428/. And how Johnson came up with the invention, while working for 
NASA: 
Johnson was at home in 1982 working on an idea for an improved heat pump—a 
device for heating and cooling that mechanically transfers heat to another source—
when his creation sprang a leak. A burst of water shot across the room and Johnson 
immediately thought, “That would make a great squirt gun.” 
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Id. How many inventions do you think come about this way? If inventions often come 
about when their inventors are trying to solve different problems, how does or should 
that impact the way we think about patent doctrines? 
B. The Doctrine of Equivalents 
Courts and scholars often emphasize the importance of precise claim construction, 
recognizing that patent holders need to know what they have and third parties need to 
know what they are forbidden from doing—at least, without a license. But bright-line 
rules can have seemingly harsh consequences: 
Strict interpretations of patent infringement boundaries sometimes operate in 
ways that appear unfair to patent holders. Early cases that extended infringement 
boundaries did so when a third party was deliberately circumventing a patent 
while producing goods that embodied the heart of the invention. In addition to 
circumvention, early indirect infringement cases addressed the difficulties some 
patent holders had enforcing their patents against end users when manufacturers 
and distributors were the least cost avoiders (and easiest to sue). 
Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Infringement, Unbound, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 117 (2018). 
Accordingly, we’ve seen a number of doctrines expand infringement liability to beyond 
literal, direct infringement in the United States.  
One of these is the doctrine of equivalents (sometimes referred to as the “DOE”). The 
DOE is a judge-made doctrine that occurs when the elements of a claim are not all met 
literally by an accused device, yet the device is deemed infringing. For example, if a patent 
claim included elements A, B, C, and D, and the accused product included A, B, C, and X, 
the patent holder might yet be able to argue infringement if X performs the same function, 
in the same way, to achieve the same result as D, or if X is insubstantially different from 
D. 
The DOC can be traced back to Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330 (1853) (covered in 
Chapter 2 of this book). The claim in that case covered “the body of a car for the 
transportation of coal, &c., in the form of a frustum of a cone.” The accused device, rather 
than having a circular cross section, like the frustrum of a cone, was an octagon. The Court 
rejected the argument that it had to be precisely a circle in order to infringe. Instead, the 
DOE was born. 
There was some question whether the doctrine of equivalents, as a judge-made 
doctrine, survived passage of the 1952 Act, and if so, what role prosecution history 
estoppel would play in limiting the claim to equivalents. The Court took this question up 
in Warner-Jenkinson, which provides a summary of the doctrinal history of the DOE. 
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Warner–Jenkinson Company, Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. 
520 U.S. 17 (1997) 
Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Nearly 50 years ago, this Court in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 
U.S. 605 (1950), set out the modern contours of what is known in patent law as the 
“doctrine of equivalents.” Under this doctrine, a product or process that does not literally 
infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe if 
there is “equivalence” between the elements of the accused product or process and the 
claimed elements of the patented invention. Petitioner, which was found to have infringed 
upon respondent’s patent under the doctrine of equivalents, invites us to speak the death 
of that doctrine. We decline that invitation. The significant disagreement within the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concerning the application of Graver Tank suggests, 
however, that the doctrine is not free from confusion. We therefore will endeavor to clarify 
the proper scope of the doctrine. 
I 
The essential facts of this case are few. Petitioner Warner–Jenkinson Co. and 
respondent Hilton Davis Chemical Co. manufacture dyes. Impurities in those dyes must 
be removed. Hilton Davis holds United States Patent No. 4,560,746 (’746 patent), which 
discloses an improved purification process involving “ultrafiltration.” The ’746 process 
filters impure dye through a porous membrane at certain pressures and pH levels, 
resulting in a high purity dye product. 
 The ’746 patent issued in 1985. As relevant to this case, the patent claims as its 
invention an improvement in the ultrafiltration process as follows: 
In a process for the purification of a dye the improvement which comprises: 
subjecting an aqueous solution to ultrafiltration through a membrane having a 
nominal pore diameter of 5–15 Angstroms under a hydrostatic pressure of 
approximately 200 to 400 p.s.i.g., at a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0, to thereby 
cause separation of said impurities from said dye. 
The inventors added the phrase “at a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0” during patent 
prosecution. At a minimum, this phrase was added to distinguish a previous patent (the 
“Booth” patent) that disclosed an ultrafiltration process operating at a pH above 9.0. The 
parties disagree as to why the low-end pH limit of 6.0 was included as part of the claim. 
In 1986, Warner–Jenkinson developed an ultrafiltration process that operated . . . at a 
pH of 5.0. 
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II 
In Graver Tank we considered the application of the doctrine of equivalents to an 
accused chemical composition for use in welding that differed from the patented welding 
material by the substitution of one chemical element. The substituted element did not fall 
within the literal terms of the patent claim, but the Court nonetheless found that the 
“question which thus emerges is whether the substitution of one element for the other is 
a change of such substance as to make the doctrine of equivalents inapplicable; or 
conversely, whether under the circumstances the change was so insubstantial that the trial 
court’s invocation of the doctrine of equivalents was justified.” The Court also described 
some of the considerations that go into applying the doctrine of equivalents: 
What constitutes equivalency must be determined against the context of the 
patent, the prior art, and the particular circumstances of the case. Equivalence, in 
the patent law, is not the prisoner of a formula and is not an absolute to be 
considered in a vacuum. It does not require complete identity for every purpose 
and in every respect. In determining equivalents, things equal to the same thing 
may not be equal to each other and, by the same token, things for most purposes 
different may sometimes be equivalents. Consideration must be given to the 
purpose for which an ingredient is used in a patent, the qualities it has when 
combined with the other ingredients, and the function which it is intended to 
perform. An important factor is whether persons reasonably skilled in the art 
would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the 
patent with one that was. 
Considering those factors, the Court viewed the difference between the chemical element 
claimed in the patent and the substitute element to be “colorable only,” and concluded 
that the trial court’s judgment of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents was 
proper.  
A 
 Petitioner’s primary argument in this Court is that the doctrine of equivalents, as set 
out in Graver Tank in 1950, did not survive the 1952 revision of the Patent Act because it is 
inconsistent with several aspects of that Act. In particular, petitioner argues: (1) The 
doctrine of equivalents is inconsistent with the statutory requirement that a patentee 
specifically “claim” the invention covered by a patent, § 112; (2) the doctrine circumvents 
the patent reissue process—designed to correct mistakes in drafting or the like—and 
avoids the express limitations on that process, §§ 251–252; (3) the doctrine is inconsistent 
with the primacy of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) in setting the scope of a patent 
through the patent prosecution process; and (4) the doctrine was implicitly rejected as a 
general matter by Congress’ specific and limited inclusion of the doctrine in one section 
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regarding “means” claiming, § 112, ¶ 6. All but one of these arguments were made in 
Graver Tank in the context of the 1870 Patent Act, and failed to command a majority. 
 The 1952 Patent Act is not materially different from the 1870 Act with regard to 
claiming, reissue, and the role of the PTO. . . . Such minor differences as exist between 
those provisions in the 1870 and the 1952 Acts have no bearing on the result reached in 
Graver Tank, and thus provide no basis for our overruling it. In the context of 
infringement, we have already held that pre-1952 precedent survived the passage of the 
1952 Act. . . . We see no reason to reach a different result here.  
B 
 We do, however, share the concern of the dissenters below that the doctrine of 
equivalents, as it has come to be applied since Graver Tank, has taken on a life of its own, 
unbounded by the patent claims. There can be no denying that the doctrine of equivalents, 
when applied broadly, conflicts with the definitional and public-notice functions of the 
statutory claiming requirement. Judge Nies identified one means of avoiding this conflict: 
A distinction can be drawn that is not too esoteric between substitution of an 
equivalent for a component in an invention and enlarging the metes and bounds 
of the invention beyond what is claimed.  
Where a claim to an invention is expressed as a combination of elements, as here, 
“equivalents” in the sobriquet “Doctrine of Equivalents” refers to the equivalency 
of an element or part of the invention with one that is substituted in the accused 
product or process. 
This view that the accused device or process must be more than “equivalent” 
overall reconciles the Supreme Court’s position on infringement by equivalents 
with its concurrent statements that “the courts have no right to enlarge a patent 
beyond the scope of its claims as allowed by the Patent Office.” The “scope” is not 
enlarged if courts do not go beyond the substitution of equivalent elements.”  
[Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc.,] 62 F.3d 1512, 1573–74 (dissenting 
opinion). 
We concur with this apt reconciliation of our two lines of precedent. Each element 
contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the patented 
invention, and thus the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of 
the claim, not to the invention as a whole. It is important to ensure that the application of 
the doctrine, even as to an individual element, is not allowed such broad play as to 
effectively eliminate that element in its entirety. So long as the doctrine of equivalents 
does not encroach beyond the limits just described, or beyond related limits to be 
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discussed infra, we are confident that the doctrine will not vitiate the central functions of 
the patent claims themselves. 
III 
Understandably reluctant to assume this Court would overrule Graver Tank, petitioner 
has offered alternative arguments in favor of a more restricted doctrine of equivalents 
than it feels was applied in this case. We address each in turn. 
A 
 Petitioner first argues that Graver Tank never purported to supersede a well-
established limit on nonliteral infringement, known variously as “prosecution history 
estoppel” and “file wrapper estoppel.” According to petitioner, any surrender of subject 
matter during patent prosecution, regardless of the reason for such surrender, precludes 
recapturing any part of that subject matter, even if it is equivalent to the matter expressly 
claimed. Because, during patent prosecution, respondent limited the pH element of its 
claim to pH levels between 6.0 and 9.0, petitioner would have those limits form bright 
lines beyond which no equivalents may be claimed. Any inquiry into the reasons for a 
surrender, petitioner claims, would undermine the public’s right to clear notice of the 
scope of the patent as embodied in the patent file.  
We can readily agree with petitioner that Graver Tank did not dispose of prosecution 
history estoppel as a legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents. But petitioner reaches 
too far in arguing that the reason for an amendment during patent prosecution is 
irrelevant to any subsequent estoppel. In each of our cases cited by petitioner and by the 
dissent below, prosecution history estoppel was tied to amendments made to avoid the 
prior art, or otherwise to address a specific concern—such as obviousness—that arguably 
would have rendered the claimed subject matter unpatentable. Thus, in Exhibit Supply Co. 
v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126 (1942) Chief Justice Stone distinguished inclusion of a 
limiting phrase in an original patent claim from the “very different” situation in which 
“the applicant, in order to meet objections in the Patent Office, based on references to the 
prior art, adopted the phrase as a substitute for the broader one” previously used. 
Similarly, in Keystone Driller Co. v. Northwest Engineering Corp., 294 U.S. 42 (1935), estoppel 
was applied where the initial claims were “rejected on the prior art,” and where the 
allegedly infringing equivalent element was outside of the revised claims and within the 
prior art that formed the basis for the rejection of the earlier claims.  
It is telling that in each case this Court probed the reasoning behind the Patent Office’s 
insistence upon a change in the claims. In each instance, a change was demanded because 
the claim as otherwise written was viewed as not describing a patentable invention at 
all—typically because what it described was encompassed within the prior art. But, as the 
United States informs us, there are a variety of other reasons why the PTO may request a 
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change in claim language. And if the PTO has been requesting changes in claim language 
without the intent to limit equivalents or, indeed, with the expectation that language it 
required would in many cases allow for a range of equivalents, we should be extremely 
reluctant to upset the basic assumptions of the PTO without substantial reason for doing 
so. Our prior cases have consistently applied prosecution history estoppel only where 
claims have been amended for a limited set of reasons, and we see no substantial cause 
for requiring a more rigid rule invoking an estoppel regardless of the reasons for a change.  
 In this case, the patent examiner objected to the patent claim due to a perceived 
overlap with the Booth patent, which revealed an ultrafiltration process operating at a pH 
above 9.0. In response to this objection, the phrase “at a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0” 
was added to the claim. While it is undisputed that the upper limit of 9.0 was added in 
order to distinguish the Booth patent, the reason for adding the lower limit of 6.0 is 
unclear. The lower limit certainly did not serve to distinguish the Booth patent, which said 
nothing about pH levels below 6.0. Thus, while a lower limit of 6.0, by its mere inclusion, 
became a material element of the claim, that did not necessarily preclude the application 
of the doctrine of equivalents as to that element. . . . Where the reason for the change was 
not related to avoiding the prior art, the change may introduce a new element, but it does 
not necessarily preclude infringement by equivalents of that element.  
 We are left with the problem, however, of what to do in a case like the one at bar, 
where the record seems not to reveal the reason for including the lower pH limit of 6.0. In 
our view, holding that certain reasons for a claim amendment may avoid the application 
of prosecution history estoppel is not tantamount to holding that the absence of a reason 
for an amendment may similarly avoid such an estoppel. Mindful that claims do indeed 
serve both a definitional and a notice function, we think the better rule is to place the 
burden on the patent holder to establish the reason for an amendment required during 
patent prosecution. The court then would decide whether that reason is sufficient to 
overcome prosecution history estoppel as a bar to application of the doctrine of 
equivalents to the element added by that amendment. Where no explanation is 
established, however, the court should presume that the patent applicant had a 
substantial reason related to patentability for including the limiting element added by 
amendment. In those circumstances, prosecution history estoppel would bar the 
application of the doctrine of equivalents as to that element. The presumption we have 
described, one subject to rebuttal if an appropriate reason for a required amendment is 
established, gives proper deference to the role of claims in defining an invention and 
providing public notice, and to the primacy of the PTO in ensuring that the claims allowed 
cover only subject matter that is properly patentable in a proffered patent application. 
Applied in this fashion, prosecution history estoppel places reasonable limits on the 
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doctrine of equivalents, and further insulates the doctrine from any feared conflict with 
the Patent Act.  
 Because respondent has not proffered in this Court a reason for the addition of a lower 
pH limit, it is impossible to tell whether the reason for that addition could properly avoid 
an estoppel. Whether a reason in fact exists, but simply was not adequately developed, 
we cannot say. On remand, the Federal Circuit can consider whether reasons for that 
portion of the amendment were offered or not and whether further opportunity to 
establish such reasons would be proper.  
V 
All that remains is to address the debate regarding the linguistic framework under 
which “equivalence” is determined. Both the parties and the Federal Circuit spend 
considerable time arguing whether the so-called “triple identity” test—focusing on the 
function served by a particular claim element, the way that element serves that function, 
and the result thus obtained by that element—is a suitable method for determining 
equivalence, or whether an “insubstantial differences” approach is better. There seems to 
be substantial agreement that, while the triple identity test may be suitable for analyzing 
mechanical devices, it often provides a poor framework for analyzing other products or 
processes. On the other hand, the insubstantial differences test offers little additional 
guidance as to what might render any given difference “insubstantial.” 
 In our view, the particular linguistic framework used is less important than whether 
the test is probative of the essential inquiry: Does the accused product or process contain 
elements identical or equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention? 
Different linguistic frameworks may be more suitable to different cases, depending on 
their particular facts. A focus on individual elements and a special vigilance against 
allowing the concept of equivalence to eliminate completely any such elements should 
reduce considerably the imprecision of whatever language is used. An analysis of the role 
played by each element in the context of the specific patent claim will thus inform the 
inquiry as to whether a substitute element matches the function, way, and result of the 
claimed element, or whether the substitute element plays a role substantially different 
from the claimed element. With these limiting principles as a backdrop, we see no purpose 
in going further and micromanaging the Federal Circuit’s particular word choice for 
analyzing equivalence. We expect that the Federal Circuit will refine the formulation of 
the test for equivalence in the orderly course of case-by-case determinations, and we leave 
such refinement to that court’s sound judgment in this area of its special expertise. 
VI 
Today we adhere to the doctrine of equivalents. The determination of equivalence 
should be applied as an objective inquiry on an element-by-element basis. Prosecution 
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history estoppel continues to be available as a defense to infringement, but if the patent 
holder demonstrates that an amendment required during prosecution had a purpose 
unrelated to patentability, a court must consider that purpose in order to decide whether 
an estoppel is precluded. Where the patent holder is unable to establish such a purpose, a 
court should presume that the purpose behind the required amendment is such that 
prosecution history estoppel would apply. Because the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit did not consider all of the requirements as described by us today, particularly as 
related to prosecution history estoppel and the preservation of some meaning for each 
element in a claim, we reverse its judgment and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd. 
535 U.S. 722 (2002) 
Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case requires us to address once again the relation between two patent law 
concepts, the doctrine of equivalents and the rule of prosecution history estoppel. The 
Court considered the same concepts in Warner–Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 
and reaffirmed that a patent protects its holder against efforts of copyists to evade liability 
for infringement by making only insubstantial changes to a patented invention. At the 
same time, we appreciated that by extending protection beyond the literal terms in a 
patent the doctrine of equivalents can create substantial uncertainty about where the 
patent monopoly ends. If the range of equivalents is unclear, competitors may be unable 
to determine what is a permitted alternative to a patented invention and what is an 
infringing equivalent. 
To reduce the uncertainty, Warner–Jenkinson acknowledged that competitors may rely 
on the prosecution history, the public record of the patent proceedings. In some cases the 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) may have rejected an earlier version of the patent 
application on the ground that a claim does not meet a statutory requirement for 
patentability. When the patentee responds to the rejection by narrowing his claims, this 
prosecution history estops him from later arguing that the subject matter covered by the 
original, broader claim was nothing more than an equivalent. Competitors may rely on 
the estoppel to ensure that their own devices will not be found to infringe by equivalence. 
In the decision now under review the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held 
that by narrowing a claim to obtain a patent, the patentee surrenders all equivalents to the 
amended claim element. Petitioner asserts this holding departs from past precedent in 
two respects. First, it applies estoppel to every amendment made to satisfy the 
requirements of the Patent Act and not just to amendments made to avoid pre-emption 
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by an earlier invention, i.e., the prior art. Second, it holds that when estoppel arises, it bars 
suit against every equivalent to the amended claim element. The Court of Appeals 
acknowledged that this holding departed from its own cases, which applied a flexible bar 
when considering what claims of equivalence were estopped by the prosecution history. 
Petitioner argues that by replacing the flexible bar with a complete bar the Court of 
Appeals cast doubt on many existing patents that were amended during the application 
process when the law, as it then stood, did not apply so rigorous a standard. 
We granted certiorari to consider these questions. 
I 
Petitioner Festo Corporation owns two patents for an improved magnetic rodless 
cylinder, a piston-driven device that relies on magnets to move objects in a conveying 
system. The device has many industrial uses and has been employed in machinery as 
diverse as sewing equipment and the Thunder Mountain ride at Disney World. Although 
the precise details of the cylinder’s operation are not essential here, the prosecution 
history must be considered. 
Petitioner’s patent applications, as often occurs, were amended during the 
prosecution proceedings. The application for the first patent, the Stoll Patent (U.S. Patent 
No. 4,354,125), was amended after the patent examiner rejected the initial application 
because the exact method of operation was unclear and some claims were made in an 
impermissible way. The inventor, Dr. Stoll, submitted a new application designed to meet 
the examiner’s objections and also added certain references to prior art. The second patent, 
the Carroll Patent (U.S. Patent No. 3,779,401), was also amended during a reexamination 
proceeding. The prior art references were added to this amended application as well. Both 
amended patents added a new limitation—that the inventions contain a pair of sealing 
rings, each having a lip on one side, which would prevent impurities from getting on the 
piston assembly. The amended Stoll Patent added the further limitation that the outer 
shell of the device, the sleeve, be made of a magnetizable material. 
After Festo began selling its rodless cylinder, respondents (whom we refer to as SMC) 
entered the market with a device similar, but not identical, to the ones disclosed by Festo’s 
patents. SMC’s cylinder, rather than using two one-way sealing rings, employs a single 
sealing ring with a two-way lip. Furthermore, SMC's sleeve is made of a nonmagnetizable 
alloy. SMC’s device does not fall within the literal claims of either patent, but petitioner 
contends that it is so similar that it infringes under the doctrine of equivalents. 
SMC contends that Festo is estopped from making this argument because of the 
prosecution history of its patents. The sealing rings and the magnetized alloy in the Festo 
product were both disclosed for the first time in the amended applications. In SMC’s view, 
these amendments narrowed the earlier applications, surrendering alternatives that are 
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the very points of difference in the competing devices—the sealing rings and the type of 
alloy used to make the sleeve. As Festo narrowed its claims in these ways in order to 
obtain the patents, says SMC, Festo is now estopped from saying that these features are 
immaterial and that SMC’s device is an equivalent of its own. 
. . . 
The en banc [Federal Circuit held] that prosecution history estoppel barred Festo from 
asserting that the accused device infringed its patents under the doctrine of equivalents. 
The court held, with only one judge dissenting, that estoppel arises from any amendment 
that narrows a claim to comply with the Patent Act, not only from amendments made to 
avoid prior art. More controversial in the Court of Appeals was its further holding: When 
estoppel applies, it stands as a complete bar against any claim of equivalence for the 
element that was amended. . . . In the court’s view a complete-bar rule, under which 
estoppel bars all claims of equivalence to the narrowed element, would promote certainty 
in the determination of infringement cases. 
Four judges dissented from the decision to adopt a complete bar. . . . We granted 
certiorari.  
II 
The patent laws “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” by rewarding 
innovation with a temporary monopoly. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The monopoly is a 
property right; and like any property right, its boundaries should be clear. This clarity is 
essential to promote progress, because it enables efficient investment in innovation. A 
patent holder should know what he owns, and the public should know what he does not. 
For this reason, the patent laws require inventors to describe their work in “full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms,” 35 U.S.C. § 112, as part of the delicate balance the law attempts 
to maintain between inventors, who rely on the promise of the law to bring the invention 
forth, and the public, which should be encouraged to pursue innovations, creations, and 
new ideas beyond the inventor’s exclusive rights.  
Unfortunately, the nature of language makes it impossible to capture the essence of a 
thing in a patent application. The inventor who chooses to patent an invention and 
disclose it to the public, rather than exploit it in secret, bears the risk that others will devote 
their efforts toward exploiting the limits of the patent’s language . . . . 
The language in the patent claims may not capture every nuance of the invention or 
describe with complete precision the range of its novelty. If patents were always 
interpreted by their literal terms, their value would be greatly diminished. Unimportant 
and insubstantial substitutes for certain elements could defeat the patent, and its value to 
inventors could be destroyed by simple acts of copying. For this reason, the clearest rule 
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of patent interpretation, literalism, may conserve judicial resources but is not necessarily 
the most efficient rule. The scope of a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead 
embraces all equivalents to the claims described. See Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 
330, 347 (1854). 
It is true that the doctrine of equivalents renders the scope of patents less certain. It 
may be difficult to determine what is, or is not, an equivalent to a particular element of an 
invention. If competitors cannot be certain about a patent's extent, they may be deterred 
from engaging in legitimate manufactures outside its limits, or they may invest by mistake 
in competing products that the patent secures. In addition the uncertainty may lead to 
wasteful litigation between competitors, suits that a rule of literalism might avoid. These 
concerns with the doctrine of equivalents, however, are not new. Each time the Court has 
considered the doctrine, it has acknowledged this uncertainty as the price of ensuring the 
appropriate incentives for innovation, and it has affirmed the doctrine over dissents that 
urged a more certain rule. When the Court in Winans v. Denmead, first adopted what has 
become the doctrine of equivalents, it stated that “the exclusive right to the thing patented 
is not secured, if the public are at liberty to make substantial copies of it, varying its form 
or proportions.” . . .   
III 
Prosecution history estoppel requires that the claims of a patent be interpreted in light 
of the proceedings in the PTO during the application process. Estoppel is a “rule of patent 
construction” that ensures that claims are interpreted by reference to those “that have 
been cancelled or rejected.” The doctrine of equivalents allows the patentee to claim those 
insubstantial alterations that were not captured in drafting the original patent claim but 
which could be created through trivial changes. When, however, the patentee originally 
claimed the subject matter alleged to infringe but then narrowed the claim in response to 
a rejection, he may not argue that the surrendered territory comprised unforeseen subject 
matter that should be deemed equivalent to the literal claims of the issued patent. On the 
contrary, “by the amendment the patentee recognized and emphasized the difference 
between the two phrases, and the difference which the patentee thus disclaimed must be 
regarded as material.”  
A rejection indicates that the patent examiner does not believe the original claim could 
be patented. While the patentee has the right to appeal, his decision to forgo an appeal 
and submit an amended claim is taken as a concession that the invention as patented does 
not reach as far as the original claim. Were it otherwise, the inventor might avoid the 
PTO’s gatekeeping role and seek to recapture in an infringement action the very subject 
matter surrendered as a condition of receiving the patent. 
 CHAPTER 9  
428 
Prosecution history estoppel ensures that the doctrine of equivalents remains tied to 
its underlying purpose. Where the original application once embraced the purported 
equivalent but the patentee narrowed his claims to obtain the patent or to protect its 
validity, the patentee cannot assert that he lacked the words to describe the subject matter 
in question. The doctrine of equivalents is premised on language’s inability to capture the 
essence of innovation, but a prior application describing the precise element at issue 
undercuts that premise. In that instance the prosecution history has established that the 
inventor turned his attention to the subject matter in question, knew the words for both 
the broader and narrower claim, and affirmatively chose the latter. 
A 
The first question in this case concerns the kinds of amendments that may give rise to 
estoppel. Petitioner argues that estoppel should arise when amendments are intended to 
narrow the subject matter of the patented invention, for instance, amendments to avoid 
prior art, but not when the amendments are made to comply with requirements 
concerning the form of the patent application. . . . 
Petitioner is correct that estoppel has been discussed most often in the context of 
amendments made to avoid the prior art. It does not follow, however, that amendments 
for other purposes will not give rise to estoppel. Prosecution history may rebut the 
inference that a thing not described was indescribable. That rationale does not cease 
simply because the narrowing amendment, submitted to secure a patent, was for some 
purpose other than avoiding prior art. 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that a narrowing amendment made to satisfy any 
requirement of the Patent Act may give rise to an estoppel. As that court explained, a 
number of statutory requirements must be satisfied before a patent can issue. The claimed 
subject matter must be useful, novel, and not obvious. In addition, the patent application 
must describe, enable, and set forth the best mode of carrying out the invention. § 112. 
These latter requirements must be satisfied before issuance of the patent, for exclusive 
patent rights are given in exchange for disclosing the invention to the public. What is 
claimed by the patent application must be the same as what is disclosed in the 
specification; otherwise the patent should not issue. The patent also should not issue if the 
other requirements of § 112 are not satisfied, and an applicant’s failure to meet these 
requirements could lead to the issued patent being held invalid in later litigation. 
Petitioner contends that amendments made to comply with § 112 concern the form of 
the application and not the subject matter of the invention. The PTO might require the 
applicant to clarify an ambiguous term, to improve the translation of a foreign word, or 
to rewrite a dependent claim as an independent one. In these cases, petitioner argues, the 
applicant has no intention of surrendering subject matter and should not be estopped 
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from challenging equivalent devices. While this may be true in some cases, petitioner’s 
argument conflates the patentee’s reason for making the amendment with the impact the 
amendment has on the subject matter. 
Estoppel arises when an amendment is made to secure the patent and the amendment 
narrows the patent’s scope. If a § 112 amendment is truly cosmetic, then it would not 
narrow the patent’s scope or raise an estoppel. On the other hand, if a § 112 amendment 
is necessary and narrows the patent’s scope—even if only for the purpose of better 
description—estoppel may apply. A patentee who narrows a claim as a condition for 
obtaining a patent disavows his claim to the broader subject matter, whether the 
amendment was made to avoid the prior art or to comply with § 112. We must regard the 
patentee as having conceded an inability to claim the broader subject matter or at least as 
having abandoned his right to appeal a rejection. In either case estoppel may apply. 
B 
Petitioner concedes that the limitations at issue—the sealing rings and the composition 
of the sleeve—were made for reasons related to § 112, if not also to avoid the prior art. 
Our conclusion that prosecution history estoppel arises when a claim is narrowed to 
comply with § 112 gives rise to the second question presented: Does the estoppel bar the 
inventor from asserting infringement against any equivalent to the narrowed element or 
might some equivalents still infringe? The Court of Appeals held that prosecution history 
estoppel is a complete bar, and so the narrowed element must be limited to its strict literal 
terms. Based upon its experience the Court of Appeals decided that the flexible-bar rule 
is unworkable because it leads to excessive uncertainty and burdens legitimate 
innovation. For the reasons that follow, we disagree with the decision to adopt the 
complete bar. 
Though prosecution history estoppel can bar a patentee from challenging a wide range 
of alleged equivalents made or distributed by competitors, its reach requires an 
examination of the subject matter surrendered by the narrowing amendment. The 
complete bar avoids this inquiry by establishing a per se rule; but that approach is 
inconsistent with the purpose of applying the estoppel in the first place—to hold the 
inventor to the representations made during the application process and to the inferences 
that may reasonably be drawn from the amendment. By amending the application, the 
inventor is deemed to concede that the patent does not extend as far as the original claim. 
It does not follow, however, that the amended claim becomes so perfect in its description 
that no one could devise an equivalent. After amendment, as before, language remains an 
imperfect fit for invention. The narrowing amendment may demonstrate what the claim 
is not; but it may still fail to capture precisely what the claim is. There is no reason why a 
narrowing amendment should be deemed to relinquish equivalents unforeseeable at the 
time of the amendment and beyond a fair interpretation of what was surrendered. Nor is 
 CHAPTER 9  
430 
there any call to foreclose claims of equivalence for aspects of the invention that have only 
a peripheral relation to the reason the amendment was submitted. The amendment does 
not show that the inventor suddenly had more foresight in the drafting of claims than an 
inventor whose application was granted without amendments having been submitted. It 
shows only that he was familiar with the broader text and with the difference between the 
two. As a result, there is no more reason for holding the patentee to the literal terms of an 
amended claim than there is for abolishing the doctrine of equivalents altogether and 
holding every patentee to the literal terms of the patent. 
. . . 
In Warner–Jenkinson we struck the appropriate balance by placing the burden on the 
patentee to show that an amendment was not for purposes of patentability . . . . 
When the patentee is unable to explain the reason for amendment, estoppel not only 
applies but also “bars the application of the doctrine of equivalents as to that element.” 
These words do not mandate a complete bar; they are limited to the circumstance where 
“no explanation is established.” They do provide, however, that when the court is unable 
to determine the purpose underlying a narrowing amendment—and hence a rationale for 
limiting the estoppel to the surrender of particular equivalents—the court should 
presume that the patentee surrendered all subject matter between the broader and the 
narrower language. 
Just as Warner–Jenkinson held that the patentee bears the burden of proving that an 
amendment was not made for a reason that would give rise to estoppel, we hold here that 
the patentee should bear the burden of showing that the amendment does not surrender 
the particular equivalent in question. . . . The patentee, as the author of the claim language, 
may be expected to draft claims encompassing readily known equivalents. A patentee’s 
decision to narrow his claims through amendment may be presumed to be a general 
disclaimer of the territory between the original claim and the amended claim. There are 
some cases, however, where the amendment cannot reasonably be viewed as 
surrendering a particular equivalent. The equivalent may have been unforeseeable at the 
time of the application; the rationale underlying the amendment may bear no more than 
a tangential relation to the equivalent in question; or there may be some other reason 
suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the 
insubstantial substitute in question. In those cases the patentee can overcome the 
presumption that prosecution history estoppel bars a finding of equivalence. 
This presumption is not, then, just the complete bar by another name. Rather, it reflects 
the fact that the interpretation of the patent must begin with its literal claims, and the 
prosecution history is relevant to construing those claims. When the patentee has chosen 
to narrow a claim, courts may presume the amended text was composed with awareness 
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of this rule and that the territory surrendered is not an equivalent of the territory claimed. 
In those instances, however, the patentee still might rebut the presumption that estoppel 
bars a claim of equivalence. The patentee must show that at the time of the amendment 
one skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would 
have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent. 
IV 
On the record before us, we cannot say petitioner has rebutted the presumptions that 
estoppel applies and that the equivalents at issue have been surrendered. Petitioner 
concedes that the limitations at issue—the sealing rings and the composition of the 
sleeve—were made in response to a rejection for reasons under § 112, if not also because 
of the prior art references. As the amendments were made for a reason relating to 
patentability, the question is not whether estoppel applies but what territory the 
amendments surrendered. While estoppel does not effect a complete bar, the question 
remains whether petitioner can demonstrate that the narrowing amendments did not 
surrender the particular equivalents at issue. On these questions, SMC may well prevail, 
for the sealing rings and the composition of the sleeve both were noted expressly in the 
prosecution history. These matters, however, should be determined in the first instance 
by further proceedings in the Court of Appeals or the District Court. 
The judgment of the Federal Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Context & Application 
1. In Festo, the Supreme Court stated that “[a] patent holder should know what he 
owns, and the public should know what he does not.” Does the DOE appear contradictory 
to this statement? Do you think the defendants in Warner Jenkinson were unfairly profiting 
off the core idea of the invention? If so, what about the infringing product—or the 
infringer—supports that conclusion? Intentions? The nature of the substitution? Some 
other factor?   
2. Why does the DOE exist? According to the Supreme Court, why can’t (or 
shouldn’t) a utility patent owner be held to the literal scope of their claims?  
3. As we’ve seen, prosecution history estoppel is a limit to the DOE. “Another 
limitation—the doctrine of claim vitiation—ensures that “the application of the doctrine 
of equivalents is not allowed such broad play as to effectively eliminate a claim element 
in its entirety.” Bio-Rad Labs., Inc. v. 10X Genomics Inc., 967 F.3d 1353, 1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 
2020) (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997)). 
According to the Federal Circuit: 
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“[S]aying that a claim element would be vitiated is akin to saying that there is no 
equivalent to the claim element in the accused device based on the well-
established ‘function-way-result’ or ‘insubstantial differences’ tests.” Brilliant 
Instruments, Inc. v. GuideTech, LLC, 707 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013). More 
recently, we have explained that vitiation “is not an exception or threshold 
determination that forecloses resort to the doctrine of equivalents, but is instead a 
legal conclusion of a lack of equivalence based on the evidence presented and the 
theory of equivalence asserted.” UCB, Inc. v. Watson Labs., Inc., 927 F.3d 1272, 1283 
(Fed. Cir. 2019) see also DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 
1005, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“The ‘all elements’ rule generally is not met—and 
therefore a claim limitation can be said to be vitiated—if the theory or evidence of 
equivalence is legally incapable of establishing that the differences between the 
limitation in the claim and the accused device are insubstantial; i.e., if the theory 
or evidence is so legally insufficient as to warrant a holding of non-infringement 
as a matter of law.”). 
Id. at 1366–67. 
4. In Claiming Intellectual Property, Jeanne Fromer argues that the DOE is traceable to 
the practice of “central claiming,” in which patent applicants claimed the core 
embodiments of their inventions and patent rights extended outward from there. 76 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 719, 736 (2009). But today, we use a system of “peripheral claiming” for utility 
patents, where the claims denote the outermost boundaries of what a patent holder claims 
to have invented. Should the DOE have survived the switch to peripheral claiming? 
Which of these claiming methods sounds the most predictable to you? The fairest? The 
most efficient? Does it depend on what type of invention you’re talking about? 
C. Indirect Infringement  
Indirect infringement liability derives from tort law’s recognition of secondary 
liability for actors who assist or encourage others in the commission of a tort. Its roots are 
in common law. While direct infringement does not rely on knowledge of infringement, 
courts only find indirect infringement when there are markers of some type of culpability, 
the contours and content of which we will explore. Indirect infringement liability was 
codified in the 1952 Act, which allows for liability under separate theories of inducement 
or contribution. 
The common law doctrine allowing for indirect infringement contained requirements 
of intent and a “primary” act of infringement (generally understood to mean direct 
infringement). The doctrine was codified in the 1952 Patent Act alongside direct 
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infringement and allows for liability under two related, but distinct theories. Each has its 
own statutory provision. 
The first theory, now known as “contributory infringement,” is defined in the statute 
as follows: 
Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or 
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, 
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially 
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent and not a staple article or 
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable 
as a contributory infringer.  
35 U.S.C. § 271(c). Under contributory infringement, there is liability for knowingly 
offering for sale, selling, or importing a material part of an invention that does not have 
substantial noninfringing uses. The intuition is that liability can attach for selling or 
importing something that is an important part of the invention and that is primarily going 
to be used to infringe. There are limits—the person needs to have some awareness of this 
fact, and there is an exception for products that have significant alternative uses. Still, the 
basic idea is to ensure that the patent rights cannot be evaded by selling some material 
pieces of the invention and letting the buyers do the rest. 
The second theory, now known as “inducement,” is defined in the statute as follows: 
“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.” 35 
U.S.C. § 271(b). Inducement infringement was not a separate theory of liability before the 
1952 Act. Instead, inducement was a type of evidence for contributory infringement. As a 
result, there is a great deal of overlap in the assertion of the two theories and in doctrinal 
application of their requirements.  
But the line between direct and indirect infringement is not always a bright one. For 
example, what happens when a claimed method is performed by more than one entity? 
Suppose first that two separate people carry out separate steps of a method claim without 
coordinating with each other at all. In this instance, there is no direct infringement because 
no one has met all the elements of the claim. Moreover, because indirect infringement 
liability is only available when there is an underlying act of direct infringement, there is 
no indirect infringement either. That sounds fair, because in this example, there is no 
coordination or expectations between the parties. But now suppose that a distributor 
carries out some of the steps of a method patent and the rest are carried out by a customer. 
In some ways, this situation resembles cases of indirect infringement, where a distributor 
may sell a machine that performs an infringing process. But, through a series of Federal 
Circuit and then Supreme Court cases, the doctrine has developed so that the best way to 
analyze—or reach—such activities is through claims for direct infringement, with liability 
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depending on the level of direction and control between the actors, or on whether they 
form a joint enterprise. 
Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement 
377 U.S. 476 (1964) 
Convertible Top Replacement Co., Inc., (CTR) [was assigned] all rights for the territory 
of Massachusetts in United States Patent No. 2,569,724, known as the Mackie-Duluk 
patent. Structures embodying the patented combination were included as original 
equipment in 1952–1954 models of convertibles manufactured by the General Motors 
Corporation and the Ford Motor Company. They were included in the General Motors 
cars by authority of a license granted to General Motors by AB; Ford, however, had no 
license during the 1952–1954 period, and no authority whatever under the patent until 
July 21, 1955, when it entered into an agreement, discussed later, with AB; Ford’s 
manufacture and sale of the automobiles in question therefore infringed the patent. 
Petitioner Aro Manufacturing Co., Inc. (Aro), which is not licensed under the patent, 
produces fabric components designed as replacements for wornout fabric portions of 
convertible tops; unlike the other elements of the topstructure, which ordinarily are usable 
for the life of the car, the fabric portion normally wears out and requires replacement after 
about three years of use. 
[An earlier Supreme Court opinion (“Aro I”) addressed the question of whether Aro’s 
sales to owners of the GM cars constituted indirect infringement; the Court found that 
such uses were allowable, noninfringing “repairs” rather than impermissible, infringing 
“reconstruction” of the convertible tops. In this case, the Court decides whether sales to 
owners of the (unlicensed) Ford cars constitute indirect infringement.] 
I 
CTR contends, and the Court of Appeals held, that since Ford infringed the patent by 
making and selling the top-structures without authority from the patentee, persons who 
purchased the automobiles from Ford likewise infringed by using and repairing the 
structures; and hence Aro, by supplying replacement fabrics specially designed to be 
utilized in such infringing repair, was guilty of contributory infringement under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(c). In Aro I, the Court said: 
It is admitted that petitioners (Aro) know that the purchasers intend to use the 
fabric for replacement purposes on automobile convertible tops which are covered 
by the claims of respondent’s combination patent, and such manufacture and sale 
with that knowledge might well constitute contributory infringement under 
§ 271(c), if, but only if, such a replacement by the purchaser himself would in itself 
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constitute a direct infringement under § 271(a), for it is settled that if there is no 
direct infringement of a patent there can be no contributory infringement. . . . The 
determinative question, therefore, comes down to whether the car owner would 
infringe the combination patent by replacing the worn-out fabric element of the 
patented convertible top on his car. 
Similarly here, to determine whether Aro committed contributory infringement, we must 
first determine whether the car owners, by replacing the worn-out fabric element of the 
patented top-structures, committed direct infringement. We think it clear, under § 271(a) 
of the Patent Code and the “entire body of case law on direct infringement” which 
[Congress] “left intact,” that they did. 
 Section 271(a) provides that ‘whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any 
patented invention infringes the patent.’ It is not controverted—nor could it be—that Ford 
infringed by making and selling cars embodying the patented top-structures without any 
authority from the patentee. If Ford had had such authority, its purchasers would not 
have infringed by using the automobiles, for it is fundamental that sale of a patented 
article by the patentee or under his authority carries with it an “implied license to use.” 
But with Ford lacking authority to make and sell, it could by its sale of the cars confer on 
the purchasers no implied license to use, and their use of the patented structures was thus 
“without authority” and infringing under § 271(a). Not only does that provision explicitly 
regard an unauthorized user of a patented invention as an infringer, but it has often and 
clearly been held that unauthorized use, without more, constitutes infringement.  
 If the owner’s use infringed, so also did his repair of the top-structure, as by replacing 
the worn-out fabric component. Where use infringes, repair does also, for it perpetuates 
the infringing use. . . . 
. . . 
Consequently replacement of worn-out fabric components with fabrics sold by Aro, 
held in Aro I to constitute “repair” rather than “reconstruction” and thus to be permissible 
in the case of licensed General Motors cars, was not permissible here in the case of 
unlicensed Ford cars. Here, as was not the case in Aro I, the direct infringement by the car 
owners that is prerequisite to contributory infringement by Aro was unquestionably 
established. 
 We turn next to the question whether Aro, as supplier of replacement fabrics for use 
in the infringing repair by the Ford car owners, was a contributory infringer under § 271(c) 
of the Patent Code. That section provides: 
Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or 
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, 
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constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially 
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a 
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing 
use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer. 
 We think Aro was indeed liable under this provision. 
 Such a result would plainly have obtained under the contributory-infringement case 
law that § 271(c) was intended to codify. Indeed, most of the law was established in cases 
where, as here, suit was brought to hold liable for contributory infringement a supplier of 
replacement parts specially designed for use in the repair of infringing articles. In Union 
Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S., at 113-14, the Court held that where use of the patented 
machines themselves was not authorized, 
 There was, consequently, no implied license to use the spare parts in these 
machines. As such use, unless licensed, clearly constituted an infringement, the 
sale of the spare parts to be so used violated the injunction (enjoining 
infringement). 
. . . 
In enacting § 271(c), Congress clearly succeeded in its objective of codifying this case 
law. The language of the section fits perfectly Aro’s activity of selling “a component of a 
patented combination, constituting a material part of the invention, especially made or 
especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent and not a staple article or 
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.” Indeed, this is the 
almost unique case in which the component was hardly suitable for any noninfringing 
use. On this basis both the District Court originally and the Court of Appeals in the instant 
case held that Aro was a contributory infringer within the precise letter of § 271(c).  
However, the language of § 271(c) presents a question, apparently not noticed by the 
parties or the courts below, concerning the element of knowledge that must be brought 
home to Aro before liability can be imposed. It is only sale of a component of a patented 
combination “knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an 
infringement of such patent” that is contributory infringement under the statute. Was Aro 
“knowing” within the statutory meaning because—as it admits, and as the lower courts 
found—it knew that its replacement fabrics were especially designed for use in the 1952–
1954 Ford convertible tops and were not suitable for other use? Or does the statute require 
a further showing that Aro knew that the tops were patented, and knew also that Ford 
was not licensed under the patent so that any fabric replacement by a Ford car owner 
constituted infringement? 
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 On this question a majority of the Court is of the view that § 271(c) does require a 
showing that the alleged contributory infringer knew that the combination for which his 
component was especially designed was both patented and infringing. With respect to 
many of the replacement-fabric sales involved in this case, Aro clearly had such 
knowledge. For by letter dated January 2, 1954, AB informed Aro that it held the Mackie-
Duluk patent; that it had granted a license under the patent to General Motors but to no 
one else; and that ‘It is obvious, from the foregoing and from an inspection of the 
convertible automobile sold by the Ford Motor Company, that anyone selling ready-made 
replacement fabrics for these automobiles would be guilty of contributory infringement 
of said patent.’ Thus the Court’s interpretation of the knowledge requirement affords Aro 
no defense with respect to replacement-fabric sales made after January 2, 1954. It would 
appear that the overwhelming majority of the sales were in fact made after that date, since 
the oldest of the cars were 1952 models and since the average life of a fabric top is said to 
be three years. With respect to any sales that were made before that date, however, Aro 
cannot be held liable in the absence of a showing that at that time it had already acquired 
the requisite knowledge that the Ford car tops were patented and infringing. . . . 
Context & Application 
1. Knowledge of Infringement: The decision you just read (later referred to as 
“Aro II”) was about contributory infringement. In 2011, the Supreme Court extended 
Aro II’s knowledge requirement to a case about induced infringement: 
While both the language of § 271(b) and the pre-1952 case law that this provision 
was meant to codify are susceptible to conflicting interpretations, our decision in 
Aro II resolves the question in this case. In Aro II, a majority held that a violator of 
§ 271(c) must know “that the combination for which his component was especially 
designed was both patented and infringing,” 377 U.S. at 488, and . . . that 
conclusion compels this same knowledge for liability under § 271(b) . . . .  
While there is much to be said in favor of both views expressed in Aro II, the 
“holding in Aro II has become a fixture in the law of contributory infringement 
under § 271(c),” 5 R. MOY, WALKER ON PATENTS § 15:20, p. 15-131 (4th ed. 2009)—
so much so that SEB has not asked us to overrule it. Nor has Congress seen fit to 
alter § 271(c)’s intent requirement in the nearly half a century since Aro II was 
decided. In light of the special force of the doctrine of stare decisis with regard to 
questions of statutory interpretation, we proceed on the premise that § 271(c) 
requires knowledge of the existence of the patent that is infringed. 
Based on this premise, it follows that the same knowledge is needed for induced 
infringement under § 271(b). As noted, the two provisions have a common origin 
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in the pre-1952 understanding of contributory infringement, and the language of 
the two provisions creates the same difficult interpretive choice. It would thus be 
strange to hold that knowledge of the relevant patent is needed under § 271(c) but 
not under § 271(b). 
Accordingly, we now hold that induced infringement under § 271(b) requires 
knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement. 
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 763–66 (2011). The Court then turned 
to what standard should be applied to determine whether there was knowledge of 
infringement, finding that the Federal Circuit’s application of “deliberate indifference to 
a known risk that a patent exists” was not the appropriate standard. Instead, the Court 
looked to criminal law’s established theory of “willful blindness,” stating: 
Many criminal statutes require proof that a defendant acted knowingly or 
willfully, and courts applying the doctrine of willful blindness hold that 
defendants cannot escape the reach of these statutes by deliberately shielding 
themselves from clear evidence of critical facts that are strongly suggested by the 
circumstances. The traditional rationale for this doctrine is that defendants who 
behave in this manner are just as culpable as those who have actual knowledge.  
. . . 
Given the long history of willful blindness and its wide acceptance in the Federal 
Judiciary, we can see no reason why the doctrine should not apply in civil lawsuits 
for induced patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). 
Why do you think the Court turned to criminal law to supply this standard? Can you 
think of any reasons that the criminal law doctrine of willful blindness should not apply 
in civil lawsuits for induced patent infringement? Justice Kennedy, dissenting, could: 
First, the Court appeals to moral theory by citing the “traditional rationale” that 
willfully blind defendants “are just as culpable as those who have actual 
knowledge.” But the moral question is a difficult one. Is it true that the lawyer who 
knowingly suborns perjury is no more culpable than the lawyer who avoids 
learning that his client, a criminal defendant, lies when he testifies that he was not 
the shooter? . . . The answer is not obvious. Perhaps the culpability of willful 
blindness depends on a person’s reasons for remaining blind. Or perhaps only the 
person’s justification for his conduct is relevant. This is a question of morality and 
of policy best left to the political branches. Even if one were to accept the 
substitution of equally blameworthy mental states in criminal cases in light of the 
retributive purposes of the criminal law, those purposes have no force in the 
domain of patent law that controls in this case. The Constitution confirms that the 
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purpose of the patent law is a utilitarian one, to “promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts,” Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
According to Justice Kennedy, the standard should be actual knowledge. Do you find this 
reasoning persuasive? 
2. What if the defendant has a good-faith belief that the patent they’re accused of 
infringing is invalid? Remember that an invalid patent cannot be infringed. The Court 
took up that issue in Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc. Justice Kennedy, who 
dissented in Global-Tech, wrote the opinion: 
The question the Court confronts today concerns whether a defendant’s belief 
regarding patent validity is a defense to a claim of induced infringement. It is not. 
The scienter element for induced infringement concerns infringement; that is a 
different issue than validity. Section 271(b) requires that the defendant “actively 
induced infringement.” That language requires intent to “bring about the desired 
result,” which is infringement. And because infringement and validity are 
separate issues under the Act, belief regarding validity cannot negate the scienter 
required under § 271(b). 
When infringement is the issue, the validity of the patent is not the question to be 
confronted. In Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993), the 
Court explained, “A party seeking a declaratory judgment of invalidity presents a 
claim independent of the patentee’s charge of infringement.” It further held 
noninfringement and invalidity were “alternative grounds” for dismissing the 
suit. And in Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, 445 U. S. 326, 334 (1980), the Court 
explained that an accused infringer “may prevail either by successfully attacking 
the validity of the patent or by successfully defending the charge of infringement.” 
These explanations are in accord with the long-accepted truth—perhaps the 
axiom—that infringement and invalidity are separate matters under patent law. 
Indeed, the issues of infringement and validity appear in separate parts of the 
Patent Act. Part III of the Act deals with “Patents and Protection of Patent Rights,” 
including the right to be free from infringement. §§ 251-329. Part II, entitled 
“Patentability of Inventions and Grants of Patents,” defines what constitutes a 
valid patent. §§ 100-212. Further, noninfringement and invalidity are listed as two 
separate defenses, see §§ 282(b)(1), (2), and defendants are free to raise either or 
both of them. Were this Court to interpret § 271(b) as permitting a defense of belief 
in invalidity, it would conflate the issues of infringement and validity. 
Allowing this new defense would also undermine a presumption that is a 
“common core of thought and truth” reflected in this Court’s precedents for a 
century. Under the Patent Act, and the case law before its passage, a patent is 
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“presumed valid.” § 282(a). That presumption takes away any need for a plaintiff 
to prove his patent is valid to bring a claim. But if belief in invalidity were a defense 
to induced infringement, the force of that presumption would be lessened to a 
drastic degree, for a defendant could prevail if he proved he reasonably believed 
the patent was invalid. That would circumvent the high bar Congress is presumed 
to have chosen: the clear and convincing standard. Defendants must meet that 
standard to rebut the presumption of validity. 
To say that an invalid patent cannot be infringed, or that someone cannot be 
induced to infringe an invalid patent, is in one sense a simple truth, both as a 
matter of logic and semantics. But the questions courts must address when 
interpreting and implementing the statutory framework require a determination 
of the procedures and sequences that the parties must follow to prove the act of 
wrongful inducement and any related issues of patent validity. . . . To be sure, if 
at the end of the day, an act that would have been an infringement or an 
inducement to infringe pertains to a patent that is shown to be invalid, there is no 
patent to be infringed. But the allocation of the burden to persuade on these 
questions, and the timing for the presentations of the relevant arguments, are 
concerns of central relevance to the orderly administration of the patent system. 
Invalidity is an affirmative defense that “can preclude enforcement of a patent 
against otherwise infringing conduct.” 6A CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.01, at 19-5 
(2015). An accused infringer can, of course, attempt to prove that the patent in suit 
is invalid; if the patent is indeed invalid, and shown to be so under proper 
procedures, there is no liability. That is because invalidity is not a defense to 
infringement, it is a defense to liability. And because of that fact, a belief as to 
invalidity cannot negate the scienter required for induced infringement. 
There are also practical reasons not to create a defense based on a good-faith belief 
in invalidity. First and foremost, accused inducers who believe a patent is invalid 
have various proper ways to obtain a ruling to that effect. They can file a 
declaratory judgment action asking a federal court to declare the patent invalid. 
They can seek inter partes review at the Patent Trial & Appeal Board and receive 
a decision as to validity within 12 to 18 months. See § 316. Or they can, as Cisco 
did here, seek ex parte reexamination of the patent by the [USPTO]. § 302. And, of 
course, any accused infringer who believes the patent in suit is invalid may raise 
the affirmative defense of invalidity. § 282(b)(2). If the defendant is successful, he 
will be immune from liability. 
Creating a defense of belief in invalidity, furthermore, would have negative 
consequences. It can render litigation more burdensome for everyone involved. 
Every accused inducer would have an incentive to put forth a theory of invalidity 
 INFRINGEMENT  
441 
and could likely come up with myriad arguments. And since “it is often more 
difficult to determine whether a patent is valid than whether it has been 
infringed,” accused inducers would likely find it easier to prevail on a defense 
regarding the belief of invalidity than noninfringement. In addition the need to 
respond to the defense will increase discovery costs and multiply the issues the 
jury must resolve. Indeed, the jury would be put to the difficult task of separating 
the defendant’s belief regarding validity from the actual issue of validity. 
575 U.S. 632 (2015). Do you agree that there should be a distinction between a good faith 
belief in non-infringement (which is a defense to indirect infringement) and a good faith 
belief in invalidity (which is not)? For an argument that method claims are afforded less 
protection than patents on products in the context of what has come to be known as 
“divided infringement,” see Timothy R. Holbrook, Method Patent Exceptionalism, 102 IOWA 
L. REV. 1001, 1047 (2017). 
3. Indirect infringement is one area where notions of knowledge and culpability play 
a role in determining infringement. In general, patent infringement is often referred to as 
a “strict liability” tort, because it requires no knowledge of the infringement for liability 
to attach. For an argument that patent infringement is more akin to an intentional tort, 
requiring intent to perform the act, but not intent to infringe another’s rights, see Saurabh 
Vishnubhakat, An Intentional Tort Theory of Patents, 68 FLA. L. REV. 571 (2016). 
C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. 
911 F.2d 670 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
PLAGER, Circuit Judge. 
This is a case of claimed infringement of a method patent for a medical treatment. 
Defendant–Appellant Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. (ACS) was marketing the 
only perfusion catheter approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration for 
use in coronary angioplasty. Plaintiff–Appellee C.R. Bard, Inc. (Bard) sued ACS for 
alleged infringement of U.S. Patent No. 4,581,017 (’017), application for which was filed 
in 1983 and which issued to Harvinder Sahota in 1986; Bard had purchased all rights to 
the ’017 patent as of December 31, 1986. The ’017 patent relates to a method for using a 
catheter in coronary angioplasty. On July 28, 1989, the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California granted plaintiff Bard summary judgment against ACS 
determining that the ’017 patent was not invalid as obvious, and finding infringement of 
claim 1 of the ’017 patent. We reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand the 
case for further proceedings. 




In the human circulatory system, the left ventricle of the heart pumps blood into the 
aorta, the body’s largest artery, which then distributes the blood to smaller arteries 
throughout the body. The first arteries to branch off from the aorta are the left and right 
main coronary arteries, which provide blood to the heart muscle itself. 
 Atherosclerosis may cause these arteries to be progressively narrowed (stenosis) by 
the formation of plaque within the arteries resulting in coronary artery disease. This 
decreases blood flow to the heart muscle and may cause problems ranging from chest 
pain (angina) to, in the extreme, a fatal heart attack (myocardial infarction). 
 Bypass surgery allows the grafting of a vein to the affected coronary artery to bypass 
the stenosis. Percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA), an alternative 
procedure, involves inserting a deflated balloon dilation catheter through the patient’s 
arteries to reach the stenosis in the coronary artery. The balloon is inflated to dilate the 
stenosis and then deflated and removed to restore blood flow to the heart. 
 A difficulty associated with PTCA is that a prolonged blockage of blood flow to the 
heart muscle in the course of the procedure, caused by the inflated balloon, may itself 
result in angina or a heart attack. Typically during a PTCA, repeated inflations of the 
balloon, each lasting from 60–90 seconds, are performed. 
B 
U.S. Patent No. 4,423,725 (’725), filed in 1982 and issued in 1984, discloses a catheter 
having a multiple surgical cuff with an inflatable cuff member, and having a central lumen 
or channel containing side window openings in fluid communication with the central 
lumen. The side openings allow blood to circulate through the central lumen even while 
the inflatable cuff is inflated, thus avoiding blockage of fluid flow when the cuff member 
is inflated. The ’725 patent discloses that, in an angioplasty, “the side openings ... should 
be located at the level of the aorta to create the highest blood pressure and to prevent the 
side openings from being closed laterally by an adherent small artery wall.” 
 In 1983, inventor Sahota filed a patent application (ultimately issuing as the ’017 
patent, the patent at issue in this case) having (1) device claims for a catheter to administer 
an angioplasty treatment and (2) method claims for the manner in which a surgeon would 
use the catheter in administration of an angioplasty treatment. All claims were rejected by 
the patent examiner. In particular, claim 4 of the application (which, following significant 
amendment, became claim 1 of the ’017 patent) was rejected, inter alia, in view of the prior 
art ’725 patent. 
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Following this rejection, the inventor modified certain claims. These modified claims 
were also rejected. Following this rejection, the inventor removed all claims to a catheter, 
and claimed only a method of administering an angioplasty. 
In twice amending claim 4 of the application, the inventor argued to the examiner that 
“the proximal orifices which admit blood to the main lumen in the blood catheter are 
‘immediately adjacent said balloon.’” Claim 4 of the application was ultimately allowed as 
claim 1 of the ’017 patent, and contained the “immediately adjacent” language. 
C 
The ACS catheter, sold under the name ACS Stack Perfusion Catheter, is a balloon-
type catheter having side openings in the main lumen located near the proximal end of 
the balloon. The ACS catheter’s main lumen is simply open past the distal end of the 
balloon enabling blood to flow through the catheter while the balloon is inflated. Plaintiff 
Bard alleges that the ACS catheter is especially adapted for use by a surgeon in the course 
of administering a coronary angioplasty in a manner that infringes claim 1 of the ’017 
patent, that therefore ACS is a contributory infringer, and that ACS actively induces 
infringement. 
ACS denied both charges and challenged the validity of the Bard patent. The district 
judge agreed with Bard and granted Bard’s request for summary judgment, finding ACS 
to have “actively induced or contributed to [the] infringement” of claim 1 of the ’017 
patent, and to have failed to prove the invalidity of the ’017 patent.  
II 
B 
Bard alleges that under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), (c) (1988), ACS has both (1) induced 
infringement of method claim 1 in the ’017 patent and (2) contributorily infringed. Of 
course, a finding of induced or contributory infringement must be predicated on a direct 
infringement of claim 1 by the users of the ACS catheter. 
1 
Bard argues that by selling its catheter for use by surgeons in angioplasty procedures, 
ACS is a contributory infringer of Bard’s method claim 1 in the ’017 patent. Section 271 of 
Title 35, United States Code, deals with infringement of patents; subsection (c) specifies 
what is necessary to be a contributory infringer. For purposes of this case, the statute 
requires that ACS sell a catheter for use in practicing the ’017 process, which use 
constitutes a material part of the invention, knowing that the catheter is especially made 
or adapted for use in infringing the patent, and that the catheter is not a staple article or 
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use. 
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In asserting ACS’s contributory infringement of claim 1, Bard seeks to establish the 
requisite direct infringement by arguing that there is no evidence that any angioplasty 
procedures using the ACS catheter would be noninfringing. Testing this assertion requires 
a two step analysis. First is a determination of the scope of the claim at issue. Second is an 
examination of the evidence before the court to ascertain whether, under § 271(c), use of 
the ACS catheter would infringe the claim as interpreted.  
Claim 1 of the ’017 patent claims, inter alia, 
[a] method of administering an angioplasty treatment to a patient to produce 
acceptable blood flow in a stenotic region of a coronary artery having restricted 
blood flow, comprising: 
inserting a tube having an outer surface enclosing a main lumen terminating in a 
main axial orifice into said coronary artery . . . 
channeling blood flow through the wall of said proximal portion of said main 
lumen immediately adjacent said balloon to fluidly connect locations within said 
coronary artery surrounding said proximal and distal portions of said tube while 
said balloon is inflated within said coronary artery to conduct blood downstream 
from the portion of said coronary artery occluded by the inflated balloon. 
Bard argues that the prior art ’725 patent teaches the use of the catheter with the inlets 
(side openings) where the blood enters the tube placed only in the aorta, whereas the ’017 
method in suit involves insertion of the catheter into the coronary artery in such a manner 
that the openings “immediately adjacent [to] the balloon fluidly connect locations within 
the coronary artery surrounding the proximal and distal portions of the tube.” Thus, Bard 
argues, a surgeon, inserting the ACS catheter into a coronary artery to a point where an 
inlet at the catheter’s proximal end draws blood from the artery, infringes the ’017 patent. 
 To fully understand this difference, it is important to note that the ACS catheter has 
a series of ten openings in the tube near, and at the proximal end of, the balloon. The first 
of these openings—the one closest to the balloon—is approximately six millimeters (less 
than ¼ inch) from the edge of the proximal end of the balloon. The remainder are located 
along the main lumen at intervals, the furthest from the balloon being 6.3 centimeters 
(approximately 2 ½ inches) away. 
 It would appear that three possible fact patterns may arise in the course of using the 
ACS catheter during a PTCA. The first pattern involves positioning the catheter such that 
all of its side openings are located only in the aorta. This is clearly contemplated by the 
prior art ’725 patent cited by the examiner; claims to this method were expressly given up 
by inventor Sahota during patent prosecution and are not now available to Bard.  
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 In the second of the possible fact patterns, all of the side openings are located within 
the coronary artery. This situation appears to have been contemplated by the ’017 patent, 
the method patent at issue. In this situation, it correctly can be said that blood flowing 
through the main lumen will “fluidly connect locations within the coronary artery 
surrounding the proximal and distal portions of the tube.” 
 In the third fact pattern, some of the side openings are located in the aorta and some 
are located in the artery. The trial judge concluded, 
[t]hat ACS has added extra holes further from the balloon does not affect the 
conclusion of infringement, as the patent does not require that all holes be 
“immediately adjacent” the balloon, nor that the blood flowing through the 
balloon come solely from the coronary artery. 
There is evidence in the record that 40 to 60 percent of the stenoses that require 
angioplasty are located less than three centimeters from the entrance to the coronary 
artery. ACS argues that therefore the ACS catheter may be used in such a way that all of 
the openings are located in the aorta. Even assuming that the trial judge’s conclusion is 
correct that claim 1 is applicable to the third of the fact patterns, it remains true that on 
this record a reasonable jury could find that, pursuant to the procedure described in the 
first of the fact patterns (a noninfringing procedure), there are substantial noninfringing 
uses for the ACS catheter. 
Whether the ACS catheter “has no use except through practice of the patented 
method,” is thus a critical issue to be decided in this case. As the Supreme Court recently 
noted, “when a charge of contributory infringement is predicated entirely on the sale of 
an article of commerce that is used by the purchaser allegedly to infringe a patent, the 
public interest in access to that article of commerce is necessarily implicated.” Sony Corp. 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 440 (1983). Viewing the evidence in this case in 
a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and resolving reasonable inferences in 
ACS’s favor, it cannot be said that Bard is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The 
grant of summary judgment finding ACS a contributory infringer under § 271(c) is not 
appropriate. 
2 
 A person induces infringement under § 271(b) by actively and knowingly aiding and 
abetting another’s direct infringement. Bard argues that ACS induced infringement under 
§ 271(b) by: 1) providing detailed instructions and other literature on how to use its 
catheter in a manner which would infringe claim 1; and 2) having positioned the inlets 
near the balloon’s proximal end so as to allow a user of the ACS catheter to infringe claim 
1. As already discussed, on a motion for summary judgment we view the evidence in a 
light most favorable to ACS, the nonmoving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in 
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its favor. The evidence before the trial judge on the motion for summary judgment was at 
best ambiguous regarding the fact pattern or patterns under which the catheter was to be 
used. Because a genuine issue of material fact thus exists, a grant of summary judgment 
finding ACS induced infringement is also not appropriate. 
Context & Application 
1.  In C.R. Bard, the Federal Circuit quotes and relies on a copyright case, Sony Corp. 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., for a proposition about contributory infringement. Unlike 
the Patent Act, the Copyright Act does not mention contributory or inducement liability. 
It does not create a cause of action for contributory infringement. But in Sony, the Court 
read one into the statute and imported the concept of a “staple article of commerce” from 
the Patent Act into copyright law. See 464 U.S. 417, 440–42 (1983). The Court built on Sony 
in the copyright case Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 
(2005), which the Court then relied upon in the patent case Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. 
SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 763 (2011). What do you think about this kind of doctrinal cross-
pollination? What does it mean for your research responsibilities and the potential 
arguments you could make if you were working on a patent contributory liability case? 
D. Joint Infringement  
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc., 
572 U.S. 915 (2014) 
Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether a defendant may be liable for inducing 
infringement of a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) when no one has directly infringed the 
patent under § 271(a) or any other statutory provision. . . . 
I 
A 
Respondent the Massachusetts Institute of Technology is the assignee of U.S. Patent 
No. 6,108,703 (’703 patent), which claims a method of delivering electronic data using a 
“content delivery network,” or “CDN.” Respondent Akamai Technologies, Inc., is the 
exclusive licensee. Akamai maintains many servers distributed in various locations. 
Proprietors of Web sites, known as “content providers,” contract with Akamai to deliver 
their Web sites’ content to individual Internet users. The ’703 patent provides for the 
designation of certain components of a content provider’s Web site (often large files, such 
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as video or music files) to be stored on Akamai’s servers and accessed from those servers 
by Internet users. The process of designating components to be stored on Akamai’s 
servers is known as “tagging.” By “aggregating the data demands of multiple content 
providers with differing peak usage patterns and serving that content from multiple 
servers in multiple locations,” as well as by delivering content from servers located in the 
same geographic area as the users who are attempting to access it, Akamai is able to 
increase the speed with which Internet users access the content of its customers’ Web sites. 
Petitioner Limelight Networks, Inc., also operates a CDN and carries out several of the 
steps claimed in the ’703 patent. But instead of tagging those components of its customers’ 
Web sites that it intends to store on its servers (a step included in the ’703 patent), 
Limelight requires its customers to do their own tagging. Respondents claim that 
Limelight “provides instructions and offers technical assistance” to its customers 
regarding how to tag, but the record is undisputed that Limelight does not tag the 
components to be stored on its servers. 
B 
In 2006, respondents sued Limelight in the United States District Court for the District 
of Massachusetts, claiming ‘919 patent infringement. The case was tried to a jury, which 
found that Limelight had committed infringement and awarded more than $40 million in 
damages. 
 Respondents’ victory was short-lived, however. After the jury returned its verdict, 
the Federal Circuit decided Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318 (2008). In that 
case the Court of Appeals rejected a claim that the defendant’s method, involving bidding 
on financial instruments using a computer system, directly infringed the plaintiff’s patent. 
The defendant performed some of the steps of the patented method, and its customers, to 
whom the defendant gave access to its system along with instructions on the use of the 
system, performed the remaining steps. The court started from “the proposition that 
direct infringement requires a single party to perform every step of a claimed method.” 
This requirement is satisfied even though the steps are actually undertaken by multiple 
parties, the court explained, if a single defendant “exercises ‘control or direction’ over the 
entire process such that every step is attributable to the controlling party.” The court held 
that the defendant in Muniauction was not liable for direct infringement because it did not 
exercise control or direction over its customers’ performance of those steps of the patent 
that the defendant itself did not perform.  
 In light of Muniauction, Limelight moved for reconsideration of its earlier motion for 
judgment as a matter of law, which the District Court had denied. The District Court 
granted the motion, concluding that Muniauction precluded a finding of direct 
infringement under § 271(a) because infringement of the ’703 patent required tagging and 
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Limelight does not control or direct its customers’ tagging. A panel of the Federal Circuit 
affirmed, explaining that a defendant that does not itself undertake all of a patent’s steps 
can be liable for direct infringement only “when there is an agency relationship between 
the parties who perform the method steps or when one party is contractually obligated to 
the other to perform the steps.” Since neither of these conditions was met in the present 
case, the Federal Circuit panel held that Limelight could not be held liable for direct 
infringement. 
The Federal Circuit granted en banc review and reversed. The en banc court found it 
unnecessary to revisit its § 271(a) direct infringement case law. Instead, it concluded that 
the “evidence could support a judgment in respondents’ favor on a theory of induced 
infringement” under § 271(b). This was true, the court explained, because § 271(b) liability 
arises when a defendant carries out some steps constituting a method patent and 
encourages others to carry out the remaining steps—even if no one would be liable as a 
direct infringer in such circumstances, because those who performed the remaining steps 
did not act as agents of, or under the direction or control of, the defendant. The Court of 
Appeals did not dispute that “there can be no indirect infringement without direct 
infringement,” but it explained that “requiring proof that there has been direct 
infringement is not the same as requiring proof that a single party would be liable as a 
direct infringer”. Judge Newman and Judge Linn both dissented (with the latter joined by 
Judges Dyk, Prost, and O’Malley). 
Limelight sought certiorari, which we granted.  
II 
A 
Neither the Federal Circuit, nor respondents dispute the proposition that liability for 
inducement must be predicated on direct infringement. This is for good reason, as our 
case law leaves no doubt that inducement liability may arise “if, but only if, there is direct 
infringement.” Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, (1961). 
One might think that this simple truth is enough to dispose of this appeal. But the 
Federal Circuit reasoned that a defendant can be liable for inducing infringement under 
§ 271(b) even if no one has committed direct infringement within the terms of § 271(a) (or 
any other provision of the patent laws), because direct infringement can exist 
independently of a violation of these statutory provisions.  
  The Federal Circuit’s analysis fundamentally misunderstands what it means to 
infringe a method patent. A method patent claims a number of steps; under this Court’s 
case law, the patent is not infringed unless all the steps are carried out. See, e.g., Aro (a 
“patent covers only the totality of the elements in the claim and ... no element, separately 
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viewed, is within the grant”). This principle follows ineluctably from what a patent is: the 
conferral of rights in a particular claimed set of elements. “Each element contained in a 
patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the patented invention,” Warner–
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997), and a patentee’s rights 
extend only to the claimed combination of elements, and no further. 
  The Federal Circuit held in Muniauction that a method’s steps have not all been 
performed as claimed by the patent unless they are all attributable to the same defendant, 
either because the defendant actually performed those steps or because he directed or 
controlled others who performed them. Assuming without deciding that the Federal 
Circuit’s holding in Muniauction is correct, there has simply been no infringement of the 
method in which respondents have staked out an interest, because the performance of all 
the patent’s steps is not attributable to any one person. And, as both the Federal Circuit 
and respondents admit, where there has been no direct infringement, there can be no 
inducement of infringement under § 271(b). 
 The Federal Circuit’s contrary view would deprive § 271(b) of ascertainable 
standards. If a defendant can be held liable under § 271(b) for inducing conduct that does 
not constitute infringement, then how can a court assess when a patent holder’s rights 
have been invaded? What if a defendant pays another to perform just one step of a 12–
step process, and no one performs the other steps, but that one step can be viewed as the 
most important step in the process? In that case the defendant has not encouraged 
infringement, but no principled reason prevents him from being held liable for 
inducement under the Federal Circuit’s reasoning, which permits inducement liability 
when fewer than all of a method’s steps have been performed within the meaning of the 
patent. The decision below would require the courts to develop two parallel bodies of 
infringement law: one for liability for direct infringement, and one for liability for 
inducement. 
 Section 271(f)(1) reinforces our reading of § 271(b). That subsection imposes liability 
on a party who “supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States all or a 
substantial portion of the components of a patented invention in such manner as to 
actively induce the combination of such components outside of the United States in a 
manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United 
States.” As this provision illustrates, when Congress wishes to impose liability for 
inducing activity that does not itself constitute direct infringement, it knows precisely 
how to do so. The courts should not create liability for inducement of non-infringing 
conduct where Congress has elected not to extend that concept. 
 The Federal Circuit seems to have adopted the view that Limelight induced 
infringement on the theory that the steps that Limelight and its customers perform would 
infringe the ’703 patent if all the steps were performed by the same person. But we have 
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already rejected the notion that conduct which would be infringing in altered 
circumstances can form the basis for contributory infringement, and we see no reason to 
apply a different rule for inducement. . . . In this case, performance of all the claimed steps 
cannot be attributed to a single person, so direct infringement never occurred. Limelight 
cannot be liable for inducing infringement that never came to pass. 
III 
 Respondents ask us to review the merits of the Federal Circuit’s Muniauction rule for 
direct infringement under § 271(a). We decline to do so today. 
In the first place, the question presented is clearly focused on § 271(b), not § 271(a). 
We granted certiorari on the following question: “Whether the Federal Circuit erred in 
holding that a defendant may be held liable for inducing patent infringement under 35 
U.S.C. § 271(b) even though no one has committed direct infringement under § 271(a).” 
The question presupposes that Limelight has not committed direct infringement under 
§ 271(a). And since the question on which we granted certiorari did not involve § 271(a), 
petitioner did not address that important issue in its opening brief. Our decision on the 
§ 271(b) question necessitates a remand to the Federal Circuit, and on remand, the Federal 
Circuit will have the opportunity to revisit the § 271(a) question if it so chooses. 
IV 
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
Context & Application 
1. The issue of joint infringement does not fit squarely as indirect or direct 
infringement. Like much indirect infringement, the alleged infringing activity in Limelight 
involved facilitation by a company and then action by a customer. Unlike a classic case of 
indirect infringement, each entity carried out some portion of the steps of the method 
claim. However, there can be no indirect infringement without an underlying act of direct 
infringement. At the same time, direct infringement didn’t fit the facts because of the rule 
from Muniauction requiring that a single party perform all the steps of a method patent in 
order for there to be direct infringement. The Court indicated that it was this rule that 
complicated things for the patent holder. The case was remanded to the Federal Circuit, 
which clarified its test for when acts may be attributed to another party: 
Direct infringement under § 271(a) occurs where all steps of a claimed method are 
performed by or attributable to a single entity. Where more than one actor is 
involved in practicing the steps, a court must determine whether the acts of one 
are attributable to the other such that a single entity is responsible for the 
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infringement. We will hold an entity responsible for others’ performance of 
method steps in two sets of circumstances: (1) where that entity directs or controls 
others’ performance, and (2) where the actors form a joint enterprise. 
To determine if a single entity directs or controls the acts of another, we continue 
to consider general principles of vicarious liability. In the past, we have held that 
an actor is liable for infringement under § 271(a) if it acts through an agent 
(applying traditional agency principles) or contracts with another to perform one 
or more steps of a claimed method. We conclude, on the facts of this case, that 
liability under § 271(a) can also be found when an alleged infringer conditions 
participation in an activity or receipt of a benefit upon performance of a step or 
steps of a patented method and establishes the manner or timing of that 
performance. In those instances, the third party’s actions are attributed to the 
alleged infringer such that the alleged infringer becomes the single actor 
chargeable with direct infringement. Whether a single actor directed or controlled 
the acts of one or more third parties is a question of fact, reviewable on appeal for 
substantial evidence, when tried to a jury. 
 Alternatively, where two or more actors form a joint enterprise, all can be charged 
with the acts of the other, rendering each liable for the steps performed by the 
other as if each is a single actor. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 491 cmt. b 
(“The law considers that each is the agent or servant of the others, and that the act 
of any one within the scope of the enterprise is to be charged vicariously against 
the rest.”). A joint enterprise requires proof of four elements: 
(1) an agreement, express or implied, among the members of the group; 
(2) a common purpose to be carried out by the group; 
(3) a community of pecuniary interest in that purpose, among the 
members; and  
(4) an equal right to a voice in the direction of the enterprise, which gives 
an equal right of control. 
As with direction or control, whether actors entered into a joint enterprise is a 
question of fact, reviewable on appeal for substantial evidence. 
We believe these approaches to be most consistent with the text of § 271(a), the 
statutory context in which it appears, the legislative purpose behind the Patent 
Act, and our past case law. Section 271(a) is not limited solely to principal-agent 
relationships, contractual arrangements, and joint enterprise, as the vacated panel 
decision held. Rather, to determine direct infringement, we consider whether all 
method steps can be attributed to a single entity. 
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Akamai Tech. v. Limelight, 797 F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The Federal Circuit then found 
there were substantial facts from which a jury could conclude that Limelight directed or 
controlled its customers’ performance of steps, such that those steps could be attributed 
to Limelight itself and that the verdict of direct infringement was supported. 
E. Cross-border Infringement  
Cross-border cases include the import and export of information and goods at various 
stages of production. When acts take place in separate locations or the claim elements are 
not satisfied entirely within one country, U.S. courts must decide whether domestic rights 
have in fact been infringed. Cross-border infringement expansion is similar to the doctrine 
of equivalents and indirect infringement doctrines because fairness interests for patent 
holders conflict with the interests of bounding patent rights—and thereby the application 
of infringement. 
Congress has expanded infringement liability to include the manufacture of 
components in the United States that are assembled abroad into a device that would 
infringe a U.S. patent if assembled within the United States. Congress has also expanded 
infringement liability for imports that were manufactured through a method that, if 
performed in the United States, would constitute infringement of a U.S. patent. And 
courts have faced other complicated questions in determining when infringement of a U.S. 
patent have occurred when a step of a patented method is performed outside the United 
States or when offers for sale and sales are made such that one is in the United States and 
the other is outside. 
Imagine a manufacturer makes all the components of a patented shrimp deveining 
machine in the United States, but the combination is not assembled or sold domestically; 
rather, the components are sent abroad to be combined and sold elsewhere. Should this 
company be liable for infringement of a U.S. patent? A company that manufactured and 
combined the components in the United States would infringe the U.S. patent, even if the 
goods were subsequently exported, because it is direct infringement to “make” a patented 
invention without authority in the United States. In a 1972 case called Deepsouth Packing 
Co. v. Laitram Corp., the Court held that the United States patent was not infringed by the 
manufacture and export of the un-combined components, based on the theory that U.S. 
laws do not apply extra-territorially, and the combination only happened outside of the 
country. 
Congress moved to remedy this seeming loophole in 1984, enacting § 271(f) of the 
Patent Act, the first paragraph of which declared it an act of patent infringement to 
“suppl[y] . . . in or from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components 
of a patented invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in 
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such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside the United 
States.” Section 271(f) has a second paragraph that is targeted to the export of any 
component (rather than “all or a substantial portion of the components”) of a patented 
invention “that is especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention and not 
a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use . . . .” 
Microsoft, Corp. v. AT&T Corp. 
550 U.S. 437 (2007) 
Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. 
It is the general rule under United States patent law that no infringement occurs when 
a patented product is made and sold in another country. There is an exception. Section 
271(f) of the Patent Act, adopted in 1984, provides that infringement does occur when one 
“supplies from the United States,” for “combination” abroad, a patented invention’s 
“components.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1). This case concerns the applicability of § 271(f) to 
computer software first sent from the United States to a foreign manufacturer on a master 
disk, or by electronic transmission, then copied by the foreign recipient for installation on 
computers made and sold abroad. 
AT&T holds a patent on an apparatus for digitally encoding and compressing 
recorded speech. Microsoft’s Windows operating system, it is conceded, has the potential 
to infringe AT&T’s patent, because Windows incorporates software code that, when 
installed, enables a computer to process speech in the manner claimed by that patent. It 
bears emphasis, however, that uninstalled Windows software does not infringe AT&T’s 
patent any more than a computer standing alone does; instead, the patent is infringed 
only when a computer is loaded with Windows and is thereby rendered capable of 
performing as the patented speech processor. The question before us: Does Microsoft’s 
liability extend to computers made in another country when loaded with Windows 
software copied abroad from a master disk or electronic transmission dispatched by 
Microsoft from the United States? Our answer is “No.” 
The master disk or electronic transmission Microsoft sends from the United States is 
never installed on any of the foreign-made computers in question. Instead, copies made 
abroad are used for installation. Because Microsoft does not export from the United States 
the copies actually installed, it does not “supply from the United States” “components” of 
the relevant computers, and therefore is not liable under § 271(f) as currently written. 
Plausible arguments can be made for and against extending § 271(f) to the conduct 
charged in this case as infringing AT&T’s patent. Recognizing that § 271(f) is an exception 
to the general rule that our patent law does not apply extraterritorially, we resist giving 
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the language in which Congress cast § 271(f) an expansive interpretation. Our decision 
leaves to Congress’ informed judgment any adjustment of § 271(f) it deems necessary or 
proper. 
I 
Our decision some 35 years ago in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 
(1972), a case about a shrimp deveining machine, led Congress to enact § 271(f). In that 
case, Laitram, holder of a patent on the time-and-expense-saving machine, sued 
Deepsouth, manufacturer of an infringing deveiner. Deepsouth conceded that the Patent 
Act barred it from making and selling its deveining machine in the United States, but 
sought to salvage a portion of its business: Nothing in United States patent law, 
Deepsouth urged, stopped it from making in the United States the parts of its deveiner, as 
opposed to the machine itself, and selling those parts to foreign buyers for assembly and 
use abroad. We agreed. 
Interpreting our patent law as then written, we reiterated in Deepsouth that it was “not 
an infringement to make or use a patented product outside of the United States.” 
Deepsouth’s foreign buyers did not infringe Laitram’s patent, we held, because they 
assembled and used the deveining machines outside the United States. Deepsouth, we 
therefore concluded, could not be charged with inducing or contributing to an 
infringement. Nor could Deepsouth be held liable as a direct infringer, for it did not make, 
sell, or use the patented invention—the fully assembled deveining machine—within the 
United States. The parts of the machine were not themselves patented, we noted, hence 
export of those parts, unassembled, did not rank as an infringement of Laitram’s patent. 
Laitram had argued in Deepsouth that resistance to extension of the patent privilege to 
cover exported parts “derived from too narrow and technical an interpretation of the 
Patent Act.” Rejecting that argument, we referred to prior decisions holding that “a 
combination patent protects only against the operable assembly of the whole and not the 
manufacture of its parts.” Congress’ codification of patent law, we said, signaled no 
intention to broaden the scope of the privilege. And we again emphasized that “our patent 
system makes no claim to extraterritorial effect; these acts of Congress do not, and were 
not intended to, operate beyond the limits of the United States; and we correspondingly 
reject the claims of others to such control over our markets.” Absent “a clear congressional 
indication of intent,” we stated, courts had no warrant to stop the manufacture and sale 
of the parts of patented inventions for assembly and use abroad.  
Focusing its attention on Deepsouth, Congress enacted § 271(f). The provision expands 
the definition of infringement to include supplying from the United States a patented 
invention’s components: 
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(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the 
United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented 
invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such 
manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the 
United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination 
occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer. 
(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the 
United States any component of a patented invention that is especially made or 
especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity 
of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where such component is 
uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such component is so made or 
adapted and intending that such component will be combined outside of the 
United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination 
occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer. 
II 
Windows is designed, authored, and tested at Microsoft’s Redmond, Washington, 
headquarters. Microsoft sells Windows to end users and computer manufacturers, both 
foreign and domestic. Purchasing manufacturers install the software onto the computers 
they sell. Microsoft sends to each of the foreign manufacturers a master version of 
Windows, either on a disk or via encrypted electronic transmission. The manufacturer 
uses the master version to generate copies. Those copies, not the master sent by Microsoft, 
are installed on the foreign manufacturer’s computers. Once assembly is complete, the 
foreign-made computers are sold to users abroad.4 
4 Microsoft also distributes Windows to foreign manufacturers indirectly, by 
sending a master version to an authorized foreign “replicator”; the replicator then 
makes copies and ships them to the manufacturers. 
AT&T’s patent (’580 patent) is for an apparatus (as relevant here, a computer) capable 
of digitally encoding and compressing recorded speech. Windows, the parties agree, 
contains software that enables a computer to process speech in the manner claimed by the 
’580 patent. In 2001, AT&T filed an infringement suit in the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York, charging Microsoft with liability for domestic and 
foreign installations of Windows. 
Neither Windows software (e.g., in a box on the shelf) nor a computer standing alone 
(i.e., without Windows installed) infringes AT&T’s patent. Infringement occurs only when 
Windows is installed on a computer, thereby rendering it capable of performing as the 
patented speech processor. Microsoft stipulated that by installing Windows on its own 
computers during the software development process, it directly infringed the ’580 patent. 
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Microsoft further acknowledged that by licensing copies of Windows to manufacturers of 
computers sold in the United States, it induced infringement of AT&T’s patent. 
Microsoft denied, however, any liability based on the master disks and electronic 
transmissions it dispatched to foreign manufacturers, thus joining issue with AT&T. By 
sending Windows to foreign manufacturers, AT&T contended, Microsoft “supplied from 
the United States,” for “combination” abroad, “components” of AT&T’s patented speech 
processor; accordingly, AT&T urged, Microsoft was liable under § 271(f). Microsoft 
responded that unincorporated software, because it is intangible information, cannot be 
typed a “component” of an invention under § 271(f). In any event, Microsoft urged, the 
foreign-generated copies of Windows actually installed abroad were not “supplied from 
the United States.” Rejecting these responses, the District Court held Microsoft liable 
under § 271(f). On appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
affirmed. We granted certiorari and now reverse. 
III 
A 
This case poses two questions: First, when, or in what form, does software qualify as 
a “component” under § 271(f)? Second, were “components” of the foreign-made 
computers involved in this case “supplied” by Microsoft “from the United States”? 
As to the first question, no one in this litigation argues that software can never rank as 
a “component” under § 271(f). The parties disagree, however, over the stage at which 
software becomes a component. Software, the “set of instructions, known as code, that 
directs a computer to perform specified functions or operations,” can be conceptualized 
in (at least) two ways. One can speak of software in the abstract: the instructions 
themselves detached from any medium. (An analogy: The notes of Beethoven’s Ninth 
Symphony.) One can alternatively envision a tangible “copy” of software, the instructions 
encoded on a medium such as a CD-ROM. (Sheet music for Beethoven’s Ninth.) AT&T 
argues that software in the abstract, not simply a particular copy of software, qualifies as 
a “component” under § 271(f). Microsoft and the United States argue that only a copy of 
software, not software in the abstract, can be a component. 
The significance of these diverse views becomes apparent when we turn to the second 
question: Were components of the foreign-made computers involved in this case 
“supplied” by Microsoft “from the United States”? If the relevant components are the 
copies of Windows actually installed on the foreign computers, AT&T could not 
persuasively argue that those components, though generated abroad, were “supplied 
from the United States” as § 271(f) requires for liability to attach.9 
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9 On this view of “component,” the copies of Windows on the master disks and 
electronic transmissions that Microsoft sent from the United States could not 
themselves serve as a basis for liability, because those copies were not installed on 
the foreign manufacturers’ computers. See § 271(f)(1) (encompassing only those 
components “combined outside of the United States in a manner that would 
infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States”). 
If, on the other hand, Windows in the abstract qualifies as a component within § 271(f)’s 
compass, it would not matter that the master copies of Windows software dispatched 
from the United States were not themselves installed abroad as working parts of the 
foreign computers.10 
10 The Federal Circuit panel in this case, relying on that court’s prior decision in 
Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005), held that 
software qualifies as a component under § 271(f). We are unable to determine, 
however, whether the Federal Circuit panels regarded as a component software in 
the abstract, or a copy of software. 
With this explanation of the relationship between the two questions in view, we 
further consider the twin inquiries. 
B 
First, when, or in what form, does software become a “component” under § 271(f)? 
We construe § 271(f)’s terms “in accordance with their ordinary or natural meaning.” 
Section 271(f) applies to the supply abroad of the “components of a patented invention, 
where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively 
induce the combination of such components.” § 271(f)(1). The provision thus applies only 
to “such components”11 as are combined to form the “patented invention” at issue.  
11 “Component” is commonly defined as “a constituent part,” “element,” or 
“ingredient.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 466 (1981). 
The patented invention here is AT&T’s speech-processing computer. 
Until it is expressed as a computer-readable “copy,” e.g., on a CD-ROM, Windows 
software—indeed any software detached from an activating medium—remains 
uncombinable. It cannot be inserted into a CD-ROM drive or downloaded from the 
Internet; it cannot be installed or executed on a computer. Abstract software code is an 
idea without physical embodiment, and as such, it does not match § 271(f)’s 
categorization: “components” amenable to “combination.” Windows abstracted from a 
tangible copy no doubt is information—a detailed set of instructions—and thus might be 
compared to a blueprint (or anything containing design information, e.g., a schematic, 
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template, or prototype). A blueprint may contain precise instructions for the construction 
and combination of the components of a patented device, but it is not itself a combinable 
component of that device. AT&T and its amici do not suggest otherwise.  
AT&T urges that software, at least when expressed as machine-readable object code, 
is distinguishable from design information presented in a blueprint. Software, unlike a 
blueprint, is “modular”; it is a stand-alone product developed and marketed “for use on 
many different types of computer hardware and in conjunction with many other types of 
software.” Software’s modularity persists even after installation; it can be updated or 
removed (deleted) without affecting the hardware on which it is installed. Software, 
unlike a blueprint, is also “dynamic.” After a device has been built according to a 
blueprint’s instructions, the blueprint’s work is done (as AT&T puts it, the blueprint’s 
instructions have been “exhausted”). Software’s instructions, in contrast, are contained in 
and continuously performed by a computer. 
The distinctions advanced by AT&T do not persuade us to characterize software, 
uncoupled from a medium, as a combinable component. Blueprints too, or any design 
information for that matter, can be independently developed, bought, and sold. If the 
point of AT&T’s argument is that we do not see blueprints lining stores’ shelves, the same 
observation may be made about software in the abstract: What retailers sell, and 
consumers buy, are copies of software. Likewise, before software can be contained in and 
continuously performed by a computer, before it can be updated or deleted, an actual, 
physical copy of the software must be delivered by CD-ROM or some other means capable 
of interfacing with the computer. 
Because it is so easy to encode software’s instructions onto a medium that can be read 
by a computer, AT&T intimates, that extra step should not play a decisive role under 
§ 271(f). But the extra step is what renders the software a usable, combinable part of a 
computer; easy or not, the copy-producing step is essential. Moreover, many tools may be 
used easily and inexpensively to generate the parts of a device. A machine for making 
sprockets might be used by a manufacturer to produce tens of thousands of sprockets an 
hour. That does not make the machine a “component” of the tens of thousands of devices 
in which the sprockets are incorporated, at least not under any ordinary understanding 
of the term “component.” Congress, of course, might have included within § 271(f)’s 
compass, for example, not only combinable “components” of a patented invention, but 
also “information, instructions, or tools from which those components readily may be 
generated.” It did not. In sum, a copy of Windows, not Windows in the abstract, qualifies 
as a “component” under § 271(f). 
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C 
The next question, has Microsoft “supplied from the United States” components of the 
computers here involved? Under a conventional reading of § 271(f)’s text, the answer 
would be “No,” for the foreign-made copies of Windows actually installed on the 
computers were “supplied” from places outside the United States. The Federal Circuit 
majority concluded, however, that “for software ‘components,’ the act of copying is 
subsumed in the act of ‘supplying.’” A master sent abroad, the majority observed, differs 
not at all from the exact copies, easily, inexpensively, and swiftly generated from the 
master; hence “sending a single copy abroad with the intent that it be replicated invokes 
§ 271(f) liability for the foreign-made copies.” 
Judge Rader, dissenting, noted that “supplying” is ordinarily understood to mean an 
activity separate and distinct from any subsequent “copying, replicating, or 
reproducing—in effect manufacturing.” He further observed: “The only true difference 
between making and supplying software components and physical components of other 
patented inventions is that copies of software components are easier to make and 
transport.” But nothing in § 271(f)’s text, Judge Rader maintained, renders ease of copying 
a relevant, no less decisive, factor in triggering liability for infringement. We agree. 
Section 271(f) prohibits the supply of components “from the United States in such 
manner as to actively induce the combination of such components.” § 271(f)(1). Under this 
formulation, the very components supplied from the United States, and not copies thereof, 
trigger § 271(f) liability when combined abroad to form the patented invention at issue. 
Here, as we have repeatedly noted, the copies of Windows actually installed on the 
foreign computers were not themselves supplied from the United States. Indeed, those 
copies did not exist until they were generated by third parties outside the United States. 
Copying software abroad, all might agree, is indeed easy and inexpensive. But the same 
could be said of other items: “Keys or machine parts might be copied from a master; 
chemical or biological substances might be created by reproduction; and paper products 
might be made by electronic copying and printing.” Brief for United States as Amicus 
Curiae 24. Section 271(f) contains no instruction to gauge when duplication is easy and 
cheap enough to deem a copy in fact made abroad nevertheless “supplied from the United 
States.” The absence of anything addressing copying in the statutory text weighs against 
a judicial determination that replication abroad of a master dispatched from the United 
States “supplies” the foreign-made copies from the United States within the intendment 
of § 271(f). 
D 
Any doubt that Microsoft’s conduct falls outside § 271(f)’s compass would be resolved 
by the presumption against extraterritoriality, on which we have already touched. The 
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presumption that United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world 
applies with particular force in patent law. The traditional understanding that our patent 
law “operate[s] only domestically and does not extend to foreign activities,” is embedded 
in the Patent Act itself, which provides that a patent confers exclusive rights in an 
invention within the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (patentee’s rights over invention 
apply to manufacture, use, or sale “throughout the United States” and to importation 
“into the United States”). See Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 531 (“Our patent system makes no 
claim to extraterritorial effect”; our legislation “does not, and was not intended to, operate 
beyond the limits of the United States, and we correspondingly reject the claims of others 
to such control over our markets.”). 
As a principle of general application, moreover, we have stated that courts should 
“assume that legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations 
when they write American laws.” Thus, as the United States accurately conveyed in this 
case: “Foreign conduct is generally the domain of foreign law,” and in the area here 
involved, in particular, foreign law “may embody different policy judgments about the 
relative rights of inventors, competitors, and the public in patented inventions.” Brief for 
United States as Amicus Curiae 28. Applied to this case, the presumption tugs strongly 
against construction of § 271(f) to encompass as a “component” not only a physical copy 
of software, but also software’s intangible code, and to render “supplied from the United 
States” not only exported copies of software, but also duplicates made abroad. 
AT&T argues that the presumption is inapplicable because Congress enacted § 271(f) 
specifically to extend the reach of United States patent law to cover certain activity abroad. 
But as this Court has explained, “the presumption is not defeated just because a statute 
specifically addresses an issue of extraterritorial application,” Smith v. United States, 507 
U.S. 197, 204 (1993); it remains instructive in determining the extent of the statutory 
exception.  
AT&T alternately contends that the presumption holds no sway here given that 
§ 271(f), by its terms, applies only to domestic conduct, i.e., to the supply of a patented 
invention’s components “from the United States.” § 271(f)(1). AT&T’s reading, however, 
“converts a single act of supply from the United States into a springboard for liability each 
time a copy of the software is subsequently made abroad and combined with computer 
hardware abroad for sale abroad.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29. In short, 
foreign law alone, not United States law, currently governs the manufacture and sale of 
components of patented inventions in foreign countries. If AT&T desires to prevent 
copying in foreign countries, its remedy today lies in obtaining and enforcing foreign 
patents.  
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IV 
AT&T urges that reading § 271(f) to cover only those copies of software actually 
dispatched from the United States creates a “loophole” for software makers. Liability for 
infringing a United States patent could be avoided, as Microsoft’s practice shows, by an 
easily arranged circumvention: Instead of making installation copies of software in the 
United States, the copies can be made abroad, swiftly and at small cost, by generating 
them from a master supplied from the United States. The Federal Circuit majority found 
AT&T’s plea compelling: 
Were we to hold that Microsoft’s supply by exportation of the master versions of 
the Windows software—specifically for the purpose of foreign replication—
avoids infringement, we would be subverting the remedial nature of § 271(f), 
permitting a technical avoidance of the statute by ignoring the advances in a field 
of technology—and its associated industry practices—that developed after the 
enactment of § 271(f). Section 271(f), if it is to remain effective, must therefore be 
interpreted in a manner that is appropriate to the nature of the technology at issue. 
While the [Federal Circuit] majority’s concern is understandable, we are not persuaded 
that dynamic judicial interpretation of § 271(f) is in order. The “loophole,” in our 
judgment, is properly left for Congress to consider, and to close if it finds such action 
warranted. 
There is no dispute, we note again, that § 271(f) is inapplicable to the export of design 
tools—blueprints, schematics, templates, and prototypes—all of which may provide the 
information required to construct and combine overseas the components of inventions 
patented under United States law. We have no license to attribute to Congress an unstated 
intention to place the information Microsoft dispatched from the United States in a 
separate category. 
Section 271(f) was a direct response to a gap in our patent law revealed by this Court’s 
Deepsouth decision. The facts of that case were undeniably at the fore when § 271(f) was 
in the congressional hopper. In Deepsouth, the items exported were kits containing all the 
physical, readily assemblable parts of a shrimp deveining machine (not an intangible set 
of instructions), and those parts themselves (not foreign-made copies of them) would be 
combined abroad by foreign buyers. Having attended to the gap made evident in 
Deepsouth, Congress did not address other arguable gaps: Section 271(f) does not identify 
as an infringing act conduct in the United States that facilitates making a component of a 
patented invention outside the United States; nor does the provision check “supplying 
from the United States” information, instructions, or other materials needed to make 
copies abroad. Given that Congress did not home in on the loophole AT&T describes, and 
in view of the expanded extraterritorial thrust AT&T’s reading of § 271(f) entails, our 
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precedent leads us to leave in Congress’ court the patent-protective determination AT&T 
seeks.  
Congress is doubtless aware of the ease with which software (and other electronic 
media) can be copied, and has not left the matter untouched. In 1998, Congress addressed 
“the ease with which pirates could copy and distribute a copyrightable work in digital 
form.” The resulting measure, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 et 
seq., “backed with legal sanctions the efforts of copyright owners to protect their works 
from piracy behind digital walls such as encryption codes or password protections.” 
Universal City Studios, 273 F.3d at 435. If the patent law is to be adjusted better “to account 
for the realities of software distribution,” the alteration should be made after focused 
legislative consideration, and not by the Judiciary forecasting Congress’ likely disposition. 
Context & Application 
1.  In Life Technologies v. Promega, the Court again interpreted § 271(f) narrowly. See 
139 S.Ct. 156 (2018). The patent at issue in that case covered a five-component kit used for 
analysis of a DNA sample. Life Technologies manufactured the second of these 
components (Taq polymerase) in the United States and shipped it to the United Kingdom 
where it was incorporated in genetic testing kits sold worldwide. The Supreme Court 
reversed the Federal Circuit’s ruling that the manufacture and export of a single 
component may be the basis for a finding of infringement under the statute. Instead, the 
Court held “that a single component does not constitute a substantial portion of the 
components that can give rise to liability under § 271(f)(1).” In its determination of the 
meaning of “substantial portion of the components,” the Court distinguished the first and 
second paragraphs of the section, noting that the second paragraph addresses the export 
of a single component but limits liability to situations where the component is not a 
commodity. The first paragraph—at issue in the case—refers to “a substantial portion of 
the components of a patented invention.” The Court declined to find that this required a 
qualitative determination of how important a single component was to the invention, 
instead finding that the context of the provision showed that it referred to the export of 
multiple components, and that a single component could not satisfy the statutory 
provision. 
The Court was cognizant of the importance of notice to third parties of the limits of 
liability, asking how, under Promega’s suggested test for the importance of components, 
“market participants attempting to avoid liability . . . [are] to determine the relative 
importance of the components of an invention?” In contrast to Microsoft, the Court in Life 
Technologies did not focus on extraterritoriality as a limiting factor. Instead, the Court 
looked to the history and purpose of the statutory language and what type of acts the 
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statute seeks to capture. In tandem, it appears that the two paragraphs of the section 
expand liability to reach acts that are close to infringement “makings” that would be direct 
infringement, but that don’t fully meet the patent claims, with the first paragraph reaching 
the Deepsouth situation of manufacturing all (or a substantial portion) of the components 
in the United States for foreign assembly and the second paragraph reaching situations 
where a single component may so fully embody the invention that it only requires the 






The most common defenses to claims of patent infringement are invalidity and 
noninfringement. But they are not the only defenses. This chapter will cover some other 
important defenses, specifically inequitable conduct, laches, the reverse doctrine of 
equivalents, experimental use, prior user rights, and exhaustion. 
A. Inequitable Conduct 
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co. 
649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
RADER, Chief Judge. 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California found U.S. 
Patent No. 5,820,551 (“the ’551 patent”) unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. 
Therasense, Inc. (now Abbott Diabetes Care, Inc.) and Abbott Laboratories (collectively, 
“Abbott”) appeal that judgment. This court vacates and remands for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
I 
The ’551 patent involves disposable blood glucose test strips for diabetes 
management. These strips employ electrochemical sensors to measure the level of glucose 
in a sample of blood. When blood contacts a test strip, glucose in the blood reacts with an 
enzyme on the strip, resulting in the transfer of electrons from the glucose to the enzyme. 
A mediator transfers these electrons to an electrode on the strip. Then, the electrons flow 
from the strip to a glucose meter, which calculates the glucose concentration based on the 
electrical current. 
. . . 
[The ‘551 patent claims include the following element:] 
a reference counterelectrode in electrical contact with said second conductor and 
positioned to contact said whole blood sample, 
wherein said active electrode is configured to be exposed to said whole blood sample without 
an intervening membrane or other whole blood filtering member 
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’551 patent col. 13 l.29–col. 14 l.3 “Whole blood,” an important term in the claim, means 
blood that contains all of its components, including red blood cells. 
In the prior art, some sensors employed diffusion-limiting membranes to control the 
flow of glucose to the electrode because the slower mediators of the time could not deal 
with a rapid influx of glucose. Other prior art sensors used protective membranes to 
prevent “fouling.” Fouling occurs when red blood cells stick to the active electrode and 
interfere with electron transfer to the electrode. Protective membranes permit glucose 
molecules to pass, but not red blood cells. 
Abbott filed the original application leading to the ’551 patent in 1984. Over thirteen 
years, that original application saw multiple rejections for anticipation and obviousness, 
including repeated rejections over U.S. Patent No. 4,545,382 (“the ’382 patent”), another 
patent owned by Abbott. The ’382 patent specification discussed protective membranes 
in the following terms: “Optionally, but preferably when being used on live blood, a 
protective membrane surrounds both the enzyme and the mediator layers, permeable to 
water and glucose molecules.” “Live blood” refers to blood within a body. 
In 1997, Lawrence Pope, Abbott’s patent attorney, and Dr. Gordon Sanghera, Abbott’s 
Director of Research and Development, studied the novel features of their application and 
decided to present a new reason for a patent. Pope presented new claims to the examiner 
based on a new sensor that did not require a protective membrane for whole blood. Pope 
asserted that this distinction would overcome the prior art ’382 patent, whose electrodes 
allegedly required a protective membrane. The examiner requested an affidavit to show 
that the prior art required a membrane for whole blood at the time of the invention. 
To meet this evidentiary request, Dr. Sanghera submitted a declaration to the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) stating: 
One skilled in the art would have felt that an active electrode comprising an 
enzyme and a mediator would require a protective membrane if it were to be used 
with a whole blood sample. One skilled in the art would not read lines 63 to 65 of 
column 4 of U.S. Patent No. 4,545,382 to teach that the use of a protective 
membrane with a whole blood sample is optionally or merely preferred. 
Pope, in submitting Sanghera’s affidavit represented that:  “. . . One skilled in the art 
would not have read the disclosure of the ’382 patent as teaching that the use of a 
protective membrane with whole blood samples was optional. . . .” 
Several years earlier, while prosecuting the European counterpart to the ’382 patent, 
European Patent EP 0 078 636 (“EP ’636”), Abbott made representations to the European 
Patent Office (“EPO”) regarding the same “optionally, but preferably” language in the 
European specification. On January 12, 1994, to distinguish a German reference labeled 
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D1, which required a diffusion-limiting membrane, Abbott’s European patent counsel 
argued that their invention did not require a diffusion-limiting membrane . . . . 
. . . 
On May 23, 1995, Abbott’s European patent counsel submitted another explanation 
about the D1 reference and EP ’636. [Regarding the “optionally, but preferably” language, 
the European patent counsel stated:] “It is submitted that this disclosure is unequivocally 
clear. The protective membrane is optional, however, it is preferred when used on live 
blood in order to prevent the larger constituents of the blood, in particular erythrocytes 
from interfering with the electrode sensor. . . .”  
II 
[A number of cases between these parties and related to the ’164, ’745, and ’551 patents 
were consolidated in the Northern District of California.] Of primary relevance here, the 
district court held the ’551 patent unenforceable for inequitable conduct because Abbott 
did not disclose to the PTO its briefs to the EPO . . . . [The panel upheld the district court’s 
judgments of noninfringement, invalidity, and unenforceability. The Federal Circuit then 
took the case en banc.] 
III 
Inequitable conduct is an equitable defense to patent infringement that, if proved, bars 
enforcement of a patent. This judge-made doctrine evolved from a trio of Supreme Court 
cases that applied the doctrine of unclean hands to dismiss patent cases involving 
egregious misconduct: Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933), 
Hazel–Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford–Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), and Precision Instrument 
Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945). 
Keystone involved the manufacture and suppression of evidence. The patentee knew 
of “a possible prior use” by a third party prior to filing a patent application but did not 
inform the PTO. After the issuance of the patent, the patentee paid the prior user to sign 
a false affidavit stating that his use was an abandoned experiment and bought his 
agreement to keep secret the details of the prior use and to suppress evidence. With these 
preparations in place, the patentee then asserted this patent, along with two other patents, 
against Byers Machine Co. (“Byers”). Unaware of the prior use and of the cover-up, the 
court held the patents valid and infringed and granted an injunction. 
The patentee then asserted the same patents against General Excavator Co. and 
Osgood Co. and sought a temporary injunction based on the decree in the previous Byers 
case. The district court denied the injunctions but made the defendants post bonds. The 
defendants discovered and introduced evidence of the corrupt transaction between the 
patentee and the prior user. The district court declined to dismiss these cases for unclean 
 CHAPTER 10  
468 
hands. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss 
the complaints. The Supreme Court affirmed. 
The Supreme Court explained that if the corrupt transaction between the patentee and 
the prior user had been discovered in the previous Byers case, “the court undoubtedly 
would have been warranted in holding it sufficient to require dismissal of the cause of 
action.” Because the patentee used the Byers decree to seek an injunction in the cases 
against General Excavator Co. and Osgood Co., it did not come to the court with clean 
hands, and dismissal of these cases was appropriate. 
Like Keystone, Hazel–Atlas involved both the manufacture and suppression of 
evidence. Faced with “apparently insurmountable Patent Office opposition,” the 
patentee's attorneys wrote an article describing the invention as a remarkable advance in 
the art and had William Clarke, a well-known expert, sign it as his own and publish it in 
a trade journal. After the patentee submitted the Clarke article to the PTO in support of 
its application, the PTO allowed a patent to issue. 
The patentee brought suit against Hazel–Atlas Glass Co., alleging infringement of this 
patent. The district court found no infringement. On appeal, the patentee’s attorneys 
emphasized the Clarke article, and the Third Circuit reversed the district court's 
judgment, holding the patent valid and infringed. The patentee then went to great lengths 
to conceal the false authorship of the Clarke article, contacting Clarke multiple times, 
including before and after Hazel–Atlas's investigators spoke to him. After Hazel–Atlas 
settled with the patentee, the patentee paid Clarke a total of $8,000. These facts surfaced 
in a later suit. 
On the basis of these newly-discovered facts, Hazel–Atlas petitioned the Third Circuit 
to vacate its judgment, but the court refused. The Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme 
Court explained that if the district court had learned of the patentee's deception before the 
PTO, it would have been warranted in dismissing the patentee's case under the doctrine 
of unclean hands. Likewise, had the Third Circuit learned of the patentee’s suppression 
of evidence, it also could have dismissed the appeal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
vacated the judgment against Hazel–Atlas and reinstated the original judgment 
dismissing the patentee’s case. 
In Precision, the patentee suppressed evidence of perjury before the PTO and 
attempted to enforce the perjury-tainted patent. The PTO had declared an interference 
between two patent applications, one filed by Larson and the other by Zimmerman. 
Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co. (“Automotive”) owned the Zimmerman 
application. Larson filed his preliminary statement in the PTO proceedings with false 
dates of conception, disclosure, drawing, description, and reduction to practice. Later, he 
testified in support of these false dates in an interference proceeding. 
 DEFENSES  
469 
Automotive discovered this perjury but did not reveal this information to the PTO.  
Instead, Automotive entered into a private settlement with Larson that gave Automotive 
the rights to the Larson application and suppressed evidence of Larson's perjury. 
Automotive eventually received patents on both the Larson and Zimmerman 
applications. Despite knowing that the Larson patent was tainted with perjury, 
Automotive sought to enforce it against others.  
The district court found that Automotive had unclean hands and dismissed the suit.  
The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit’s decision, 
explaining that dismissal was warranted because not only had the patentee failed to 
disclose its knowledge of perjury to the PTO, it had actively suppressed evidence of the 
perjury and magnified its effects. 
IV 
The unclean hands cases of Keystone, Hazel–Atlas, and Precision formed the basis for a 
new doctrine of inequitable conduct that developed and evolved over time. Each of these 
unclean hands cases before the Supreme Court dealt with particularly egregious 
misconduct, including perjury, the manufacture of false evidence, and the suppression of 
evidence. Moreover, they all involved “deliberately planned and carefully executed 
schemes to defraud” not only the PTO but also the courts. As the inequitable conduct 
doctrine evolved from these unclean hands cases, it came to embrace a broader scope of 
misconduct, including not only egregious affirmative acts of misconduct intended to 
deceive both the PTO and the courts but also the mere nondisclosure of information to the 
PTO. Inequitable conduct also diverged from the doctrine of unclean hands by adopting 
a different and more potent remedy—unenforceability of the entire patent rather than 
mere dismissal of the instant suit. 
In line with this wider scope and stronger remedy, inequitable conduct came to 
require a finding of both intent to deceive and materiality. To prevail on the defense of 
inequitable conduct, the accused infringer must prove that the applicant misrepresented 
or omitted material information with the specific intent to deceive the PTO. The accused 
infringer must prove both elements—intent and materiality—by clear and convincing 
evidence. If the accused infringer meets its burden, then the district court must weigh the 
equities to determine whether the applicant’s conduct before the PTO warrants rendering 
the entire patent unenforceable. 
This court recognizes that the early unclean hands cases do not present any standard 
for materiality. Needless to say, this court’s development of a materiality requirement for 
inequitable conduct does not (and cannot) supplant Supreme Court precedent. Though 
inequitable conduct developed from these cases, the unclean hands doctrine remains 
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available to supply a remedy for egregious misconduct like that in the Supreme Court 
cases. 
As inequitable conduct emerged from unclean hands, the standards for intent to 
deceive and materiality have fluctuated over time. In the past, this court has espoused low 
standards for meeting the intent requirement, finding it satisfied based on gross 
negligence or even negligence. Further weakening the showing needed to establish 
inequitable conduct, this court then placed intent and materiality together on a “sliding 
scale.” This modification to the inequitable conduct doctrine held patents unenforceable 
based on a reduced showing of intent if the record contained a strong showing of 
materiality, and vice versa. In effect, this change conflated, and diluted, the standards for 
both intent and materiality. 
This court embraced these reduced standards for intent and materiality to foster full 
disclosure to the PTO. This new focus on encouraging disclosure has had numerous 
unforeseen and unintended consequences. Most prominently, inequitable conduct has 
become a significant litigation strategy. A charge of inequitable conduct conveniently 
expands discovery into corporate practices before patent filing and disqualifies the 
prosecuting attorney from the patentee's litigation team. Moreover, inequitable conduct 
charges cast a dark cloud over the patent’s validity and paint the patentee as a bad actor. 
Because the doctrine focuses on the moral turpitude of the patentee with ruinous 
consequences for the reputation of his patent attorney, it discourages settlement and 
deflects attention from the merits of validity and infringement issues. . . . 
Perhaps most importantly, the remedy for inequitable conduct is the “atomic bomb” 
of patent law. Unlike validity defenses, which are claim specific, see 35 U.S.C. § 288, 
inequitable conduct regarding any single claim renders the entire patent unenforceable. 
Unlike other deficiencies, inequitable conduct cannot be cured by reissue or 
reexamination. Moreover, the taint of a finding of inequitable conduct can spread from a 
single patent to render unenforceable other related patents and applications in the same 
technology family. Thus, a finding of inequitable conduct may endanger a substantial 
portion of a company’s patent portfolio. 
. . . 
Left unfettered, the inequitable conduct doctrine has plagued not only the courts but 
also the entire patent system. Because allegations of inequitable conduct are routinely 
brought on “the slenderest grounds,” patent prosecutors constantly confront the specter 
of inequitable conduct charges. With inequitable conduct casting the shadow of a 
hangman’s noose, it is unsurprising that patent prosecutors regularly bury PTO 
examiners with a deluge of prior art references, most of which have marginal value. . . . 
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While honesty at the PTO is essential, low standards for intent and materiality have 
inadvertently led to many unintended consequences, among them, increased adjudication 
cost and complexity, reduced likelihood of settlement, burdened courts, strained PTO 
resources, increased PTO backlog, and impaired patent quality. This court now tightens 
the standards for finding both intent and materiality in order to redirect a doctrine that 
has been overused to the detriment of the public. 
V 
To prevail on a claim of inequitable conduct, the accused infringer must prove that the 
patentee acted with the specific intent to deceive the PTO. A finding that the 
misrepresentation or omission amounts to gross negligence or negligence under a “should 
have known” standard does not satisfy this intent requirement.  “In a case involving 
nondisclosure of information, clear and convincing evidence must show that the applicant 
made a deliberate decision to withhold a known material reference.” In other words, the 
accused infringer must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the applicant knew 
of the reference, knew that it was material, and made a deliberate decision to withhold it. 
. . . 
Intent and materiality are separate requirements. A district court should not use a 
“sliding scale,” where a weak showing of intent may be found sufficient based on a strong 
showing of materiality, and vice versa. Moreover, a district court may not infer intent 
solely from materiality. Instead, a court must weigh the evidence of intent to deceive 
independent of its analysis of materiality. Proving that the applicant knew of a reference, 
should have known of its materiality, and decided not to submit it to the PTO does not 
prove specific intent to deceive. 
Because direct evidence of deceptive intent is rare, a district court may infer intent 
from indirect and circumstantial evidence.  However, to meet the clear and convincing 
evidence standard, the specific intent to deceive must be “the single most reasonable 
inference able to be drawn from the evidence.” Indeed, the evidence “must be sufficient 
to require a finding of deceitful intent in the light of all the circumstances.” Hence, when 
there are multiple reasonable inferences that may be drawn, intent to deceive cannot be 
found. This court reviews the district court’s factual findings regarding what reasonable 
inferences may be drawn from the evidence for clear error. 
Because the party alleging inequitable conduct bears the burden of proof, the 
“patentee need not offer any good faith explanation unless the accused infringer first 
proves a threshold level of intent to deceive by clear and convincing evidence.” The 
absence of a good faith explanation for withholding a material reference does not, by itself, 
prove intent to deceive. 
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VI 
In the past, this court has tried to address the proliferation of inequitable conduct 
charges by raising the intent standard alone. In Kingsdown, this court made clear that gross 
negligence alone was not enough to justify an inference of intent to deceive. 863 F.2d at 
876. Kingsdown established that “the involved conduct . . . must indicate sufficient 
culpability to require a finding of intent to deceive.” This higher intent standard, standing 
alone, did not reduce the number of inequitable conduct cases before the courts and did 
not cure the problem of overdisclosure of marginally relevant prior art to the PTO. To 
address these concerns, this court adjusts as well the standard for materiality.  
. . . 
This court holds that, as a general matter, the materiality required to establish 
inequitable conduct is but-for materiality. When an applicant fails to disclose prior art to 
the PTO, that prior art is but-for material if the PTO would not have allowed a claim had 
it been aware of the undisclosed prior art. Hence, in assessing the materiality of a withheld 
reference, the court must determine whether the PTO would have allowed the claim if it 
had been aware of the undisclosed reference. In making this patentability determination, 
the court should apply the preponderance of the evidence standard and give claims their 
broadest reasonable construction. Often the patentability of a claim will be congruent with 
the validity determination—if a claim is properly invalidated in district court based on 
the deliberately withheld reference, then that reference is necessarily material because a 
finding of invalidity in a district court requires clear and convincing evidence, a higher 
evidentiary burden than that used in prosecution at the PTO. However, even if a district 
court does not invalidate a claim based on a deliberately withheld reference, the reference 
may be material if it would have blocked patent issuance under the PTO’s different 
evidentiary standards. 
As an equitable doctrine, inequitable conduct hinges on basic fairness. “The remedy 
imposed by a court of equity should be commensurate with the violation.” Because 
inequitable conduct renders an entire patent (or even a patent family) unenforceable, as a 
general rule, this doctrine should only be applied in instances where the patentee’s 
misconduct resulted in the unfair benefit of receiving an unwarranted claim. After all, the 
patentee obtains no advantage from misconduct if the patent would have issued anyway. 
Moreover, enforcement of an otherwise valid patent does not injure the public merely 
because of misconduct, lurking somewhere in patent prosecution, that was immaterial to 
the patent's issuance. 
Although but-for materiality generally must be proved to satisfy the materiality prong 
of inequitable conduct, this court recognizes an exception in cases of affirmative egregious 
misconduct. This exception to the general rule requiring but-for proof incorporates 
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elements of the early unclean hands cases before the Supreme Court, which dealt with 
“deliberately planned and carefully executed schemes” to defraud the PTO and the courts. 
Hazel–Atlas, 322 U.S. at 245. When the patentee has engaged in affirmative acts of 
egregious misconduct, such as the filing of an unmistakably false affidavit, the 
misconduct is material. After all, a patentee is unlikely to go to great lengths to deceive 
the PTO with a falsehood unless it believes that the falsehood will affect issuance of the 
patent. Because neither mere nondisclosure of prior art references to the PTO nor failure 
to mention prior art references in an affidavit constitutes affirmative egregious 
misconduct, claims of inequitable conduct that are based on such omissions require proof 
of but-for materiality. By creating an exception to punish affirmative egregious acts 
without penalizing the failure to disclose information that would not have changed the 
issuance decision, this court strikes a necessary balance between encouraging honesty 
before the PTO and preventing unfounded accusations of inequitable conduct. 
VII 
In this case, the district court held the ’551 patent unenforceable for inequitable 
conduct because Abbott did not disclose briefs it submitted to the EPO regarding the 
European counterpart of the ’382 patent. . . . On remand, the district court should 
determine whether the PTO would not have granted the patent but for Abbott’s failure to 
disclose the EPO briefs. In particular, the district court must determine whether the PTO 
would have found Sanghera’s declaration and Pope’s accompanying submission 
unpersuasive in overcoming the obviousness rejection over the ’382 patent if Abbott had 
disclosed the EPO briefs. 
. . . On remand, the district court should [also] determine whether there is clear and 
convincing evidence demonstrating that Sanghera or Pope knew of the EPO briefs, knew 
of their materiality, and made the conscious decision not to disclose them in order to 
deceive the PTO. 
For the foregoing reasons, this court vacates the district court’s finding of inequitable 
conduct and remands for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 Context & Application 
1. According to the Federal Circuit, what was wrong with the law of inequitable 
conduct prior to Therasense? What did the Federal Circuit change? 
2. Following Therasense, courts are less likely to make a finding of inequitable 
conduct and parties are less likely to allege inequitable conduct. But it has not disappeared 
entirely. In 2017, for example, the Federal Circuit upheld a district court holding of 
inequitable conduct that found both but-for materiality and specific intent to deceive the 
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PTO. Regeneron Pharms., Inc. v. Merus N.V., 864 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017). While the district 
court made evidentiary findings on but-for materiality (which the Federal Circuit found 
to be supported by substantial evidence), the finding of specific intent was based on 
adverse inferences the district court drew due to litigation misconduct. Because 
Regeneron’s conduct in failing to produce relevant documents warranted “serious 
sanctions,” and because reopening discovery would be unfair and costly to the litigants, 
the district court drew adverse inferences with respect to specific intent: 
Regeneron failed to disclose documents directly related to its prosecuting 
attorneys’ mental impressions of the Withheld References during prosecution of 
the ’018 patent. The district court drew an adverse inference to sanction this 
litigation misconduct. The district court did not punish Regeneron’s litigation 
misconduct by holding the patent unenforceable. Only after Merus proved the 
remaining elements of inequitable conduct did the district court hold the patent 
unenforceable. In light of Appellant’s widespread litigation misconduct . . . we 
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by drawing an adverse 
inference of specific intent to deceive the PTO. 
864 F.3d at 1364. 
B. Laches 
There are two types of laches that are relevant to patents. The first is for when a 
plaintiff delays in filing suit. The second is when a patent holder delays in prosecuting a 
patent. Under the previous patent term rules, which ran for seventeen years from 
issuance, there was an opportunity for strategic delay of applications. Applicants could 
file early and then delay prosecution, including through the continuations, while 
watching which technologies the industry adopted. Once the industry locked into a 
technology that fell within the scope of the (then-secret) application, the applicant could 
resume prosecution; when the patent issued, industry participants would have a hard 
time avoiding infringement, and the patentee would have significant leverage in licensing 
negotiations. This second type of laches has become much less important because utility 
patent terms now begin on the date of filing rather than the date of issuance. The first type 
of laches—delay in bringing suit—came to the attention of the Supreme Court recently. 
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SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC 
137 S. Ct. 954 (2017) 
Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We return to a subject that we addressed in Petrella v. Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer, Inc., 134 
S.Ct. 1962 (2014): the relationship between the equitable defense of laches and claims for 
damages that are brought within the time allowed by a statute of limitations. In Petrella, 
we held that laches cannot preclude a claim for damages incurred within the Copyright 
Act’s 3-year limitations period. “Laches,” we explained, “cannot be invoked to bar legal 
relief” “in the face of a statute of limitations enacted by Congress.” The question in this 
case is whether Petrella’s reasoning applies to a similar provision of the Patent Act, 35 
U.S.C. § 286. We hold that it does. 
I 
Petitioners SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag and SCA Personal Care, Inc. 
(collectively, SCA), manufacture and sell adult incontinence products. In October 2003, 
SCA sent a letter to respondents (collectively, First Quality), alleging that First Quality 
was making and selling products that infringed SCA’s rights under U.S. Patent No. 
6,375,646 B1 (’646 patent). First Quality responded that one of its patents—U.S. Patent No. 
5,415,649 (Watanabe patent)—antedated the ’646 patent and revealed “the same diaper 
construction.” As a result, First Quality maintained, the ’646 patent was invalid and could 
not support an infringement claim. SCA sent First Quality no further correspondence 
regarding the ’646 patent, and First Quality proceeded to develop and market its products. 
In July 2004, without notifying First Quality, SCA asked the Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO) to initiate a reexamination proceeding to determine whether the ’646 patent 
was valid in light of the Watanabe patent. Three years later, in March 2007, the PTO issued 
a certificate confirming the validity of the ’646 patent. 
In August 2010, SCA filed this patent infringement action against First Quality. First 
Quality moved for summary judgment based on laches and equitable estoppel, and the 
District Court granted that motion on both grounds. 
SCA appealed to the Federal Circuit, but before the Federal Circuit panel issued its 
decision, this Court decided Petrella. The panel nevertheless held, based on a Federal 
Circuit precedent, A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (1992) (en 
banc), that SCA’s claims were barred by laches. 
The Federal Circuit then reheard the case en banc in order to reconsider Aukerman in 
light of Petrella. But in a 6–to–5 decision, the en banc court reaffirmed Aukerman’s holding 
that laches can be asserted to defeat a claim for damages incurred within the 6–year period 
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set out in the Patent Act. As it had in Aukerman, the en banc court concluded that Congress, 
in enacting the Patent Act, had “codified a laches defense” that “barred recovery of legal 
remedies.” Judge Hughes, joined by four other judges, dissented. We granted certiorari. 
II 
Laches is “a defense developed by courts of equity” to protect defendants against 
“unreasonable, prejudicial delay in commencing suit.” Petrella. See also 1 D. DOBBS, LAW 
OF REMEDIES § 2.3(5), p. 89 (2d ed. 1993) (Dobbs) (“The equitable doctrine of laches bars 
the plaintiff whose unreasonable delay in prosecuting a claim or protecting a right has 
worked a prejudice to the defendant”). Before the separate systems of law and equity were 
merged in 1938, the ordinary rule was that laches was available only in equity courts. This 
case turns on the application of the defense to a claim for damages, a quintessential legal 
remedy. We discussed this subject at length in Petrella. 
Petrella arose out of a copyright dispute relating to the film Raging Bull. The Copyright 
Act's statute of limitations requires a copyright holder claiming infringement to file suit 
“within three years after the claim accrued.” 17 U.S.C. § 507(b). In Petrella, the plaintiff 
sought relief for alleged acts of infringement that accrued within that 3–year period, but 
the lower courts nevertheless held that laches barred her claims. We reversed, holding 
that laches cannot defeat a damages claim brought within the period prescribed by the 
Copyright Act’s statute of limitations. And in so holding, we spoke in broad terms. 
Petrella’s holding rested on both separation-of-powers principles and the traditional 
role of laches in equity. Laches provides a shield against untimely claims, and statutes of 
limitations serve a similar function. When Congress enacts a statute of limitations, it 
speaks directly to the issue of timeliness and provides a rule for determining whether a 
claim is timely enough to permit relief. The enactment of a statute of limitations 
necessarily reflects a congressional decision that the timeliness of covered claims is better 
judged on the basis of a generally hard and fast rule rather than the sort of case-specific 
judicial determination that occurs when a laches defense is asserted. Therefore, applying 
laches within a limitations period specified by Congress would give judges a “legislation-
overriding” role that is beyond the Judiciary’s power. As we stressed in Petrella, “courts 
are not at liberty to jettison Congress’ judgment on the timeliness of suit.” 
Applying laches within the limitations period would also clash with the purpose for 
which the defense developed in the equity courts. As Petrella recounted, the “principal 
application” of laches “was, and remains, to claims of an equitable cast for which the 
Legislature has provided no fixed time limitation.” Laches is a gap-filling doctrine, and 
where there is a statute of limitations, there is no gap to fill. 
With Petrella’s principles in mind, we turn to the present dispute. 




Although the relevant statutory provisions in Petrella and this case are worded 
differently, Petrella’s reasoning easily fits the provision at issue here. As noted, the statute 
in Petrella precludes a civil action for copyright infringement “unless it is commenced 
within three years after the claim accrued.” 17 U.S.C. § 507(b). We saw in this language a 
congressional judgment that a claim filed within three years of accrual cannot be 
dismissed on timeliness grounds. 
The same reasoning applies in this case. Section 286 of the Patent Act provides: 
“Except as otherwise provided by law, no recovery shall be had for any infringement 
committed more than six years prior to the filing of the complaint or counterclaim for 
infringement in the action.” By the logic of Petrella, we infer that this provision represents 
a judgment by Congress that a patentee may recover damages for any infringement 
committed within six years of the filing of the claim. 
B 
First Quality contends that this case differs from Petrella because § 286 of the Patent 
Act is not a true statute of limitations. A true statute of limitations, we are told, “runs 
forward from the date a cause of action accrues,” but § 286 “runs backward from the time 
of suit.” 
Petrella cannot reasonably be distinguished on this ground. First Quality thinks it 
critical that § 286 “runs backward from the time of suit,” but Petrella described the 
Copyright Act’s statute of limitations in almost identical terms. We said that this provision 
“allows plaintiffs to gain retrospective relief running only three years back from the date 
the complaint was filed.” And we described the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations as 
“a three-year look-back limitations period.” 
First Quality contends that the application of a true statute of limitations, like the 
defense of laches (but unlike § 286), takes into account the fairness of permitting the 
adjudication of a particular plaintiff's claim. First Quality argues as follows: “When 
Congress enacts a true statute of limitations, it can be viewed as having made a considered 
judgment about how much delay may occur after a plaintiff knows of a cause of action 
(i.e., after accrual) before the plaintiff must bring suit—thus potentially leaving no room 
for judges to evaluate the reasonableness of a plaintiff's delay on a case-by-case basis 
under laches.” According to First Quality, § 286 of the Patent Act is different because it 
“turns only on when the infringer is sued, regardless of when the patentee learned of the 
infringement.”  
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This argument misunderstands the way in which statutes of limitations generally 
work. First Quality says that the accrual of a claim, the event that triggers the running of 
a statute of limitations, occurs when “a plaintiff knows of a cause of action,” but that is 
not ordinarily true. As we wrote in Petrella, “a claim ordinarily accrues ‘when a plaintiff 
has a complete and present cause of action.’” While some claims are subject to a 
“discovery rule” under which the limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovers 
or should have discovered the injury giving rise to the claim, that is not a universal feature 
of statutes of limitations.  
For these reasons, Petrella cannot be dismissed as applicable only to what First Quality 
regards as true statutes of limitations. At least for present purposes, nothing depends on 
this debatable taxonomy.  
C 
The Federal Circuit based its decision on a different footing. Section 286 of the Patent 
Act begins with the phrase “except as otherwise provided by law,” and according to the 
Federal Circuit, § 282 of the Act is a provision that provides otherwise. In its view, § 282 
creates an exception to § 286 by codifying laches as a defense to all patent infringement 
claims, including claims for damages suffered within § 286’s 6–year period. Section 282(b), 
which does not specifically mention laches, provides in relevant part as follows: 
The following shall be defenses in any action involving the validity or 
infringement of a patent and shall be pleaded: 
(1) Noninfringement, absence of liability for infringement or unenforceability. 
The en banc majority below never identified which word or phrase in § 282 codifies laches 
as a defense, but First Quality argues that laches falls within § 282(b)(1) because laches is 
a defense based on “unenforceability.”  
SCA disputes this interpretation of § 282(b)(1), arguing that laches does not make a 
patent categorically unenforceable. We need not decide this question. Even if we assume 
for the sake of argument that § 282(b)(1) incorporates a laches defense of some dimension, 
it does not necessarily follow that this defense may be invoked to bar a claim for damages 
incurred within the period set out in § 286. Indeed, it would be exceedingly unusual, if 
not unprecedented, if Congress chose to include in the Patent Act both a statute of 
limitations for damages and a laches provision applicable to a damages claim. Neither the 
Federal Circuit, nor First Quality, nor any of First Quality’s amici has identified a single 
federal statute that provides such dual protection against untimely claims. 
D 
In holding that Congress codified a damages-limiting laches defense, the Federal 
Circuit relied on patent cases decided by the lower courts prior to the enactment of the 
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Patent Act. After surveying these cases, the Federal Circuit concluded that by 1952 there 
was a well-established practice of applying laches to such damages claims and that 
Congress, in adopting § 282, must have chosen to codify such a defense in § 282(b)(1). First 
Quality now presses a similar argument. We have closely examined the cases on which 
the Federal Circuit and First Quality rely, and we find that they are insufficient to support 
the suggested interpretation of the Patent Act. The most prominent feature of the relevant 
legal landscape at the time of enactment of the Patent Act was the well-established general 
rule, often repeated by this Court, that laches cannot be invoked to bar a claim for damages 
incurred within a limitations period specified by Congress. Petrella confirmed and 
restated this long-standing rule. If Congress examined the relevant legal landscape when 
it adopted 35 U.S.C. § 282, it could not have missed our cases endorsing this general rule. 
The Federal Circuit and First Quality dismiss the significance of this Court’s many 
reiterations of the general rule because they were not made in patent cases. But as the 
dissenters below noted, “patent law is governed by the same common-law principles, 
methods of statutory interpretation, and procedural rules as other areas of civil litigation.” 
807 F.3d, at 1333 (opinion of Hughes, J.). 
In light of the general rule regarding the relationship between laches and statutes of 
limitations, nothing less than a broad and unambiguous consensus of lower court 
decisions could support the inference that § 282(b)(1) codifies a very different patent-law-
specific rule. No such consensus is to be found. 
. . . 
First Quality and its supporting amici also make various policy arguments, but we 
cannot overrule Congress’s judgment based on our own policy views. We note, however, 
as we did in Petrella, that the doctrine of equitable estoppel provides protection against 
some of the problems that First Quality highlights, namely, unscrupulous patentees 
inducing potential targets of infringement suits to invest in the production of arguably 
infringing products. Indeed, the Federal Circuit held that there are genuine disputes of 
material fact as to whether equitable estoppel bars First Quality’s claims in this very case.  
Laches cannot be interposed as a defense against damages where the infringement 
occurred within the period prescribed by § 286. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
vacated in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. It is so ordered. 
Context & Application 
1. Is the opinion driven primarily by Petrella or by interpretation of Section 286? If 
Petrella, was that case more relevant because it dealt with another IP statute? Why? Or 
 CHAPTER 10  
480 
was it simply because Petrella was the Court’s most recent analysis of the relationship 
between laches and statutes of limitations? 
2. Are there considerations specific to patents that change how the statute of 
limitations should be applied? Or, considerations specific to other forms of IP? Other 
kinds of intangible property? 
3. Statutes of limitations form the foundation for the doctrine of adverse possession 
in real property law. Should there be a doctrine of adverse possession in patent law? 
Which of the justifications for real property adverse possession apply with equal force in 
patent law? Which ones don’t apply? 
C. Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents 
The reverse doctrine of equivalents addresses circumstances where an accused 
product meets all of the claim elements of a patent, but the accused device is so changed 
in principle from the patented invention that the court does not consider it to be 
infringing. In Westinghouse v. Boyden Power-Brake Co., the Supreme Court famously 
explained and applied the reverse doctrine of equivalents in affirming the appellate 
court’s reversal of the district court’s findings that Boyden Power-Brake Co. had infringed 
one of the claims of Westinghouse’s U.S. patent No. 360,070. 170 U.S. 537 (1898). The 
technology at issue was for air brakes for railway trains, an area of heavy innovation and 
patenting. The Court recognizes Westinghouse’s substantial contribution to this 
technological development, citing an earlier district court case that upheld the validity of 
a prior Westinghouse patent: 
The validity of this patent was sustained by the circuit court for the Northern 
district of Ohio in Westinghouse v. Air-Brake Co., 9 O. G. 538, Fed. Cas. No. 17,450. 
The court said, in its opinion, that, while Westinghouse was not the first to 
conceive the idea of operating railway brakes by air pressure, such fact did not 
detract at all from his merits or rights as a successful inventor; that the new 
elements introduced by him ‘fully substantiated his pretensions as an original and 
meritorious inventor, and entitled him, as such, to the amplest protection of the 
law’; and that it appeared from the record and briefs that he was the first to put an 
air brake into successful, actual use. 
Id. at 546. The later patent at issue in Westinghouse was an attempt to address the problem 
that air brakes did not operate quickly enough to bring a long train to a stop, because “the 
air from the auxiliary reservoirs did not act with sufficient promptness upon the brakes 
of the rear cars, where a particularly speedy action was required, and that it would be 
necessary to devise some other means for cases of special emergency.” The Court 
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explained the technology and the flow of pressurized air to the brakes in the patent in suit 
in the following text and figures: 
Upon examination of these defects, it was found that they could only be remedied 
by securing (1), in cases of emergency, a more abundant discharge of compressed 
air into the brake cylinder; and (2) an escape of air near to each triple valve without 
requiring the escaping air to travel all the way back to the engine. The latter device 
having been already embodied in patent No. 217,838, these features Mr. 
Westinghouse introduced into the patent in suit, by which a passage was opened 
directly from the train pipe, filled from the main reservoir on the engine, to the 
brake cylinder, through which, in cases of emergency, the train-pipe air, instead of 
being discharged into the atmosphere, could pour directly from the train pipe into 
the brake cylinder. This operation resulted in charging the brake cylinder and 
applying the brakes more quickly than before; and also, by reason of the fact that 
the filling of the brake cylinder from the train pipe on one car made what was, in 
effect, a local vent for the release of pressure sufficient to operate the valve on the 
next car behind, each successive valve operated more quickly than when a 
diminution of pressure was caused by an escape of air only at the locomotive. 
The direct passage of the air from the train pipe to the brake cylinder was effected 
by a valve, 41, colored red in the [following] diagrams, which is never opened 
except in cases of emergency. In ordinary cases, when the brakes are desired to be 
applied, sufficient air is released from the train pipe to open the passage from the 
auxiliary reservoir to the brake cylinder by what is called a ‘preliminary traverse’ 
of the piston, 12; but, when a quick action is required, sufficient air is drawn from 
the train pipe, not only to open this passage, but, by a further traverse of the piston, 
to shove valve 41 off its port, and introduced air directly from the train pipe to the 
brake cylinder, as shown in the third drawing [below] set forth. 
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In the foregoing skeleton drawings, from which all details of construction and all 
figures of reference not necessary for a clear understanding of the structure are 
omitted, the essential parts are colored, so that their changes of position in the 
different stages of action can be easily followed. 
The access of train-pipe air is shown located at the right end of the structure. . . . 
Its course [illustrated in orange] from the train pipe to the auxiliary cylinder is 
through the small port above the upper arm of the piston, 12. 
The main valve of the triple is black. Its office is to admit auxiliary reservoir air to 
brake cylinder. 
The quick-action valve is colored red. Its office is to admit train-pipe air to brake 
cylinder. 
The release port is colored green. Its office is to discharge air from brake cylinder, 
in releasing the brakes. 
There is also shown, in yellow, what is known as the ‘graduating valve,’ the 
function of which will be hereafter explained. As at present used, the triple valve 
is in reality a quadruple valve. 
The flow or movement of air in the several positions of the structure is also shown 
by colored lines and arrows, viz.: 
Air released from brake cylinder to open air by green arrow. 
Air flowing from auxiliary reservoir to brake cylinder, in ‘service’ application of 
the brakes, by red line; and air flowing from train pipe to brake cylinder in ‘quick-
action’ application, by blue line. 
The Court noted that the invention as patented was not “entirely successful in its practical 
operation,” and then moved on to claim construction, in which the parties argued over 
whether the patent required the element of an auxiliary valve controlling the passage of 
air from the train pipe to the brake cylinder. The patent holder argued that the function 
could be fulfilled by any number of structures, whereas the defendants argued that the 
auxiliary valve was required. The Court looked to the specification and the prosecution 
history and concluded that it could “adopt no other construction than to consider it as if 
the auxiliary valve were inserted in the claim in so many words . . . .”  
Finally, the Court turned to the question of infringement: 
To what liberality of construction these claims are entitled depends, to a certain 
extent, upon the character of the invention, and whether it is what is termed, in 
ordinary parlance, a ‘pioneer.’ This word, although used somewhat loosely, is 
commonly understood to denote a patent covering a function never before 
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performed, a wholly novel device, or one of such novelty and importance as to 
mark a distinct step in the progress of the art, as distinguished from a mere 
improvement or perfection of what had gone before. Most conspicuous examples 
of such patents are the one to Howe, of the sewing machine; to Morse, of the 
electrical telegraph; and to Bell, of the telephone. The record in this case would 
indicate that the same honorable appellation might be safely bestowed upon the 
original air brake of Westinghouse, and perhaps, also, upon his automatic brake. 
In view of the fact that the invention in this case was never put into successful 
operation, and was to a limited extent anticipated by the Boyden patent of 1883, it 
is perhaps an unwarrantable extension of the term to speak of it as a ‘pioneer,’ 
although the principle involved subsequently, and through improvements upon 
this invention, became one of great value to the public. The fact that this invention 
was first in the line of those which resulted in placing it within the power of an 
engineer, running a long train, to stop in about half the time and half the distance 
within which any similar train had stopped, is certainly deserving of recognition, 
and entitles the patent to a liberality of construction which would not be accorded 
to an ordinary improvement upon prior devices. At the same time, as hereinafter 
observed, this liberality must be exercised in subordination to the general principle 
above stated,—that the function of a machine cannot be patented, and hence that 
the fact that the defendants’ machine performs the same function is not conclusive 
that it is an infringement. 
The device made use of by the defendants is exhibited in patents No. 481,134 and 
No. 481,135, both dated August 16, 1892, and both of which were granted after the 
commencement of this suit. There are two forms of this patent, one of which, 
illustrated in patent No. 481,135, is here given in its three positions. . . . 
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The operation of this device is best shown by the foregoing skeleton drawings. 
. . . 
The argument of the defendants in this connection is that in this device there is no 
auxiliary valve or by-passage, but the quick-action result is effected simply by 
proportioning the ports and passages of the old triple valve, and using a fixed 
partition, 9 [colored red in the above diagrams], to divide the piston chamber … 
from the main-valve chamber…; that it is this partition which produces the quick 
action, and that such partition is not a valve, nor the mechanical equivalent of a 
valve, but merely a metal ring screwed immovably into the triple-valve casing, 
and serving to divide the piston chamber from the main-valve chamber [to create 
a substantial pressure differential in quick-action mode]; that this partition was a 
new element, never before found in triple valves, and introduced a new principle 
and mode of operation, totally different from anything ever invented by Mr. 
Westinghouse or any other inventor…. 
As the graduating valve of the Boyden patent practically does all the work in 
ordinary cases, and the poppet valve [22] is only called into action in emergency 
cases, the latter is practically an auxiliary valve, by which we understand, not 
necessarily an independent valve, nor one of a particular construction, but simply 
a valve which in emergency cases is called into the assistance of the graduating 
valve. In this particular the poppet valve of the Boyden device performs practically 
the same function as the slide valve, 41, of the Westinghouse. It is not material in 
this connection that it is a poppet valve, while the other is a slide valve, since there 
is no invention in substituting one valve or spring of familiar shape for another…. 
. . . 
But, even if it be conceded that the Boyden device corresponds with the letter of 
the Westinghouse claims, that does not settle conclusively the question of 
infringement. We have repeatedly held that a charge of infringement is sometimes 
made out, though the letter of the claims be avoided.… The converse is equally 
true. The patentee may bring the defendant within the letter of his claims, but if 
the latter has so far changed the principle of the device that the claims of the patent, 
literally construed, have ceased to represent his actual invention, he is as little 
subject to be adjudged an infringer as one who has violated the letter of a statute 
has to be convicted, when he has done nothing in conflict with its spirit and 
intent…. 
We have no desire to qualify the repeated expressions of this court to the effect 
that, where the invention is functional, and the defendant’s device differs from 
that of the patentee only in form, or in a rearrangement of the same elements of a 
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combination, he would be adjudged an infringer, even if, in certain particulars, his 
device be an improvement upon that of the patentee. But, after all, even if the 
patent for a machine be a pioneer, the alleged infringer must have done something 
more than reach the same result. He must have reached it by substantially the same 
or similar means, or the rule that the function of a machine cannot be patented is 
of no practical value. To say that the patentee of a pioneer invention for a new 
mechanism is entitled to every mechanical device which produces the same result 
is to hold, in other language, that he is entitled to patent his function.  
. . . Under the very terms of the first and fourth claims of the Westinghouse patent, 
the infringing device must not only contain an auxiliary valve, or its mechanical 
equivalent, but it must contain the elements of the combination, “substantially as 
set forth.” 
. . . 
Conceding that the functions of the two devices are practically the same, the means 
used in accomplishing this function are so different that we find it impossible to 
say, even in favor of a primary patent, that they are mechanical equivalents. While 
[Boyden’s] poppet valve [22], which, for the purposes of this case, we may term 
the auxiliary valve, is, in its operation, independent of the main valve, the word 
‘independent’ in the claims of the Westinghouse patent evidently refers to a valve 
auxiliary to the triple valve, and independently located as well as operated. The 
difference is that in one case [Westinghouse] the air from the train pipe is 
introduced into the brake cylinder separately and independently from the air from 
the auxiliary reservoir, while in the other case [Boyden] they unite in the chamber 
… and pass through the same valve [26] to the brake cylinder. In the Westinghouse 
patent there is one valve operated by the direct thrust of the piston, opening a by-
passage; in the other, there is a poppet valve also opened by the piston, and 
another valve, 26, opened by the pressure maintained upon the outside of the 
partition, 9. 
. . . 
We are induced to look with more favor upon this device, not only because it is a 
novel one, and a manifest departure from the principle of the Westinghouse 
patent, but because it solved at once, in the simplest manner, the problem of quick 
action, whereas the Westinghouse patent did not prove to be a success until certain 
additional members had been incorporated into it. The underlying distinction 
between the two devices is that in one a separate valve and separate by-passage 
are provided for the train-pipe air, while in the other the patentee has taken the 
old triple (or quadruple) valve, and by a slight change in the functions of two of 
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its valves, and the incorporation of a new element (partition 9), has made a more 
perfect brake than the one described in the Westinghouse patent. If credit be due 
to Mr. Westinghouse for having invented the function, Mr. Boyden has certainly 
exhibited great ingenuity in the discovery of a new and more perfect method of 
performing such function. If his patent be compared with the later Westinghouse 
patent, No. 376,837, which appears to have been the first completely successful 
one, the difference between the two, both in form and principle, becomes still more 
apparent, and the greater simplicity of the Boyden patent certainly entitles it to a 
favorable consideration. If the method pursued by the patentee for the 
performance of the function discovered by him would naturally have suggested 
the device adopted by the defendants, that is in itself evidence of an intended 
infringement; but, although Mr. Boyden may have intended to accomplish the 
same results, the Westinghouse patent, if he had had it before him, would scarcely 
have suggested the method he adopted to accomplish these results. Under such 
circumstances, the law entitles him to the rights of an independent inventor. 
Upon a careful consideration of the testimony, we have come to the conclusion 
that the Boyden device is not an infringement of the complainants’ patent, and the 
decree of the circuit court of appeals is therefore affirmed. 
Context & Application 
1. The Court states that the reach of the patent depends on whether it is a “pioneer.” 
However, some of the language appears to focus more on whether the accused device is 
pioneering. How much weight should pioneering patents be given for purposes of the 
doctrine of equivalents? Should the same weight be given to pioneering accused 
infringing devices under the reverse doctrine of equivalents? Is the answer dependent on 
just how pioneering the invention and accused device are in relation to each other? If so, 
how does this square with the general goals of certainty and predictability for patents? 
2. What doctrines have we studied so far that play a similar role to that of the reverse 
doctrine of equivalents in Westinghouse? Are these doctrines easier to apply? More 
predictable? Are they as fair? 
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D. Experimental Use Defense 
Madey v. Duke University 
307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
GAJARSA, Circuit Judge. 
Dr. John M.J. Madey (“Madey”) appeals from a judgment of the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. Madey sued Duke University (“Duke”), 
bringing claims of patent infringement and various other federal and state law claims. 
After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Duke on the 
remaining claims. For a first set of alleged infringing acts, it held that the experimental 
use defense applied to Duke’s use of Madey’s patented laser technology. . . .  
Background 
In the mid–1980s Madey was a tenured research professor at Stanford University. At 
Stanford, he had an innovative laser research program, which was highly regarded in the 
scientific community. An opportunity arose for Madey to consider leaving Stanford and 
take a tenured position at Duke. Duke recruited Madey, and in 1988 he left Stanford for a 
position in Duke’s physics department. In 1989 Madey moved his free electron laser 
(“FEL”) research lab from Stanford to Duke. The FEL lab contained substantial 
equipment, requiring Duke to build an addition to its physics building to house the lab. 
In addition, during his time at Stanford, Madey had obtained sole ownership of two 
patents practiced by some of the equipment in the FEL lab. 
At Duke, Madey served for almost a decade as director of the FEL lab. During that 
time the lab continued to achieve success in both research funding and scientific 
breakthroughs. However, a dispute arose between Madey and Duke. Duke contends that, 
despite his scientific prowess, Madey ineffectively managed the lab. Madey contends that 
Duke sought to use the lab's equipment for research areas outside the allocated scope of 
certain government funding, and that when he objected, Duke sought to remove him as 
lab director. Duke eventually did remove Madey as director of the lab in 1997. The 
removal is not at issue in this appeal, however, it is the genesis of this unique patent 
infringement case. As a result of the removal, Madey resigned from Duke in 1998. Duke, 
however, continued to operate some of the equipment in the lab. Madey then sued Duke 
for patent infringement of his two patents, and brought a variety of other claims. 
One of Madey’s patents, U.S. Patent No. 4,641,103 (“the ’103 patent”), covers a 
“Microwave Electron Gun” used in connection with free electron lasers. The other patent, 
U.S. Patent No. 5,130,994 (“the ’994 patent”), is titled “Free–Electron Laser Oscillator For 
Simultaneous Narrow Spectral Resolution And Fast Time Resolution Spectroscopy.” The 
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details of these two patents are not material to the issues on appeal. Their use in the lab, 
however, as embodied in certain equipment, is central to this appeal. 
. . . 
The three alleged infringing devices are the Mark III FEL, the Storage Ring FEL, and 
the Microwave Gun Test Stand. Although it is not clear from the record, perhaps because 
Duke defended by asserting experimental use and government license defenses, Duke 
seems to concede that the alleged infringing devices and methods read on the claims of 
the patents. Although the three devices were housed in Duke’s physics facilities, the 
Microwave Gun Test Stand was not Duke’s asset, but rather belonged to North Carolina 
Central University (“NCCU”). 
. . . 
Among Duke’s motions for summary judgment, two are relevant on appeal, entitled 
by the district court as: (i) the “Patent Motion;” and (ii) the “Test Stand Gun Motion.” 
The district court acknowledged a common law “exception” for patent infringement 
liability for uses that, in the district court’s words, are “solely for research, academic or 
experimental purposes.” The district court recognized the debate over the scope of the 
experimental use defense, but cited this court’s opinion in Embrex, Inc. v. Service 
Engineering Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) to hold that the defense was viable 
for experimental, non-profit purposes.  
Discussion 
On appeal, Madey asserts three primary errors related to experimental use. First, 
Madey claims that the district court improperly shifted the burden to Madey to prove that 
Duke’s use was not experimental. Second, Madey argues that the district court applied an 
overly broad version of the very narrow experimental use defense inconsistent with our 
precedent. Third, Madey attacks the supporting evidence relied on by the district court as 
overly general and not indicative of the specific propositions and findings required by the 
experimental use defense, and further argues that there is no support in the record before 
us to allow any court to apply the very narrow experimental use defense to Duke's 
ongoing FEL lab operation. We substantially agree with Madey on all three points. In 
addition, Madey makes a threshold argument concerning the continued existence of the 
experimental use doctrine in any form, which we turn to first. Our precedent, to which 
we are bound, continues to recognize the judicially created experimental use defense, 
however, in a very limited form. 
The Experimental Use Defense 
Citing the concurring opinion in Embrex, Madey contends that the Supreme Court's 
opinion in Warner–Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) eliminates the 
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experimental use defense. Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1352–53 (Rader, J., concurring). The 
Supreme Court held in Warner–Jenkinson that intent plays no role in the application of the 
doctrine of equivalents. Madey implicitly argues that the experimental use defense 
necessarily incorporates an intent inquiry, and thus is inconsistent with Warner–
Jenkinson. Like the majority in Embrex, we do not view such an inconsistency as 
inescapable, and conclude the experimental use defense persists albeit in the very narrow 
form articulated by this court . . . . 
The District Court Improperly Shifted the Burden to Madey 
As a precursor to the burden-shifting issue, Madey argues that the experimental use 
defense is an affirmative defense that Duke must plead or lose. We disagree. Madey points 
to no source of authority for its assertion that experimental use is an affirmative defense. 
Indeed, we have referred to the defense in a variety of ways. Given this lack of precise 
treatment in the precedent, Madey has no basis to support its affirmative defense 
argument. The district court and the parties in the present case joined the issue during the 
summary judgment briefing. We see no mandate from our precedent, nor any compelling 
reason from other considerations, why the opportunity to raise the defense if not raised 
in the responsive pleading should not also be available at the later stages of a case, within 
the procedural discretion typically afforded the trial court judge. 
The district court held that in order for Madey to overcome his burden to establish 
actionable infringement, he must establish that Duke did not use the patent-covered free 
electron laser equipment solely for experimental or other non-profit purposes. Madey 
argues that this improperly shifts the burden to the patentee and conflates the 
experimental use defense with the initial infringement inquiry. 
We agree with Madey that the district court improperly shifted the burden to him. The 
district court folded the experimental use defense into the baseline assessment as to 
whether Duke infringed the patents. Duke characterizes the district court's holding as 
expressing the following sequence: first, the court recognized that Madey carried his 
burden of proof on infringement; second, the court held that Duke carried its burden of 
proof on the experimental use defense; and third, the court held that Madey was unable 
to marshal sufficient evidence to rebut Duke’s shifting of the burden. We disagree with 
Duke’s reading of the district court's opinion. The district court explicitly contradicts 
Duke’s argument by stating that Madey failed to “meet its burden to establish patent 
infringement by a preponderance of the evidence.” This statement is an assessment of 
whether Madey supported his initial infringement claim. It is not an assessment of which 
party carried or shifted the burden of evidence related to the experimental use defense. 
Thus, the district court did not conclude that Madey failed to rebut Duke’s assertion of 
the experimental use defense. Instead, it erroneously required Madey to show as a part of 
 CHAPTER 10  
490 
his initial claim that Duke’s use was not experimental. The defense, if available at all, must 
be established by Duke. 
The District Court’s Overly Broad Conception of Experimental Use 
Madey argues, and we agree, that the district court had an overly broad conception of 
the very narrow and strictly limited experimental use defense. The district court stated 
that the experimental use defense inoculated uses that “were solely for research, 
academic, or experimental purposes,” and that the defense covered use that “is made for 
experimental, non-profit purposes only.” Both formulations are too broad and stand in 
sharp contrast to our admonitions . . . . that the experimental use defense is very narrow 
and strictly limited. In Embrex, we . . .  [held] that the defense was very narrow and limited 
to actions performed “for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical 
inquiry.” Further, use does not qualify for the experimental use defense when it is 
undertaken in the “guise of scientific inquiry” but has “definite, cognizable, and not 
insubstantial commercial purposes.” The concurring opinion in Embrex expresses a 
similar view: use is disqualified from the defense if it has the “slightest commercial 
implication.” Moreover, use in keeping with the legitimate business of the alleged 
infringer does not qualify for the experimental use defense. . . . 
. . . 
Our precedent clearly does not immunize use that is in any way commercial in nature. 
Similarly, our precedent does not immunize any conduct that is in keeping with the 
alleged infringer’s legitimate business, regardless of commercial implications. For 
example, major research universities, such as Duke, often sanction and fund research 
projects with arguably no commercial application whatsoever. However, these projects 
unmistakably further the institution's legitimate business objectives, including educating 
and enlightening students and faculty participating in these projects. These projects also 
serve, for example, to increase the status of the institution and lure lucrative research 
grants, students and faculty. 
In short, regardless of whether a particular institution or entity is engaged in an 
endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the act is in furtherance of the alleged infringer’s 
legitimate business and is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly 
philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very narrow and strictly limited 
experimental use defense. Moreover, the profit or non-profit status of the user is not 
determinative. 
In the present case, the district court attached too great a weight to the non-profit, 
educational status of Duke, effectively suppressing the fact that Duke’s acts appear to be 
in accordance with any reasonable interpretation of Duke’s legitimate business 
objectives.7 
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7 Duke’s patent and licensing policy may support its primary function as an 
educational institution. See Duke University Policy on Inventions, Patents, and 
Technology Transfer (1996). Duke, however, like other major research institutions 
of higher learning, is not shy in pursuing an aggressive patent licensing program 
from which it derives a not insubstantial revenue stream.  
On remand, the district court will have to significantly narrow and limit its conception of 
the experimental use defense. The correct focus should not be on the non-profit status of 
Duke but on the legitimate business Duke is involved in and whether or not the use was 
solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry. 
Context & Application 
1. How does the Federal Circuit define “experimental use” in Madey? What kinds of 
uses can you imagine that might qualify? 
2. Do you think that the doctrine of experimental use as described in Madey 
represents the optimal balance of patent policy objectives? If not, what criteria would you 
use to draw the line between non-infringing, experimental use and infringing use? 
3. Be sure to keep this kind of “experimental use” separate from the doctrine we saw 
in Chapter 6. How are they similar? How are they different? What impact do the different 
kinds of experimental use have? 
E. Prior User Rights 
Patents are meant to encourage development and disclosure of novel inventions, but 
as we have seen, some inventors forego patenting and rely instead on trade secret 
protection. These inventors run the risk that someone else will obtain a patent that covers 
their invention, subjecting the initial inventor to infringement liability. Since 1999, section 
273 of the Patent Act has included a defense for prior users of a patented technology. This 
defense was substantially revised by the America Invents Act. 
In order to prevail under the current version of the prior commercial use defense, the 
alleged infringer must show that at least 1 year prior to the patentee’s effective filing date, 
the alleged infringer commercially used the invention in the United States, in good faith, 
in connection with either (i) an internal commercial use, or (ii) an arm’s length sale or 
transfer of the end result of such commercial use. 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)-(b). The patentee 
might be able to rely on a date earlier than the effective filing date if they disclosed and 
then filed under the § 102(b) grace periods. 
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This defense is, however, sharply limited. The defense is personal and non-
transferrable. It is also site restricted—the right may not be transferred, divided, or 
assigned, unless the transfer is made as part of a sale of the underlying business. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 273(e)(1). The defense only covers activities already engaged in by the prior user, 35 
U.S.C. § 273(e)(3), and if the user at any point abandons its use, it cannot later begin again. 
35 U.S.C. § 273(e)(4). And, the defense is not available against patents originally owned 
by universities. 35 U.S.C. § 273(e)(5). 
Even a successful assertion of the prior commercial use defense will not, by itself, form 
a sufficient basis for invalidating the patent under Sections 102 or 103. Can you see why? 
See 35 U.S.C. § 273(g). And an infringer who asserts the defense and loses will be ordered 
to pay the patentee’s attorney fees. 35 U.S.C. § 273(f), 285. These limitations have made 
the prior use defense relatively unappealing. Of course, the types of inventions that are 
amenable to being kept as trade secrets may also be those for which infringement is 
difficult to detect, adding to the reasons that we may not see the defense asserted very 
often. 
F. Exhaustion 
In Adams v. Burke, the Supreme Court reviewed a patent infringement claim arising 
from the use of patented coffin lids by an undertaker who bought the lids from a licensed 
manufacturer who had been assigned all rights in the patent—but only within ten miles 
of Boston. An undertaker purchased a coffin lid from the manufacturer within the 
prescribed area, but the lid was subsequently used farther away. The Court held that the 
right to sell may indeed have been restricted by geographical area, but that the purchaser 
“acquired the right to [the] use of it freed from any claim of the patentee . . . .” 84 U.S. (17 
Wall.) 453, 457 (1873). The Court based its holding on the single reward theory—that the 
patent holder had been rewarded for the first use of the invention, which exhausted their 
rights in that particular good. The doctrine of exhaustion, also known as “first sale,” is 
based both on this idea that the patent holder need only be rewarded the first time a 
patented good is sold, and on the corollary idea that once goods are circulating in 
commerce, there should not be restraints on alienation of those goods. That is, consumers 
who have made authorized purchases of goods subject to patent rights should be free to 
resell those goods. 
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Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. 
553 U.S. 617 (2008) 
Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
For over 150 years this Court has applied the doctrine of patent exhaustion to limit the 
patent rights that survive the initial authorized sale of a patented item. In this case, we 
decide whether patent exhaustion applies to the sale of components of a patented system 
that must be combined with additional components in order to practice the patented 
methods. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the doctrine does not 
apply to method patents at all and, in the alternative, that it does not apply here because 
the sales were not authorized by the license agreement. We disagree on both scores. 
Because the exhaustion doctrine applies to method patents, and because the license 
authorizes the sale of components that substantially embody the patents in suit, the sale 
exhausted the patents. 
I 
Respondent LG Electronics, Inc. (LGE), purchased a portfolio of computer technology 
patents in 1999, including the three patents at issue here…. The main functions of a 
computer system are carried out on a microprocessor, or central processing unit, which 
interprets program instructions, processes data, and controls other devices in the system. 
A set of wires, or bus, connects the microprocessor to a chipset, which transfers data 
between the microprocessor and other devices, including the keyboard, mouse, monitor, 
hard drive, memory, and disk drives. [The LGE patents-in-suit claim methods for 
ensuring accurate reading and writing of data by monitoring data requests and traffic 
across these components of a computer system.] 
. . .  
LGE licensed a patent portfolio, including the LGE Patents, to Intel Corporation 
(Intel). The cross-licensing agreement (License Agreement) permits Intel to manufacture 
and sell microprocessors and chipsets that use the LGE Patents (Intel Products). The 
License Agreement authorizes Intel to “‘make, use, sell (directly or indirectly), offer to sell, 
import or otherwise dispose of’” its own products practicing the LGE Patents. 
Notwithstanding this broad language, the License Agreement contains some limitations. 
Relevant here, it stipulates that no license 
is granted by either party hereto ... to any third party for the combination by a 
third party of Licensed Products of either party with items, components, or the 
like acquired ... from sources other than a party hereto, or for the use, import, offer 
for sale or sale of such combination. 
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The License Agreement purports not to alter the usual rules of patent exhaustion, 
however, providing that, “notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this 
Agreement, the parties agree that nothing herein shall in any way limit or alter the effect 
of patent exhaustion that would otherwise apply when a party hereto sells any of its 
Licensed Products.”  
In a separate agreement (Master Agreement), Intel agreed to give written notice to its 
own customers informing them that, while it had obtained a broad license “ensuring that 
any Intel product that you purchase is licensed by LGE and thus does not infringe any 
patent held by LGE,” the license “does not extend, expressly or by implication, to any 
product that you make by combining an Intel product with any non-Intel product.” The 
Master Agreement also provides that “‘a breach of this Agreement shall have no effect on 
and shall not be grounds for termination of the Patent License.’” 
Petitioners, including Quanta Computer (collectively Quanta), are a group of 
computer manufacturers. Quanta purchased microprocessors and chipsets from Intel and 
received the notice required by the Master Agreement. Nonetheless, Quanta 
manufactured computers using Intel parts in combination with non-Intel memory and 
buses in ways that practice the LGE Patents. Quanta does not modify the Intel components 
and follows Intel’s specifications to incorporate the parts into its own systems. 
LGE filed a complaint against Quanta, asserting that the combination of the Intel 
Products with non-Intel memory and buses infringed the LGE Patents. The District Court 
granted summary judgment to Quanta, holding that, for purposes of the patent 
exhaustion doctrine, the license LGE granted to Intel resulted in forfeiture of any potential 
infringement actions against legitimate purchasers of the Intel Products. The court found 
that, although the Intel Products do not fully practice any of the patents at issue, they have 
no reasonable noninfringing use and therefore their authorized sale exhausted patent 
rights in the completed computers under United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 
(1942). In a subsequent order limiting its summary judgment ruling, the court held that 
patent exhaustion applies only to apparatus or composition-of-matter claims that describe 
a physical object, and does not apply to process, or method, claims that describe 
operations to make or use a product. Because each of the LGE Patents includes method 
claims, exhaustion did not apply. 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It 
agreed that the doctrine of patent exhaustion does not apply to method claims. In the 
alternative, it concluded that exhaustion did not apply because LGE did not license Intel 
to sell the Intel Products to Quanta for use in combination with non-Intel products.  
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II 
The longstanding doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized 
sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item. . . .  
. . . 
This Court most recently discussed patent exhaustion in Univis, on which the District 
Court relied. Univis Lens Company, the holder of patents on eyeglass lenses, licensed a 
purchaser to manufacture lens blanks by fusing together different lens segments to create 
bi- and tri-focal lenses and to sell them to other Univis licensees at agreed-upon rates. 
Wholesalers were licensed to grind the blanks into the patented finished lenses, which 
they would then sell to Univis-licensed prescription retailers for resale at a fixed rate. 
Finishing retailers, after grinding the blanks into patented lenses, would sell the finished 
lenses to consumers at the same fixed rate. The United States sued Univis under the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3, 15, alleging unlawful restraints on trade. Univis asserted 
its patent monopoly rights as a defense to the antitrust suit. The Court granted certiorari 
to determine whether Univis’ patent monopoly survived the sale of the lens blanks by the 
licensed manufacturer and therefore shielded Univis’ pricing scheme from the Sherman 
Act. 
The Court assumed that the Univis patents containing claims for finished lenses were 
practiced in part by the wholesalers and finishing retailers who ground the blanks into 
lenses, and held that the sale of the lens blanks exhausted the patents on the finished 
lenses. Univis, 316 U.S., at 248–249. The Court explained that the lens blanks “embodied 
essential features of the patented device and were without utility until ground and 
polished as the finished lens of the patent.” The Court noted that 
where one has sold an uncompleted article which, because it embodies essential 
features of his patented invention, is within the protection of his patent, and has 
destined the article to be finished by the purchaser in conformity to the patent, he 
has sold his invention so far as it is or may be embodied in that particular article.  
Id., at 250–251. In sum, the Court concluded that the traditional bar on patent restrictions 
following the sale of an item applies when the item sufficiently embodies the patent—
even if it does not completely practice the patent—such that its only and intended use is 
to be finished under the terms of the patent. 
With this history of the patent exhaustion doctrine in mind, we turn to the parties’ 
arguments. 




LGE argues that the exhaustion doctrine is inapplicable here because it does not apply 
to method claims, which are contained in each of the LGE Patents. LGE reasons that, 
because method patents are linked not to a tangible article but to a process, they can never 
be exhausted through a sale. Rather, practicing the patent—which occurs upon each use 
of an article embodying a method patent—is permissible only to the extent rights are 
transferred in an assignment contract. Quanta, in turn, argues that there is no reason to 
preclude exhaustion of method claims, and points out that both this Court and the Federal 
Circuit have applied exhaustion to method claims. It argues that any other rule would 
allow patent holders to avoid exhaustion entirely by inserting method claims in their 
patent specifications. 
Quanta has the better of this argument. Nothing in this Court’s approach to patent 
exhaustion supports LGE’s argument that method patents cannot be exhausted. It is true 
that a patented method may not be sold in the same way as an article or device, but 
methods nonetheless may be “embodied” in a product, the sale of which exhausts patent 
rights. Our precedents do not differentiate transactions involving embodiments of 
patented methods or processes from those involving patented apparatuses or materials. 
To the contrary, this Court has repeatedly held that method patents were exhausted by 
the sale of an item that embodied the method. In Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 
U.S. 436, 446, 457 (1940), for example, the Court held that the sale of a motor fuel produced 
under one patent also exhausted the patent for a method of using the fuel in combustion 
motors. Similarly, as previously described, Univis held that the sale of optical lens blanks 
that partially practiced a patent exhausted the method patents that were not completely 
practiced until the blanks were ground into lenses. 316 U.S., at 248–251. 
These cases rest on solid footing. Eliminating exhaustion for method patents would 
seriously undermine the exhaustion doctrine. Patentees seeking to avoid patent 
exhaustion could simply draft their patent claims to describe a method rather than an 
apparatus. . . . 
This case illustrates the danger of allowing such an end-run around exhaustion. On 
LGE’s theory, although Intel is authorized to sell a completed computer system that 
practices the LGE Patents, any downstream purchasers of the system could nonetheless 
be liable for patent infringement. Such a result would violate the longstanding principle 
that, when a patented item is “once lawfully made and sold, there is no restriction on its 
use to be implied for the benefit of the patentee.” Adams, 17 Wall., at 457. We therefore 
reject LGE’s argument that method claims, as a category, are never exhaustible. 
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B 
We next consider the extent to which a product must embody a patent in order to 
trigger exhaustion. Quanta argues that, although sales of an incomplete article do not 
necessarily exhaust the patent in that article, the sale of the microprocessors and chipsets 
exhausted LGE’s patents in the same way the sale of the lens blanks exhausted the patents 
in Univis. Just as the lens blanks in Univis did not fully practice the patents at issue because 
they had not been ground into finished lenses, Quanta observes, the Intel Products cannot 
practice the LGE Patents—or indeed, function at all—until they are combined with 
memory and buses in a computer system. If, as in Univis, patent rights are exhausted by 
the sale of the incomplete item, then LGE has no postsale right to require that the patents 
be practiced using only Intel parts. Quanta also argues that exhaustion doctrine will be a 
dead letter unless it is triggered by the sale of components that essentially, even if not 
completely, embody an invention. Otherwise, patent holders could authorize the sale of 
computers that are complete with the exception of one minor step—say, inserting the 
microprocessor into a socket—and extend their rights through each downstream 
purchaser all the way to the end user. 
LGE, for its part, argues that Univis is inapplicable here . . . . because the Intel Products 
are analogous to individual elements of a combination patent, and allowing sale of those 
components to exhaust the patent would impermissibly “ascribe to one element of the 
patented combination the status of the patented invention in itself.” Aro Mfg. Co. v. 
Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 344–345 (1961). 
We agree with Quanta that Univis governs this case. As the Court there explained, 
exhaustion was triggered by the sale of the lens blanks because their only reasonable and 
intended use was to practice the patent and because they “embodied essential features of 
the patented invention.” 316 U.S., at 249–251. Each of those attributes is shared by the 
microprocessors and chipsets Intel sold to Quanta under the License Agreement. 
First, Univis held that “the authorized sale of an article which is capable of use only in 
practicing the patent is a relinquishment of the patent monopoly with respect to the article 
sold.” The lens blanks in Univis met this standard because they were “without utility until 
[they were] ground and polished as the finished lens of the patent.” Accordingly, “the 
only object of the sale was to enable thefinishing retailer] to grind and polish it for use as 
a lens by the prospective wearer.” Here, LGE has suggested no reasonable use for the Intel 
Products other than incorporating them into computer systems that practice the LGE 
Patents. Nor can we discern one: A microprocessor or chipset cannot function until it is 
connected to buses and memory. And here, as in Univis, the only apparent object of Intel’s 
sales to Quanta was to permit Quanta to incorporate the Intel Products into computers 
that would practice the patents. 
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Second, the lens blanks in Univis “embodied essential features of the patented 
invention.” The essential, or inventive, feature of the Univis lens patents was the fusing 
together of different lens segments to create bi- and trifocal lenses. The finishing process 
performed by the finishing and prescription retailers after the fusing was not unique. . . . 
. . .  
While the Court assumed that the finishing process was covered by the patents and 
the District Court found that it was necessary to make a working lens, the grinding process 
was not central to the patents. That standard process was not included in detail in any of 
the patents and was not referred to at all in two of the patents. . . .  
Like the Univis lens blanks, the Intel Products constitute a material part of the 
patented invention and all but completely practice the patent. Here, as in Univis, the 
incomplete article substantially embodies the patent because the only step necessary to 
practice the patent is the application of common processes or the addition of standard 
parts. Everything inventive about each patent is embodied in the Intel Products. . . . 
Naturally, the Intel Products cannot carry out these functions unless they are attached to 
memory and buses, but those additions are standard components in the system, providing 
the material that enables the microprocessors and chipsets to function. The Intel Products 
were specifically designed to function only when memory or buses are attached; Quanta 
was not required to make any creative or inventive decision when it added those parts. 
Indeed, Quanta had no alternative but to follow Intel’s specifications in incorporating the 
Intel Products into its computers because it did not know their internal structure, which 
Intel guards as a trade secret. Intel all but practiced the patent itself by designing its 
products to practice the patents, lacking only the addition of standard parts. 
. . .  
With regard to LGE’s argument that exhaustion does not apply across patents, we 
agree on the general principle: The sale of a device that practices patent A does not, by 
virtue of practicing patent A, exhaust patent B. But if the device practices patent A while 
substantially embodying patent B, its relationship to patent A does not prevent exhaustion 
of patent B. For example, if the Univis lens blanks had been composed of shatter-resistant 
glass under patent A, the blanks would nonetheless have substantially embodied, and 
therefore exhausted, patent B for the finished lenses. This case is no different. While each 
Intel microprocessor and chipset practices thousands of individual patents, including 
some LGE patents not at issue in this case, the exhaustion analysis is not altered by the 
fact that more than one patent is practiced by the same product. The relevant 
consideration is whether the Intel Products that partially practice a patent—by, for 
example, embodying its essential features—exhaust that patent. 
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Finally, LGE’s reliance on Aro is misplaced because that case dealt only with the 
question whether replacement of one part of a patented combination infringes the patent. 
. . . Aro is not squarely applicable to the exhaustion of patents like the LGE Patents that do 
not disclose a new combination of existing parts…. Aro’s warning that no element can be 
viewed as central to or equivalent to the invention is specific to the context in which the 
combination itself is the only inventive aspect of the patent. In this case, the inventive part 
of the patent is not the fact that memory and buses are combined with a microprocessor 
or chipset; rather, it is included in the design of the Intel Products themselves and the way 
these products access the memory or bus. 
C 
Having concluded that the Intel Products embodied the patents, we next consider 
whether their sale to Quanta exhausted LGE’s patent rights. Exhaustion is triggered only 
by a sale authorized by the patent holder. 
LGE argues that there was no authorized sale here because the License Agreement 
does not permit Intel to sell its products for use in combination with non-Intel products 
to practice the LGE Patents. It cites General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 
U.S. 175, (1938), and General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938), 
in which the manufacturer sold patented amplifiers for commercial use, thereby 
breaching a license that limited the buyer to selling the amplifiers for private and home 
use. The Court held that exhaustion did not apply because the manufacturer had no 
authority to sell the amplifiers for commercial use, and the manufacturer “could not 
convey to petitioner what both knew it was not authorized to sell.” 304 U.S., at 181. LGE 
argues that the same principle applies here: Intel could not convey to Quanta what both 
knew it was not authorized to sell, i.e., the right to practice the patents with non-Intel 
parts. 
LGE overlooks important aspects of the structure of the Intel–LGE transaction. 
Nothing in the License Agreement restricts Intel’s right to sell its microprocessors and 
chipsets to purchasers who intend to combine them with non-Intel parts. It broadly 
permits Intel to “‘make, use, or sell’” products free of LGE’s patent claims. To be sure, 
LGE did require Intel to give notice to its customers, including Quanta, that LGE had not 
licensed those customers to practice its patents. But neither party contends that Intel 
breached the agreement in that respect. In any event, the provision requiring notice to 
Quanta appeared only in the Master Agreement, and LGE does not suggest that a breach 
of that agreement would constitute a breach of the License Agreement. Hence, Intel’s 
authority to sell its products embodying the LGE Patents was not conditioned on the 
notice or on Quanta’s decision to abide by LGE’s directions in that notice. 
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LGE points out that the License Agreement specifically disclaimed any license to third 
parties to practice the patents by combining licensed products with other components. 
But the question whether third parties received implied licenses is irrelevant because 
Quanta asserts its right to practice the patents based not on implied license but on 
exhaustion. And exhaustion turns only on Intel’s own license to sell products practicing 
the LGE Patents. 
Alternatively, LGE invokes the principle that patent exhaustion does not apply to 
postsale restrictions on “making” an article. But this is simply a rephrasing of its argument 
that combining the Intel Products with other components adds more than standard 
finishing to complete a patented article. As explained above, making a product that 
substantially embodies a patent is, for exhaustion purposes, no different from making the 
patented article itself. In other words, no further “making” results from the addition of 
standard parts—here, the buses and memory—to a product that already substantially 
embodies the patent. 
The License Agreement authorized Intel to sell products that practiced the LGE 
Patents. No conditions limited Intel’s authority to sell products substantially embodying 
the patents. Because Intel was authorized to sell its products to Quanta, the doctrine of 
patent exhaustion prevents LGE from further asserting its patent rights with respect to 
the patents substantially embodied by those products. 
IV 
The authorized sale of an article that substantially embodies a patent exhausts the 
patent holder’s rights and prevents the patent holder from invoking patent law to control 
postsale use of the article. Here, LGE licensed Intel to practice any of its patents and to sell 
products practicing those patents. Intel’s microprocessors and chipsets substantially 
embodied the LGE Patents because they had no reasonable noninfringing use and 
included all the inventive aspects of the patented methods. Nothing in the License 
Agreement limited Intel’s ability to sell its products practicing the LGE Patents. Intel’s 
authorized sale to Quanta thus took its products outside the scope of the patent monopoly, 
and as a result, LGE can no longer assert its patent rights against Quanta. Accordingly, 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
Context & Application 
1. Other areas of intellectual property law also adhere to rules of exhaustion. In 
copyright law, the defense has been codified. 17 U.S.C. § 109. In trademark law, as in 
patent law, the doctrine arises from common law. See, e.g., Champion Spark Plug Co. v. 
Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947); Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 US 359 (1924). What are the 
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justifications for the exhaustion doctrine? When you buy or sell a used car, do you stop to 
consider the state of the various patents and copyrights covering the technology it 
contains? What about when the technology is digital in nature? And, consider whether 
you own or lease the various digital technologies you think of as “yours.” Can you sell 
them? See AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP: PERSONAL 
PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (2016); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New 
Servitudes, 96 GEO. L. J. 885 (2008). 
2. One area where exhaustion is consistently revisited is in regards to self-replicating 
technology. In Bowman v. Monsanto, the Supreme Court was faced with a patent 
infringement claim brought by Monsanto, which holds patents on genetically modified 
soybean seeds. The Court held that the farmer who bought patented seeds from a grain 
elevator and, without authorization, planted the seeds and harvested the newly-grown 
seed crop had infringed Monsanto’s patents, based in part on Monsanto’s restrictive 
licensing agreement. Bowman claimed that the authorized sale of seeds to the grain 
elevator exhausted Monsanto's patent rights, such that the company could not claim 
infringement based on a subsequent purchaser’s use of the seeds. The Supreme Court held 
that while Bowman could have consumed the seed, fed it to animals, or sold it to others, 
his use of the patented seeds to “make” new, patented seeds was infringement. 569 U.S. 
278 (2013). 
3. The Supreme Court has also recently heard cases on international exhaustion in 
both the copyright and patent law contexts. Intellectual property rights are generally 
considered territorial—foreign sales and uses of goods that are patented in the United 
States do not generally result in infringement of a U.S. patent. So what happens when the 
first, authorized sale of a good is abroad—and then the purchaser imports the goods into 
the United States. There has been no first sale in the United States. At the same time, with 
the increase in international manufacturing and sales, arguments against restrictions on 
downstream use would seem to counsel for an international rule of exhaustion.  
In 2017, in Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Inc., the Court held that the authorized 
sale of a patented product, anywhere in the world, exhausts the patent-holder’s rights in 
that product. Impression Products had bought used Lexmark toner cartridges abroad 
from lawful purchasers, refilled them, and then imported and sold them in the United 
States. The Court overturned Federal Circuit case law holding that post-sale restrictions 
and foreign sales preserve a U.S. patent-holder’s right to sue for infringement. The Court 
stated:  
Patent exhaustion . . . has its roots in the antipathy toward restraints on alienation 
. . . and nothing in the text or history of the Patent Act shows that Congress 
intended to confine that borderless common law principle to domestic sales. . . . 
Exhaustion does not depend on whether the patentee receives a premium for 
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selling in the United States, or the type of rights that buyers expect to receive. As 
a result, restrictions and location are irrelevant; what matters is the patentee’s 
decision to make a sale. 
137 S.Ct. at 1536-38. This ruling made patent law consistent with Copyright in the area of 
international exhaustion, but it was counter to the United States’ policy position in its 
negotiations of international intellectual property and trade treaties. For more on the 
history and policy behind international exhaustion in patent law, see Sarah R. Wasserman 
Rajec, Free Trade in Patented Goods: International Exhaustion for Patents, 29 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 317 (2014). For an argument that international patent exhaustion will likely result in 
lower prices of patented goods in the United States and higher prices abroad, to the 
detriment of lower-income countries, see Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, 
Trade and Tradeoffs: The Case of International Patent Exhaustion, 116 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 




Plant protection is an area of increasing interest to the practicing bar, due in no small 
part to the legalization—at least in some states—of cannabis. Arguments about plant 
protection have also come up in important § 101 cases like Diamond v. Chakrabarty. To 
understand those arguments, it is helpful to know a bit more about the various regimes 
that protect and encourage plant development. The study of these regimes also provides 
a helpful lens through which we can consider important big-picture questions such as: 
What types of things and processes should be protected by patents? And if not patents, 
what type (or types) of protection should be available for those things? Finally, studying 
plant protection gives us more opportunities to practice statutory interpretation—a vital 
practical skill for any lawyer. 
In the United States, there are three different forms of intellectual property protection 
available for plants: (1) plant patents; (2) plant variety protection; and (3) utility patents. 
This chapter will consider all three forms of protection in the order in which they became 
available for plants.  
A. Plant Patents 
The Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA) was the first statute to provide intellectual property 
protection for plants anywhere in the world. See Keith Aoki, Seeds of Dispute: Intellectual-
Property Rights and Agricultural Biodiversity, 3 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 79, 96 (2009). 
This act was passed following lobbying from plant breeders, “primarily from rose and 
fruit tree breeders.” Donald G. Daus, Plant Patents: A Potentially Extinct Variety, 21 
ECONOMIC BOTANY 388, 388 (1967). The first plant patent was issued for a new variety of 
rose. See Climbing or Trailing Rose, U.S. Patent No. PP1 (filed Aug. 6, 1930).  
Today, the statutory subject matter provision for plant patents is codified at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 161. That section provides:   
Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new 
variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found 
seedlings, other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated 
state, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of 
this title. 
The provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions shall apply to patents 
for plants, except as otherwise provided. 
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If it’s been a while since you took biology, the USPTO has explained that: 
Asexually propagated plants are those that are reproduced by means other than 
from seeds, such as by the rooting of cuttings, by layering, budding, grafting, 
inarching, etc. Plants capable of sexual reproduction are not excluded from 
consideration if they have also been asexually reproduced. 
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 1601 (9th ed. Jan. 2018) (“MPEP”). The C.C.P.A. interpreted “plant” in 
accordance with its common English meaning, not in the “strict, scientific sense” of that 
word. See In re Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834, 838 (C.C.P.A. 1940). Thus, bacteria have long been 
considered nonstatutory subject matter. Id.  
Note that § 161 excludes “tuber propagated plant[s].” According to one commentator: 
“The exclusion of tuber propagated plants, [a category] which includes only Irish potatoes 
and Jerusalem artichokes, was a political rather than technical distinction. The rationale 
for this exclusion is that for tuber propagated plants the propagating and edible portions 
of the plant are the same.” Nicholas J. Seay, Protecting the Seeds of Innovation: Patenting 
Plants, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 418, 420 (1989). See also MPEP § 1601. You may know Jerusalem 
artichokes as “sunchokes.” See DEREK B. MUNRO, VEGETABLES OF CANADA 213 (1997). 
Given the time period, you can see why Congress might have been cautious about limiting 
access to important food supplies like potatoes. But other factors may have been at play: 
Another possible reason for [the tuber] exclusion was that the Department of 
Agriculture wished to keep its own potato-breeding project outside the terms of 
the Act. Paul Stark later said that a reason for the exclusion was that because 
potatoes were readily available and used both as a food source and for the growing 
of plants, infringement of a potato plant patent would have been ‘easy’ and 
‘widespread,’ thereby making enforcement absurd.” 
See also Alain Pottage & Brad Sherman, Organisms and Manufactures: On the History of Plant 
Inventions, 31 MELB. U. L. REV. 539, 549 (2007). 
As we’ve seen, § 161 states that “[t]he provisions of this title relating to patents for 
inventions shall apply to patents for plants, except as otherwise provided.” What is 
“otherwise provided”? Sections 161–164 of the Patent Act provide specific rules that apply 
only to plant patents. Otherwise, the provisions of the Patent Act that apply to utility 
patents also apply to plant patents. So, for example, a patentable plant must be novel and 
nonobvious. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103. And a plant patent lasts 20 years from its effective filing 
date. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2); MPEP § 1601.  
Plant patent claims are very different than utility patent claims. A plant patent can 
only have one claim, 37 C.F.R. § 1.164, and that claim “shall be in formal terms to the plant 
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shown and described,” 35 U.S.C. § 162. See also 37 C.F.R. § 1.153(a) (setting similar rules 
for design patents). According to the USPTO: 
A plant patent is granted only on the entire plant. Only one claim is necessary and 
only one is permitted. A method claim in a plant patent application is improper. 
An example of a proper claim would be “A new and distinct variety of hybrid tea 
rose plant, substantially as illustrated and described herein.” 
MPEP § 1605. Because the plant must be “shown” or “illustrated,” as part of the claim, 
drawings or photographs are required. 37 C.F.R. § 1.163(b)(5). Specifically: 
(a) Plant patent drawings should be artistically and competently executed . . . . The 
drawing must disclose all the distinctive characteristics of the plant capable of 
visual representation. 
(b) The drawings may be in color. The drawing must be in color if color is a 
distinguishing characteristic of the new variety. Two copies of color drawings or 
photographs must be submitted. 
37 C.F.R. § 1.165. Plant patent specifications must also include a detailed botanical 
description of the claimed plant variety. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.163(c)(9). 
Additionally, plant patent specifications must include both the “Latin name of the 
genus and species of the plant claimed” as well as a “variety denomination,” or plant 
name. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.163(c)(4)-(5). Today, the variety-designation is required by an 
international treaty, the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants (generally known as the “UPOV Convention,” based on the convention’s French 
name, “Union pour la Protection des Obtentions Végétales”). MPEP § 1612. But plant 
variety designations were used even prior to the treaty. See, e.g., U.S. Patent PP1 (giving 
the new climbing-rose variety the name “The New Dawn.”). 
In practice, plant-patent variety denominations run the gamut from somewhat cold 
and clinical names, like a Buxus plant named “HER2010B04” (PP32,273), to less clinical 
names, like a Phlox plant named “Uptown Girl” (PP32,287) or a Cannabis plant named 
“Rainbow Gummeez” (PP31,918). But a plant patent applicant can’t pick just any name. 
In examining a plant patent application: 
The examiner must evaluate the proposed denomination in light of UPOV 
Convention, Article 13. Basically, this Article requires that the proposed variety 
denomination not be identical with or confusingly similar to other names utilized 
in the United States or other UPOV member countries for the same or a closely 
related species. In addition, the proposed denomination must not mislead the 
average consumer as to the characteristics, value, or identity of the patented plant. 
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MPEP § 1612. If you’ve studied other areas of intellectual property law, do these sound 
like patent requirements to you? Or do they remind you of another intellectual property 
regime? See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125. 
x x x 
What does it mean to “invent or discover” a new variety of plant? That’s the central 
question in the following case. 
In re Beineke 
690 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
DYK, Circuit Judge. 
Walter F. Beineke (“Beineke”) appeals from the decisions of the Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interferences (“Board”) affirming the examiner’s rejection of two plant 
patent applications under 35 U.S.C. § 161. We affirm. 
Background 
This appeal concerns two plant patent applications filed under section 161 by Beineke 
for new and distinct oak trees. In the fall of 1980, Beineke noticed two white oak trees 
(“AFTO–2” and “AFTO–3”) in the front yard of a home (not Beineke’s own residence) that 
appeared to display superior genetic traits as compared to other white oak trees, such as 
excellent timber quality and strong central stem tendency. When first identified by 
Beineke, AFTO–2 was approximately 118 years old and AFTO–3 was approximately 105 
years old. . . . Beineke planted acorns from each of the trees and, over the next few years, 
observed the progeny trees. After observing the same superior traits in the progeny trees, 
Beineke asexually reproduced the trees and found that the reproductions ran true to the 
originally discovered trees and to each other in all respects. Having concluded that he had 
discovered two new and distinct varieties, Beineke applied for plant patents on both trees. 
The examiner initially rejected both applications because . . . in his view the statute 
required that the trees not have been “found in an uncultivated state,” and the trees did 
not satisfy that requirement. In response, Beineke argued to the examiner that the land on 
which the trees were found was cultivated at the time of discovery, and that was sufficient 
to meet the requirements of section 161. The examiner then issued final rejections, finding 
that Beineke did not provide sufficient “factual support for the assertion that the instant 
trees were ‘in a cultivated state,’” such as “evidence of record describing cultivation of the 
claimed trees, e.g., planting of the trees, or maintenance, labor or attention given the 
claimed trees.” 
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A divided Board affirmed the rejection of both applications. 
. . . 
Discussion 
It is settled that an applicant for a patent under section 161 must establish that the 
inventor has “recognized the plant’s uniqueness and difference,” and has “taken the step 
of asexual reproduction,” Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995). The parties do not dispute these requirements. But in other respects, the parties 
offer quite different interpretations of the statute. Beineke argues that section 161 does not 
require that the alleged inventor (or other human) have played any role in the creation of 
the plant, and that finding a new variety of mature plant qualifies the plant for patent 
protection, assuming post-find cultivation, recognition, and asexual reproduction. The 
PTO, on the other hand, contends that no plant is patentable unless human activity played 
a role in the creation of the plant; in the PTO’s view, the statute protects only the work of 
plant breeders who create new varieties of plants either intentionally or by accident. As 
will be seen, we conclude that neither party is entirely correct, though the PTO’s reading 
of the statute is closer to the correct reading. 
We consider first whether the trees are patentable . . . . 
I 
As we discuss in detail below, under the 1930 Act, in addition to post-find cultivation, 
recognition, and asexual reproduction, two things were necessary for an applicant to 
obtain plant patent protection: (1) the plant must have been created in its inception by 
human activity, i.e., it must be the result of plant breeding or other agricultural or 
horticultural efforts; and (2) the plant must have been created by the “inventor,” i.e., the 
person seeking the patent must have contributed to the creation of the plant in addition 
to having appreciated its uniqueness and asexually reproduced it. Beineke has not 
demonstrated that he fulfills either of these requirements. 
In 1930, Congress enacted the Plant Patent Act . . . . We must interpret the 1930 Act in 
light of the “contemporary legal context” in which it was enacted—that is, against the 
historical backdrop of the patent laws and the existing understanding of the language 
used in the act at the time.  
Significantly, the 1930 Act crafted the plant patent provisions onto the pre-existing 
utility patent statute which included the “invents or discovers” requirement. The 1930 
Act’s requirement that the applicant must “invent or discover” had an established 
meaning at the time. The “invents or discovers” language appeared in the first patent act 
in 1790 and appeared in all subsequent patent statutes. Prior to 1930, the Supreme Court 
in construing the “invents or discovers” language consistently emphasized that 
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the beneficiary of a patent must be an inventor and he must have made a discovery. . . . 
It is not enough that a thing shall be new, in the sense that in the shape or form in which 
it is produced shall not have been before known, and that it shall be useful, but it must, 
under the constitution and the statute, amount to an invention or discovery. 
Thompson v. Boisselier, 114 U.S. 1, 11 (1885). In other words, the statute required some 
“exercise of the inventive faculty.” Other federal courts had also recognized that a patent 
could not be granted for “mere naked discovery.” 
Prior to 1930, this view of the invention requirement suggested that plants, being 
products of nature, were not patentable at all. Judicial decisions reflected a “belief that 
plants, even those artificially bred, were products of nature for purposes of the patent 
law.” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 311 (1980); see also Imazio Nursery, 69 F.3d at 
1563. As recognized in Chakrabarty, at the time of the 1930 Act, decisions of the 
Commissioner of Patents also reflected this view. For example, an 1889 decision by the 
Commissioner of Patents in Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 123, exemplified the 
then-prevailing understanding of the patentability of natural products. In rejecting a 
patent application on the fiber from pine needles, the Commissioner explained that 
it cannot be said that the applicant in this case has made any discovery, or is 
entitled to patent the idea, or fact, rather, that fiber can be found in [pine needles]  
because the mere ascertaining of the character or quality of trees that grow in the 
forest and the construction of the woody fiber and tissue of which they are 
composed is not a patentable invention, recognized by the statute, any more than 
to find a new gem or jewel in the earth would entitle the discoverer to patent all 
gems which should be subsequently found. Otherwise it would be possible for an 
element or a principle to be secured by patent, and the patentee would obtain the 
right, to the exclusion of all other men, of securing by his new process from the 
trees of the forest . . . the fiber which nature has produced and which nature has 
intended to be equally for the use of all men. The result would be that patents might 
be obtained upon the trees of the forest and the plants of the earth, which of course would 
be unreasonable and impossible. 
The Commissioner concluded by explaining that he was “not aware of any instance in 
which it has been held that a natural product is the subject of a patent, although it may 
have existed from creation without being discovered.”  
Congress in 1930 sought to change the existing rule that no plants could be patented 
while preserving the rule that plants found in nature were not patentable. Plants created 
by plant breeders were viewed as an “exercise of the inventive faculty” and thus 
deserving of patent protection. In making this change to protect plant breeders, the 1930 
Act also incorporated another fundamental [tenet] of patent law: that only the “inventor” 
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could secure a patent application based on his own inventive efforts. All early patent 
statutes reflected the fact that a patent was only available to the true inventor. . . . The 
Supreme Court likewise emphasized the requirement that the inventor must be the one 
seeking the patent, and that “no one is entitled to a patent for that which he did not 
invent.” Agawam Woolen Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. 583, 602 (1868). 
The legislative history of the 1930 Act confirms its limited scope. The Senate and 
House Committee Reports indicated that one of the primary purposes of the bill was to 
stimulate plant breeding by providing a financial incentive for plant breeders to engage 
in their work. Indeed, the reports speak mainly in terms of work to be done by “plant 
breeders” and “plant developers.” It is true that the reports do mention in multiple places 
“discovery” of plants but, as can be seen from various amendments to the bill that 
ultimately became the 1930 Plant Patent Act, such references refer to a plant breeder’s 
discovery resulting from his own work, and not a “chance find” or discovery of a plant 
explorer.  
Although not explicitly stated in the statute, Congress was clear that only “cultivated 
sports, mutants, and hybrids were included in the bill.”6  
6 At the time of the 1930 Plant Patent Act, a “new and distinct variety” necessarily 
fell into one of three classes: sports, mutants, and hybrids. Sports result from bud 
variation and not seed variation. It occurs when a plant or portion of a plant 
suddenly assumes a new appearance or characteristic. Mutants result from 
seedling variation by self-pollenization. Hybrids result from seedlings of cross-
pollenization of two different species. Because these sports, mutants, and hybrids 
will not reproduce true to type on their own, asexual reproduction is necessary to 
preserve them. 
This reference to cultivation reemphasized Congress’s understanding that patent 
protection was available only for plants resulting from human creative efforts by the 
patent applicant, and not for found plants. . . . 
. . . 
This history demonstrates that the 1930 Act was not meant to include plants 
discovered by chance by plant explorers and the like.  
In short, the provisions of the original 1930 Act, incorporated in the present plant 
patent statute, provided patent protection to only those plants (e.g., sports, mutants, and 
hybrids) that were created as a result of plant breeding or other agricultural and 
horticultural efforts and that were created by the inventor, that is, the one applying for 
the patent. Beineke meets neither of these requirements. Beineke does not argue that the 
oak trees were in any way the result of his creative efforts or indeed anyone’s creative 
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efforts, and thus they do not fall within the scope of those plants protected by the 1930 
Act. 
II 
Because Beineke does not meet the other requirements of section 161 . . . , we need not 
reach the question of what is meant by “found in an uncultivated state”—that is, we need 
not determine what level of human cultivation of the area in which a seedling was found 
at its inception is necessary to satisfy the statute. The Board correctly determined that the 
mature oak trees found by Beineke in the front yard of a home were not entitled to plant 
patent protection under section 161. 
Context & Application 
1. Why is there a separate type of patent for plants? In Beineke, the court tells us that 
Congress believed that plants were excluded from § 101 as “products of nature.” But there 
was another reason—in 1930, “plants were not considered amenable to the written 
description requirement.” Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560, 1563 
(Fed. Cir. 1995). Congress addressed this problem by relaxing the written description 
requirement as applied to plants. See 35 U.S.C. § 162 (“No plant patent shall be declared 
invalid for noncompliance with section 112 if the description is as complete as is 
reasonably possible.”). 
2. How could plant breeders protect their research investments prior to the passage 
of the PPA? Reportedly, the creator of the “Golden Delicious” apple tree enclosed it “in 
an iron cage to keep persons from stealing shoots for the purpose of propagating the tree.” 
LEON H. AMDUR. PATENT FUNDAMENTALS 261 (1948). What are the costs and benefits of 
that form of plant protection? 
3. What is the scope of a plant patent? 35 U.S.C. § 163 provides: 
In the case of a plant patent, the grant shall include the right to exclude others from 
asexually reproducing the plant, and from using, offering for sale, or selling the 
plant so reproduced, or any of its parts, throughout the United States, or from 
importing the plant so reproduced, or any parts thereof, into the United States. 
The Federal Circuit has construed this language to mean that, “for purposes of plant 
patent infringement, the patentee must prove that the alleged infringing plant is an 
asexual reproduction, that is, that it is the progeny of the patented plant.” Imazio Nursery, 
69 F.3d at 1569. In doing so, the court rejected the patent owner’s argument that a single 
plant patent could cover “a range of plants.” Id. at 1567. Not only is a plant patent limited 
to a single plant; it is limited to physical appropriations of that plant. An independently-
created plant with identical attributes would not infringe a plant patent. But a plant patent 
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can be infringed even if the progeny has different superficial characteristics. How does 
this compare to the scope given to a utility patent? Why would anyone want such a 
narrow form of protection? As two commentators have explained: 
The PPA . . . provided protection only for asexual means of reproduction, like 
grafting or budding. In other words, a breeder who successfully creates a novel 
and distinct apple tree has the sole right, under the corresponding plant patent, to 
propagate and commercialize the tree by taking cuttings from it and grafting them 
on to new rootstock. Although the law appears to provide relatively narrow 
protection, the main object of protection, fruit trees, nut trees, and roses, do not 
breed true-to-type. Therefore, the only way for a competitor to appropriate a new 
variety of apple, for example, is to steal a cutting from the new tree, which is 
precisely what the law penalizes. 
Paul J. Heald & Susannah Chapman, Veggie Tales: Pernicious Myths About Patents, 
Innovation, and Crop Diversity in the Twentieth Century, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1051, 1057 (2012). 
4. In Beineke, the court leaves open the question of what it means for a plant to be 
“found in an uncultivated state.” See 35 U.S.C. § 161 (excluding such plants from 
patentability). How much work should a plant breeder have to do to take a plant from 
“uncultivated” to “cultivated”? For one view, see Ex Parte Amy Iezzoni, No. 2020-001008, 
2020 WL 5039374, at *2 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 20, 2020).  
5. In Beineke, the court relies on § 101 patent precedent to interpret § 161. Why does 
it do that? And can this case teach us anything about what it means to “invent or discover” 
something in the utility patent context? 
B. Plant Variety Protection Act 
Congress passed the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) in 1970. The PVPA provides 
sui generis patent-like protection for “new,” “distinct,” “uniform,” and “stable” (“DUS”) 
plant varieties. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a). As the Supreme Court has explained: 
The developer of a novel variety obtains PVPA coverage by acquiring a certificate 
of protection from the [U.S. Department of Agriculture’s] Plant Variety Protection 
Office. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2421, 2422, 2481–2483. This confers on the owner the 
exclusive right . . . to “exclude others from selling the variety, or offering it for sale, 
or reproducing it, or importing it, or exporting it, or using it in producing (as 
distinguished from developing) a hybrid or different variety therefrom.” § 2483. 
Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 181 (1995). A plant variety protection certificate 
(PVP) lasts 20 or 25 years from the date the certificate issues. See 7 U.S.C. § 2483(b) 
(granting a term of 20 years for most plants and 25 years for vines and trees). 
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To be clear, PVPs are not patents. They are not subject to the requirements of 
patentability, such as nonobviousness. And PVPs are granted by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, not the USPTO. But arguments about the PVPA frequently arise in plant 
patent cases. See, e.g., Imazio Nursery, 69 F.3d at 1567 (“Both parties argue[d] that the 
provisions of the Plant Variety Protection Act are relevant to a proper interpretation of 
the scope of protection afforded plant patents under the Plant Patent Act.”). We also see 
arguments about the PVPA in utility patent cases. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. 303, 313–14 (1980). And appeals from cases involving PVPA claims are in the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). How might that 
affect how the PVPA and the other plant-protection statutes are interpreted? 
AGSouth Genetics, LLC v. Georgia Farm Services, LLC 
22 F. Supp. 3d 1342 (M.D. Ga. 2014) 
W. LOUIS SANDS, District Judge. 
Presently pending before the Court is Defendant’s Post–Trial Motion for Judgment as 
a Matter of Law. For the following reasons, Defendant’s Post–Trial Motion for Judgment 
as a Matter of Law is DENIED. 
Background 
Following a six-day trial, a jury rendered a verdict finding Georgia Farm Services 
(“GFS”) liable for willful infringement of Plaintiffs’ Plant Variety Protection Act (“PVPA”) 
Certificate in violation of the PVPA. . . . 
. . . 
On November 29, 2013, Defendant filed its Post–Trial Motion for Judgment as a Matter 
of Law and Memorandum of Supporting Authorities. Therein, Defendant claims that it is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . .  
Analysis 
Defendant bases all of its arguments regarding infringement of the PVPA on its 
assertion that “the only set of 15 bags that the evidence could have allowed the jury to 
find infringing were the 15 bags sold to Plaintiffs’ private investigator, Zelotis Wofford.” 
Defendant claims that the evidence is undisputed that those bags were not used for actual 
propagation of the variety and therefore are not infringing under the plain language of 7 
U.S.C. § 2541(d). Plaintiffs argue that there is no basis to conclude that the 15 bags that the 
jury found infringing were the bags that were sold to Mr. Wofford. Plaintiffs maintain, 
however, that, even if the infringing bags were those sold to Mr. Wofford, the PVPA does 
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not require a showing of actual propagation. Instead, Plaintiffs assert that § 2541(d) only 
exempts actions taken with express consent of the owner of the variety.  
. . .  
7 U.S.C. § 2541(a), titled “Acts constituting infringement,” enumerates various acts 
that, if taken by a person or entity in regard to a protected variety, constitute infringement 
of the rights of the holder of the applicable PVP certificate. Infringing acts are limited to 
acts that occur in the United States, “or in commerce which can be regulated by Congress 
or affecting such commerce,” within the time period when the PVP certificate is valid and 
active, and only where the purported infringer acts without authority and with requisite 
notice of the protected nature of the variety. The prohibited acts are as follows: 
(1) sell or market the protected variety, or offer it or expose it for sale, deliver it, 
ship it, consign it, exchange it, or solicit an offer to buy it, or any other transfer of 
title or possession of it; 
(2) import the variety into, or export it from, the United States; 
(3) sexually multiply, or propagate by a tuber or a part of a tuber, the variety as a 
step in marketing (for growing purposes) the variety; 
(4) use the variety in producing (as distinguished from developing) a hybrid or 
different variety therefrom; 
(5) use seed which had been marked “Unauthorized Propagation Prohibited” or 
“Unauthorized Seed Multiplication Prohibited” or progeny thereof to propagate 
the variety; 
(6) dispense the variety to another, in a form which can be propagated, without 
notice as to being a protected variety under which it was received; 
(7) condition the variety for the purpose of propagation, except to the extent that 
the conditioning is related to the activities permitted under section 2543 of this 
title; 
(8) stock the variety for any of the purposes referred to in paragraphs (1) through 
(7); 
(9) perform any of the foregoing acts even in instances in which the variety is 
multiplied other than sexually, except in pursuance of a valid United States plant 
patent; or 
(10) instigate or actively induce performance of any of the foregoing acts 
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7 U.S.C. § 2541(a). “The PVPA gives the holder of a PVP Certificate rather broad exclusive 
rights.” However, subsection (d) provides language that arguably circumscribes the 
purview of the PVPA. That subsection provides: 
It shall not be an infringement of the rights of the owner of a variety to perform 
any act concerning propagating material of any kind, or harvested material, 
including entire plants and parts of plants, of a protected variety that is sold or 
otherwise marketed with the consent of the owner in the United States, unless the 
act involves further propagation of the variety or involves an export of material of 
the variety, that enables the propagation of the variety, into a country that does 
not protect varieties of the plant genus or species to which the variety belongs, 
unless the exported material is for final consumption purposes. 
7 U.S.C. § 2541(d). Defendant argues that subsection (d) exempts any act from the ambit 
of infringing acts under the PVPA unless there is evidence of actual propagation. In other 
words, Defendant reads subsection (d) to require that actual propagation of the variety 
occur before any of the enumerated actions in subsection (a) constitute infringement. 
Plaintiffs argue that subsection (d) “only applies when the seller is given express authority 
by the owner to sell or market a protected variety prior to commencing such sale or 
marketing.” In other words, Plaintiffs read subsection (d) to exempt only those actions 
that are taken with express authority of the owner of the protected variety. 
The Court rejects both suggested readings of subsection (d). Defendant’s 
interpretation would greatly circumscribe infringing acts under the PVPA. For instance, 
a seed dealer could sell seeds to farmers without limitation and avoid PVPA liability as 
long as there is no evidence that those seeds were actually propagated. That conclusion 
would be contrary to the apparent intent of the sweeping scope of § 2541(a). For instance, 
§ 2541(a)(8) makes the mere stocking of a variety for any purpose also enumerated in 
§ 2541(a) an infringing act. It would be incongruous to assume that Congress intended to 
make the mere stocking of a protected variety an infringing act if actual propagation was 
required for infringement. Since Defendant’s reading of § 2541(d) would completely 
remove the mere stocking of a variety from the purview of § 2541(a), Defendant’s reading 
of § 2541(d) would render § 2541(a)(8) superfluous. . . . Because the Court “must strive to 
give effect to every word in the statutory text,” the Court rejects both Parties’ 
interpretations of § 2541(d).  
In the Federal Circuit, the “first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether 
the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular 
dispute in the case.” The PVPA and § 2541(d) are not models of clarity. As the Court reads 
the language, certain clauses could modify several other clauses and determining which 
clause modifies which cannot be ascertained without context. For instance, it is not 
immediately clear whether “in the United States” is intended to modify “of a protected 
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variety that is sold or otherwise marketed” or “with the consent of the owner.” As such, 
the Court finds that the statutory language is ambiguous and thus turns to the canons of 
statutory construction. 
“Beyond the statute’s text, the ‘traditional tools of statutory construction’ include the 
statute’s structure, canons of statutory construction, and legislative history.” “When the 
statutory language is ambiguous, legislative history can be useful in determining 
Congressional intent.” In light of the various rules and canons of statutory construction, 
the Court reads 7 U.S.C. § 2541(d) to exclude from the ambit of infringing acts any act that 
does not involve further propagation of any material of a protected variety that is capable 
of being propagated and that has been placed into the stream of commerce in the United 
States by or with the participation and consent of the owner. Thus, once a variety is placed 
into the stream of commerce by the owner, § 2541(d) exempts acts taken in relation to that 
variety to the extent the acts do not involve propagation. Defendant proposes that 
“involves propagation” should be read to require actual propagation. Neither the 
statutory language nor any case cited by Defendant supports that reading. Instead, 
“involve” should be given its Merriam-Webster definition: “to have or include (someone 
or something) as a part of something.” 
The Court’s reading of subsection (d) comports with the legislative history of the 
PVPA. When passed in 1970, the purpose of the PVPA was to “assure the developers of 
novel varieties of sexually reproduced plants of exclusive rights to sell, reproduce, import, 
or export such varieties, or use them in the production (as distinguished from the 
development) of hybrids or different varieties, for a period of 17 years.” H.P. Rep. No. 91–
1605 (1970). Thus, the PVPA seeks to protect owners of varieties from the distribution of 
the variety for the purpose of production as distinguished from distribution for the 
purpose of development. Accordingly, it stands to reason that § 2451(d) would exempt 
any act that does not involve production—i.e. propagation. The Court is mindful, 
however, that defining “involve” too narrowly would eviscerate the intended purpose of 
the PVPA by removing from the PVPA’s ambit many instances where the protected 
variety was distributed for the purpose of production but actual propagation did not 
occur or could not be demonstrated. 
In light of the referenced interpretation of § 2541(d), the Court finds that Defendant’s 
actions are not covered by the exemption at § 2541(d) because this case involved 
propagation. The evidence introduced at trial supports a finding that Defendant sold 320 
bags of AGS 2000 to Edward Parker and that the seed from those bags were actually 
propagated, and thus involved propagation. Also, even if the jury relied solely on the 
transaction with Mr. Wofford, the evidence at trial showed that propagation was involved 
in that transaction. Mr. Wofford asked Mr. Wingate several questions regarding the 
various characteristics of the seeds and their crop-yielding potential, and Mr. Wingate 
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offered to sell Mr. Wofford various products to help the seeds grow. Further, Mr. Wingate 
admitted at trial that he assumed that the seeds were to be planted. Accordingly, the Court 
finds that Defendant’s actions as to AGS 2000 “involved further propagation of the 
variety,” and therefore do not fall within the exemption at § 2541(d). 
Context & Application 
1. What can we learn from this case about the requirements of the PVPA? What can 
we learn about statutory interpretation more generally?  
2. Why was the PVPA passed? In addition to “the purpose” discussed in AGSouth, 
“the PVPA was enacted partially in response to Western European nations' formation of 
the Paris Union in 1960, also known as the International Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants (UPOV).” Keith Aoki, Seeds of Dispute: Intellectual-Property Rights and 
Agricultural Biodiversity, 3 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 79, 98–99 (2009). The United States 
joined the UPOV in 1981. Id. at 99 n.98.  
3. How are the protections provided by the PVPA similar to or different than those 
provided by plant patents? In what situations might someone prefer one form of 
protection to the other? 
4. As enacted in 1970, the PVPA only protected sexually reproduced plants—i.e., 
those grown from seeds. Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560, 1567 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995). The Agricultural Improvement Act (also known as the “Farm Bill”) of 2018 
amended the PVPA to also cover asexually produced plants. See 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a). Why 
do you think Congress made this change?  
5. The 2018 Farm Bill also legalized industrial hemp (Cannabis sativa L.). See Sean M. 
O’Connor & Erika Lietzan, The Surprising Reach of FDA Regulation of Cannabis, Even After 
Descheduling, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 823, 858 (2019) (noting that the Farm Bill “effectively 
defines hemp as Cannabis sativa with THC concentration of not more than 0.3 percent on 
a dry weight basis.”) (citing Pub. L. No. 115-334 (2018)). Accordingly, the USDA began 
accepting PVP applications for hemp in April 2019. See Jocelyn Bosse, Before The High 
Court: The Legal Systematics of Cannabis, 29 GRIFFITH LAW REVIEW 1, 20–21 (2020). As of 
March 2021, the USDA had issued PVPs for hemp. See, e.g., TOLS Cherry Wine S-1, PVP 
Certificate No. 201900198 (issued June 24, 2020). 
6. In AGSouth, the court mentions the concept of “requisite notice.” In the PVPA, 
Congress prefaced the list of infringing actions with the following: 
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, it shall be an infringement of the 
rights of the owner of a protected variety to perform without authority, any of the 
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following acts in the United States . . . after either the issue of the certificate or the 
distribution of a protected plant variety with the notice under section 2567 of this title: 
7 U.S.C. § 2541 (emphasis added). The PVPA further provides that: 
Owners may give notice to the public by physically associating with or affixing to 
the container of seed of a variety or by fixing to the variety, a label containing 
either the words “Unauthorized Propagation Prohibited” or the words “Unauthorized 
Seed Multiplication Prohibited” and after the certificate issues, such additional 
words as “U.S. Protected Variety”. In the event the variety is distributed by 
authorization of the owner and is received by the infringer without such marking, 
no damages shall be recovered against such infringer by the owner in any action 
for infringement, unless the infringer has actual notice or knowledge that 
propagation is prohibited or that the variety is a protected variety, in which event 
damages may be recovered only for infringement occurring after such notice. As 
to both damages and injunction, a court shall have discretion to be lenient as to 
disposal of materials acquired in good faith by acts prior to such notice. 
7 U.S.C. § 2567 (emphasis added). Does this mean that there is no cause of action under 
the PVPA without this notice? Or is this merely an inducement to provide notice? 
7. The PVPA specifically prohibits certain types of misbranding. For example, “[u]se 
of the words ‘U.S. Protected Variety’ or any word or number importing that the material 
is a variety protected under certificate, when it is not” and “[u]se of either the phrase 
‘Unauthorized Propagation Prohibited’ or ‘Unauthorized Seed Multiplication Prohibited’ 
or similar phrase without reasonable basis” are both prohibited. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2568(a)(1), 
(3). As to the last point, “[a]ny reasonable basis expires one year after the first sale of the 
variety except as justified thereafter by a pending application or a certificate still in force.” 
Id. § 2568(a)(3). While we’re on the subject of branding, should a PVP owner be able to 
register its variety name as a trademark? See In re Pennington Seed, Inc., 466 F.3d 1053, 1055 
(Fed. Cir. 2006). 
8. Unlike the PPA, the PVPA requires that “a viable sample of basic seed (including 
any propagating material) necessary for propagation of the variety . . . be deposited and 
replenished periodically in a public repository . . . .” See 7 U.S.C. § 2422(4). See also 85 Fed. 
Reg. 422 (2020) (delaying enforcement of the deposit requirement for asexually 
reproduced varieties until January 6, 2023). Those deposits must be submitted to the 
National Laboratory for Genetic Resource Preservation in Fort Collins, Colorado. These 
deposits are not made public until the PVP expires. How might this requirement affect 
the desirability of this form of protection?  
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C. Utility Patents for Plants 
In 1985, the USPTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) held that 
plants could be the subject of utility patents. See Ex Parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) ¶ 443 
(BPAI Sept. 24, 1985). But, of course, the USPTO does not have the final say on questions 
of patent law. Therefore, the status of utility patents for plants remained unclear until 
2001, when the Supreme Court decided the case that follows. 
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. 
534 U.S. 124 (2001) 
Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether utility patents may be issued for plants under 
35 U.S.C. § 101, or whether the Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2321 et seq., and the 
Plant Patent Act of 1930, 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–164, are the exclusive means of obtaining a 
federal statutory right to exclude others from reproducing, selling, or using plants or plant 
varieties. We hold that utility patents may be issued for plants. 
I 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has issued some 1,800 utility 
patents for plants, plant parts, and seeds pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 101. Seventeen of these 
patents are held by respondent Pioneer Hi–Bred International, Inc. (Pioneer). Pioneer’s 
patents cover the manufacture, use, sale, and offer for sale of the company’s inbred and 
hybrid corn seed products. . . . 
. . . 
Pioneer sells its patented hybrid seeds under a limited label license that provides: 
“License is granted solely to produce grain and/or forage.” The license “does not extend 
to the use of seed from such crop or the progeny thereof for propagation or seed 
multiplication.” It strictly prohibits “the use of such seed or the progeny thereof for 
propagation or seed multiplication or for production or development of a hybrid or 
different variety of seed.”  
Petitioner J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., doing business as Farm Advantage, Inc., purchased 
patented hybrid seeds from Pioneer in bags bearing this license agreement. Although not 
a licensed sales representative of Pioneer, Farm Advantage resold these bags. Pioneer 
subsequently brought a complaint for patent infringement against Farm Advantage and 
several other corporations . . . . Pioneer alleged that Farm Advantage has “for a long-time 
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past been and still is infringing one or more Pioneer patents by making, using, selling, or 
offering for sale corn seed of the hybrids in infringement of these patents-in-suit.”  
Farm Advantage . . . argu[es] that patents that purport to confer protection for corn 
plants are invalid because sexually reproducing plants are not patentable subject matter 
within the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101. Farm Advantage maintained that the Plant Patent Act 
of 1930 (PPA) and the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) set forth the exclusive statutory 
means for the protection of plant life because these statutes are more specific than § 101, 
and thus each carves out subject matter from § 101 for special treatment.1 
1  Petitioners favor a holding that the PVPA is the only means of protecting these 
corn plants primarily because the PVPA’s coverage is generally less extensive and 
the hybrid seeds at issue do not have PVPA protection. Most notably, the PVPA 
provides exemptions for research and for farmers to save seed from their crops for 
replanting. Utility patents issued for plants do not contain such exemptions. 
The District Court granted summary judgment to Pioneer. . . . 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed . . . . We granted 
certiorari and now affirm. 
II 
The question before us is whether utility patents may be issued for plants pursuant to 
35 U.S.C. § 101. . . . 
As this Court recognized over 20 years ago in Chakrabarty, the language of § 101 is 
extremely broad. “In choosing such expansive terms as ‘manufacture’ and ‘composition 
of matter,’ modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the 
patent laws would be given wide scope.” . . . 
. . . 
Thus, in approaching the question presented by this case, we are mindful that this 
Court has already spoken clearly concerning the broad scope and applicability of § 101. 
Several years after Chakrabarty, the PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences 
held that plants were within the understood meaning of “manufacture” or “composition 
of matter” and therefore were within the subject matter of § 101. In re Hibberd, 227 USPQ 
443, 444 (1985). It has been the unbroken practice of the PTO since that time to confer 
utility patents for plants. To obtain utility patent protection, a plant breeder must show 
that the plant he has developed is new, useful, and non-obvious. In addition, the plant 
must meet the specifications of § 112, which require a written description of the plant and 
a deposit of seed that is publicly accessible.  
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Petitioners do not allege that Pioneer’s patents are invalid for failure to meet the 
requirements for a utility patent. Nor do they dispute that plants otherwise fall within the 
terms of § 101’s broad language that includes “manufacture” or “composition of matter.” 
Rather, petitioners argue that the PPA and the PVPA provide the exclusive means of 
protecting new varieties of plants, and so awarding utility patents for plants upsets the 
scheme contemplated by Congress. We disagree. Considering the two plant specific 
statutes in turn, we find that neither forecloses utility patent coverage for plants. 
A 
The 1930 PPA conferred patent protection to asexually reproduced plants. 
Significantly, nothing within either the original 1930 text of the statute or its recodified 
version in 1952 indicates that the PPA’s protection for asexually reproduced plants was 
intended to be exclusive. 
Plants were first explicitly brought within the scope of patent protection in 1930 when 
the PPA included “plants” among the useful things subject to patents. Thus the 1930 PPA 
amended the general utility patent provision to provide: 
Any person who has invented or discovered any new and useful art, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvements 
thereof, or who has invented or discovered and asexually reproduced any distinct 
and new variety of plant, other than a tuber-propagated plant, not known or used 
by others in this country, before his invention or discovery thereof,  may obtain a 
patent therefor. 
Act of May 23, 1930, § 1, 46 Stat. 376. 
This provision limited protection to the asexual reproduction of the plant. Asexual 
reproduction occurs by grafting, budding, or the like, and produces an offspring with a 
genetic combination identical to that of the single parent—essentially a clone.3  
3 By contrast, sexual reproduction occurs by seed and sometimes involves two 
different plants. 
. . . 
In 1952, Congress revised the patent statute and placed the plant patents into a 
separate chapter 15 of Title 35 entitled, “Patents for plants.” 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–164. This was 
merely a housekeeping measure that did nothing to change the substantive rights or 
requirements for a plant patent. A “plant patent” continued to provide only the exclusive 
right to asexually reproduce a protected plant, § 163, and the description requirement 
remained relaxed, § 162.5 
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5 Patents issued under § 161 are referred to as ‘‘plant patents,’’ which are 
distinguished from § 101 utility patents and § 171 design patents. 
Plant patents under the PPA thus have very limited coverage and less stringent 
requirements than § 101 utility patents. 
Importantly, chapter 15 nowhere states that plant patents are the exclusive means of 
granting intellectual property protection to plants. Although unable to point to any 
language that requires, or even suggests, that Congress intended the PPA’s protections to 
be exclusive, petitioners advance three reasons why the PPA should preclude assigning 
utility patents for plants. We find none of these arguments to be persuasive. 
First, petitioners argue that plants were not covered by the general utility patent 
statute prior to 1930. In advancing this argument, petitioners overlook the state of patent 
law and plant breeding at the time of the PPA’s enactment. The Court in Chakrabarty 
explained the realities of patent law and plant breeding at the time the PPA was enacted: 
“Prior to 1930, two factors were thought to remove plants from patent protection. The first 
was the belief that plants, even those artificially bred, were products of nature for 
purposes of the patent law. The second obstacle to patent protection for plants was the 
fact that plants were thought not amenable to the ‘written description’ requirement of the 
patent law.” Congress addressed these concerns with the 1930 PPA, which recognized 
that the work of a plant breeder was a patentable invention and relaxed the written 
description requirement. The PPA thus gave patent protection to breeders who were 
previously unable to overcome the obstacles described in Chakrabarty. 
This does not mean, however, that prior to 1930 plants could not have fallen within 
the subject matter of § 101. Rather, it illustrates only that in 1930 Congress believed that 
plants were not patentable under § 101, both because they were living things and because 
in practice they could not meet the stringent description requirement. Yet these premises 
were disproved over time. As this Court held in Chakrabarty, “the relevant distinction” for 
purposes of § 101 is not “between living and inanimate things, but between products of 
nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions.” In addition, advances in 
biological knowledge and breeding expertise have allowed plant breeders to satisfy § 
101’s demanding description requirement. 
Whatever Congress may have believed about the state of patent law and the science 
of plant breeding in 1930, plants have always had the potential to fall within the general 
subject matter of § 101, which is a dynamic provision designed to encompass new and 
unforeseen inventions. . . . 
Petitioners essentially ask us to deny utility patent protection for sexually reproduced 
plants because it was unforeseen in 1930 that such plants could receive protection under 
§ 101. Denying patent protection under § 101 simply because such coverage was thought 
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technologically infeasible in 1930, however, would be inconsistent with the forward-
looking perspective of the utility patent statute. As we noted in Chakrabarty, “Congress 
employed broad general language in drafting § 101 precisely because new types of 
inventions are often unforeseeable.”  
Second, petitioners maintain that the PPA’s limitation to asexually reproduced plants 
would make no sense if Congress intended § 101 to authorize patents on plant varieties 
that were sexually reproduced. But this limitation once again merely reflects the reality of 
plant breeding in 1930. At that time, the primary means of reproducing bred plants true-
to-type was through asexual reproduction. Congress thought that sexual reproduction 
through seeds was not a stable way to maintain desirable bred characteristics. Thus, it is 
hardly surprising that plant patents would protect only asexual reproduction, since this 
was the most reliable type of reproduction for preserving the desirable characteristics of 
breeding.  
Furthermore, like other laws protecting intellectual property, the plant patent 
provision must be understood in its proper context. Until 1924, farmers received seed 
from the Government’s extensive free seed program that distributed millions of packages 
of seed annually. In 1930, seed companies were not primarily concerned with varietal 
protection, but were still trying to successfully commodify seeds. There was no need to 
protect seed breeding because there were few markets for seeds.  
By contrast, nurseries at the time had successfully commercialized asexually 
reproduced fruit trees and flowers. These plants were regularly copied, draining profits 
from those who discovered or bred new varieties. Nurseries were the primary subjects of 
agricultural marketing and so it is not surprising that they were the specific focus of the 
PPA.  
Moreover, seed companies at the time could not point to genuinely new varieties and 
lacked the scientific knowledge to engage in formal breeding that would increase 
agricultural productivity. In short, there is simply no evidence, let alone the 
overwhelming evidence needed to establish repeal by implication, that Congress, by 
specifically protecting asexually reproduced plants through the PPA, intended to 
preclude utility patent protection for sexually reproduced plants. 
Third, petitioners argue that in 1952 Congress would not have moved plants out of 
the utility patent provision and into § 161 if it had intended § 101 to allow for protection 
of plants. Petitioners again rely on negative inference because they cannot point to any 
express indication that Congress intended § 161 to be the exclusive means of patenting 
plants. But this negative inference simply does not support carving out subject matter that 
otherwise fits comfortably within the expansive language of § 101, especially when § 101 
can protect different attributes and has more stringent requirements than does § 161. 
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This is especially true given that Congress in 1952 did nothing to change the 
substantive rights or requirements for obtaining a plant patent. Absent a clear intent to 
the contrary, we are loath to interpret what was essentially a housekeeping measure as an 
affirmative decision by Congress to deny sexually reproduced plants patent protection 
under § 101. 
B 
By passing the PVPA in 1970, Congress specifically authorized limited patent-like 
protection for certain sexually reproduced plants. Petitioners therefore argue that this 
legislation evidences Congress’ intent to deny broader § 101 utility patent protection for 
such plants. Petitioners’ argument, however, is unavailing for two reasons. First, nowhere 
does the PVPA purport to provide the exclusive statutory means of protecting sexually 
reproduced plants. Second, the PVPA and § 101 can easily be reconciled. Because it is 
harder to qualify for a utility patent than for a Plant Variety Protection (PVP) certificate, 
it only makes sense that utility patents would confer a greater scope of protection. 
1 
The PVPA provides plant variety protection for: “The breeder of any sexually 
reproduced or tuber propagated plant variety (other than fungi or bacteria) who has so 
reproduced the variety.” 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a). 
Infringement of plant variety protection occurs, inter alia, if someone sells or markets 
the protected variety, sexually multiplies the variety as a step in marketing, uses the 
variety in producing a hybrid, or dispenses the variety without notice that the variety is 
protected. 
. . . 
The PVPA also contains exemptions for saving seed and for research. A farmer who 
legally purchases and plants a protected variety can save the seed from these plants for 
replanting on his own farm. See § 2543. In addition, a protected variety may be used for 
research. See 7 U.S.C. § 2544. The utility patent statute does not contain similar 
exemptions. 
Thus, while the PVPA creates a statutory scheme that is comprehensive with respect 
to its particular protections and subject matter, giving limited protection to plant varieties 
that are new, distinct, uniform, and stable, § 2402(a), nowhere does it restrict the scope of 
patentable subject matter under § 101. With nothing in the statute to bolster their view 
that the PVPA provides the exclusive means for protecting sexually reproducing plants, 
petitioners rely on the legislative history of the PVPA. They argue that this history shows 
the PVPA was enacted because sexually reproducing plant varieties and their seeds were 
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not and had never been intended by Congress to be included within the classes of things 
patentable under Title 35. 
The PVPA itself, however, contains no statement that PVP certificates were to be the 
exclusive means of protecting sexually reproducing plants. The relevant statements in the 
legislative history reveal nothing more than the limited view of plant breeding taken by 
some Members of Congress who believed that patent protection was unavailable for 
sexually reproduced plants. This view stems from a lack of awareness concerning 
scientific possibilities. 
Furthermore, at the time the PVPA was enacted, the PTO had already issued 
numerous utility patents for hybrid plant processes. Many of these patents, especially 
since the 1950’s, included claims on the products of the patented process, i.e., the hybrid 
plant itself. Such plants were protected as part of a hybrid process and not on their own. 
Nonetheless, these hybrids still enjoyed protection under § 101, which reaffirms that such 
material was within the scope of § 101. 
3 
Petitioners also suggest that even when statutes overlap and purport to protect the 
same commercially valuable attribute of a thing, such “dual protection” cannot exist. Yet 
this Court has not hesitated to give effect to two statutes that overlap, so long as each 
reaches some distinct cases. Here, while utility patents and PVP certificates do contain 
some similar protections, as discussed above, the overlap is only partial. 
Moreover, this Court has allowed dual protection in other intellectual property cases. 
“Certainly the patent policy of encouraging invention is not disturbed by the existence of 
another form of incentive to invention. In this respect the two systems [trade secret 
protection and patents] are not and never would be in conflict.” Kewanee Oil [Co. v. Bicron 
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)]; see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (the 
patentability of an object does not preclude the copyright of that object as a work of art). 
In this case, many plant varieties that are unable to satisfy the stringent requirements of 
§ 101 might still qualify for the lesser protections afforded by the PVPA. 
III 
We also note that the PTO has assigned utility patents for plants for at least 16 years 
and there has been no indication from either Congress or agencies with expertise that such 
coverage is inconsistent with the PVPA or the PPA. The Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences, which has specific expertise in issues of patent law, relied heavily on this 
Court’s decision in Chakrabarty when it interpreted the subject matter of § 101 to include 
plants. In re Hibberd, 227 USPQ 443 (1985). This highly visible decision has led to the 
issuance of some 1,800 utility patents for plants. Moreover, the PTO, which administers 
 PLANTS  
525 
§ 101 as well as the PPA, recognizes and regularly issues utility patents for plants. In 
addition, the Department of Agriculture’s Plant Variety Protection Office acknowledges 
the existence of utility patents for plants. 
In the face of these developments, Congress has not only failed to pass legislation 
indicating that it disagrees with the PTO’s interpretation of § 101; it has even recognized 
the availability of utility patents for plants. In a 1999 amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 119, which 
concerns the right of priority for patent rights, Congress provided: “Applications for plant 
breeder’s rights filed in a WTO member country shall have the same effect for the purpose 
of the right of priority as applications for patents, subject to the same conditions and 
requirements of this section as apply to applications for patents.” 35 U.S.C. § 119(f). 
Crucially, § 119(f) is part of the general provisions of Title 35, not the specific chapter of 
the PPA, which suggests a recognition on the part of Congress that plants are patentable 
under § 101. 
IV 
For these reasons, we hold that newly developed plant breeds fall within the terms of 
§ 101, and that neither the PPA nor the PVPA limits the scope of § 101’s coverage. As in 
Chakrabarty, we decline to narrow the reach of § 101 where Congress has given us no 
indication that it intends this result. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
It is so ordered. 
Justice BREYER, with whom Justice STEVENS joins, dissenting. 
The question before us is whether the words “manufacture” or “composition of 
matter” contained in the utility patent statute, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (Utility Patent Statute), cover 
plants that also fall within the scope of two more specific statutes, the Plant Patent Act of 
1930 (PPA), and the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA). I believe that the words 
“manufacture” or “composition of matter” do not cover these plants. That is because 
Congress intended the two more specific statutes to exclude patent protection under the 
Utility Patent Statute for the plants to which the more specific Acts directly refer. And, as 
the Court implicitly recognizes, this Court neither considered nor decided this question 
in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). Consequently, I dissent. 
I 
Respondent and the Government claim that Chakrabarty controls the outcome in this 
case. This is incorrect, for Chakrabarty said nothing about the specific issue before us. 
Chakrabarty, in considering the scope of the Utility Patent Statute’s language 
“manufacture, or composition of matter,” 35 U.S.C. § 101, asked whether those words 
included such living things as bacteria—a substance to which neither of the two specific 
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plant Acts refers. The Court held that the Utility Patent Statute language included a “new” 
bacterium because it was “a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of 
matter” that was “not nature's handiwork.” It quoted language from a congressional 
Committee Report indicating that “Congress intended statutory subject matter to ‘include 
anything under the sun that is made by man.’” But it nowhere said or implied that this 
Utility Patent Statute language also includes the very subject matter with which the two 
specific statutes deal, namely, plants. Whether a bacterium technically speaking is, or is 
not, a plant, the Court considered it a “life form,” and not the kind of “plant” that the two 
specific statutes had in mind.  
The Court did consider a complicated argument that sought indirectly to relate the 
two specific plant statutes to the issue before it. That argument went roughly as follows: 
(1) Congress enacted two special statutes related to plants. (2) Even though those two 
statutes do not cover bacteria, the fact that Congress enacted them shows that Congress 
thought the Utility Patent Statute’s language (“manufacture, or composition of matter”) 
did not cover any living thing, including bacteria. (3) Congress consequently must have 
intended the two special Acts to provide exclusive protection for all forms of “life” 
whether they do, or do not, count as the kinds of “plants” to which the specific statutes 
refer. 
The Court, in reply, wrote that Congress, when enacting the specific statutes, might 
have (wrongly) believed that the Utility Patent Statute did not apply to plants, probably 
because Congress thought that plants were “natural products,” not human products. It 
added that Congress also might have believed that it was too difficult for plant inventors 
to meet patent law’s ordinary “written description” requirement. In addition, the Court 
pointed out that the relevant distinction between unpatentable and patentable subject 
matter was not between living and inanimate things, but rather between products of 
nature and human-made inventions. As such, the bacteria at issue were patentable 
because they were products of human invention. And the Court concluded that “nothing” 
in Congress’ decision to exclude bacteria from the PVPA supported “petitioner’s 
position,” namely, that Congress intended no utility patent protection for any living thing.  
Neither this refutation nor the argument itself decides the question here. That question 
is not about general coverage for matters that the special statutes do not mention (namely, 
nonplant life forms such as bacteria). It is about general coverage for matters to which the 
special plant statutes do refer (namely, plants). Chakrabarty neither asked, nor answered, 
this latter question, the question now before us. And nothing in the Court’s opinion 
indicates the contrary. 
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II 
The critical question, as I have said, is whether the two specific plant statutes embody 
a legislative intent to deny coverage under the Utility Patent Statute to those plants to 
which the specific plant statutes refer. In my view, the first of these statutes, the PPA, 
reveals precisely that intent. And nothing in the later history of either the Utility Patent 
Statute or the PVPA suggests the contrary. 
As initially enacted in 1930, the PPA began by amending the Utility Patent Statute to 
read as follows: 
Any person who has invented or discovered any new and useful art, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvements 
thereof, or who has invented or discovered and asexually reproduced any distinct and new 
variety of plant, other than a tuber-propagated plant may obtain a patent therefor.”  
Rev. Stat. § 4886, as amended by Act of May 23, 1930, § 1, 46 Stat. 376 (language added by 
the PPA italicized). 
. . . 
. . . [T]he PPA permits patenting of new and distinct varieties of (1) plants that breeders 
primarily reproduce through grafts (say, apple trees), (2) plants that breeders primarily 
reproduce through seeds (say, corn), and (3) plants that reproduce both ways (say, 
violets). But, because that statute left plant buyers free to keep, to reproduce, and to sell 
seeds, the statute likely proved helpful only to those in the first category. Both the PPA’s 
legislative history and the earliest patents granted under the Act fully support this 
interpretation.  
Given these characteristics, the PPA is incompatible with the claim that the Utility 
Patent Statute’s language (“manufacture, or composition of matter”) also covers plants. 
To see why that is so, simply imagine a plant breeder who, in 1931, sought to patent a 
new, distinct variety of plant that he invented but which he has never been able to 
reproduce through grafting, i.e., asexually. Because he could not reproduce it through 
grafting, he could not patent it under the more specific terms of the PPA. Could he 
nonetheless patent it under the more general Utility Patent Statute language 
“manufacture, or composition of matter?” 
Assume the court that tried to answer that question was prescient, i.e., that it knew 
that this Court, in Chakrabarty, would say that the Utility Patent Statute language 
(“manufacture,” or “composition of matter”) in principle might cover “anything under 
the sun,” including bacteria. Such a prescient court would have said that the Utility Patent 
Statute did cover plants had the case reached it in 1929, before Congress enacted the more 
specific 1930 law. But how could any court decide the case similarly in 1931 after 
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enactment of the 1930 amendment? To do so would virtually nullify the PPA’s primary 
condition—that the breeder have reproduced the new characteristic through a graft—
reading it out of the Act. Moreover, since the Utility Patent Statute would cover, and 
thereby forbid, reproduction by seed, such a holding would also have read out of the 
statute the PPA’s more limited list of exclusive rights. Consequently, even a prescient 
court would have had to say, as of 1931, that the 1930 Plant Patent Act had, in amending 
the Utility Patent Statute, placed the subject matter of the PPA—namely, plants—outside 
the scope of the words “manufacture, or composition of matter.”  
Nothing that occurred after 1930 changes this conclusion. In 1952, the Utility Patent 
Statute was recodified, and the PPA language I have quoted was given its own separate 
place in the Code. As Pioneer itself concedes, that change was not “substantive.” Indeed, 
as recodified the PPA still allows a breeder to obtain a patent when he “invents or 
discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant,” 35 U.S.C. § 161 
(1994 ed.), but it only allows the patent holder to “exclude others from asexually 
reproducing the plant or selling or using the plant so reproduced,” § 163. 
Nor does the enactment of the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 change the 
conclusion. The PVPA proved necessary because plant breeders became capable of 
creating new and distinct varieties of certain crops, corn, for example, that were valuable 
only when reproduced through seeds—a form of reproduction that the earlier Act freely 
permitted. Just prior to its enactment a special Presidential Commission, noting the special 
problems that plant protection raised and favoring the development of a totally new plant 
protection scheme, had recommended that “all provisions in the patent statute for plant 
patents be deleted.” Instead Congress kept the PPA while adding the PVPA. The PVPA 
gave patent-like protection (for 20 years) to plants reproduced by seed, and it excluded 
the PPA’s requirement that a breeder have “asexually reproduced” the plant. It imposed 
certain specific requirements. And it provided the breeder with an exclusive right to sell, 
offer to sell, reproduce, import, or export the variety, including the seeds.  
At the same time, the PVPA created two important exceptions. The first provided that 
a farmer who plants his fields with a protected plant “shall not infringe any right 
hereunder” by saving the seeds and planting them in future years. § 2543. The second 
permitted “use and reproduction of a protected variety for plant breeding or other bona 
fide research.” § 2544. 
Nothing in the history, language, or purpose of the 1970 statute suggests an intent to 
reintroduce into the scope of the general words “manufacture, or composition of matter” 
the subject matter that the PPA had removed, namely, plants. To the contrary, any such 
reintroduction would make meaningless the two exceptions—for planting and for 
research—that Congress wrote into that Act. . . . 
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Context & Application 
1. If plants can be protected by utility patents, do we still need plant patents? Or 
PVPs? Who might benefit from each different form of plant protection? 
2. In Bowman v. Monsanto Co., the Supreme Court considered “whether a farmer who 
buys [utility] patented seeds may reproduce them through planting and harvesting 
without the patent holder’s permission” and held that they could not. 569 U.S. 278, 280 
(2013). According to the Court, this followed from J.E.M.: 
 [W]e explained that only a patent holder (not a certificate holder) could prohibit 
“a farmer who legally purchases and plants” a protected seed from saving 
harvested seed “for replanting.” That statement is inconsistent with applying 
exhaustion to protect conduct like Bowman’s. If a sale cut off the right to control a 
patented seed’s progeny then (contrary to J.E.M.) the patentee could not prevent 
the buyer from saving harvested seed. Indeed, the patentee could not stop the 
buyer from selling such seed, which even a PVP certificate owner (who, recall, is 
supposed to have fewer rights) can usually accomplish. Those limitations would 
turn upside-down the statutory scheme J.E.M. described. 
Do you agree? How does the Bowman holding affect your view of the desirability (from 
an individual and a system perspective) of utility patent protection for plants? 
3.  In J.E.M., the majority states that Congress was simply wrong to believe, in 1930, 
that plants were not patentable under the statutory subject matter provision that is now 
codified at 35 U.S.C. § 101. Do you agree?  
4. In J.E.M., the majority also states that in the 16 years since the USPTO started 
issuing utility patents for plants, “there ha[d] been no indication from either Congress or 
agencies with expertise that such coverage is inconsistent with the PVPA or the PPA.” 
Would you expect the USPTO to speak up against its own position? Or for members of 
Congress to speak up on this issue? If not, what should we make (or not make) of this 
silence? 
5. What about plants that are illegal under federal law? “Marihuana”—which is 
defined as “all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether growing or not; the seeds 
thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every compound, 
manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or resin”—
is a Schedule I drug under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 
802(16)(A). See also id. 802(16)(B) (“The term ‘marihuana’ does not include—(i) hemp, as 
defined in section 1639o of Title 7 . . . .”); 7 U.S.C.A. § 1639o (“The term ‘hemp’ means the 
plant Cannabis sativa L. and any part of that plant, including the seeds thereof and all 
derivatives, extracts, cannabinoids, isomers, acids, salts, and salts of isomers, whether 
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growing or not, with a delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol concentration of not more than 0.3 
percent on a dry weight basis.”). This means it is illegal under federal law “for any person 
knowingly or intentionally . . . [to] manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with 
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense” most cannabis products. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). 
Nevertheless, the USPTO will issue patents for new varieties of cannabis and other 
cannabis-related inventions. See, e.g., Breeding, Production, Processing and Use of 
Specialty Cannabis, U.S. Patent 9,095,554 (filed Mar. 17, 2014); Cannabis Plant Named 
‘Ecuadorian Sativa,’ U.S. Patent PP27,475 (filed Mar. 13, 2010); Cannabis Storing Container 
with Individual Tear Off Lids, U.S. Patent D798,739 (filed Apr. 7, 2016). By contrast, the 
USPTO will not register trademarks for use in connection with cannabis products that are 
illegal under the CSA:  
[I]f the record indicates that the mark itself or the goods or services violate federal 
law, an inquiry or refusal must be made. For example, evidence indicating that the 
identified goods or services involve the sale or transportation of a controlled 
substance or drug paraphernalia in violation of the Controlled Substances Act . . . 
would be a basis for issuing an inquiry or refusal. . . . Note that, regardless of state 
law, marijuana, marijuana extracts, and the psychoactive component THC remain 
Schedule I controlled substances under federal law and are subject to the CSA’s 
prohibitions. These prohibitions apply with equal force to the distribution and 
dispensing of medical marijuana. 
TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 907 (Oct. 2018) (citations omitted). 
Does this disparate treatment make sense? If not, which approach—protection or 
nonprotection—is better, as a policy matter? Does (or should) it matter that some uses of 
cannabis are not legal in various states?  
Some courts have refused to enforce Lanham Act claims related to cannabis products. 
See, e.g., Shulman v. Kaplan, No. 2020 WL 7094063, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2020) (“[B]ecause 
any alleged use of the Iron Triangle trademark was on cannabis products which are illegal 
under federal law, Plaintiffs cannot state a claim for violation of the Lanham Act.”). How, 
if at all, would these cases affect how you would counsel a client who was interested in 
obtaining a cannabis-related patent? 
6. The USPTO allows a utility patent applicant to deposit biological material to help 
satisfy the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.802, 1.808. 
And, as noted in J.E.M., these deposits must be made available to the public. What would 
you do if a client wanted a patent for a new variety of Cannabis? Hint: The United States 
is a party to a treaty (the Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit 
of Microorganisms for the Purpose of Patent Procedures) that allows applicants to file 





Unlike utility patents, which protect how things work, design patents protect how 
things look. See MPEP §1502.01. The statutory subject matter provision for design patents 
is 35 U.S.C. § 171. In re Finch, 535 F.2d 70, 71–72 (C.C.P.A. 1976). Section 171(a) provides: 
Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for an article of 
manufacture may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title. 
In accordance with this statutory language, “design patents are granted only for a design 
applied to an article of manufacture, and not a design per se . . . .” Curver Luxembourg, 
SARL v. Home Expressions Inc., 938 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2019).  
What types of designs might be applied to an article of manufacture? There are three 
longstanding types of patentable designs: 
 (1) A design for “surface ornamentation applied to an article”;  
(2) A design for “the configuration or shape of an article”; or  
(3) A design for the combination of both. 
See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1504.01 (9th ed. Jan. 2018) (“MPEP”). These three types of 
patentable designs—surface designs, configuration designs, and combination designs—
can be traced all the way back to the Supreme Court’s first design patent decision, Gorham 
v. White. See 81 U.S. 511, 525 (1871). Today, applicants can obtain design patents for any 
of these types of designs, or any part (or parts) thereof. See In re Zahn, 617 F.2d 261 
(C.C.P.A. 1980). The USPTO has also interpreted the statute to allow applicants to claim 
designs that “encompass multiple articles or multiple parts within that article.” MPEP 
§ 1504.01(b) (citing Ex parte Gibson, 20 USPQ 249 (Bd. App. 1933)).  
Section 171(b) states that “[t]he provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions 
shall apply to patents for designs, except as otherwise provided.” So what is “otherwise 
provided”? Sections 171-173 provide specific rules that apply only to design patents—
specifically, § 172 provides only six months priority for international applications and 
§ 173 sets the term of a design patent as “15 years from the date of grant.” Section 289 
provides a special remedy that is only available for certain acts of design patent 
infringement. Otherwise, the statutory provisions we’ve studied in connection with utility 
patents also apply to design patents. So, for example, a patentable design must be novel 
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and nonobvious. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103. And a design patent must satisfy the requirements 
of § 112. However, the application of these sections and the tests used to analyze a design’s 
compliance with them are quite different. This sometimes strikes those who’ve studied 
only utility patents as odd or even troubling. But design patents cover fundamentally 
different types of inventions and use an entirely different claiming system; under these 
circumstances, it would be odd if the statutory requirements weren’t applied differently. 
Principles or practices developed with only utility patents in mind may or may not make 
sense for design patents and there is no reason why such principles or practices 
necessarily need to be imported into the design patent regime.  
This chapter will start by exploring the scope of design patents, including how they’re 
claimed. It will then discuss how the requirements of § 102 and § 103 have been 
interpreted and applied in the context of designs. Next, we’ll cover the statutory 
requirement of ornamentality. Finally, we’ll look at how § 112 has been applied to designs, 
and how that affects priority claims. 
A. Scope 
Before diving into the validity doctrines, it’s important to understand the scope of a 
design patent. So we’ll start with how designs are claimed and then look at the test for 
design patent infringement.  
1. Claiming 
Design patent claims are very different than utility patent claims. A design patent can 
only have one claim and that “claim shall be in formal terms to the ornamental design for 
the article (specifying name) as shown, or as shown and described.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.153(a). 
“The title of the design must designate the particular article,” id., and “the title and claim 
must correspond,” MPEP § 1503.01(I). 
How is a design “shown and described”? The applicant must submit drawings or 
photographs, including “a sufficient number of views to constitute a complete disclosure 
of the appearance of the design.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.152. See also MPEP § 1503.02 (noting that 
photographs are also allowed). Color can also be claimed as part of a design, either by 
using color drawings or photographs or by using certain color shading conventions. Id. 
For line drawings, anything shown in full lines is part of the claimed design. Applicant 
are also allowed to use broken lines in their design patent drawings. One word of 
warning: The rules about how and when applicants can use broken lines have changed 
over time, so be careful when looking at older design patents. Today: 
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The two most common uses of broken lines are to disclose the environment related 
to the claimed design and to define the bounds of the claim. Structure that is not 
part of the claimed design, but is considered necessary to show the environment 
in which the design is associated, may be represented in the drawing by broken 
lines. This includes any portion of an article in which the design is embodied, or 
applied to, that is not considered part of the claimed design. See In re Zahn, 617 
F.2d 261 (CCPA 1980).  
MPEP § 1503.02. Accordingly, an applicant might use broken lines to show how a claimed 
design might look in use, as in this drawing from a design patent that claims a design for 
a “Litter Box”: 
 
U.S. Patent D816,281, fig. 1 (issued Apr . 24 , 2018). The cat is shown in broken lines and, 
therefore, is not a part of the claimed design. (If you look closely, you can see some other 
details of the litter box are also disclaimed.) 
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Broken lines can also be used to disclaim parts of an article’s shape or surface 
ornamentation. Consider, for example, this illustration from a design patent that claims a 
design for a “Pressed Shredded Potato Product”:  
 
U.S. Patent No. D857,332, fig. 7 (issued Aug. 27 , 2019). The entire shape is shown in solid 
lines; therefore, the claim covers the entire shape. Compare that drawing to this one, from 
a design patent that was issued to the same patentee: 
 
U.S. Patent D884,309 fig. 7 (issued May 19 , 2020). Why would an applicant want to 
disclaim part of a design? They do it to increase the scope of the design patent. As we’ll 
see below, a design patent is infringed when an accused product looks the same as the 
claimed design. If the claim only covers part of an article’s shape or surface ornamentation, 
then only the corresponding part of the accused product has to look the same. So this 
claim could be infringed by a pressed, shredded potato product that was round or square 
or any shape—as long as the dimple pattern (the part shown in solid lines) looks the same.  
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Broken lines can also be used to show unclaimed boundaries: “Applicant may choose 
to define the bounds of a claimed design with broken lines when the boundary does not 
exist in reality in the article embodying the design. It would be understood that the 
claimed design extends to the boundary but does not include the boundary.” MPEP 
§ 1503.02. These boundary lines are often (though not always) depicted using dot-dash 
lines, while environmental and disclaimer lines are often depicted using plain dashed 
lines. Here is an example of a drawing, from a design patent that claims a design for 
“Footwear,” that uses both dashed disclaimer lines and dot-dash boundary lines: 
 
U.S. Patent D787,798, fig. 1 (issued May 30, 2017). Why would someone want to draft a 
claim like this? Is it a “design for an article of manufacture”? See 35 U.S.C. § 171(a). 
Who examines design patent claims? Design patent examiners are not drawn from the 
general USPTO examiner corps. Instead, the USPTO hires people with backgrounds in 
design—people who majored (or have the equivalent experience) in fields like industrial 
design, architecture, graphic design, and fine arts—as design patent examiners. But you 
still have to have a technical background (i.e., be a member of the “patent bar”) to 
prosecute design patents for other people or to be lead counsel in a design patent 
proceeding before the PTAB. Does that make sense? For one argument for change, see 
Christopher Buccafusco & Jeanne C. Curtis, The Design Patent Bar: An Occupational 
Licensing Failure, 37 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 263 (2019). 
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2. Infringement 
Section 271 applies to design patents. It is an infringement to make, use, sell, offer to 
sell, or import a patented design (or to do any of the other things specified in § 271). But 
how do we know if someone has made or sold a patented design? The rules that have 
been developed to evaluate utility patent infringement don’t work for design patents 
because the form of the claims and the types of protected inventions are so different.  
Indeed, ever since the Supreme Court’s first design patent case, Gorham v. White, courts 
have recognized that different infringement rules are needed for this different type of 
invention.  
x x x 
The next case, Gorham Co. v. White, involved U.S. Patent D1,440, issued in 1861 for a 
design for a “Fork and Spoon Handle.” Here is a representative drawing from that patent: 
 
The lower court held that: 
A patent for a design, like a patent for an improvement in machinery, must be for 
the means of producing a certain result or appearance, and not for the result or 
appearance itself. The plaintiffs’ patent is for their described means of producing 
a certain appearance in the completed handle. Even if the same appearance is 
produced by another design, if the means used in such other design to produce 
the appearance are substantially different from the means used in the prior 
patented design to produce such appearance, the later design is not an 
infringement of the patented one.  
10 F. Cas. 827, 830 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1870). The patent owner appealed to the Supreme Court 
(which at that time, heard direct appeals in patent cases). 
 DESIGNS  
537 
Gorham Co. v. White 
81 U.S. 511 (1871) 
Mr. Justice STRONG delivered the opinion of the court. 
The sole question is one of fact. Has there been an infringement? Are the designs used 
by the defendant substantially the same as that owned by the complainants? To answer 
these questions correctly, it is indispensable to understand what constitutes identity of 
design, and what amounts to infringement? 
The acts of Congress which authorize the grant of patents for designs were plainly 
intended to give encouragement to the decorative arts. They contemplate not so much 
utility as appearance, and that, not an abstract impression, or picture, but an aspect given 
to those objects mentioned in the acts. It is a new and original design for a manufacture, 
whether of metal or other material; a new and original design for a bust, statue, bas relief, 
or composition in alto or basso relievo; a new or original impression or ornament to be 
placed on any article of manufacture; a new and original design for the printing of 
woollen, silk, cotton, or other fabrics; a new and useful pattern, print, or picture, to be 
either worked into, or on, any article of manufacture; or a new and original shape or 
configuration of any article of manufacture—it is one or all of these that the law has in 
view. And the thing invented or produced, for which a patent is given, is that which gives 
a peculiar or distinctive appearance to the manufacture, or article to which it may be 
applied, or to which it gives form. The law manifestly contemplates that giving certain 
new and original appearances to a manufactured article may enhance its salable value, 
may enlarge the demand for it, and may be a meritorious service to the public. It therefore 
proposes to secure for a limited time to the ingenious producer of those appearances the 
advantages flowing from them. Manifestly the mode in which those appearances are 
produced has very little, if anything, to do with giving increased salableness to the article. 
It is the appearance itself which attracts attention and calls out favor or dislike. It is the 
appearance itself, therefore, no matter by what agency caused, that constitutes mainly, if 
not entirely, the contribution to the public which the law deems worthy of recompense. 
The appearance may be the result of peculiarity of configuration, or of ornament alone, or 
of both conjointly, but, in whatever way produced, it is the new thing, or product, which 
the patent law regards. To speak of the invention as a combination or process, or to treat 
it as such, is to overlook its peculiarities. As the acts of Congress embrace only designs 
applied, or to be applied, they must refer to finished products of invention rather than to 
the process of finishing them, or to the agencies by which they are developed. A patent 
for a product is a distinct thing from a patent for the elements entering into it, or for the 
ingredients of which it is composed, or for the combination that causes it. We do not say 
that in determining whether two designs are substantially the same, differences in the 
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lines, the configuration, or the modes by which the aspects they exhibit are not to be 
considered; but we think the controlling consideration is the resultant effect. . . . 
We are now prepared to inquire what is the true test of identity of design. Plainly, it 
must be sameness of appearance, and mere difference of lines in the drawing or sketch, a 
greater or smaller number of lines, or slight variances in configuration, if sufficient to 
change the effect upon the eye, will not destroy the substantial identity. An engraving 
which has many lines may present to the eye the same picture, and to the mind the same 
idea or conception as another with much fewer lines. The design, however, would be the 
same. So a pattern for a carpet, or a print may be made up of wreaths of flowers arranged 
in a particular manner. Another carpet may have similar wreaths, arranged in a like 
manner, so that none but very acute observers could detect a difference. Yet in the wreaths 
upon one there may be fewer flowers, and the wreaths may be placed at wider distances 
from each other. Surely in such a case the designs are alike. The same conception was in 
the mind of the designer, and to that conception he gave expression. 
If, then, identity of appearance, or sameness of effect upon the eye, is the main test of 
substantial identity of design, the only remaining question upon this part of the case is, 
whether it is essential that the appearance should be the same to the eye of an expert. The 
court below was of opinion that the test of a patent for a design is not the eye of an 
ordinary observer. The learned judge thought there could be no infringement unless there 
was ‘substantial identity’ ‘in view of the observation of a person versed in designs in the 
particular trade in question—of a person engaged in the manufacture or sale of articles 
containing such designs—of a person accustomed to compare such designs one with 
another, and who sees and examines the articles containing them side by side.’ There 
must, he thought, be a comparison of the features which make up the two designs. With 
this we cannot concur. Such a test would destroy all the protection which the act of 
Congress intended to give. There never could be piracy of a patented design, for human 
ingenuity has never yet produced a design, in all its details, exactly like another, so like, 
that an expert could not distinguish them. No counterfeit bank note is so identical in 
appearance with the true that an experienced artist cannot discern a difference. It is said 
an engraver distinguishes impressions made by the same plate. Experts, therefore, are not 
the persons to be deceived. Much less than that which would be substantial identity in 
their eyes would be undistinguishable in the eyes of men generally, of observers of 
ordinary acuteness, bringing to the examination of the article upon which the design has 
been placed that degree of observation which men of ordinary intelligence give. It is 
persons of the latter class who are the principal purchasers of the articles to which designs 
have given novel appearances, and if they are misled, and induced to purchase what is 
not the article they supposed it to be, if, for example, they are led to purchase forks or 
spoons, deceived by an apparent resemblance into the belief that they bear the ‘cottage’ 
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design, and, therefore, are the production of the holders of the Gorham, Thurber, and 
Dexter patent, when in fact they are not, the patentees are injured, and that advantage of 
a market which the patent was granted to secure is destroyed. The purpose of the law 
must be effected if possible; but, plainly, it cannot be if, while the general appearance of 
the design is preserved, minor differences of detail in the manner in which the appearance 
is produced, observable by experts, but not noticed by ordinary observers, by those who 
buy and use, are sufficient to relieve an imitating design from condemnation as an 
infringement. 
We hold, therefore, that if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as 
a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the resemblance is 
such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the 
other, the first one patented is infringed by the other. 
Context & Application 
1. What does Gorham tell us about the purpose or purposes of design patent law? Do 
the goals identified by the Supreme Court seem like good goals for the system? 
2. That there are two major issues decided in Gorham: (1) What is the test for identity 
(infringement) of a design?; and (2) From whose point of view is this inquiry conducted? 
What was the Court’s answer to each question?  
3.  The most-quoted line from Gorham—“We hold, therefore, that if, in the eye of an 
ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are 
substantially the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing 
him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the 
other”—may strike contemporary readers as setting forth a trademark-like “likelihood of 
confusion” test. But that is not how the test was originally understood nor how it is 
understood today. Unette Corp. v. Unit Pack Co., 785 F.2d 1026, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(answering the question of “whether ‘likelihood of confusion’ is a factor to be determined 
under the Gorham test for infringement of a design patent” in the negative). See also Braun 
Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 820 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“Design patent 
infringement does not concern itself with the broad issue of consumer behavior in the 
marketplace.”). Read in the context of the case as a whole, Gorham clearly sets forth a test 
of visual similarity. That most-quoted line tells us how similar the designs must be—so 
similar that an ordinary observer would mistake one for the other. See, e.g., Goodyear Tire 
& Rubber Co. v. Hercules Tire & Rubber Co., 162 F.3d 1113, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated on 
other grounds by Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(“Infringement of a design patent requires that the designs have the same general visual 
appearance, such that it is likely that the purchaser would be deceived into confusing the 
 CHAPTER 12  
540 
design of the accused article with the patented design.”) (emphasis added); HECTOR T. 
FENTON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR DESIGNS 129 (1889) (“The general rule for the 
determination of the question of infringement of design patents was enunciated by the 
Supreme Court, in Gorham v. White, to be similarity of general appearance to the eye of 
average observers.”) (emphasis added). 
4. As you can tell from Gorham, the design patent statutory subject matter provision 
used to look different. Back then, Congress defined design patentable subject matter in a 
long list of protectable designs. Congress enacted the current language—i.e., what is now 
found in § 171(a)—in 1902. What, if anything, should we make of this language change? 
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc. 
543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
BRYSON, Circuit Judge. 
We granted rehearing en banc in this design patent case to address the appropriate 
legal standard to be used in assessing claims of design patent infringement. 
Appellant Egyptian Goddess, Inc., (“EGI”) brought this action . . . alleging that Swisa, 
Inc., and Dror Swisa (collectively, “Swisa”) had infringed EGI’s U.S. Design Patent No. 
467,389 (“the ’389 patent”). The patent claimed a design for a nail buffer, consisting of a 
rectangular, hollow tube having a generally square cross-section and featuring buffer 
surfaces on three of its four sides. Swisa’s accused product consists of a rectangular, 
hollow tube having a square cross-section, but featuring buffer surfaces on all four of its 
sides. 
The district court first issued an order construing the claim of the ’389 patent. In so 
doing, the district court sought to describe in words the design set forth in Figure 1 of the 
patent, which is depicted below: 
 
Upon study of the claimed design, the court described it as follows: 
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A hollow tubular frame of generally square cross section, where the square has 
sides of length S, the frame has a length of approximately 3S, and the frame has a 
thickness of approximately T = 0.1S; the corners of the cross section are rounded, 
with the outer corner of the cross section rounded on a 90 degree radius of 
approximately 1.25T, and the inner corner of the cross section rounded on a 90 
degree radius of approximately 0.25T; and with rectangular abrasive pads of 
thickness T affixed to three of the sides of the frame, covering the flat portion of 
the sides while leaving the curved radius uncovered, with the fourth side of the 
frame bare. 
. . . 
Swisa . . . moved for summary judgment of noninfringement. The district court 
granted the motion. . . . 
. . . 
EGI appealed, and a panel of this court affirmed.  
. . . 
This court granted rehearing en banc and asked the parties to address several 
questions, including whether the “point of novelty” test should continue to be used as a 
test for infringement of a design patent . . . and whether district courts should perform 
formal claim construction in design patent cases. 
I 
The starting point for any discussion of the law of design patents is the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511 (1871). That case involved a design 
patent for the handles of tablespoons and forks. In its analysis of claim infringement, the 
Court stated that the test of identity of design “must be sameness of appearance, and mere 
difference of lines in the drawing or sketch or slight variances in configuration will not 
destroy the substantial identity.” Identity of appearance, the Court explained, or 
“sameness of effect upon the eye, is the main test of substantial identity of design”; the 
two need not be the same “to the eye of an expert,” because if that were the test, “there 
never could be piracy of a patented design, for human ingenuity has never yet produced 
a design, in all its details, exactly like another, so like, that an expert could not distinguish 
them.”  
The Gorham Court then set forth the test that has been cited in many subsequent cases: 
“If, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, 
two designs are substantially the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an 
observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented 
is infringed by the other.” In the case before it, the Court concluded that “whatever 
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differences there may be between the plaintiffs’ design and those of the defendant in 
details of ornament, they are still the same in general appearance and effect, so much alike 
that in the market and with purchasers they would pass for the same thing—so much 
alike that even persons in the trade would be in danger of being deceived.”  
Since the decision in Gorham, the test articulated by the Court in that case has been 
referred to as the “ordinary observer” test and has been recognized by lower courts, 
including both of this court’s predecessors, as the proper standard for determining design 
patent infringement. However, in a series of cases tracing their origins to Litton Systems, 
Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984), this court has held that proof of 
similarity under the ordinary observer test is not enough to establish design patent 
infringement. Rather, the court has stated that the accused design must also appropriate 
the novelty of the claimed design in order to be deemed infringing. The court in Litton 
Systems wrote as follows: 
For a design patent to be infringed no matter how similar two items look, “the 
accused device must appropriate the novelty in the patented device which 
distinguishes it from the prior art.” That is, even though the court compares two 
items through the eyes of the ordinary observer, it must nevertheless, to find 
infringement, attribute their similarity to the novelty which distinguishes the 
patented device from the prior art. 
After identifying the combination of features in the design that it considered novel, the 
court in Litton Systems held that the accused design had none of those features and 
therefore did not infringe.  
In a number of cases decided after Litton Systems, this court has interpreted the 
language quoted above to require that the test for design patent infringement consider 
both the perspective of the ordinary observer and the particular novelty in the claimed 
design.  
The extent to which the point of novelty test has been a separate test has not always 
been clear in this court’s case law. In cases decided shortly after Litton, the court described 
the ordinary observer test and the point of novelty test as “conjunctive.” It has not been 
until much more recently that this court has described the ordinary observer and point of 
novelty tests as “two distinct tests” and has stated that “the merger of the point of novelty 
test and the ordinary observer test is legal error.”  
II 
As noted, this court has cited Litton Systems for the proposition that the point of 
novelty test is separate from the ordinary observer test and requires the patentee to point 
out the point of novelty in the claimed design that has been appropriated by the accused 
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design. We think, however, that Litton and the predecessor cases on which it relied are 
more properly read as applying a version of the ordinary observer test in which the 
ordinary observer is deemed to view the differences between the patented design and the 
accused product in the context of the prior art. When the differences between the claimed 
and accused design are viewed in light of the prior art, the attention of the hypothetical 
ordinary observer will be drawn to those aspects of the claimed design that differ from 
the prior art. And when the claimed design is close to the prior art designs, small 
differences between the accused design and the claimed design are likely to be important 
to the eye of the hypothetical ordinary observer. . . . 
. . . 
Not only is this approach consistent with the precedents discussed above, but it makes 
sense as a matter of logic as well. Particularly in close cases, it can be difficult to answer 
the question whether one thing is like another without being given a frame of reference. 
The context in which the claimed and accused designs are compared, i.e., the background 
prior art, provides such a frame of reference and is therefore often useful in the process of 
comparison. Where the frame of reference consists of numerous similar prior art designs, 
those designs can highlight the distinctions between the claimed design and the accused 
design as viewed by the ordinary observer. 
. . . 
. . . Our rejection of the point of novelty test does not mean, of course, that the 
differences between the claimed design and prior art designs are irrelevant. To the 
contrary, examining the novel features of the claimed design can be an important 
component of the comparison of the claimed design with the accused design and the prior 
art. But the comparison of the designs, including the examination of any novel features, 
must be conducted as part of the ordinary observer test, not as part of a separate test 
focusing on particular points of novelty that are designated only in the course of litigation.  
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, we hold that the “point of novelty” test should 
no longer be used in the analysis of a claim of design patent infringement. . . . [I]n 
accordance with Gorham and subsequent decisions, we hold that the “ordinary observer” 
test should be the sole test for determining whether a design patent has been infringed. 
Under that test, as this court has sometimes described it, infringement will not be found 
unless the accused article “embodies the patented design or any colorable imitation 
thereof.”  
In some instances, the claimed design and the accused design will be sufficiently 
distinct that it will be clear without more that the patentee has not met its burden of 
proving the two designs would appear “substantially the same” to the ordinary observer 
. . . . In other instances, when the claimed and accused designs are not plainly dissimilar, 
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resolution of the question whether the ordinary observer would consider the two designs 
to be substantially the same will benefit from a comparison of the claimed and accused 
designs with the prior art, as in many of the cases discussed above and in the case at bar. 
Where there are many examples of similar prior art designs . . . differences between the 
claimed and accused designs that might not be noticeable in the abstract can become 
significant to the hypothetical ordinary observer who is conversant with the prior art. 
. . . [I]f the accused infringer elects to rely on the comparison prior art as part of its 
defense against the claim of infringement, the burden of production of that prior art is on 
the accused infringer. . . . [I]t makes sense to impose the burden of production as to any 
comparison prior art on the accused infringer. The accused infringer is the party with the 
motivation to point out close prior art, and in particular to call to the court’s attention the 
prior art that an ordinary observer is most likely to regard as highlighting the differences 
between the claimed and accused design. Regardless of whether the accused infringer 
elects to present prior art that it considers pertinent to the comparison between the 
claimed and accused design, however, the patentee bears the ultimate burden of proof to 
demonstrate infringement by a preponderance of the evidence. . . . 
III 
One of the issues raised by this court in its order granting en banc review was whether 
trial courts should conduct claim construction in design patent cases. While this court has 
held that trial courts have a duty to conduct claim construction in design patent cases, as 
in utility patent cases, the court has not prescribed any particular form that the claim 
construction must take. To the contrary, the court has recognized that design patents 
“typically are claimed as shown in drawings,” and that claim construction “is adapted 
accordingly.” For that reason, this court has not required that the trial court attempt to 
provide a detailed verbal description of the claimed design, as is typically done in the case 
of utility patents.  
As the Supreme Court has recognized, a design is better represented by an illustration 
“than it could be by any description and a description would probably not be intelligible 
without the illustration.” Dobson v. Dornan, 118 U.S. 10, 14 (1886). The Patent and 
Trademark Office has made the same observation. Manual of Patent Examining Procedure 
§ 1503.01 (8th ed. 2006) (“As a rule the illustration in the drawing views is its own best 
description.”). Given the recognized difficulties entailed in trying to describe a design in 
words, the preferable course ordinarily will be for a district court not to attempt to 
“construe” a design patent claim by providing a detailed verbal description of the claimed 
design. 
With that said, it is important to emphasize that a district court’s decision regarding 
the level of detail to be used in describing the claimed design is a matter within the court’s 
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discretion, and absent a showing of prejudice, the court’s decision to issue a relatively 
detailed claim construction will not be reversible error. At the same time, it should be clear 
that the court is not obligated to issue a detailed verbal description of the design if it does 
not regard verbal elaboration as necessary or helpful. In addition, in deciding whether to 
attempt a verbal description of the claimed design, the court should recognize the risks 
entailed in such a description, such as the risk of placing undue emphasis on particular 
features of the design and the risk that a finder of fact will focus on each individual 
described feature in the verbal description rather than on the design as a whole. In this 
case, for example, the district court came up with a detailed verbal description of the 
claimed design. We see no inaccuracy in the court’s description, and neither party has 
pointed to any prejudice resulting from the court’s interpretation. Yet it is not clear that 
the considerable effort needed to fashion the verbal description contributed enough to the 
process of analyzing the case to justify the effort. 
While it may be unwise to attempt a full description of the claimed design, a court 
may find it helpful to point out, either for a jury or in the case of a bench trial by way of 
describing the court’s own analysis, various features of the claimed design as they relate 
to the accused design and the prior art. . . . 
Apart from attempting to provide a verbal description of the design, a trial court can 
usefully guide the finder of fact by addressing a number of other issues that bear on the 
scope of the claim. Those include such matters as describing the role of particular 
conventions in design patent drafting, such as the role of broken lines, see 37 C.F.R. § 1.152; 
assessing and describing the effect of any representations that may have been made in the 
course of the prosecution history; and distinguishing between those features of the 
claimed design that are ornamental and those that are purely functional, see OddzOn 
Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  
Providing an appropriate measure of guidance to a jury without crossing the line and 
unduly invading the jury’s fact-finding process is a task that trial courts are very much 
accustomed to, and any attempt by an appellate court to guide that process in detail is 
likely to do more harm than good. We therefore leave the question of verbal 
characterization of the claimed designs to the discretion of trial judges, with the proviso 
that as a general matter, those courts should not treat the process of claim construction as 
requiring a detailed verbal description of the claimed design, as would typically be true 
in the case of utility patents. 
IV 
We now turn to the facts of this case. It is agreed that the general shape of the accused 
nail buffer at issue in this case is the same as that of the patented buffer design. The 
difference between the two is that the accused buffer has raised buffing pads on all four 
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sides, while the patented buffer has buffing pads on only three sides. The two closest prior 
art nail buffers before the court were the Falley nail buffer, which has a solid, rectangular 
cross section with slightly raised buffers on all sides, and the Nailco patent, which shows 
a nail buffer design having a triangular shape and a hollow cross section, and in which 
raised buffing pads are located on all three sides. The four nail buffers are pictured below: 
 
The question before this court under the standard we have set forth above is whether 
an ordinary observer, familiar with the prior art Falley and Nailco designs, would be 
deceived into believing the Swisa buffer is the same as the patented buffer. EGI argues 
that such an observer would notice a difference between the prior art and the ’389 patent, 
consisting of “the hollow tube that is square in cross section and that has raised pads with 
exposed gaps at the corners.” . . . 
. . . 
In light of the similarity of the prior art buffers to the accused buffer, we conclude that 
no reasonable fact-finder could find that EGI met its burden of showing, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that an ordinary observer, taking into account the prior 
art, would believe the accused design to be the same as the patented design. In concluding 
that a reasonable fact-finder could not find infringement in this case, we reach the same 
conclusion that the district court reached, and for many of the same reasons. . . . 
. . . The panel wrote: “The Swisa buffers have raised, abrasive pads on all four sides. 
When considering the prior art in the nail buffer field, this difference between the accused 
design and the patented design cannot be considered minor.” That point captures the 
essence of the rationale of our decision today, even though the panel decision employed 
a different analytical approach. For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the district court’s 
entry of summary judgment of no infringement . . . . 
Context & Application 
1. Egyptian Goddess creates a two-part framework for analyzing claims of design 
patent infringement. First, the claimed design and the accused design must be compared. 
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If the designs are “sufficiently distinct that it will be clear without more that the patentee 
has not met its burden of proving the two designs would appear ‘substantially the same’ 
to the ordinary observer,” 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008), then there is no infringement. 
We might think of this first step as setting forth the “presumptive scope” of a design 
patent. Second, if the designs are “not plainly dissimilar,” the prior art may be used to 
narrow the presumptive scope of the patent. See id.  
Note that this is a one-way ratchet—the prior art can only be used to narrow the 
presumptive scope of a design patent, not to expand it. See Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. 
Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[C]omparing the claimed and accused 
designs with the prior art is beneficial only when the claimed and accused designs are not 
plainly dissimilar”) (emphasis added). How does this work in practice? An example 
might help. Here is the asserted design patent and accused product from Snap-On Inc. v. 
Harbor Freight Tools USA, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-01265, 2017 WL 44833 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 4, 2017):  
 
Remember, everything shown in solid lines is part of the claimed design. So this design 
patent covers the entire shape of the product. Considered in the abstract, these designs 
might not seem plainly dissimilar. But when viewed in light of the prior art, a number of 
visual differences between the claimed design (top left) and accused design (bottom right) 
become apparent: 
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See id. at *4. The court concluded that the patent owner was not likely to succeed on the 
merits and denied the patent owner’s motion for a preliminary injunction. 
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2. Notice that, in design patent law, there is no distinction between literal 
infringement and infringement by equivalents. There’s just Egyptian Goddess. Does that 
makes sense, given how design patents are claimed? Do the reasons that support the 
doctrine of equivalents for utility patents apply to designs? See, e.g. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 734 (2002) (“The doctrine of equivalents is 
premised on language’s inability to capture the essence of innovation . . . .”). 
3. The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit say that infringement must be 
analyzed from the perspective of an “ordinary observer.” Who is the ordinary observer? 
In Egyptian Goddess, the court uses the term as a synonym for “purchaser” more 
specifically, a “purchaser familiar with the prior art.” Additionally, as Egyptian Goddess 
makes clear, the ordinary observer is a hypothetical person, like the reasonable person in 
torts. So patent owners cannot prove similarity by going out and surveying purchasers. 
Instead, as a practical matter, the factfinder (the judge or the jury) sits in for the ordinary 
observer:  
Nothing in Gorham suggests that, in finding design patent infringement, a trier of 
fact may not as a matter of law rely exclusively or primarily on a visual comparison 
of the patented design, as well as the device that embodies the design, and the 
accused device’s design. It is true that in Gorham, the U.S. Supreme Court found 
design patent infringement and in doing so relied in part on empirical and 
testimonial evidence that ordinary observers would be likely to mistake one 
product for another. However, in Gorham, the Supreme Court did not state, or 
suggest, that a panel of jurors was anything other than a panel of ordinary 
observers capable of making a factual determination as to whether they would be 
deceived by an accused device’s design similarity to a patented design. Simply 
put, a jury, comprised of a sampling of ordinary observers, does not necessarily 
require empirical evidence as to whether ordinary observers would be deceived 
by an accused device’s design. 
Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 821–22 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Therefore, if there 
is prior art that could narrow the presumptive scope of the design patent at Egyptian 
Goddess step two, the accused infringer needs to be sure to get any such prior art admitted 
into evidence. 
4. One major issue in Egyptian Goddess was claim construction. What does the en banc 
Federal Circuit allow district courts to do with respect to claim construction? What does 
it advise them to do? 
5. One thing that Egyptian Goddess says district judges can do in claim construction is 
“distinguish[] between those features of the claimed design that are ornamental and those 
that are purely functional,” citing OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1405 
 CHAPTER 12  
550 
(Fed. Cir. 1997). Would making such distinctions actually be helpful to the jury under the 
test articulated in Egyptian Goddess? Would you expect “functional” features (however 
that term is defined) to already exist in the prior art? We already know that design patents 
protect how something looks, not what it does. So even if “functional” (however that term 
is defined) features are included in the claim scope, they would not protect any function 
qua function. What useful purpose—if any—could this OddzOn-style claim construction 
serve, post-Egyptian Goddess? 
6. How close is too close under Egyptian Goddess? In Lin v. Belkin International, Inc., 
the plaintiff alleged that this USB cable infringed this design patent:  
  
 
The court granted summary judgment of noninfringement. Based on its own visual 
review, the court found that the designs were so “sufficiently distinct and plainly 
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dissimilar . . . that no reasonable jury could find the two designs to be substantially the 
same.” Lin v. Belkin Int’l, Inc., No. 8:16-cv-00628, 2017 WL 2903261, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 
2017). 
In Wallace v. Ideavillage Products Corp., the plaintiff alleged that this spinning brush 
infringed this design patent: 
 
 
The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment of 
noninfringement, concluding, upon visual review, that the designs were “sufficiently 
distinct” and that the plaintiff could not, “as a matter of law, prove that the designs appear 
substantially the same.” Wallace v. Ideavillage Prods. Corp., No. 2:06-cv-05673, 2014 WL 
4637216, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2014), aff’d, 640 F. App’x 970, 972 (Fed. Cir. 2016).  
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In Performance Designed Products LLC v. Mad Catz, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that this 
video game controller infringed this design patent: 
 
 
The judge dismissed the claim with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), concluding that these designs were so “plainly dissimilar” under Egyptian 
Goddess that any attempt to amend the claim would be “futile.” Performance Designed Prods. 
LLC v. Mad Catz, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00629, 2016 WL 3552063, at *6-7 (S.D. Cal. June 29, 2016). 
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In Boost Oxygen, LLC v. Oxygen Plus, Inc., No. 0:17-cv-05004, 2020 WL 4582253, at *6 
(D. Minn. Aug. 10, 2020), the court ruled that this accused product was plainly dissimilar 
from this patented design: 
 
By contrast, in C&A Mktg., Inc. v. GoPro, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-07854, 2016 WL 1626018, at 
*1 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2016), the court ruled that these designs were not plainly dissimilar:  
  
To be clear: A finding that an accused design is “not plainly dissimilar” is not the same as 
a finding of infringement. Even if the designs are not plainly dissimilar, there is still a 
second step of the Egyptian Goddess test. At step two, the accused infringer can introduce 
evidence of prior art designs to narrow the presumptive scope of the asserted patent. And 
the designs still must look the same to the ordinary observer. See Sarah Burstein, Intelligent 
Design & Egyptian Goddess: A Response to Professors Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, 68 DUKE 
L.J. ONLINE 94 (2019). 
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And courts sometimes give—or allow juries to give—design patents a broader scope. 
The most notable outlier when it comes to scope may be Apple v. Samsung, where the jury 
found that this design patent for a graphical user interface was infringed by various 
devices, including this one: 
            
See Amended Verdict Form at 7, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 5:11-cv-01846 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 24, 2012), ECF 1931. See also Expert Report Of Susan Kare at 10, 32, Apple Inc. v. 
Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 5:11-cv-01846 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2012), ECF 927-25 ( illustrations). 
Is the jury’s verdict consistent with the other examples you’ve seen in this chapter? 
Samsung did not seek summary judgment of noninfringement on this and similar claims. 
See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 5:11-cv-01846, 2012 WL 2571719, at *20 (N.D. Cal. 
June 30, 2012). Should it have done so? Should design patents be construed this broadly? 
B. Novelty & Nonobviousness 
Like other types of inventions, a design must be novel and nonobvious to be 
patentable. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103. Some commentators have described these as difficult 
hurdles for designs to satisfy. See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller & Daniel Harris Brean, 
Overcoming the “Impossible Issue” of Nonobviousness in Design Patents, 99 KY. L.J. 419, 434 
(2011) (calling nonobviousness a “substantial hurdle” for designers); UMA SUTHERSANEN, 
DESIGN LAW: EUROPEAN UNION AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 10.1, at 210 (2d ed. 
2010) (stating that U.S. design patent law uses “a high standard of novelty”). As you read 
the cases that follow, think about whether you agree with these assessments. 
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High Point Design LLC v. Buyers Direct, Inc. 
730 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
SCHALL, Circuit Judge. 
Buyer’s Direct, Inc. (“BDI”) appeals from a final judgment of the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York holding BDI’s asserted design patent invalid 
on summary judgment and also dismissing BDI’s trade dress claims with prejudice. For 
the reasons set forth below, we reverse the grant of summary judgment of invalidity . . . 
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Background 
I 
BDI is the owner of U.S. Design Patent No. D598,183 (the “’183 patent”) and the 
manufacturer of slippers known as SNOOZIES®. An exemplary pair of SNOOZIES® 
slippers is shown below: 
 
The ’183 patent recites one claim, for “the ornamental design for a slipper, as shown 
and described.” [One] of the drawings included in the ′183 patent [is] shown below: 
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As additional design features, the ’183 patent discloses two different soles: a smooth 
bottom (as shown in Figure 8) and a sole with two groups of raised dots (as shown in 
Figure 7): 
 
BDI alleges that SNOOZIES® are an embodiment of the design disclosed in the ’183 
patent. 
II 
High Point Design LLC (“High Point”) manufactures and distributes the accused 
FUZZY BABBA® slippers, which are sold through various retailers, including appellees 
Meijer, Inc., Sears Holdings Corporation, and WalMart Stores, Inc. (collectively, the 
“Retail Entities”). An exemplary pair of FUZZY BABBA® slippers is shown below: 
 
On June 22, 2011, after becoming aware of the manufacturing and sale of FUZZY 
BABBA® slippers, BDI sent High Point a cease and desist letter, in which BDI asserted 
infringement of the ’183 patent. With a responsive letter sent on July 6, 2011, High Point 
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included a copy of a complaint for declaratory judgment that it had filed five days earlier 
in federal district court. In the complaint, High Point alleged (1) that the manufacturing 
and sale of FUZZY BABBA® slippers did not infringe the ’183 patent and (2) that the ’183 
patent is invalid and/or unenforceable. 
In its answer to High Point’s declaratory judgment complaint, filed on December 29, 
2011, BDI lodged counterclaims for infringement of the ’183 patent and for infringement 
of the trade dress found in BDI’s SNOOZIES® slippers. That same day, BDI filed a third-
party complaint alleging that the Retail Entities infringed the ’183 patent and infringed 
BDI’s trade dress based on sales of High Point’s FUZZY BABBA® slippers. 
III 
On May 15, 2012, the district court granted the motion for summary judgment, holding 
the ’183 patent invalid on the ground that the design claimed in it was . . . obvious in light 
of the prior art . . . . The court characterized the ’183 patent as disclosing “slippers with an 
opening for a foot that contain a fuzzy (fleece) lining and have a smooth outer surface.” 
As to the prior art, the court found that a consumer apparel company, known as Woolrich, 
had, prior to the effective filing date of the ’183 patent, sold two different models of 
footwear: the “Penta” and the “Laurel Hill” (collectively, the “Woolrich Prior Art”). The 
Penta and the Laurel Hill models are shown in photographs below: 
 
 
J.A. 486–87 (Penta.) 




J.A. 490–91 (Laurel Hill). The [district] court found that the Penta “looks indistinguishable 
from the drawing shown in the ’183 Patent,” and that the Laurel Hill, “while having 
certain differences with the Penta slipper that are insubstantial and might be referred to 
as streamlining, nonetheless has the precise look that an ordinary observer would think 
of as a physical embodiment of the drawings shown on the ’183 Patent.”  
The district court also identified two secondary references—U.S. Design Patent Nos. 
D566,934 and D540,517 (collectively, the “Secondary References”)—that disclose “slippers 
with a pattern of small dots on the bottom surface.” Representative drawings from the 
Secondary References are shown below: 
 
U.S. Design Patent No. D566,934 fig. 1. 
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U.S. Design Patent No. D540,517 fig. 1. Based on these findings, the court concluded that 
the design in the ’183 patent was invalid as obvious: 
The overall visual effect created by the Woolrich prior art is the same overall visual 
effect created by the ′183 patent. To an ordinary observer, they are the same 
slippers. The only difference between the slippers relates to the sole of the slippers, 
which is quite minor in the context of the overall slipper. Even if, however, this 
Court were to find that the differences in the sole design were of any note, the 
design of the dots on the ’183 patent are anticipated by the dots on the Secondary 
References. 
Since both of those design patents were noted on the face of the ’183 patent, and 
since both relate to slippers, they would have been available to a slipper designer 
skilled in the art—and would have easily suggested the addition of “dots” to the 
sole of a slipper. Combining the dots shown on those two design patents with the 
prior art in the Woolrich slipper would have been obvious to any designer. That 
combination would have created a slipper with a virtually identical visual 
impression as the ’183 patent. 
Discussion 
On appeal, BDI challenges both the grant of summary judgment of invalidity . . . . This 
court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment under the law of the regional 
circuit. The Second Circuit reviews a grant of summary judgment without deference, 
construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and drawing all 
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Summary judgment may only be granted when 
no “reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”  




When assessing the potential obviousness of a design patent, a finder of fact employs 
two distinct steps: first, “one must find a single reference, a something in existence, the 
design characteristics of which are basically the same as the claimed design”; second, 
“once this primary reference is found, other references may be used to modify it to create 
a design that has the same overall visual appearance as the claimed design.” Durling v. 
Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted); see 
also Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
Under the first step, a court must both “(1) discern the correct visual impression 
created by the patented design as a whole; and (2) determine whether there is a single 
reference that creates ‘basically the same’ visual impression.” Durling, 101 F.3d at 103. The 
ultimate inquiry in an obviousness analysis is “whether the claimed design would have 
been obvious to a designer of ordinary skill who designs articles of the type involved.”  
B 
BDI asserts that the district court erred by using the Woolrich Prior Art as primary 
references because their design characteristics are not “basically the same as the claimed 
design,” as required under the first step set forth in Durling. Specifically, BDI relies on the 
Rake Declaration to argue that various design features distinguish the ’183 patent from 
the Woolrich Prior Art, including differences in (1) the fleece collars, (2) the height of the 
sidewalls, and (3) the thickness of the soles. According to BDI, these alleged differences 
create genuine issues of material facts as to whether the Woolrich Prior Art can properly 
serve as primary references. 
Next, BDI asserts that the district court identified no motivation to modify the 
Woolrich Prior Art to achieve the “same overall visual appearance as the claimed design,” 
as required under the second step set forth in Durling. According to BDI, the court erred 
by ignoring the design features that distinguish the ′183 patent from the Woolrich Prior 
Art, and finding that the only differences relate to the soles. 
BDI also argues that the district court failed to perform a proper obviousness analysis. 
First, BDI asserts that the court erred by applying an “ordinary observer” standard, 
because this court’s case law requires application of an “ordinary designer” standard in 
an obviousness analysis relating to a design patent. Second, BDI argues that the district 
court failed to properly communicate its reasoning in either step of the obviousness 
analysis. Finally, BDI asserts that the court erred by not addressing secondary 
considerations, including copying and commercial sales. 
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In response, High Point and the Retail Entities (collectively, the “Appellees”) assert 
that either the Penta or the Laurel Hill could act as the primary reference for the 
obviousness analysis because they are both “basically the same as the claimed design,” 
which, according to the Appellees, is all that is required under the first step. The Appellees 
assert that BDI seeks to apply a “virtual identity” standard in the first step, rather than the 
proper standard, which allows for minor differences. According to the Appellees, under 
this court’s case law, a district court can assess the “overall visual appearance,” as 
required by the second step under Durling, without expert testimony and “almost 
instinctively.” 
The Appellees also argue that the district court properly discounted the Rake 
Declaration because obviousness should be assessed from the vantage point of the 
ordinary observer, not an ordinary designer such as Mr. Rake. According to the Appellees, 
the district court properly applied the ordinary observer standard to find obviousness 
based on the combination of either the Penta or the Laurel Hill with the Secondary 
References. 
As to secondary considerations, the Appellees argue that BDI failed to show the nexus 
necessary to demonstrate that either the alleged copying or the commercial sale of 
SNOOZIES® support the nonobviousness of the ′183 patent. Specifically, the Appellees 
assert that BDI has not established that SNOOZIES® actually embody the ’183 patent, as 
is necessary to support BDI’s nonobviousness arguments. 
C 
We first address the standard applied by the district court here. The use of an 
“ordinary observer” standard to assess the potential obviousness of a design patent runs 
contrary to the precedent of this court and our predecessor court, under which the 
obviousness of a design patent must, instead, be assessed from the viewpoint of an 
ordinary designer. Given this precedent, the district court erred in applying the ordinary 
observer standard to assess the obviousness of the design patent at issue. 
Although obviousness is assessed from the vantage point of an ordinary designer in 
the art, “an expert’s opinion on the legal conclusion of obviousness is neither necessary 
nor controlling.” That said, an expert’s opinion may be relevant to the factual aspects of 
the analysis leading to that legal conclusion. For that reason, the district court erred by 
categorically disregarding the Rake Declaration.  
We now turn to what we conclude were additional errors in the district court’s 
application of the two-step analysis set forth in Durling. As to the first part of the first 
step—”discerning the correct visual impression created by the patented design as a 
whole”—the district court erred by failing to translate the design of the ’183 patent into a 
verbal description. See Durling, 101 F.3d at 103 (“From this translation, the parties and 
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appellate courts can discern the internal reasoning employed by the trial court to reach its 
decision as to whether or not a prior art design is basically the same as the claimed 
design.”). The closest to the necessary description was the court’s comment characterizing 
the design in the ’183 patent as “slippers with an opening for a foot that can contain a 
fuzzy (fleece) lining and have a smooth outer surface.” This, however, represents “too 
high a level of abstraction” by failing to focus “on the distinctive visual appearances of 
the reference and the claimed design.” On remand, the district court should add sufficient 
detail to its verbal description of the claimed design to evoke a visual image consonant 
with that design.  
As to the second part of the first step—”determining whether there is a single 
reference that creates ‘basically the same’ visual impression”—the court erred by failing 
to provide its reasoning, as required under this court’s precedent. Absent such reasoning, 
we cannot discern how the district court concluded that the Woolrich Prior Art was 
“basically the same as the claimed design,” so that either design could act as a primary 
reference. On remand, the district court should do a side-by-side comparison of the two 
designs to determine if they create the same visual impression. See, e.g., Apple, 678 F.3d at 
1330 (comparing images of the claimed design to images of the asserted primary 
references). In addition, based on the record before us, there appear to be genuine issues 
of material fact as to whether the Woolrich Prior Art are, in fact, proper primary 
references. For this additional reason, summary judgment must be reversed.  
To the extent that the obviousness of the ’183 patent remains at issue on remand, the 
district court will, after properly completing the first step under Durling, be in a better 
position to assess whether or not  the Woolrich Prior Art, modified by the Secondary 
References, provide a design with the “same overall visual appearance as the claimed 
design,” as required under the second step of Durling.3 
3 Having setting forth the proper framework for the obviousness analysis, we take 
no position on whether the district court could or should find obviousness under 
the proper standard. 
Finally, we turn to secondary considerations, which the district court did not address 
in the Final Decision. This court has held that “evidence rising out of the so-called 
‘secondary considerations’ must always when present be considered en route to a 
determination of obviousness.” Here, BDI alleged both commercial success of the claimed 
design as well as copying. To the extent that the obviousness of the ’183 patent remains at 
issue on remand, the district court should address any evidence of secondary 
considerations.  
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the grant of summary judgment of obviousness 
and remand the case to the district court. 
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Context & Application 
1. What test does the Federal Circuit use to evaluate whether or not a claimed design 
is obvious? Is that test consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR Int’l Co. v. 
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007)? 
2. The “primary reference” is sometimes called a “Rosen reference.” In In re Rosen, 
the C.C.P.A. held that “there must be a reference, a something in existence, the design 
characteristics of which are basically the same as the claimed design in order to support a 
holding of obviousness.” 673 F.2d 388, 391 (C.C.P.A. 1982). This reference is required 
“whether the holding is based on the basic reference alone or on the basic reference in 
view of modifications suggested by secondary references.” Id. 
3. Once a proper primary reference is identified, “other references may be used to 
modify it to create a design that has the same overall visual appearance as the claimed 
design.” Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir. 1996). But 
“secondary references may only be used to modify the primary reference if they are so 
related to the primary reference that the appearance of certain ornamental features in one 
would suggest the application of those features to the other.” Id. What does that mean? 
The case law is less than clear. And in light of the high standard of visual similarity the 
Federal Circuit requires for primary references, few cases reach this second step at all. For 
more on these issues, see Sarah Burstein, Visual Invention, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 169, 
214 (2012). 
4. The court states in High Point that in the design patent context, just like the utility 
patent context, “evidence rising out of the so-called ‘secondary considerations’ must 
always when present be considered en route to a determination of obviousness.” Are 
these considerations a good fit for designs? Do you think that evidence of, say, commercial 
success or copying are relevant to the question of whether a claimed design would have 
been obvious to an ordinary designer? 
5. In High Point, the Federal Circuit rules that “the district court erred by failing to 
translate the design of the ’183 patent into a verbal description,” citing Durling v. Spectrum 
Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 102 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Is requiring a detailed verbal description 
of a design when analyzing obviousness consistent with what the Federal Circuit said 
about the perils of verbal claim construction in Egyptian Goddess? The Federal Circuit 
addressed this issue in a footnote: 
This court has required that in determining obviousness, a district court must 
attempt to “translate the visual descriptions into words” in order to communicate 
the reasoning behind the court’s decision and to enable “the parties and appellate 
courts to discern the internal reasoning employed by the trial court.” Durling v. 
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Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 102 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Requiring such an 
explanation of a legal ruling as to invalidity is quite different from requiring an 
elaborate verbal claim construction to guide the finder of fact in conducting the 
infringement inquiry. 
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 679 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). Do you 
find this distinction persuasive?  
High Point Design LLC v. Buyers Direct, Inc. 
621 F. App’x 632  (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
CHEN, Circuit Judge.  
This is the second time this case has been appealed to our court. In High Point Design 
LLC v. Buyers Direct, Inc., 730 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“High Point I”), we reversed the . 
. . grant of summary judgment of invalidity of the design patent belonging to Buyers 
Direct, Inc. (BDI). . . . 
On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment, finding that: (1) the 
asserted patent was anticipated; (2) the accused products did not infringe; . . . .   
BDI challenges each of these determinations on appeal. For the reasons set forth below, 
we reverse summary judgment of invalidity [and] affirm summary judgment of non-
infringement . . . . 
I 
The background of the case is set forth in High Point I . . . . We recount below only the 
facts pertinent to the issues on appeal. 
BDI owns a design patent for the ornamental appearance of a fuzzy slipper, U.S. 
Patent No. D598,183 (the D’183 patent). The D’183 patent is entitled “Slipper,” and recites 
one claim for “the ornamental design for a slipper, as shown and described” in eight 
figures. . . . 
The claimed design discloses two embodiments for the slipper soles. One embodiment 
has a sole with two groups of raised dots, and the other has a sole with a smooth bottom. 
BDI manufactures a slipper called the SNOOZIE® (Snoozie), which it contends is an 
embodiment of the design disclosed in the D’183 patent. . . . 
High Point Design LLC (High Point) manufactures and distributes the accused 
FUZZY BABBA® slipper (Fuzzy Babba). . . . 
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D 
On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment of invalidity. This 
time the district court found that the D’183 patent was anticipated by the Woolrich Prior 
Art. The district court offered the following description of the claimed design in support 
of its decision: 
To an ordinary observer, the ’183 Patent is the design of a slipper with a formed 
body, a protrusion of fuzz or fluff, and a sole with some solidity. The outside of 
the slipper appears durable and looks to be made of a relatively tough material; 
the inside looks soft, plush, and made of a warm material. The sole appears to be 
fairly thick and looks sturdy. 
Addressing each of the prior art designs in turn, the district court first determined that 
the Laurel Hill anticipated because it also had “a structured body, a soft-looking fluff 
surrounding the opening of the slipper, and a sole that appears durable and fairly thick.” 
The district court then found that the Penta also anticipated, concluding that the Penta 
was even more similar to the D’183 patent than the Laurel Hill. The court found that the 
Penta “conveys the visual effect of a slipper, the body and sole of which have some 
defined shape and solidity but which has a protrusion of fluff or fuzz emanating from the 
foot opening.” Although the district court noted that a close study of the patented and 
prior art designs revealed differences, those differences were “minor” and insufficient to 
defeat anticipation.  
The district court also ruled in favor of High Point on grounds that the Fuzzy Babba 
slipper did not infringe the patented design. In particular, the district court found: 
The Fuzzy Babba conveys the visual effect of an entirely soft and malleable body 
with an indistinguishable sole; it is soft and malleable all around. In contrast, the 
visual effect of the ’183 Patent is of a formed body and sole with some solidity; and 
a body distinct from the sole. 
II 
A 
We turn first to the district court’s grant of summary judgment on anticipation. 
Design patents are presumed to be valid. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a). A party seeking to 
invalidate a patent on the basis of anticipation must do so by clear and convincing 
evidence. Design patent anticipation requires a showing that a single prior art reference 
is “identical in all material respects” to the claimed invention. In other words, the two 
designs must be substantially the same. Two designs are substantially the same “if the 
resemblance is such as to deceive an ordinary observer, inducing him to purchase one 
supposing it to be the other.” Anticipation is a question of fact. Summary judgment is 
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proper only when the evidence underlying anticipation is clear and convincing such that 
no reasonable fact-finder could find otherwise.  
Viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party—BDI—we 
conclude that a reasonable jury could have found there was not clear and convincing 
evidence of anticipation. 
In High Point I, we instructed that on remand, the district court should “add sufficient 
detail to its verbal description of the claimed design to evoke a visual image consonant 
with the claimed design.” We also instructed that the district court should perform a side-
by-side comparison of the claimed and prior art designs as part of the proper obviousness 
determination. Notably, we cautioned that there appeared to be “genuine issues of 
material fact as to whether the Woolrich Prior Art are, in fact, proper primary references” 
for obviousness purposes under 35 U.S.C. § 103.  
On remand, the district court did not perform a side-by-side comparison, but 
concluded that the claimed and prior art designs share the “same characteristics” because 
they share “a structured body, a soft-looking fluff surrounding the opening of the slipper, 
and a sole that appears durable and fairly thick.”  
We find again that the district court fundamentally erred in its analysis by analyzing 
the designs from “too high a level of abstraction” and failing to focus “on the distinctive 
visual appearances of the reference and the claimed design.” Specifically, the court’s 
description does little more than point out the main concepts of the claimed design: a 
structured slipper having fuzzy material at the foot opening. In doing so, the court failed 
to properly consider the ornamental aspects of the designs at issue. There are numerous 
such features in the body, the fuzzy material, and the sole of the designs, all of which were 
overlooked in the district court’s analysis. 
For example, there are meaningful differences between the curvatures of the slipper 
body designs. The body of the patented design has a distinct ‘S’ curve between the foot 
opening and the front of the slipper as viewed from the side, which ends in a downward 
slope toward the front of the body. By contrast, the Laurel Hill has a prominent upward 
curve near the front. The Penta is also different because it has a noticeably flatter, more 
even slope from the foot opening towards the front. 
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There are also clear differences between the protruding fuzz of the claimed and prior 
art designs. In particular, the Woolrich Prior Art appears to differ from the claims in that 
both prior art slippers have a pronounced fleece overlap oriented outward and which 
obscures the top edge of the foot opening. By contrast, no such overlap is visible in the 
patented design. 
We also find that the district court failed to take into consideration the substantial 
differences between the ornamental aspects of the soles of the claimed design and the 
prior art designs. As we stated in Contessa Food Prods., Inc. v. Conagra, Inc., “our precedent 
makes clear that all of the ornamental features illustrated in the figures must be 
considered in evaluating design patent infringement.” 282 F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
The district court did not address the ornamental aspects of the soles in the Remand 
Order, but stated in the 2012 Order that “the only difference between the slippers relates 
to the sole of the slippers, which is quite minor in the context of the overall slipper.” We 
disagree. There are unmistakable differences between the sole design of the D’183 patent 
and the Woolrich Prior Art. The patent claims one embodiment, shown in Figure 7, where 
the sole has dots. Those dots are arranged in a uniformly spaced pattern of rows and 
columns in two separate groups. One group is positioned closer to the front of the slipper, 
and narrows slightly toward the toe area. The other group is placed closer to the rear, and 
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has a corresponding taper toward the rear area. The other embodiment, shown in Figure 
8, has a smooth sole. Neither of the Woolrich Prior Art designs has either of these design 
components. 
The prior art designs instead each have their own distinct ornamental designs. The 
Laurel Hill sole has embedded within it images of four trees and two moose. The Laurel 
Hill also has a grooved border not present in the claimed design. The Penta sole has a 
large “WOOLRICH” image imprinted thereon and is also decorated with a distinct 
pattern. Like the Laurel Hill—but unlike the claimed design—the Penta also has a grooved 
border. 
As we cautioned in High Point I, there appeared to be genuine issues of material fact 
regarding whether the Woolrich Prior Art properly served as base references under this 
court’s obviousness law. We now similarly hold that the evidence is not so clear and 
convincing such that a reasonable fact-finder could not find for BDI on anticipation. For 
these reasons, we reverse summary judgment of invalidity. 
B 
We turn next to the district court’s grant of summary judgment of non-infringement. 
Infringement is a question of fact and must be proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Summary judgment of non-infringement is appropriate when no reasonable 
fact-finder could find the accused design substantially similar to the claimed design.  
Infringement of design patents is judged by the same test as anticipation—whether 
two designs are “substantially the same.” See Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 678 (adopting 
test set forth in Gorham, 81 U.S. at 528 as sole test for design patent infringement). Under 
Egyptian Goddess, where the claimed and accused designs are “sufficiently distinct” and 
“plainly dissimilar,” the patentee does not meet its burden of proving infringement. Only 
if the claimed and accused designs are not plainly dissimilar does the inquiry potentially 
benefit from comparison of the claimed and the accused designs . . . with the prior art. We 
agree with the district court that it is not necessary to resort to a comparison with the prior 
art in ruling on infringement here. 
The district court conducted a side-by-side comparison between the claimed design 
and the accused Fuzzy Babba slippers, and concluded that “the Fuzzy Babba’s appearance 
evokes a soft, gentle image, while the D’183 patent appears robust and durable.” Finding 
that a consumer would not confuse the two designs, the court then granted summary 
judgment of non-infringement.  
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We conclude that the patented and accused designs bring to mind different 
impressions. The Fuzzy Babba design appears soft and formless, whereas the claimed 
design appears structured and formed. These differences are reflected in the ornamental 
aspects of each of the designs. For example, the side profile of the Fuzzy Babba shows a 
relatively smooth, downward slope from the rear toward the front area of the slipper. By 
contrast, the D’183 patent design has a relatively defined, curved opening that is lower in 
the middle and higher at the edges. Further, the Fuzzy Babba has a relatively straight rear 
line, whereas the rear of claimed design bulges outward. The front areas of the two 
designs are also substantially dissimilar. The Fuzzy Babba has a relatively flatly sloping 
side profile, whereas the patented design has a curved profile, roughly following in an ‘S’ 
curve shape. 
As we did with respect to invalidity, we also find that there are meaningful differences 
in the soles which affect the overall visual effect of the two designs. Unlike the D’183 
patent design, the Fuzzy has a continuous distribution of dots throughout almost the 
entire length of the sole. These dots are of a constant width and in one group, in contrast 
to the varying width of dot columns displayed in Figure 7, and in further contrast to the 
embodiment in Figure 8 that has a smooth sole and no dots. 
We recognize that both designs essentially consist of a slipper with a fuzzy portion 
extending upward out of the foot opening. Such high-level similarities, however, are not 
sufficient to demonstrate infringement. 
BDI also argues that the district court erred by not performing a comparison of the 
accused Fuzzy Babba slipper to BDI’s alleged commercial embodiment, the Snoozie. We 
have long-cautioned that it is generally improper to determine infringement by 
comparing an accused product with the patentee’s purported commercial embodiment.  
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If a patentee is able to show that there is no substantial difference between the claimed 
design and the purported commercial embodiment, a comparison between that 
embodiment and the accused design is permissible. Contrary to BDI’s suggestion, 
however, we have never mandated such comparisons and decline to do so here. The 
proper test for infringement is performed by measuring the accused products against the 
claimed design.  
BDI also argues that the district court erred by failing to take into account how the 
accused products appeared as worn. We disagree. Even as worn, there are meaningful 
differences in the visual impression between the two designs. The Fuzzy Babba lacks the 
distinctive ‘S’ curve of the front area visible in Figure 4 of the claimed design. Moreover, 
the protrusion of fuzz in the Fuzzy Babba remains thicker toward the back then toward 
the front of the foot opening. And critically, there remain the aforementioned differences 
in the soles of the two designs. 
For all these reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment of non-
infringement. 
Context & Application 
1. What is the Federal Circuit’s test for anticipation of a design patent? Is it an easy 
standard for a challenger to meet?  
2.  When can a patentee’s commercial embodiment be used in the infringement 
inquiry? Who has the burden of proving that a product is, in fact, a commercial 
embodiment of a claimed design? 
3. In High Point, the court mentioned that the patent-in-suit “disclose[d] two 
embodiments for the slipper soles.” Although a design patent can only have one claim, 
“[m]ore than one embodiment of a design may be protected by a single claim. However, 
such embodiments may be presented only if they involve a single inventive concept 
according to the nonstatutory double patenting practice for designs.” MPEP § 1504.05 
(citing In re Rubinfield, 270 F.2d 391 (C.C.P.A. 1959)). What does it mean to have the same 
inventive concept? To be a different “embodiment” of the same “design”? It’s not clear. 
In practice, some attorneys report that it’s really a matter of what you can “get past the 
examiner.” But overaggressive embodiment claiming is a risky strategy, because the 
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel also applies to design patents. See Pac. Coast 
Marine Windshields Ltd. v. Malibu Boats, LLC, 739 F.3d 694, 697 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
4. In general, claiming using drawings is considered to be superior to claiming using 
photographs because the scope is generally broader. But is it true that line drawings are 
superior for every type of product? In this case, BDI’s product arguably looked more like 
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the accused design than its patent drawings did. Would BDI have been better off if it had 
claimed its slipper design using photographs? Are there any other types of products that 
might be better depicted using photographs than using line drawings? 
5. In High Point, the Federal Circuit also reversed the district court’s determination 
that the claimed design was invalid for lack of ornamentality. See 730 F.3d 1301, 1317 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013). We’ll learn more about that requirement—and how the Federal Circuit has 
interpreted it—in the next section. 
C. Ornamentality 
Since 1902, the design patent statute has expressly required that a patentable design 
be “ornamental.” What does that word mean to you? “Decorative”? “Beautiful”? In this 
section, we’ll explore how the Federal Circuit has interpreted this requirement. The 
answer may surprise you.  
But first, let’s look at how the C.C.P.A. interpreted the statutory requirement of 
ornamentality. In the case that follows, the C.C.P.A. considered the rejection of a design 
patent application for the following design for a gasket: 
 
 CHAPTER 12  
572 
In re Carletti 
328 F.2d 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1964) 
RICH, Judge.  
This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the 
rejection of the claim in an application for a design patent, serial No. 56,122, filed May 28, 
1959, for  [a] “GASKET.” 
. . . 
[T]he functionality of the elements asserted to distinguish the design from the prior 
art—as distinguished from the obviousness of those features—was a ground, if not a 
principle ground, of rejection. The Patent Office Solicitor’s brief takes the same position. 
While it cannot be said that the Patent Office has made out an iron-clad case of the 
functionality of the features relied on for patentability, more than a good case has been 
made out and the appellants have failed to refute it. In the first place we have in the record 
the military specification covering this gasket, MILP-40068, 9 June 1959, containing 
engineering drawings in great detail, specifying the exact position, dimensions, and 
tolerances of the grooves and ribs etc., without the slightest suggestion that they serve in 
any way as ornamentation. . . . 
The record further shows such drums to be the common 55 gal. drums and the gasket 
to be for the threaded plug which closes the bung hole therein. 
It seems naive in the extreme to believe that anyone would try to ‘ornament’ the rubber 
gasket on the under side of the bung cap for a gasoline drum, notwithstanding the 
seriocomic legal arguments presented by counsel for the Department of the Army. 
Common sense and but a slight familiarity with the requirements of gaskets both point to 
the obvious functionality of the groove and ribs on the gasket. . . . 
The gasket at bar was standardized in a specification. This does not bespeak the 
existence of design in anything other than the sense of engineering ‘design,’ and certainly 
contraindicates the existence of the ‘ornamental design’ referred to in 35 U.S.C. § 171, 
under which a patent is here sought. 
It is clear that appellants never invented an ‘ornamental design.’ The appearance of 
appellants’ gasket seems as much dictated by functional considerations as is the 
appearance of a piece of rope, which, too, has ribs and grooves nicely arranged. The fact 
that it is attractive or pleasant to behold is not enough. Many well-constructed articles of 
manufacture whose configurations are dictated solely by function are pleasing to look 
upon, for example a hex-nut, a ball bearing, a golf club, or a fishing rod, the pleasure 
depending largely on one’s interests. But it has long been settled that when a configuration 
 DESIGNS  
573 
is the result of functional considerations only, the resulting design is not patentable as an 
ornamental design for the simple reason that it is not ‘ornamental’—was not created for 
the purpose of ornamenting. In [In re Garbo, 287 F.2d 192 (C.C.P.A. 1961)] this court said: 
It is true that a design may embody functional features and still be patentable, but 
in order to attain this legal status under these circumstances, the design must have 
an unobvious appearance, distinct from that dictated solely by functional 
considerations. 
That is the principle which is believed to apply here. 
Neither does it suffice to argue, as appellants do, that the ribs and grooves could have 
been less gracefully arranged than they are in their actual ‘balanced relationship.’ If 
obviousness enters into this case, it is at this point. If it is desired to employ a groove for 
flexibility and three concentric ribs to make a good seal on a flat drum head, what is more 
obvious than to arrange them with approximately equal spacing, as was done? But it was 
done without thought of ornament. The creation or origination of an ornamental design 
does not reside in the mere avoidance of dissymmetry. 
For the foregoing reasons the decision is affirmed. 
Context & Application 
1. How does the C.C.P.A. interpret the statutory term “ornamental” in Carletti? Does 
the court look to the product (what the designer did) or the process (the result of that 
process)? Is this an objective or a subjective standard—that is, does the court analyze the 
issue from the perspective of an ordinary designer or do they focus on the actions and 
motivations of the actual designer? Does the C.C.P.A.’s interpretation seem faithful to the 
text of the statute? Does it seem like good policy? 
2.  Recall that, in its first decision, the Federal Circuit adopted the holdings of the 
C.C.P.A. as precedents. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en 
banc). As you read the cases that follow, think about whether they are consistent with 
Carletti.  
3.  If you have studied (or are studying) trademark law, be careful with the 
terminology in this section. The words “ornamental” and “functional” do not mean the 
same things in design patent law that they do in trademark law. See Sarah Burstein, Faux 
Amis in Design Law, 105 TRADEMARK REP. 1455 (2015).  
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In re Webb 
916 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
CLEVENGER, Circuit Judge. 
This is an appeal from a decision of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Board of 
Patent Appeals and Interferences (“Board”) affirming the final rejection of the sole claim 
of appellants’ (“Webb”) U.S. Design Patent Application Serial No. 833,470. The claim for 
“the ornamental design for a grooved femoral hip stem prosthesis as shown and 
described,” was “rejected as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 171 as being directed 
to non-statutory subject matter.” The design can be appreciated from Figure 2 of the 
application reproduced below. 
 
The Board affirmed the Examiner’s holding that the design, “clearly not intended to 
be visible in actual use,” “is not proper subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 171.” The Board’s 
decision creates a per se rule that a design for an article which will not be visible in the 
final use for which the article was created is non-statutory subject matter even if the design 
is observed at some stage of the article’s commercial life. We reverse and remand. 
I 
Hip stem prostheses of the design invented by Webb are metallic implants that are 
generally used by orthopedic surgeons to supplant the functioning of a diseased or broken 
femur, near the hip, where the femur is joined to the pelvis. According to Webb, and not 
disputed by the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), surgeons are made aware of 
differing brands and types of prostheses through advertisements in professional journals 
and through trade shows, where the prostheses themselves are displayed. 
Advertisements that were put in the record prominently and visually display the features 
of the prostheses. Furthermore, the applicant’s agent submitted that “an implant’s 
appearance is observed by potential and actual purchasers, surgeons, nurses, operating 
room staff, and other hospital personnel.” After purchase, the prosthesis is surgically 
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implanted into a patient’s body where the implant is to remain indefinitely. Neither party 
disputes that, after implantation, the prosthesis is no longer visible to the naked eye. 
II 
In the Initial Office Action, the Examiner rejected the claim “under 35 U.S.C. 171 for 
the reason that the instant article is believed to be devoid of ornamentality, as 
comprehended by the statute. Articles of this type are not only completely hidden in use, 
but are devised to satisfy purely structural and mechanical requirements as well.” The 
Examiner thus found the article to be unpatentable subject matter for two reasons: because 
it was purely functional and because it was concealed in normal use. In reply, Webb 
argued that the design was not purely functional since a “prosthetic implant could utilize 
the mechanical/utilitarian features/concepts and have a totally different visual 
appearance.” Webb also argued that the “visual appearance can certainly draw attention 
to a particular implant at a trade show or in advertising” and, therefore, the design was 
visible during normal use. 
In the Final Office Action, the Examiner stated: 
Applicant argues that, while the design is functional in nature, it is still 
ornamental. While this may be true, it has been held that articles which are hidden 
in use are not proper subject matter for design patents. 
There is not sound reason or logic for “normal use” to include the repair, service, 
replacement, sale or display of the article which incorporates the claimed design. 
While such occasions are of course “normal” in the sense of commonplace or 
routine occasions of an item's use, for patent purposes “normal use” should be 
limited to the ordinary functioning for which it was designed, not incidents in the 
article's life which are not integral to its function or purpose. Items are not 
designed for sale, display, replacement or repair. 
The Board did not address the issue of functionality of the claimed design that had been 
raised in the Examiner’s Initial Action. It affirmed the Examiner's final rejection of the 
claim as unpatentable subject matter because the article was not visible in what the Board 
considered to be its normal or intended use. 
IV 
The issuance of design patents is limited by statute to designs that are ornamental. 35 
U.S.C. § 171. Our predecessor court has affirmed the rejection of design applications that 
cannot be perceived in their normal and intended uses. For instance, the Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals affirmed the rejection of a design claim for a vent tube placed in the 
wall of a frame house, stating that “it is well-settled that patentability of a design cannot 
be based on elements which are concealed in the normal use of the device to which the 
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design is applied.” In re Cornwall, 230 F.2d 457, 459 (1956). Even earlier, that court affirmed 
the rejection of a design claim for a vacuum cleaner brush. In re Stevens, 173 F.2d 1015 
(1949). There the court noted: 
Articles which are concealed or obscure are not proper subjects for design patents, 
since their appearance cannot be a matter of concern. Almost every article is visible 
when it is made and while it is being applied to the position in which it is to be 
used. Those special circumstances, however, do not justify the granting of a design 
patent on an article such as here under consideration which is always concealed in its 
normal and intended use. 
Id. at 1016. 
We read those cases to establish a reasonable general rule that presumes the absence 
of ornamentality when an article may not be observed. This is a sound rule of thumb, but 
it is not dispositive. In each case, the inquiry must extend to whether at some point in the 
life of the article an occasion (or occasions) arises when the appearance of the article 
becomes a “matter of concern.” 
Here, we read the Board’s decision to have established a per se rule under § 171 that 
if an article is hidden from the human eye when it arrives at the final use of its functional 
life, a design upon that article cannot be ornamental. The rule in Stevens does not compel 
the Board’s decision. Instead, Stevens instructs us to decide whether the “article such as 
here under consideration”—a hip stem implant—“is always concealed in its normal and 
intended use.” The issue before us, then, is whether “normal and intended use” of these 
prosthetic devices is confined to their final use. 
V 
Although we agree that “normal and intended use” excludes the time during which 
the article is manufactured or assembled, it does not follow that evidence that an article is 
visible at other times is legally irrelevant to ascertaining whether the article is ornamental 
for purposes of § 171. Contrary to the reasoning of the Examiner in this case, articles are 
designed for sale and display, and such occasions are normal uses of an article for 
purposes of § 171. The likelihood that articles would be observed during occasions of 
display or sale could have a substantial influence on the design or ornamentality of the 
article. “The law manifestly contemplates that giving certain new and original 
appearances to a manufactured article may enhance its salable value.” Gorham Co. v. White, 
81 U.S. 511, 525 (1871). 
In short, we construe the “normal and intended use” of an article to be a period in the 
article’s life, beginning after completion of manufacture or assembly and ending with the 
ultimate destruction, loss, or disappearance of the article. Although the period includes 
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all commercial uses of the article prior to its ultimate destination, only the facts of specific 
cases will establish whether during that period the article’s design can be observed in such 
a manner as to demonstrate its ornamentality. 
It is possible, as in Stevens, that although an article may be sold as a replacement item, 
its appearance might not be of any concern to the purchaser during the process of sale. 
Indeed, many replacement items, including vacuum cleaner brushes, are sold by 
replacement or order number, or they are noticed during sale only to assess functionality. 
In such circumstances, the PTO may properly conclude that an application provides no 
evidence that there is a period in the commercial life of a particular design when its 
ornamentality may be a matter of concern. However, in other cases, the applicant may be 
able to prove to the PTO that the article's design is a “matter of concern” because of the 
nature of its visibility at some point between its manufacture or assembly and its ultimate 
use. Many commercial items, such as colorful and representational vitamin tablets, or 
caskets, have designs clearly intended to be noticed during the process of sale and equally 
clearly intended to be completely hidden from view in the final use. Here, for example, 
there was ample evidence that the features of the device were displayed in advertisements 
and in displays at trade shows. That evidence was disregarded by the Board because, in 
its view, doctors should select implants solely for their functional characteristics, not their 
design. It is not the task of the Board to make such presumptions. 
The decision of the Board is reversed and the case is remanded. 
Context & Application 
1. What was the examiner’s concern about the design claimed in Webb? Was it the 
same concern as the one that was in Carletti? If not, what does that tell us about the 
requirement of ornamentality? 
2. Who is the ordinary observer in Webb? Do you think that healthcare purchasing 
decisions work the same way today that the court describes in Webb? 
3. In Webb, the court emphasizes that the prosthetics are visible at the point of sale. 
Does that necessarily mean that the purchasers cared about what the implants look like? 
Should the “matter of concern” doctrine focus on the subjective preferences of any 
particular purchaser or should it focus on the preferences of purchasers more generally? 
In other words, if most doctors didn’t actually care what the implants looked like, should 
those appearances be deemed a “matter of concern”? Either way, what kind of evidence 
would you use to prove something was (or was not) a “matter of concern”? 
4.  Near the end of Webb, the court says: 
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Many commercial items, such as colorful and representational vitamin tablets, or 
caskets, have designs clearly intended to be noticed during the process of sale and 
equally clearly intended to be completely hidden from view in the final use. 
What assumptions is the court making here? Are those assumptions justified? Who is the 
ordinary observer of a vitamin? Of a casket? At what stage of those products’ lifecycles 
do people actually care about the appearance of those items? 
 Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp. 
94 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
LOURIE, Circuit Judge. 
Best Lock Corporation appeals from the final decision . . . in which the court held that 
Best Lock’s U.S. Design Patent 327,636 was invalid. Because the court did not clearly err 
in finding that the claimed design was functional and hence not ornamental, we affirm. 
Background 
This case involves a design patent for a key “blade.” A typical key consists of a bow, 
which allows the user to turn the key in a corresponding lock, and a blade, which is the 
portion of the key inserted into the lock’s keyway. When a key is manufactured, the key 
blade is “blank,” i.e., the blade has not been cut or “bitted” with the combination required 
to operate the corresponding lock. Although a blank key blade will not operate the lock, 
the profile of the key blade is manufactured to fit into the corresponding lock’s keyway. 
Subsequently, the blank key blade is cut to match the corresponding lock’s combination.  
In the replacement key market, a locksmith or a retail store with a key duplicating 
facility stocks blank key blades with various key profiles. The locksmith or retailer makes 
a replacement key by first selecting the appropriate blank key blade. This is done by 
matching the key blade profile with the corresponding lock keyway. Then, the locksmith 
or retailer cuts the blade of the key blank with the combination required to operate the 
lock. 
Best Lock manufactures and sells locks and keys used to maintain security at 
industrial, commercial, and institutional facilities. At these facilities, it is often feared that 
the keys used in their locks may readily be duplicated. Consequently, key and lock 
manufacturers, including Best Lock, have attempted to restrict unauthorized access to 
duplicate key blanks by obtaining utility or design patent protection on the keys. By 
obtaining patent protection, a company hopes to control the market for duplicate key 
blanks during the life of the patent. 
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Best Lock is the assignee of the two patents that were at issue before the district court, 
U.S. Patent 5,136,869 and U.S. Design Patent 327,636. The ’869 patent, entitled “High 
Security Key and Cylinder Lock Assembly,” claims an improved key blade and cylinder 
lock assembly that provides a wider key profile than standard keys and includes other 
features to deter lock picking. The ’636 patent, entitled “Portion of a Key Blade Blank,” 
claims the ornamental design for the operative portion of a key blade blank. In addition 
to the ’636 design patent, Best Lock . . . . is the assignee of 34 design patents directed to 
keyways designed to mate with the key blades claimed in Best Lock’s 34 key blade design 
patents. The ’636 patent is the only design patent at issue on appeal. 
Figures 1–5 of the ’636 design patent are shown below: 
 
Ilco manufactures duplicate and replacement key blanks for existing locks. It sells its 
replacement key blanks to locksmiths and replacement key retailers. In 1993, Ilco copied 
the design of a Best Lock key, which had a key blade shaped like the design shown in the 
’636 patent. It subsequently distributed key blanks with that key blade shape at the annual 
convention of the Associated Locksmiths of America. In response, Best sued Ilco, alleging, 
inter alia, infringement of the ’636 design patent and the ’869 utility patent. Ilco 
counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment of invalidity and noninfringement of 
both patents. 
After a ten-day bench trial, the district court held that . . . . the ‘636 design patent was 
invalid. . . . The court further found that the design patent was invalid because the shape 
of the blank key blade was dictated by its function. Best Lock appeals . . . . 
Discussion 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 171, a design patent may be granted for a “new, original and 
ornamental design for an article of manufacture.” However, if the design claimed in a 
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design patent is dictated solely by the function of the article of manufacture, the patent is 
invalid because the design is not ornamental. A design is not dictated solely by its function 
when alternative designs for the article of manufacture are available. We review for clear 
error the district court’s determination that the design claimed in the ’636 patent is 
functional. 
On appeal, Best Lock argues that the court erred in holding the ’636 design patent 
invalid as being directed solely to a functional design. As support, it asserts that although 
a particular key and its corresponding lock must mate to operate the lock, an unlimited 
number of key blade and corresponding keyway designs are available. Choice of any 
particular design is arbitrary. Thus, Best Lock maintains that the key blade blank may 
have any number of different shapes and is therefore not dictated solely by functional 
concerns. 
We disagree. The design shown in the claim of the ’636 patent is limited to a blank key 
blade as shown in Figures 1–5 of the patent. Best Lock did not claim a design for the entire 
key. The parties do not dispute that the key blade must be designed as shown in order to 
perform its intended function—to fit into its corresponding lock’s keyway. An attempt to 
create a key blade with a different design would necessarily fail because no alternative 
blank key blade would fit the corresponding lock. In fact, Best Lock admitted that no other 
shaped key blade would fit into the corresponding keyway, and it presented no evidence 
to the contrary. Therefore, we find no clear error in the court’s finding that the claimed 
key blade design was dictated solely by the key blade’s function. Any aesthetic appeal of 
the key blade design shown in the ’636 patent is the inevitable result of having a shape 
that is dictated solely by functional concerns. 
Further, Best Lock’s assertion that a variety of possible shapes of interfaces between 
keys and locks exists does not compel a different result. Clearly, different interfaces 
between key blades and corresponding lock keyways can be designed to permit the 
combination to function as a lock and key set. However, Best Lock’s patent does not claim 
the combination of a lock and corresponding key. Instead, the claim in the ‘636 design 
patent is limited to a key blade, which must be designed as shown in the ‘636 patent in 
order to perform its intended function. 
Moreover, the fact that Best Lock also has a design patent on the keyway that mates 
with the key blade shown in the ’636 patent does not alter our analysis. The existence of a 
separate patent on the keyway is irrelevant to the construction of the ’636 patent claim 
and to the ultimate determination that the claimed design is dictated solely by function. 
The validity of a patent must be evaluated based on what it claims rather than on the 
totality of the claims of multiple patents. 
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For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s finding that the claimed design is solely 
governed by functional concerns is not clearly erroneous. Consequently, we affirm its 
resulting conclusion that the ‘636 patent is invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 171 for failure to 
satisfy the statute’s ornamentality requirement. 
NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent. The design of this key blade profile meets the statutory criteria 
of design patent subject matter. . . . 
Whether the design of the D’636 patent is otherwise patentable, for example on the 
criteria of originality or non-obviousness, was not reached by the district court and is not 
before us. However, the panel majority has misapplied 35 U.S.C. § 171 in holding that the 
arbitrary design of the key profile is “functional” because it mates with its matching 
keyway. 
The design of the key profile is not removed from access to the design statute because 
the key fits a matching keyway. That two articles are designed in harmony does not 
deprive the design of access to the design patent law. The design of the key profile is not 
determined by the function of the key to fit the lock. In the case at bar there are said to be 
“thousands” of alternative key blade profiles. 
. . . The statute requires that the subject of a design patent be an ornamental design of 
a useful object. However, “ornamental” does not always mean artistic or pleasing to the 
eye. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals early recognized that “the beauty and 
ornamentation requisite in design patents is not confined to such as may be found in the 
‘aesthetic or fine arts.’” In re Koehring, 17 C.C.P.A. 774, 37 F.2d 421, 422 (1930). 
Recognizing that ornamentation is in the eye of the beholder, the courts have sought 
a more objective standard in the general rule that a design is “ornamental” for purposes 
of 35 U.S.C. § 171 when it is not primarily functional. See In re Carletti, 328 F.2d 1020 (1964). 
However, the article itself must have a utility in order for its design features to be 
patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 171. See L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 
1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“A design patent is directed to the appearance of an article of 
manufacture. An article of manufacture necessarily serves a utilitarian purpose, and the 
design of a useful article is deemed to be functional when the appearance of the claimed 
design is ‘dictated by’ the use or purpose of the article.”).  
If the design is dictated by the function performed by the article of manufacture, the 
design is not patentable. A design is “not dictated by function alone” when there are 
alternative designs or configurations available for the article of manufacture, as in the case 
before us. 
. . . 
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Courts have measured the term “ornamental” by the non-functionality that 
distinguishes the subject of a design patent from a utility patent, while recognizing that 
the design of a useful article is not insulated from the utility of the article. A review of 
patentable designs in general illustrates the mixture of functional and non-functional 
features embraced in the patented design.  
An effective design patent law must recognize the distinction between functionality 
of the article and of the particular design of the article or features thereof. See L.A. Gear, 
supra, (the sneaker tongue, moustache, delta wing, and side mesh, were useful parts of the 
sneaker, but the overall design of these features and the shoe was not dictated by function 
alone). This interaction of form and function does not remove the design from the 
statutory scope of the design patent law, or defeat the statutory patentability of a 
primarily non-functional design—although it is not always easy to draw a bright line 
between the functionality of an article and its design, as discussed by J.H. Reichman, 
Design Protection and the New Technologies: The United States Experience in a Transnational 
Perspective, 19 BALT. L.REV. 6 (1989), for design patents often appear on quite mundane 
articles of manufacture.  
The design of the key blade profile is primarily non-functional, as the Patent and 
Trademark Office recognized in granting the patent in suit. . . . 
. . . 
The parties to this litigation agree that there are myriad possible designs of key 
profiles. All keys require, of course, mating keyways. In holding that because the key must 
fit a keyway, the abstract design of the key profile is converted to one solely of function, 
the court creates an exception to design patent subject matter. An arbitrary design of a 
useful article is not statutorily excluded from § 171 simply because in use it interacts with 
an article of complementary design. Although precedent is sparse, it is contrary to this 
holding. In Motorola Inc. v. Alexander Mfg. Co., 786 F. Supp. 808 (N.D. Iowa 1991), the only 
United States case on this point of which we are aware, the court considered a design 
patent for a battery housing intended for use in a portable phone. Since the battery 
housing had to fit into the phone and a battery charger, the accused infringer argued that 
this function dictated the design. The court disagreed: 
The design of the battery housing was not dictated by the design of the battery 
charger because the charger did not exist when the housing was designed. The 
design of the phone was done concurrently with the battery housing. Therefore, 
the design of the battery housing cannot fairly be said to have been “dictated” by 
the design of the phone. 
This reasoning is equally apt in this case. The design of the key profile was not dictated 
by the design of the keyway, and indeed the two share the same arbitrary design. 
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In sum, the fact that the key blade is the mate of a keyway does not convert the 
arbitrary key profile into a primarily functional design. It is not the design of the key 
profile that is functional, but the key itself. Thus I must, respectfully, dissent from the 
ruling of the panel majority that the design of the key blade profile is not patentable 
because the key blade requires a mating keyway. 
Context & Application 
1. According to the majority, what was the problem with the design claimed in Best 
Lock? Was it a “functionality” problem (like in Carletti) or a “matter of concern” problem 
(like in Webb)? 
2. In this case, “Best Lock admitted that no other shaped key blade would fit into the 
corresponding keyway.” If Best Lock hadn’t made that admission, would (or should) the 
case have come out a different way? 
3. In her dissent, Judge Newman says that an article of manufacture “must have a 
utility in order for its design features to be patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 171,” citing L.A. 
Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993). While L.A. Gear does 
contain language that supports that proposition, that language is dicta. It is also contrary 
to history and practice. An “article of manufacture” is not the same as a “useful article,” 
as the latter term is defined in the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘useful article’ is 
an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the 
appearance of the article or to convey information. An article that is normally a part of a 
useful article is considered a ‘useful article.’”). Designs for items that would be considered 
“useful articles,” like statues, have always been considered design patentable subject 
matter. See Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 543-44 (providing protection for, 
among other things, “any new and original design for a bust, statue, or bas relief or 
composition in alto or basso relievo . . . .”).  
x x x 
In Best Lock, both the majority and dissent in focused on alternative designs as the key 
to the functionality inquiry. But the year after Best Lock was decided, the Federal Circuit 
suggested—in what is arguably dicta—that there could be other factors to consider. In 
Berry Sterling Corp. v. Pescor Plastics, Inc.: 
The patented container design was apparently developed in response to an 
industry-wide solicitation by the Coca Cola Company requesting the development 
of a car cup for its “Coke to Go” program. In order to receive consideration, the 
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cups had to meet the following criteria: (1) they had to have a 32 ounce capacity; 
(2) they had to have a spillproof lid; (3) they had to fit in a majority of car cup 
holders; (4) they had to be short enough to fit under the valve of a soda dispenser; 
and (5) they had to have a low production cost. 
122 F.3d 1452, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Here is a representative view of the claimed design: 
 
U.S. Patent D362,368, fig. 3. The district judge granted summary judgment for the 
defendant, concluding that the design was invalid due to functionality. The Federal 
Circuit reversed because “[t]he district court imposed the limitations of the manufacturing 
specifications for the ‘Coke to Go’ program cup on the underlying article of manufacture 
thereby unduly limiting the scope of the claimed design.” 122 F.3d at 1455.  
After deciding that the grant of summary judgment had to be vacated and remanded, 
the Federal Circuit stated that:  
 [T]he district court acknowledged that there may well be alternative existing 
designs of cups similar to those claimed in the ’368 patent, but apparently did not 
consider the alternative designs important to deciding whether the ’368 patent is 
invalid for functionality. We have held that “when there are several ways to 
achieve the function of an article of manufacture, the design of the article is more 
likely to serve a primarily ornamental purpose.” Berry argues that this language 
. . . coupled with the existence of the alternative designs, save the ’368 patent from 
the functionality challenge, and that the district court erred in not giving such 
effect to the alternative designs. The failure of the court to give dispositive effect 
to the existence of alternative designs in its validity analysis is not error. The 
 DESIGNS  
585 
presence of alternative designs may or may not assist in determining whether the 
challenged design can overcome a functionality challenge. Consideration of 
alternative designs, if present, is a useful tool that may allow a court to conclude 
that a challenged design is not invalid for functionality. As such, alternative 
designs join the list of other appropriate considerations for assessing whether the 
patented design as a whole—its overall appearance—was dictated by functional 
considerations. Other appropriate considerations might include: whether the 
protected design represents the best design; whether alternative designs would 
adversely affect the utility of the specified article; whether there are any 
concomitant utility patents; whether the advertising touts particular features of 
the design as having specific utility; and whether there are any elements in the 
design or an overall appearance clearly not dictated by function. 
Id. at 1455–56. Is this language holding or dicta? If it is a holding, can you reconcile this 
language with Best Lock and the cases cited therein? 
Following Berry Sterling, other panels of the Federal Circuit stated that the test was 
limited to the question of whether or not there were alternative designs. In Seiko Epson 
Corp. v. Nu-Kote Int’l, Inc., the court stated the test as follows: “The ‘ornamental’ 
requirement of the design statute means that the design must not be governed solely by 
function, i.e., that this is not the only possible form of the article that could perform its 
function.” 190 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 
988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). Another panel quoted and followed the Seiko 
formulation of the functionality test in Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 304 F.3d 1373, 1378 
(Fed. Cir. 2002). Here is the design that the Federal Circuit deemed to be not invalid as 
functional in Seiko Epson: 
 
Ink Cartridge, U.S. Patent D351,190, fig. 1.  
 CHAPTER 12  
586 
Here is the design that the Federal Circuit deemed to be not invalid as functional in 
Rosco: 
 
Automotive Mirror, U.S. Patent D346,357.  
In 2006, another Federal Circuit panel adopted the Berry Sterling factors to invalidate 
these designs for medical patient identification labels: 
 
PHG Techs., LLC v. St. John Companies, Inc., 469 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (U.S. Patent Nos. 
D496,405 and D503,197). Another Federal Circuit panel attempted to reconcile these lines 
of precedent in the case that follows.  
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Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc. 
796 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
CHEN, Circuit Judge.  
Plaintiffs-appellants Ethicon Endo–Surgery, Inc. and Ethicon Endo–Surgery, LLC 
sued defendants-appellees Covidien, Inc. and Covidien LP in the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of Ohio for alleged infringement of several utility and design patents 
related to ultrasonic surgical devices. After the close of discovery, the district court 
granted Covidien’s motions for summary judgment, concluding that . . . U.S. Patent Nos. 
D661,801 (the D’801 patent), D661,802 (the D’802 patent), D661,803 (the D’803 patent), and 
D661,804 (the D’804 patent) (collectively, the Design Patents) are invalid as functional and 
in the alternative, not infringed. . . . 
. . . 
As for the Design Patents, we reverse the district court’s grant of invalidity based on 
functionality. The district court evaluated the claimed designs using too high a level of 
abstraction, focusing on the unclaimed utilitarian aspects of the underlying article instead 
of the claimed ornamental designs of that underlying article. We affirm, however, the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement of the Design Patents. 
After the functional aspects of the claimed designs are properly excluded from the 
infringement analysis, the claimed ornamental designs are plainly dissimilar from the 
ornamental design of Covidien’s accused products. . . . 
I 
The patents-in-suit are directed to surgical instruments that use ultrasonic energy 
created by blades vibrating at high frequencies to cut tissue and blood vessels. These 
surgical instruments also use the heat generated from the friction of the blade vibrating 
against the blood vessel to coagulate and seal those blood vessels in order to prevent 
bleeding. Ethicon develops, manufactures, and sells such ultrasonic surgical instruments. 
After Covidien launched a competing line of ultrasonic surgical equipment, Ethicon sued 
Covidien, alleging infringement of the utility and design patents at issue in this appeal, 
among others. Both parties waived their rights to a jury trial and agreed to a bench trial 
on all disputed issues. . . . Covidien successfully moved for summary judgment of 
invalidity and/or noninfringement of the asserted patent claims. The district court entered 
a stipulated final judgment of noninfringement and/or invalidity of all patents-in-suit in 
favor of Covidien. . . . 
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II 
We review the grant of summary judgment under the law of the regional circuit. The 
Sixth Circuit reviews an order granting summary judgment de novo.  
C 
The Design Patents claim particular ornamental designs of an ultrasonic surgical 
device. The D’801 patent claims a particular ornamental design of an inverted “U”-shaped 
trigger. The D’802 patent claims the overall appearance of the ornamental design of the 
“U”-shaped trigger and the particular ornamental design of a rounded and fluted torque 
knob positioned above and forward from the trigger. The D’803 patent claims the overall 
appearance of the ornamental design of the “U”-shaped trigger and the particular 
ornamental design of a rounded activation button positioned directly above the trigger. 
The D’804 patent claims the overall appearance of the ornamental designs of the 
“U”-shaped trigger, the fluted torque knob, and the rounded activation button, with the 
torque knob and the button positioned relative to the trigger as in the D’802 and D’803 
patents, respectively. A figure from the D’804 patent, depicting the ornamental designs of 
the trigger, torque knob, and button claimed in various combinations and relative 
positions by the Design Patents, is reproduced below: 
 
The district court concluded that the claimed designs in the Design Patents were all 
dictated by function and were therefore invalid. Specifically, the district court determined 
that under each consideration for assessing functionality identified in PHG Technologies v. 
St. John Companies, 469 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006), Ethicon’s claimed designs were 
dictated by function. In the alternative, the district court found that because each of the 
designs of the trigger, torque knob, and button must be “factored out” under Richardson 
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v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2010), the Design Patents had no scope, and 
therefore Covidien’s accused design could not infringe the Design Patents. The district 
court also found that even if the functional elements were not factored out, there was no 
infringement under the ordinary observer test laid out in Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, 
Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). Specifically, the district court found that the 
“highly sophisticated” ordinary observer in the “highly complex medical device 
purchasing process” would find that the claimed designs and the design of Covidien’s 
accused ultrasonic shears were plainly dissimilar.  
1 
Design patents enjoy the same presumption of validity as utility patents under 35 
U.S.C. § 282. Thus, Covidien has the burden to prove invalidity of the Design Patents by 
clear and convincing evidence. We have described as “stringent” this standard as it 
applies to invalidating design patents on grounds of functionality. Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite 
Co., 304 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002). We review the district court’s finding that the 
patented designs are dictated by their function for clear error.  
. . . If a particular design is essential to the use of an article, it cannot be the subject of 
a design patent. L.A. Gear, 988 F.2d at 1123. We have found designs to be essential to the 
use of an article when the claimed design is “dictated by” the use or purpose of the article. 
Design patents on such primarily functional rather than ornamental designs are invalid.  
In determining whether a claimed design is primarily functional, “the function of the 
article itself must not be confused with ‘functionality’ of the design of the article.” Hupp 
v. Siroflex of Am., Inc., 122 F.3d 1456, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In Hupp, we separated the 
function inherent in a concrete mold—producing a simulated stone pathway by molding 
concrete—from the particular pattern of the stone produced by the mold itself—an 
aesthetic design choice. Thus, even though the claimed design pattern was embedded 
within the functional concrete mold, the proper analysis required a determination of 
whether the design pattern within the mold—and not the concrete mold itself—was 
“dictated by” its function. Because there was no utilitarian reason the mold had to impress 
the particular claimed rock walkway pattern into the concrete, we determined that the 
claimed design was “primarily ornamental,” and not invalid as functional. In High Point 
Design LLC v. Buyers Direct, Inc., we found that the district court had incorrectly relied on 
the functional aspects of a slipper—a seam connecting two components, a curved front 
accommodating the foot, an opening facilitating ingress and egress of the foot, a forward 
lean of the heel keeping the heel in place, and a fleece interior providing warmth—to find 
the particular ornamental design of that slipper to be impermissibly functional. We 
explained that a claimed design was not invalid as functional simply because the “primary 
features” of the design could perform functions. As with its analysis on other validity 
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grounds, the district court used “too a high a level of abstraction” in assessing the scope 
of the claimed design.  
By contrast, in Best Lock, we affirmed a district court’s determination that a design 
patent to the blade of a key was invalid as functional, finding no clear error in the district 
court’s conclusion that the claimed key blade design was dictated by functional concerns. 
In Best Lock, the claimed design was limited to a specific shape of a blank key blade. The 
parties did not dispute that the claimed key blade shape was designed specifically to 
perform its intended function—to fit into a similarly-shaped cylinder lock keyhole. 
Further, the patentee presented no evidence of alternative compatible key blade designs, 
admitting that no differently-shaped key blade could fit into the keyhole of the 
corresponding cylinder lock. Because no alternative design would allow the underlying 
article to perform its intended function, we determined the district court did not clearly 
err by finding that the claimed key blade design was dictated by function, and therefore 
invalid.  
We have also instructed that the overall appearance of the article—the claimed design 
viewed in its entirety—is the basis of the relevant inquiry, not the functionality of elements 
of the claimed design viewed in isolation. For example, we acknowledged in L.A. Gear 
that certain elements comprising the claimed design of an athletic sneaker each had a 
utilitarian purpose, including a “delta wing” supporting the foot and reinforcing the 
shoelace eyelets, side mesh paneling further supporting the foot, a “moustache” at the 
back of the shoe cushioning the Achilles tendon and reinforcing the rear of the shoe, and 
the particular positioning of each of these elements within the design of the shoe. 
Nevertheless, we explained that “the utility of each of the various elements that comprise 
the design is not the relevant inquiry with respect to a design patent” because whether a 
design is primarily functional or primarily ornamental requires viewing the claimed 
design “in its entirety.” 
We have not mandated applying any particular test for determining whether a 
claimed design is dictated by its function and therefore impermissibly functional. We 
have often focused, however, on the availability of alternative designs as an important—
if not dispositive—factor in evaluating the legal functionality of a claimed design. For 
example, the district court in L.A. Gear referenced the evidence of many alternative 
designs that accomplished the same functionality associated with the underlying athletic 
sneaker. 988 F.2d at 1123. In view of that evidence, we noted that “when there are several 
ways to achieve the function of an article of manufacture, the design of the article is more 
likely to serve a primarily ornamental purpose.” Id. See also Rosco, 304 F.3d at 1378 (“If 
other designs could produce the same or similar functional capabilities, the design of the 
article in question is likely ornamental, not functional.”); Best Lock, 94 F.3d at 1566 (same); 
Hupp, 122 F.3d at 1460 (same). 
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Here, the district court appeared to discount the existence and availability of 
alternative designs in determining that the claimed Design Patents were “primarily 
functional” based on its evaluation of the five considerations identified in PHG, 469 F.3d 
at 1366 (quoting Berry Sterling, 122 F.3d at 1456). In Berry Sterling, we vacated and 
remanded a district court’s grant of summary judgment of invalidity where it had failed 
to “elicit the appropriate factual underpinnings for a determination of invalidity of a 
design patent due to functionality.” In our instructions on remand, we explained that 
where the existence of alternative designs is not dispositive of the invalidity inquiry, the 
district court may look to several other factors for its analysis: 
whether the protected design represents the best design; whether alternative 
designs would adversely affect the utility of the specified article; whether there are 
any concomitant utility patents; whether the advertising touts particular features 
of the design as having specific utility; and whether there are any elements in the 
design or an overall appearance clearly not dictated by function. 
We explained that evaluating these other considerations “might” be relevant to assessing 
whether the overall appearance of a claimed design is dictated by functional 
considerations. Id.; High Point, 730 F.3d at 1315 (“Assessing these five factors may help 
determine whether a claimed design, as a whole, is ‘dictated by’ functional 
considerations.” Thus, while the Berry Sterling factors can provide useful guidance, an 
inquiry into whether a claimed design is primarily functional should begin with an 
inquiry into the existence of alternative designs.  
Ethicon presented evidence of alternative ornamental designs that could provide the 
same or similar functionality of the underlying ultrasonic shears. For example, Ethicon’s 
expert testified that “there were many different designs that would function just as well” 
as the designs claimed in the Design Patents. Ethicon’s expert also identified multiple 
alternative designs for hand-held surgical devices in the prior art. Covidien’s expert 
admitted that other trigger designs, for example, would “work well” but “look different.” 
Indeed, Covidien does not contend on appeal that there are no alternatives to the claimed 
designs, but merely argues that such designs cannot be considered true alternatives 
because, as the district court found, they did not work “equally well” as the claimed 
designs.  
The foregoing evidence does not support the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment that the claimed designs are primarily functional for two reasons. First, the 
district court’s determination that the designs did not work “equally well” apparently 
describes the preferences of surgeons for certain basic design concepts, not differences in 
functionality of the differently designed ultrasonic shears. For example, in supporting its 
conclusion that alternative designs “would not have worked as well” as the claimed 
design, the district court pointed to testimony that surgeons preferred ultrasonic shears 
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with certain basic design features like activation buttons on the front, rather than the rear 
of the device, “open” triggers, rather than closed or loop-style triggers, and forward 
positions, as opposed to other positions, for placement of the torque knob.  
Second, to be considered an alternative, the alternative design must simply provide 
“the same or similar functional capabilities.” Rosco, 304 F.3d at 1378 (reversing 
functionality finding because alternative mirror designs could still provide a similar level 
of performance); see also Seiko Epson Corp. v. Nu–Kote Intern., Inc., 190 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999) (explaining that to be patentable, there cannot only be one “possible ornamental 
form of the article that could perform its function”). Here, there is no dispute that the 
underlying ultrasonic shears could still function in the same manner with a differently-
shaped open trigger, activation button, and torque knob, and different relative locations 
of the trigger, button, and torque knob. Indeed, Covidien identifies no evidence or 
testimony that the particular appearance and shape of the open trigger, torque knob, or 
activation button provided utilitarian advantages over other ornamental designs of those 
elements.  
Further, the district court’s functionality inquiry used too high of a level of abstraction. 
Instead of focusing on whether the specific patented designs had a functional purpose—
the continuously curved “U” shape of the open trigger having tapered handles with ends 
flaring outwards, the football-shape of the activation button, and the asymmetrically-
fluted torque knob with a flat front face—the district court focused its PHG analysis on 
the functional characteristics that any design of an open trigger, button, and torque knob 
would have for the underlying ultrasonic shears. 
For example, the district court supported its conclusion that the claimed designs were 
“primarily functional” using testimony from Ethicon witnesses that the chosen design 
was “the best design ergonomically” of those considered for Ethicon’s commercial 
product. This ergonomic choice, however, was not a choice between different open trigger 
designs, but rather between the concept of an open trigger and a thumb-ring or loop-
shaped trigger. This same evaluation of an open trigger guided the district court’s 
determination that alternative designs would not have worked as well as an open trigger 
because surgeons preferred the chosen design to alternatives. And as discussed above, the 
surgeon-preferred design was not the specific patented design, but rather the general 
concept of an “open trigger” versus a “closed trigger” design.  
Similarly, the district court found significant the fact that Ethicon applied for utility 
patents that included figures similar to those of the claimed designs. The district court 
noted that the utility patents described an “ergonomically formed” trigger with a 
proximal and distal portion having different lengths, a rounded button, and a fluted 
rotation knob. Again, however, the district court’s analysis focuses on the concepts of an 
open trigger, button, and torque knob, rather than the specifically claimed design 
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conceptions of those elements. Finally, the district court relied on Ethicon’s 
advertisements for its commercial product touting the “intuitive controls” of the rounded 
button and torque knob that offered the “ergonomic benefit of ‘minimal index finger 
repositioning’ “ and the “easy access” provided by the open trigger. These 
advertisements, however, tout the functional benefits of the general design concepts of 
the underlying elements rather than any functional benefits of the specific claimed 
designs. 
Ethicon’s Design Patents cover only the specific ornamental conceptions of the 
features shown in their figures, and not the general concepts of an open trigger, a rounded 
button, and a fluted torque knob oriented in some configuration as part of an ultrasonic 
surgical device. The analysis of whether Ethicon’s patented designs are invalid as dictated 
by function must also be performed at a level of particularity commensurate with the 
scope of the claims. For functionality purposes, “it is relevant whether functional 
considerations demand only this particular design or whether other designs could be 
used, such that the choice of design is made for primarily aesthetic, non-functional 
purposes.” The district court performed its functionality analysis at too high a level of 
abstraction, focusing on the general concepts of an open trigger, torque knob, and 
activation button rather than the ornamental designs adorning those elements.  
Moreover, Covidien has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that no designs 
other than those claimed in the Design Patents allow the underlying ultrasonic shears to 
perform their intended function. Indeed, the evidence in the record leads to the opposite 
conclusion. We therefore conclude the district court clearly erred in finding that Ethicon’s 
patented designs are dictated by functional considerations and are therefore invalid as 
primarily functional. Because Covidien has not met its burden of showing that the Design 
Patents are invalid as functional, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment of invalidity of the Design Patents for functionality. 
2 
Because the Design Patents are not invalid, we move to the district court’s grant of 
Covidien’s motion for summary judgment of noninfringement. The district court found 
the claimed trigger, torque knob, and activation button elements of the Design Patents to 
be “based on functional considerations.” district court therefore construed each claim of 
the Design Patents to encompass “nothing,” factoring out and removing every element 
from the scope of the claimed designs.  
. . . 
For purposes of validity . . . a design patent is invalid if its overall appearance is 
dictated by function, and therefore primarily functional. If the overall appearance of a 
claimed design is not primarily functional, the design claim is not invalid, even if certain 
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elements have functional purposes. The scope of that claim, however, must be limited to 
the ornamental aspects of the design, and does not extend to “the broader general design 
concept.” OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  
Richardson involved a claim to the ornamental design of a multi-function carpentry 
tool that combined a hammer with a stud climbing tool and a crowbar. 597 F.3d at 1290. 
There was no dispute that several individual elements of the claimed design had 
functional purposes. In particular, a portion of the hammer head was flat to effectively 
deliver force to a struck object, the handle of the tool was elongated to provide leverage, 
the crowbar was at the end of the handle to reach into narrow spaces, and a jaw was 
located on the opposite end of the hammer head to allow the device to be used as a 
climbing step. These elements—which composed the entirety of the multi-function tool—
had utility that had been known and used in the art for more than a century, and were 
thus outside the scope of the design claim. This did not mean, however, that the design 
claim had no scope. Rather, the claim was limited to the ornamental aspects of these 
functional elements. In particular, the scope of the claim encompassed, among other 
ornamental aspects, the shape of the hammer head, the diamond-shaped flare of the 
crowbar and the top of the jaw, the rounded neck, the undecorated handle, and the 
orientation of the crowbar relative to the head of the tool (which was not driven by 
functional considerations, unlike the orientation of the hammer head and crowbar at 
opposite ends of the handle). Thus, the design claim did not broadly protect a multi-
function tool with a hammer, crowbar, handle, and claw, but only the specific ornamental 
aspects of that tool in the depicted configuration. 
. . . 
Here, the district court found that the “U”-shaped trigger, the torque knob, and the 
rounded button claimed in various combinations by the Design Patents are dictated by 
function. For example, the “U”-shaped trigger operates the clamping arm of the ultrasonic 
shears. Its “open” design allows the user to exert higher input forces by employing 
multiple fingers, thus lessening hand fatigue and strain. The torque knob and rounded 
button provide functional controls for the ultrasonic shears. Their placement relative to 
the trigger offers ergonomic access, and the fluted shape of the torque knob permits a user 
to operate the knob with one finger. We agree that the trigger, torque knob, and activation 
button elements of the underlying article have functional aspects. But the district court’s 
construction of the Design Patents to have no scope whatsoever fails to account for the 
particular ornamentation of the claimed design and departs from our established legal 
framework for interpreting design patent claims. 
[T]he district court ignored the facts that the trigger has a particular curved design, 
the torque knob has a particular flat-front shape, and the activation button has a particular 
rounded appearance. Unlike the functionality inherent in the underlying articles 
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themselves, there is no evidence in the record, that any of the ornamental designs 
adorning those underlying articles are essential to the use of the article. Thus, although 
the Design Patents do not protect the general design concept of an open trigger, torque 
knob, and activation button in a particular configuration, they nevertheless have some 
scope—the particular ornamental designs of those underlying elements. We therefore 
vacate the district court’s construction that the Design Patents cover “nothing.” The scope 
of the Design Patents, although limited, encompasses the depicted ornamental aspects of 
certain combinations of the trigger, torque knob, and activation button elements of 
ultrasonic surgical shears, in specific relative positions and orientations. 
3 
Although the district court construed the claims of the Design Patents to have no 
scope, it performed, in the alternative, an infringement analysis of Covidien’s accused 
ultrasonic shears based on a construction of the claimed designs that retained the 
ornamental aspects of the underlying trigger, torque knob, and activation button 
elements. We can thus evaluate the district court’s alternative grant of summary judgment 
of noninfringement of the Design Patents, because the district court apparently performed 
this analysis using a correct construction of the claimed designs. 
A design patent is infringed “if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such 
attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the 
resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one 
supposing it to be the other.” Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 670 (quoting Gorham Co. v. 
White, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871)). As with utility patents, the patentee must prove 
infringement of a design patent by a preponderance of the evidence. Where the claimed 
and accused designs are “sufficiently distinct” and “plainly dissimilar,” the patentee fails 
to meet its burden of proving infringement as a matter of law. If the claimed and accused 
designs are not plainly dissimilar, the inquiry may benefit from comparing the claimed 
and accused designs with prior art to identify differences that are not noticeable in the 
abstract but would be significant to the hypothetical ordinary observer familiar with the 
prior art. Id. 
Differences, however, must be evaluated in the context of the claimed design as a 
whole, and not in the context of separate elements in isolation. Where, as here, the claimed 
design includes several elements, the fact finder must apply the ordinary observer test by 
comparing similarities in overall designs, not similarities of ornamental features in 
isolation. An element-by-element comparison, untethered from application of the 
ordinary observer inquiry to the overall design, is procedural error.  
After performing a side-by-side comparison between the claimed designs and the 
design of Covidien’s accused shears, the district court concluded there could be no 
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genuine dispute that the claimed and accused designs were plainly dissimilar because 
they “simply did not look alike except for the fact that both are hand-held surgical devices 
with open trigger handles.” The district court thus determined that even if the Design 
Patents had scope, the design of Covidien’s accused shears did not infringe any of the 
claimed designs.  
The claimed and accused designs are depicted below: 
 
We agree with the district court that there is no genuine dispute the claimed and 
accused designs of an ultrasonic surgical device are plainly dissimilar. On a general 
conceptual level, both designs include an open trigger, a small activation button, and a 
fluted torque knob in relatively similar positions within the underlying ultrasonic device. 
Similarity at this conceptual level, however, is not sufficient to demonstrate infringement 
of the claimed designs. . . . [B]ecause each of these components has a functional aspect, the 
underlying elements must be excluded from the scope of the design claims at this general 
conceptual level. And when the remaining ornamental features of those components are 
compared, as a whole, to the corresponding ornamental features of Covidien’s accused 
ultrasonic surgical shears, the dissimilarities between the designs are plain.  
The district court identified the most obvious difference between the claimed and 
accused designs as “the overall contoured shape” of the claimed design and the “overall 
linear shape” of the accused design. The district court also identified plain dissimilarities 
between the ornamentation of the trigger, torque knob, and button elements of the 
claimed and accused designs. For the trigger, the district court found dissimilarities 
between the proximal and distal portions of the claimed trigger handle, which curved 
toward and away from the device, respectively, and the proximal and distal portions of 
the accused trigger handle, which were parallel. The district court also found differences 
between the width and length of the proximal and distal handles of the claimed and 
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accused triggers, noting in particular that the proximal handle of claimed design was 
tapered at its end and at the portion connecting the proximal and distal handles, while the 
proximal handle of the accused design was a consistent width throughout. For the 
activation button, the district court found the football-shaped button of the claimed design 
and the rectangular button of the accused design to be dissimilar. As for the torque knob, 
the district court found dissimilarities between the unevenly-tapered flutes and flat front 
face with a large circular recess at its center of the claimed design, and the evenly-tapered 
flutes and rounded front face with no recess of the accused design. We find no error with 
the district court’s determination that the claimed and accused designs are plainly 
dissimilar. 
Ethicon does not challenge any of these specific findings by the district court, but 
instead asserts that the claimed and accused designs are not plainly dissimilar, and as a 
result, contends that the district court should have considered the frame of reference 
provided by the prior art, which Ethicon characterizes as predominantly featuring thumb-
ring and loop-shaped triggers. However, comparing the claimed and accused designs 
with the prior art is beneficial only when the claimed and accused designs are not plainly 
dissimilar. Because the district court found the nonfunctional, ornamental aspects of the 
claimed and accused designs to be plainly dissimilar, it did not need to compare the 
claimed and accused designs with the prior art, as resolution of the infringement inquiry 
was already clear.  
Ethicon also contends that the district court erred in identifying who the ordinary 
observer would be. The district court found the ordinary observer to be a sophisticated 
entity who managed the complex medical device purchasing process, because that entity 
was the ultimate purchaser of the underlying ultrasonic surgical shears. Ethicon argues 
that the ordinary observer is the surgeon who would use the shears. 
The Supreme Court explained in Gorham that the ordinary observer is not an expert in 
the claimed designs, but one of “ordinary acuteness” who is a “principal purchaser” of 
the underlying articles with the claimed designs. Ethicon does not dispute that it is the 
hospital or medical device supplier, not the surgeon, who is ultimately responsible for 
purchasing the underlying articles at issue. Regardless, we see no need to resolve this 
dispute because Ethicon fails to explain how the infringement analysis would be affected 
if surgeons—who are more sophisticated than the general public—were considered to be 
the hypothetical ordinary observer. The claimed and accused designs are plainly 
dissimilar even to one less discerning than the ordinary observer; these distinctions would 
only be more evident to a sophisticated observer, whether a purchasing entity or a 
surgeon. 
As the district court correctly concluded, the scope of the Design Patents “does not 
entitle Ethicon to preclude others from using all styles or placements of open triggers, 
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fluted rotation knobs, or activation buttons.” Rather, because these elements have 
functional purposes, the Design Patents protect only the ornamental designs adorning 
those elements, and not the general concept of an ultrasonic surgical device having an 
open trigger, a fluted knob, and a rounded button. Here, there can be no genuine dispute 
that at the proper level of granularity, the claimed ornamental designs of the Design 
Patents are, as a whole, plainly dissimilar from the ornamental design of Covidien’s 
accused ultrasonic shears. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment of noninfringement of the Design Patents. 
We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. 
III 
Because Covidien has not met its burden of showing that the ornamental designs 
claimed by the Design Patents are primarily functional, we reverse the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment of invalidity of the Design Patents. . . . The ornamental 
designs claimed by the Design Patents, however, are plainly dissimilar from the designs 
of Covidien’s accused ultrasonic shears. We thus affirm the district court’s alternative 
grant of summary judgment of noninfringement of the Design Patents. . . . 
Context & Application 
1. Did you find Ethicon’s attempt to reconcile the court’s functionality precedents 
persuasive? Why or why not? 
2. What is the status of the Berry Sterling factors post-Ethicon? What role do 
alternative designs play in the validity analysis? What counts as an alternative design? 
3. Ethicon introduces us to a third facet of the ornamentality requirement—claim 
construction. Note that this type of functionality filtration is allowed, but not required, by 
Egyptian Goddess. What work is this kind of claim construction actually accomplishing? 
The court says that:  
We agree with the district court that there is no genuine dispute the claimed and 
accused designs of an ultrasonic surgical device are plainly dissimilar. On a 
general conceptual level, both designs include an open trigger, a small activation 
button, and a fluted torque knob in relatively similar positions within the 
underlying ultrasonic device. Similarity at this conceptual level, however, is not 
sufficient to demonstrate infringement of the claimed designs. . . . [B]ecause each 
of these components has a functional aspect, the underlying elements must be 
excluded from the scope of the design claims at this general conceptual level. And 
when the remaining ornamental features of those components are compared, as a 
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whole, to the corresponding ornamental features of Covidien’s accused ultrasonic 
surgical shears, the dissimilarities between the designs are plain. 
What do you make of this passage? If all it means is that design patents protect how 
something looks, as opposed to how it works, then what does this “claim construction” 
add to the infringement analysis? Is anything really being “excluded from the scope of the 
claim” if the functionality was never covered to begin with?  
4. Does “functionality” mean the same thing when the court is doing claim 
construction that it does when the court is analyzing validity? If not, is that a problem?  
D. Disclosure & Priority 
Design patents are subject to the disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112. But since 
design patent subject matter and claims are very different from utility patent subject 
matter and claims, the application of § 112 is also quite different. In design patents, the 
description is done primarily through drawings. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.153 (“No description, 
other than a reference to the drawing, is ordinarily required.”); MPEP § 1503.02 (“[T]he 
drawing or photograph constitutes the entire visual disclosure of the claim . . . .”). If the 
drawings in a design patent application are inconsistent with each other, the USPTO will 
reject the claim for lack of enablement and for indefiniteness. See MPEP § 1503.02. Some 
of the most important (and least developed) areas of design patent law involve § 112. 
In re Daniels 
144 F.3d 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
NEWMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Scott J. Daniels appeals the decision of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, wherein the Board determined that Mr. 
Daniels’ design patent application was not entitled to the benefit of the filing date of an 
earlier copending design application, and thus that the subject matter was unpatentable 
for obviousness in view of an intervening publication. 
On June 22, 1992 Mr. Daniels, through American Inventors Corporation, filed design 
patent application Serial No. 07/902,055 for a “leecher,” a device for trapping leeches. The 
specification consisted of seven drawings, including top and bottom, and side views 
showing the leecher decorated on each side with a pattern of leaves, as in Fig. 1: 
 CHAPTER 12  
600 
 
While the patent application was pending the Federal Trade Commission charged 
American Inventors Corporation with running a deceptive invention-promotion scheme. 
The Board reports the charges that American Inventors Corporation misled inventors by 
filing design patent applications instead of utility applications and concealing the 
differences between them. The Board describes evidence that clients were given a money-
back guarantee that a patent would issue, and evidence that the Corporation’s draftsman 
would add decorative matter to the drawings to facilitate issuance as a design patent.  
On April 1, 1994 Mr. Daniels, through new counsel, filed a continuation design 
application under 37 C.F.R. § 1.62, Serial No. 29/020,787, and by amendment directed the 
PTO’s Official Draftsman to delete the leaf pattern from the drawings. No other changes 
were made. The application thus contained drawings as shown below:  
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The examiner rejected the application in view of an intervening marketing brochure 
showing the leecher of the parent application. This rejection would be obviated if Mr. 
Daniels were entitled to the priority date of the parent application in accordance with 35 
U.S.C. § 120: 
An application for patent for an invention disclosed in the manner provided by 
the first paragraph of section 112 of this title in an application previously filed in 
the United States shall have the same effect, as to such invention, as though filed 
on the date of the prior application. 
The Board, describing the question as one of first impression, denied Mr. Daniels the 
benefit of his parent application, holding that the leecher shown in the continuing 
application is a “new and different” design in that a design is “a unitary thing,” and thus 
that the change in the drawings defeats compliance with the written description 
requirement of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which 
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best 
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. 
Mr. Daniels appeals, arguing that his parent application fully discloses the leecher design 
of the continuing application, and thus meets the requirements of § 112 ¶ 1. 
Discussion 
Entitlement to priority under § 120 is a matter of law, and receives plenary review on 
appeal. Racing Strollers, Inc. v. TRI Industries, Inc., 878 F.2d 1418, 1419, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1300, 
1301 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (en banc). Any disputed factual questions are reviewed on the clearly 
erroneous standard.   
The statutory provision governing the effective filing date of the subject matter of 
continuing applications, 35 U.S.C. § 120, applies to design patents as to utility patents. See 
35 U.S.C. § 171 (“The provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions shall apply 
to patents for designs, except as otherwise provided”). It was confirmed in Racing Strollers 
that “there are no otherwise provided statutes to take design patent applications out of 
the ambit of § 120 which makes no distinction between applications for design patents 
and applications for utility patents.” 878 F.2d at 1421. 
That the law of § 120 applies to design patent applications is illustrated in the court’s 
rulings that design and utility patents are each entitled to claim priority from the other. 
See Racing Strollers, 878 F.2d at 1418 (overruling contrary precedent and holding that a 
design patent may claim priority from a utility patent); KangaROOS, U.S.A., Inc. v. Caldor, 
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Inc., 778 F.2d 1571, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that a utility patent may claim priority 
from a design patent). The common thread, and the criterion to be met, is whether the 
later claimed subject matter is described in the earlier application in compliance with § 112 
¶ 1.  
Thus the earlier application must meet the written description requirement of § 112. 
The test for sufficiency of the written description is the same, whether for a design or a 
utility patent. This test has been expressed in various ways; for example, “whether the 
disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to the artisan that the 
inventor had possession at that time of the later claimed subject matter.” When the earlier 
disclosure is less than clear on its face, courts have explained that the prior application 
must “necessarily” have described the later claimed subject matter. In general, precedent 
establishes that although the applicant “does not have to describe exactly the subject 
matter claimed, the description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to 
recognize that the applicant invented what is claimed.”  
It is the drawings of the design patent that provide the description of the invention. 
Although linguists distinguish between a drawing and a writing, the drawings of the 
design patent are viewed in terms of the “written description” requirement of § 112. Thus 
when an issue of priority arises under § 120, one looks to the drawings of the earlier 
application for disclosure of the subject matter claimed in the later application. See Vas–
Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Racing Strollers, 878 F.2d at 1420. 
The inquiry is simply to determine whether the inventor had possession at the earlier date 
of what was claimed at the later date. 
The leecher as an article of manufacture is clearly visible in the earlier design 
application, demonstrating to the artisan viewing that application that Mr. Daniels had 
possession at that time of the later claimed design of that article . . . . The leaf 
ornamentation did not obscure the design of the leecher, all details of which are visible in 
the drawings of the earlier application. The leaf design is a mere indicium that does not 
override the underlying design. The subject matter of the later application is common to 
that of the earlier application. In the context of 35 U.S.C. § 171 (“design for an article of 
manufacture” is the subject matter of a design patent), it is apparent that the earlier 
application contains a description of what is claimed in the later application.  
The Board held that any change in the drawing defeats a priority claim for a design 
patent. Departing from the general rule that common subject matter is entitled to priority, 
the Board stated that a design is “a unitary thing,” and thus that when the design is 
changed it becomes a different design, and not subject to severance of any common subject 
matter for purposes of priority. . . . 
 DESIGNS  
603 
The Board was incorrect in holding that any change in the design defeats a priority 
claim as a matter of law. As for any application asserting a priority claim, § 120 requires 
that the subject matter for which priority is requested must be disclosed in accordance 
with the requirements of § 112. A wealth of precedent guides the application of this 
statute. Applying the guidance of precedent, as we have discussed, the later claimed 
subject matter is contained in the earlier application. The leaf ornamentation in the parent 
application, superimposed upon the design of the leecher itself, does not obscure that 
design, which is fully shown in the parent application drawings. On the correct law, it 
must be concluded that Mr. Daniels possessed the invention that is claimed in the 
continuation application, and that he is entitled to claim priority under § 120. 
Mr. Daniels is entitled to the parent application’s filing date for the subject matter of 
the continuation, thus obviating the rejection based on the intervening publication. The 
Board’s decision is reversed. 
Context & Application 
1. The court mentions that the company that filed Daniels’ first patent application, 
American Inventors Corporation (AIC), was sued by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
for “running a deceptive invention-promotion scheme.” The U.S. District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts granted a preliminary injunction against AIC. The court 
prohibited AIC from, among other things, “making, directly or by implication, any 
material false or misleading oral or written statement or representation in connection with 
providing services, for a fee, purportedly to patent, market, or promote individual 
inventions into commercial success, including, but not limited to, any misrepresentation: 
. . . That the patents defendants seek and obtain have commercial value.” FTC v. Am. 
Inventors Corp., 1995 WL 768924, at *1–2 (D. Mass. Nov. 16, 1995).  
This was not the only enforcement action filed against unscrupulous invention-
submission companies during that period. See Lynn A. Bristol, Invention Disclosure 
Services: Needed Change for A Needed System, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 753, 757–
58 (1998) (citing “numerous FTC and state actions” filed between 1977 and 1997). One 
popular tactic for these companies was to offer to obtain “patents,” letting inventors 
assume they meant utility patents, then file for a cheaper, narrower, design patent instead. 
See generally id. at 766 n.60 (“A design patent application is easier (thus, less costly) to draft 
than a utility application, and because of its limited scope of protection, relatively easy to 
get. It is also less valuable commercially because of its limited scope.”). And, at least based 
on the facts in Daniels, it appears that these companies didn’t always understand how 
design patents really worked—see, e.g., the unnecessary addition of the leaf surface motif. 
In any case, this type of invention-submission scheme has given design patents a bad 
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reputation among some patent prosecutors. While that’s understandable given this 
history, do you think design patents really deserve such a bad rap? Can you see any 
circumstances where design patent protection might be preferable to utility patent 
protection? Also, do you think the fact that Daniels was a victim of this kind of scheme 
influenced the outcome of his case? 
2. Remember that there are three longstanding types of designs—configuration 
(a/k/a shape) designs, surface ornamentation designs, and combination designs. What 
type of design was claimed in Daniels’ original application? In the continuation 
application? Should that have affected or influenced the court’s analysis of the written 
description issue? 
3. In Daniels, the court said that “precedent establishes that although the applicant 
does not have to describe exactly the subject matter claimed, the description must clearly 
allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that the applicant invented what is 
claimed,” citing cases decided before the Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Ariad Pharm., 
Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Does anything in Ariad suggest or 
require a change in design patent written-description doctrine? In Ariad, the court said: 
The term “possession,” however, has never been very enlightening. It implies that 
as long as one can produce records documenting a written description of a claimed 
invention, one can show possession. But the hallmark of written description is 
disclosure. Thus, “possession as shown in the disclosure” is a more complete 
formulation. Yet whatever the specific articulation, the test requires an objective 
inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person 
of ordinary skill in the art. Based on that inquiry, the specification must describe 
an invention understandable to that skilled artisan and show that the inventor 
actually invented the invention claimed. 
598 F.3d at 1351 (emphasis added). Is Daniels’ visibility test consistent with this statement 
from Ariad? If someone claims a combination design, does that necessarily mean that they 
also invented the shape? The surface design?  
4.  As noted above, today, design patent applicants can claim less than the whole 
shape and/or surface design in a design patent by using broken lines to indicate 
disclaimed subject matter. See In re Zahn, 617 F.2d 261 (C.C.P.A. 1980). See also MPEP § 
1504.04(C) (“The scope of a design claim is defined by what is shown in full lines in the 
application drawings.”) (citing Contessa Food Prods., Inc. v. Conagra, Inc., 282 F.3d 1370, 
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). They can also use dot-dash lines to indicate unclaimed boundary 
lines. How should these claiming conventions affect the law or policy of design patent 
written description? The next case touches on some of these issues.  
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In re Owens 
710 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
PROST, Circuit Judge. 
Timothy S. Owens, et al. (“Owens”) appeal a decision of the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office . . . affirming a rejection of his design patent application, U.S. Design 
Patent Application No. 29/253,172 (“’172 application”). . . . 
I 
The ’172 application, which is the subject of this appeal, is a continuation of U.S. 
Design Patent Application No. 29/219,709 (filed Dec. 21, 2004) (“’709 application”). The 
’709 application claimed a design for a bottle with boundaries set forth in the figures 
below:  
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The ’709 application ultimately issued as U.S. Design Patent No. D531,515 (issued Nov. 7, 
2006) (“’515 patent”), and that issuance is not contested here. 
Owens then filed the ’172 application in 2006, seeking the benefit of the ’709 
application’s 2004 priority date under 35 U.S.C. § 120. Owens conceded during 
prosecution that, if denied the earlier effective filing date, the ’172 application would be 
unpatentable because he had sold bottles embodying his design more than one year before 
filing his continuation.  
The ’172 application claimed certain design elements found on the top and side 
portions of the original bottle, as depicted in Figures 1 through 3: 
 
In particular, the ’172 application claimed three design elements: (1) the small crescent-
shaped area on the front and back of the bottle near the cap; (2) the narrow triangular 
areas along the bottle’s “shoulders;” and (3) an upper portion of the bottle’s pentagonal 
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center panel. To indicate what portion of the center area was claimed, Owens bisected the 
top of his pentagonal panel with a broken line. 
The examiner rejected the ’172 application. The basis for the rejection was the addition 
of the broken line, which the examiner understood as defining an entirely new 
“trapezoidal”-shaped surface that was considered new matter: 
 
The examiner found no evidence that Owens originally possessed such a trapezoidal 
region in the ’709 application. As such, the examiner rejected the ’172 application for lack 
of written description under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, and furthermore rejected the application 
as unpatentably obvious in view of the earlier-sold bottles under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 
Owens appealed to the Board, which noted at the outset that the correctness of the 
examiner’s § 103(a) rejection depended on whether the ’172 application was entitled to the 
benefit of the ’709 application’s filing date. That issue, in turn, hinged on whether the ’709 
application contained a written description sufficient to convey to an ordinary designer 
that Owens possessed the subject matter of the ’172 application as of the earlier filing date.  
Addressing the latter question, the Board focused upon the difference between the 
parent and the continuation’s front panels—namely, the continuation’s introduction of a 
broken line bisecting the parent’s pentagonal front panel. Like the examiner, the Board 
understood this to indicate that Owens had claimed previously undisclosed “trapezoidal 
sections occupying part, but not all, of the surface area of the front and back panels.” 
Accordingly, the Board affirmed the examiner’s rejections. 
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Owens timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) and 
35 U.S.C. § 141. 
II 
The statutory provision governing the effective filing date of the subject matter of 
continuing applications, 35 U.S.C. § 120, applies generally to design patents as well as 
utility patents. See 35 U.S.C. § 171. Entitlement to priority under § 120 is a matter of law 
which we review de novo.  
To be entitled to a parent’s effective filing date, a continuation must comply with the 
written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1. 35 U.S.C. § 120; Daniels, 144 F.3d 
at 1456. . . . 
The test for sufficiency of the written description, which is the same for either a design 
or a utility patent, has been expressed as “whether the disclosure of the application relied 
upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the 
claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” In the context of design patents, the drawings 
provide the written description of the invention. Thus, when an issue of priority arises 
under § 120 in the context of design patent prosecution, one looks to the drawings of the 
earlier application for disclosure of the subject matter claimed in the later application.  
III 
The subject of this appeal is the broken line that Owens introduced in his continuation 
application. The parties agree that the parent application discloses no boundary that 
corresponds (either explicitly or implicitly) to this newly-added broken line. However, 
the parties also agree that a design patentee may, under certain circumstances, introduce 
via amendment a straight broken line without adding new matter, even “where no 
corresponding boundary line is shown in a design application as originally filed.” MPEP 
§ 1503.02. 
The parties refer to these broken-line boundaries as “unclaimed boundary” lines 
because the lines are “not intended to form part of the claimed design” and do “not exist 
in reality in the article embodying the design.” Rather, when an unclaimed boundary line 
is introduced via amendment or continuation, it is “understood that the claimed design 
extends to the unclaimed boundary but does not include the unclaimed boundary.”  
In other words, when an unclaimed boundary line divides a previously claimed area, 
it indicates that the applicant has disclaimed the portion beyond the boundary while 
claiming the area within it. Where permissible, unclaimed boundary lines allow the 
patentee to adjust his patent coverage and encompass embodiments that differ slightly 
but insignificantly from the originally-filed design. However, like all amendments made 
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during prosecution, these lines must comply the written description requirement to 
receive the benefit of priority under § 120.  
IV 
Bearing all of this in mind, we turn to the merits of Owens’s case. The Board rejected 
the ’172 application because it believed that, as a prerequisite to patentability, Owens 
needed to demonstrate prior possession of a bottle with a trapezoidal section occupying 
part, but not all, of the surface area of the center-front panel. Owens made no such 
showing before the Board, nor does he do so on appeal. 
Instead, Owens attacks the very notion that his continuation claims a trapezoidal-
shaped area at all. Owens insists that in order to claim a new design element, one must 
first claim a new boundary. Yet his newly introduced broken line is, as all parties agree, 
“unclaimed.” Accordingly, he believes the Board applied the wrong written description 
test to his case, one which erroneously treated his unclaimed boundary as though it was 
claimed. 
Owens suggests a more relaxed written description test for these circumstances based 
upon his interpretation of In re Daniels. In that case, we held that a continuation 
application claiming a design for a container was entitled to the effective filing date of its 
parent application, which claimed the same container decorated with an ornamental floral 
design. We reasoned that the underlying container claimed in the continuation was 
“clearly visible in the earlier design application, demonstrating to the artisan viewing that 
application that Mr. Daniels had possession at that time of the later claimed design of that 
article.”  
Owens believes his amendment satisfies the Daniels test because all portions of his 
pentagonal front panel were “clearly visible” in the ’709 application. His argument is 
premised on the notion that an applicant who has possession of an entire area in a parent 
application must likewise possess all parts of the area. He therefore believes he should 
now be permitted to disclaim any portion of his original design in a continuation and still 
survive the written description test. 
Owens misconstrues our holding in Daniels. The patentee in Daniels did not introduce 
any new unclaimed lines, he removed an entire design element. It does not follow from 
Daniels that an applicant, having been granted a claim to a particular design element, may 
proceed to subdivide that element in subsequent continuations however he pleases.  
Moreover, the written description question does not turn upon what has been 
disclaimed, but instead upon whether the original disclosure “clearly allows persons of 
ordinary skill in the art to recognize that the inventor invented what is claimed.” Ariad, 
598 F.3d at 1351; Daniels, 144 F.3d at 1456 (“The written description inquiry is simply to 
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determine whether the inventor had possession at the earlier date of what was claimed at 
the later date.”). In this case, Owens’s parent application discloses a design for a bottle 
with an undivided pentagonal center-front panel, whereas the continuation claims only 
the trapezoidal top portion of that center-front panel. Therefore, the question for written 
description purposes is whether a skilled artisan would recognize upon reading the 
parent’s disclosure that the trapezoidal top portion of the front panel might be claimed 
separately from the remainder of that area. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. 
The Board answered this factual question in the negative, finding that nothing in the 
parent application’s disclosure suggested anything uniquely patentable about the top 
portion of the bottle’s front panel. This finding is supported by substantial evidence . . . . 
Accordingly, we must affirm the Board’s decision. 
V 
Lastly, we turn to a question raised implicitly in Owens’s appeal and explicitly in 
amicus briefing—whether, and under what circumstances, Owens could introduce an 
unclaimed boundary line on his center-front panel and still receive the benefit of § 120. 
The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) provides some direction in this 
regard, saying that unclaimed boundary lines “may” be acceptable when “connecting the 
ends of existing full lines.” MPEP § 1503.02. Were this the rule, it might be acceptable for 
Owens to bisect his front panel with a broken line along the pentagon’s widest point. 
However, it seems that such a boundary would simply outline a larger trapezoidal area, 
and so the resulting claim would suffer from the same written description problems as 
the ’172 application. 
Prior PTO practice offers similarly ambiguous guidance. For instance, the amicus brief 
noted certain past allowances that seemingly contradict both the MPEP and the PTO’s 
rejection of the Owens continuation.  
In our view, the best advice for future applicants was presented in the PTO’s brief, 
which argued that unclaimed boundary lines typically should satisfy the written 
description requirement only if they make explicit a boundary that already exists, but was 
unclaimed, in the original disclosure. Although counsel for the PTO conceded at oral 
argument that he could not reconcile all past allowances under this standard, he 
maintained that all future applications will be evaluated according to it. 
This rule comports with our understanding of how unclaimed boundary lines 
generally should affect entitlement to an earlier filing date under § 112, ¶ 1, and § 120. Its 
implications for Owens’s case should be obvious. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the Board’s rejection of the ’172 application. 
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Context & Application 
1. Following Owens, when can an applicant add dot-dash boundary lines without 
running afoul of the prohibition on adding new matter? 
2. What about the other kind of dotted lines, the ones that indicate something that is 
“no part of the claimed design”? See MPEP § 1503.02(III). The USPTO says that “an 
amendment that changes the scope of a design by either converting originally-disclosed 
solid line structure to broken lines or converting originally-disclosed broken line structure 
to solid lines would not introduce new matter because such amendment would not 
introduce subject matter that was not originally disclosed.” MPEP § 1504.04(B). Does this 
rule make sense? If someone creates a design for a new shape for a whole bottle and 
claimed that new shape using all solid lines, would you assume that person had also 
invented every line or curve that made up the shape of the bottle? Every part or portion 
of the claimed bottle shape? 
3. In Owens, the court says—without any citation or support—that “[w]here 
permissible, unclaimed boundary lines allow the patentee to adjust his patent coverage 
and encompass embodiments that differ slightly but insignificantly from the originally-
filed design.” What do you make of this statement? Is the court trying to describe 
contemporary USPTO practice? Or is this language proscriptive?  
4. In Owens, the court says that: 
Owens misconstrues our holding in Daniels. The patentee in Daniels did not 
introduce any new unclaimed lines, he removed an entire design element. It does 
not follow from Daniels that an applicant, having been granted a claim to a 
particular design element, may proceed to subdivide that element in subsequent 
continuations however he pleases. 
What is the court concerned about here? And in this context, what do you think the court 
means by a “design element”?  
5. A design patent lasts “for the term of 15 years from the date of grant.”35 U.S.C. § 173 
(emphasis added). This means that an applicant could file multiple related application, 
changing dotted lines to solid lines (or vice versa) to change the scope of the claim and end 
up with more than 15 years of protection for a single product. Is this a good system? The 
term of a utility patent used to be calculted the same way. As Mark Lemley has explained: 
In 1994, Congress enacted the most significant change in the patent laws in over 
forty years. . . . Under the old law, patentees received a fixed term of protection of 
seventeen years from the day the patent issued. That fixed term has been changed 
to a variable term not to exceed twenty years. Specifically, beginning on June 8, 
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1995, the patent term will extend from the day a patent is issued by the [PTO] until 
twenty years from the day the patent application was filed with the PTO. 
An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 370 (1994). Why did 
Congress change the rule for calculating utility patent terms? 
One of the primary issues driving the twenty-year term was the problem of 
“submarine patents.” 
Submarine patents are applications filed by inventors who keep their application 
pending in the PTO for a long period of time. Sometimes this delay on the part of 
the inventor is intentional-by delaying the issuance of their patent, these inventors 
hope to take the industry by surprise, announcing a new patent which all the 
participants in a mature market must license. Delay resulting from multiple 
abandonment and refiling need not be intentional to cause problems, however. 
Because the owner of the submarine patent will be able to claim priority to his 
initial application, he will presumably be able to demonstrate that he was the first 
inventor of the new technology. Under the patent laws, the patentee has the right 
to prevent all others from making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing the 
invention. It does not matter that the defendant developed the technology 
independently or before the patent issued. 
Id. at 376–77. Do you think submarine patents are likely to be a problem (or as much of a 
problem) in the context of design patents? Are there any other reasons you can think of 
for calculating design patent terms based on their issue dates instead of their effective 
filing dates? 
In re Maatita 
900 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
DYK, Circuit Judge. 
This is an appeal from a rejection in initial examination of appellant Ron Maatita’s 
design patent application covering the design of an athletic shoe bottom. The examiner 
rejected the application’s single claim as non-enabled and indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112 
because it used a single, two-dimensional plan-view drawing to disclose a shoe bottom 
design and thereby left the design open to multiple interpretations regarding the depth 
and contour of the claimed elements. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) 
affirmed the examiner’s rejection. Because we find the Board misapplied § 112 in the 
design patent context, we reverse. 
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Background 
On October 24, 2011, Appellant Ron Maatita (“Maatita”) filed design patent 
application, No. 29/404,677 covering the design of an athletic shoe bottom. The application 
contained a single claim reciting “[t]he ornamental design for a Shoe Bottom as shown 
and described” and two figures showing a plan view of the claimed shoe bottom design. 
Figure 1 is reproduced below:  
 
As is customary, the solid lines of Figure 1 show the claimed design, whereas the broken 
lines show structure that is not part of the claimed design—in this case, the shoe bottom 
environment in which the design is embodied. . . .  
On February 4, 2014, the examiner . . . . rejected Maatita’s design claim as failing to 
satisfy the enablement and definiteness requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first and second 
paragraphs. In the examiner’s view, the application’s use of a single, two-dimensional 
plan view to disclose a three-dimensional shoe bottom design left the design open to 
multiple interpretations regarding the depth and contour of the claimed elements, 
therefore rendering the claim not enabled and indefinite. 
On May 1, 2014, Maatita responded to the office action, amending the specification to 
clarify that Figure 1 and Figure 2 represented the same embodiment in different 
environmental settings. Maatita also argued that there was no enablement problem 
because “there is no specific allegation that one of ordinary skill would not be able to 
produce the claimed design, i.e., that such a person would be incapable of selecting an 
appropriate depth or contour that would result in the illustrated combination of design 
features.” Moreover, in Maatita’s view, “omission of certain design elements that 
potentially could have been included merely affects the breadth of the claimed design.” 
Thus, the single claim could cover multiple appropriate depth and contour choices 
without rendering the claim indefinite. . . . 
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On May 13, 2014, the examiner issued a final rejection, again rejecting the claim as not 
enabled and indefinite. The examiner prepared and included four three-dimensional 
renderings showing different implementations of Maatita’s two-dimensional plan view. 






In the examiner’s view, these four renderings were patentably distinct and therefore 
could not be covered by a single claim. Thus, Maatita’s single claim was indefinite and 
not enabled, “as one would not know which of the many possible distinct embodiments 
of the claim is applicant’s in order to make and use applicant’s design.” Specifically, the 
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examiner  noted that the claim was not enabled “because the disclosed design is not 
understandable to a designer of ordinary skill in the art without resorting to conjecture.” 
Similarly, the examiner found the claim indefinite “because the scope of protection sought 
is not disclosed in the specification or understandable as depicted in the drawings.”  
. . . Maatita appealed the final rejection to the Board. . . . The Board concluded that 
“because the single view does not adequately reveal the relative depths and three 
dimensionality between the surfaces provided, the Specification does not reveal enough 
detail to enable the claimed shoe bottom, under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph,” and that 
“[t]he same lack of clarity and detail also makes the scope of the claim indefinite under 35 
U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.”  
Discussion 
As with utility patents, the written description of a design patent must meet certain 
statutory requirements regarding enablement and definiteness. See 35 U.S.C. § 171. The 
pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, concerns the requirement that a patent 
be enabled by its written description. It states, in relevant part: 
 The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which 
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same. 
35 U.S.C. § 112. The second paragraph of § 112 addresses the definiteness requirement. It 
provides that: 
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out 
and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his 
invention. 
Because design patent claims are limited to what is shown in the application drawings, 
see In re Mann, 861 F.2d 1581, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988), there is often little difference in the 
design patent context between the concepts of definiteness (whether the scope of the claim 
is clear with reasonable certainty) and enablement (whether the specification sufficiently 
describes the design to enable an average designer to make the design), see Ex Parte Asano, 
201 U.S.P.Q. 315, 317 (B.P.A.I. 1978) (explaining that issues related to enablement were 
“generally the same as” issues concerning definiteness in the design patent context); 
MPEP 1504.04 (I)(A). In this case, in particular, we think that the indefiniteness and 
enablement inquiries are similar and can be assessed together. 
A visual disclosure may be inadequate—and its associated claim indefinite—if it 
includes multiple, internally inconsistent drawings. Errors and inconsistencies between 
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drawings do not merit a § 112 rejection, however, if they “do not preclude the overall 
understanding of the drawing as a whole.”  
It is also possible for a disclosure to be inadequate when there are inconsistencies 
between the visual disclosure and the claim language. Ultimately, a patent is indefinite 
for § 112 purposes whenever its claim, read in light of the visual disclosure (whether it be 
a single drawing or multiple drawings), “fails to inform, with reasonable certainty, those 
skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.” See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, 
Inc., 572 U.S. 898(2014). 
Here, we are not dealing with inconsistencies in the drawings, or inconsistencies 
between the drawings and the verbal description, but rather with a single representation 
of a design that is alleged to be of uncertain scope. The question is whether the disclosure 
sufficiently describes the design. In Nautilus, which dealt with indefiniteness in the utility 
patent context, the Supreme Court emphasized that § 112 ¶ 2 “requires that a patent’s 
claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled 
in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” The Court further 
explained that § 112’s definiteness requirement guards against “zones of uncertainty” 
within the patent system, “which enterprise and experimentation may enter only at the 
risk of infringement claims.” The purpose of § 112’s definiteness requirement, then, is to 
ensure that the disclosure is clear enough to give potential competitors (who are skilled 
in the art) notice of what design is claimed—and therefore what would infringe.  
With this purpose in mind, it is clear that the standard for indefiniteness is connected 
to the standard for infringement. In the design patent context, one skilled in the art would 
look to the perspective of the ordinary observer since that is the perspective from which 
infringement is judged. A design patent is infringed if “an ordinary observer, familiar 
with the prior art, would be deceived into thinking that the accused design was the same 
as the patented design.” Given that the purpose of indefiniteness is to give notice of what 
would infringe, we believe that in the design patent context, one skilled in the art would 
assess indefiniteness from the perspective of an ordinary observer. Thus, a design patent 
is indefinite under § 112 if one skilled in the art, viewing the design as would an ordinary 
observer, would not understand the scope of the design with reasonable certainty based 
on the claim and visual disclosure. 
. . . 
. . . [T]he government argues that Maatita’s claim is indefinite because the design, as 
disclosed in the single, two-dimensional plan or planar view, could be applied to a three-
dimensional shoe bottom in a number of ways. Specifically, the shapes specified by 
Maatita’s design could be flat, concave, convex, or some combination thereof. In Maatita’s 
view, the “relative depths and three dimensionality between the surfaces,” are not part of 
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the claimed design at all, and the differences between the possible three-dimensional 
implementations of his design are simply differences in unclaimed subject matter, see 
MPEP § 1504.04 (“When visible portions of the article embodying the design are not 
shown, it is because they form no part of the claim to be protected”.) 
In situations like this, where the sufficiency of a disclosure for purposes of § 112 
depends on whether a drawing adequately discloses the design of an article, we believe 
that the level of detail required should be a function of whether the claimed design for the 
article is capable of being defined by a two-dimensional, plan- or planar-view illustration. 
The design for an entire shoe or teapot, for instance, is inherently three-dimensional and 
could not be adequately disclosed with a single, plan- or planar-view drawing. Whether 
an article infringed would depend on the perspective chosen to view the article, and a 
two-dimensional drawing provides no fixed perspective for viewing an article. The article 
would be infringing from one perspective but not from another. The design of a rug or 
placemat, on the other hand, is capable of being viewed and understood in two-
dimensions through a plan- or planar-view illustration, which clearly defines the proper 
perspective. See Ex Parte Salsbury, 38 U.S.P.Q. 149, 1938 WL 28182, at *2 (Com’r Pat. 
& Trademarks May 5, 1938) (“It is recognized that flat articles can generally be sufficiently 
illustrated by a single view.”). Such a claim, with a single drawing, would cover all 
similarly designed rugs or mats, even if one might have a low pile and the other a high 
pile (for a rug) or might be woven or textured fabric (for a placemat). 
The government emphasizes that a shoe bottom is a three-dimensional article rather 
than a two-dimensional “ornament, impression, print, or picture to be applied to an article 
of manufacture,” and argues that the surface depths of a shoe bottom impact the visual 
impression of the design. The government is correct that a shoe sole is typically three-
dimensional, with treads that may be convex or concave. And, indeed, many shoe bottom 
designers choose to claim their designs in a three dimensional fashion. But the fact that 
shoe bottoms can have three-dimensional aspects does not change the fact that their 
ornamental design is capable of being disclosed and judged from a two-dimensional, 
plan- or planar-view perspective—and that Maatita’s two-dimensional drawing clearly 
demonstrates the perspective from which the shoe bottom should be viewed. A potential 
infringer is not left in doubt as to how to determine infringement. In this case, Maatita’s 
decision not to disclose all possible depth choices would not preclude an ordinary 
observer from understanding the claimed design, since the design is capable of being 
understood from the two-dimensional, plan- or planar-view perspective shown in the 
drawing.  
We do not, of course, suggest that an applicant for a design of a shoe bottom could not 
choose to disclose his design from a three-dimensional perspective, as many do. If so, that 
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would be the scope of the claimed design for purposes of judging obviousness, 
indefiniteness, or infringement. That is not what Maatita has done here. 
Conclusion 
Because a designer of ordinary skill in the art, judging Maatita’s design as would an 
ordinary observer, could make comparisons for infringement purposes based on the 
provided, two-dimensional depiction, Maatita’s claim meets the enablement and 
definiteness requirements of § 112. We therefore reverse the decision of the Board. 
Context & Application 
1. After Maatita, when is a design claim invalid as indefinite? 
2. In Maatita, the Federal Circuit analogizes the claimed shoe-sole shape design to a 
design for the surface ornamentation of a rug: 
Whether an article infringed would depend on the perspective chosen to view the 
article, and a two-dimensional drawing provides no fixed perspective for viewing 
an article. The article would be infringing from one perspective but not from 
another. The design of a rug or placemat, on the other hand, is capable of being 
viewed and understood in two-dimensions through a plan- or planar-view 
illustration, which clearly defines the proper perspective. Such a claim, with a 
single drawing, would cover all similarly designed rugs or mats, even if one might 
have a low pile and the other a high pile (for a rug) or might be woven or textured 
fabric (for a placemat). 
Is this a persuasive analogy for sneaker soles? Why or why not? 
3. Do you agree with the Federal Circuit that all the variants illustrated by the 
examiner were directed to the same design? Or was the examiner correct to conclude those 
were different shapes and thus patentably distinct?
 
 
13. POST-GRANT PROCEEDINGS 
The involvement of the USPTO does not end once a patent is granted. There are a 
number of post-grant administrative proceedings that can result in alteration or even 
invalidation of an issued patent. One example is that patent owners may go back to the 
USPTO to disclaim certain claims of a patent or to correct errors. 35 U.S.C. §§ 253, 255. In 
1980, Congress established “ex parte reexamination.” Ex parte reexamination permits 
“[a]ny person at any time” to “file a request for reexamination.” 35 U.S.C. § 302. If the 
Director determines that there is “a substantial new question of patentability” for “any 
claim of the patent,” the USPTO can open a reexamination. 35 U.S.C. §§ 303(a), 304.  
But post-grant proceedings play a much larger role in current patent practice than they 
did prior to passage of the AIA. This is because the AIA introduced proceedings that make 
it much easier to challenge issued patents at the PTO. These include a post-grant review 
(PGR) process, which allow third party challenges to a patent’s validity on any basis that 
could be challenged in district court in the nine months after issuance. Once nine months 
have passed, the inter partes review (IPR) process allows for third party challenges to 
validity for failure to meet the novelty or nonobviousness requirements.  
These proceedings have proven appealing to accused infringers in the federal district 
courts, who increasingly choose to resolve validity issues at the PTAB while federal 
litigation is stayed. Proceedings before the PTAB are likely appealing for their low cost, 
speed, and potentially from the expertise of PTAB judges. In any event, appeals from the 
PTAB make up a growing portion of the docket at the Federal Circuit. See Timothy B. Dyk, 
Federal Circuit Jurisdiction: Looking Back and Thinking Forward, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 971, 972–
73 (2018) (“When I joined the court in 2000, patent cases were roughly 33% of our docket. 
However, in recent years, our docket has changed. . . . Since 2013, when the impact of the 
AIA came to fruition, patent cases have . . . amounted to 63% in 2016.”). As you might 
imagine, a change of this magnitude has not been without controversy. It has even 
prompted constitutional challenges. This chapter starts with those challenges. Then, it 
gives a more detailed view of the different types of post-grant proceedings, including 
these newer proceedings as well as corrections and reissue. 
A. The PTAB and the Constitution 
The USPTO has had some kind of adjudicatory body since the 1800s. Today, the 
USPTO’s primary adjudicatory body is the PTAB. It was created by the AIA to replace the 
agency’s former adjudicative body, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI).  
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The PTAB presides over a number of pre- and post-issuance proceedings within the 
USPTO, “conduct[ing] trials, including inter partes, post-grant, and covered business 
method patent reviews and derivation proceedings, hear[ing] appeals from adverse 
examiner decisions in patent applications and reexamination proceedings, and 
render[ing] decisions in interferences.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board, U.S. PAT. 
& TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab (last visited June 11, 2021). The 
Board’s membership includes both statutorily designated officials—the Director of the 
USPTO, the Deputy Director of the USPTO, the Commissioner for Patents, and the 
Commissioner for Trademarks—and administrative patent judges (APJs). Most 
proceedings before the PTAB are heard by panels of at least three members.  
 While the idea of USPTO adjudication is not new, the changes wrought by the AIA 
have prompted a host of questions regarding its constitutional underpinnings. Consider, 
for example, the following case, which involves “inter partes review,” or “IPR.” This 
administrative proceeding, created by the AIA, allows anyone to contest the validity of an 
issued patent, so long as the basis for invalidity satisfies certain statutory requirements.   
Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC 
138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018) 
Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 100 et seq., establishes a process 
called “inter partes review.” Under that process, the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO) is authorized to reconsider and to cancel an issued patent claim in limited 
circumstances. In this case, we address whether inter partes review violates Article III or 
the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution. We hold that it violates neither. 
. . . 
B 
Over the last several decades, Congress has created administrative processes that 
authorize the PTO to reconsider and cancel patent claims that were wrongly issued. . . . 
[The Court began by describing an administrative proceeding that existed before the 
AIA and that somewhat resembled the AIA’s inter partes review at issue in this case.] In 
1999, Congress added a procedure called “inter partes reexamination.” Under this 
procedure, any person could file a request for reexamination. The Director would 
determine if the request raised “a substantial new question of patentability affecting any 
claim of the patent” and, if so, commence a reexamination. The reexamination would 
follow the general procedures for initial examination, but would allow the third-party 
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requester and the patent owner to participate in a limited manner by filing responses and 
replies. Inter partes reexamination was phased out when the America Invents Act went 
into effect . . . .  
C 
The America Invents Act replaced inter partes reexamination with inter partes review, 
the procedure at issue here. Any person other than the patent owner can file a petition for 
inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a). The petition can request cancellation of “1 or more 
claims of a patent” on the grounds that the claim fails the novelty or nonobviousness 
standards for patentability.  The challenges must be made “only on the basis of prior art 
consisting of patents or printed publications.”  If a petition is filed, the patent owner has 
the right to file a preliminary response explaining why inter partes review should not be 
instituted.  
[The Court then described the procedures associated with inter partes review.] 
A party dissatisfied with the Board’s decision can seek judicial review in the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  Any party to the inter partes review can be a party in the 
Federal Circuit. The Director can intervene to defend the Board’s decision, even if no party 
does. When reviewing the Board's decision, the Federal Circuit assesses “the Board's 
compliance with governing legal standards de novo and its underlying factual 
determinations for substantial evidence.” 
II 
Petitioner Oil States Energy Services, LLC, and respondent Greene’s Energy Group, 
LLC, are both oilfield services companies. In 2001, Oil States obtained a patent relating to 
an apparatus and method for protecting wellhead equipment used in hydraulic 
fracturing. In 2012, Oil States sued Greene’s Energy in Federal District Court for infringing 
that patent. Greene’s Energy responded by challenging the patent's validity. Near the 
close of discovery, Greene’s Energy also petitioned the Board to institute inter partes 
review. It argued that two of the patent’s claims were unpatentable because they were 
anticipated by prior art not mentioned by Oil States in its original patent application. Oil 
States filed a response opposing review. The Board found that Greene’s Energy had 
established a reasonable likelihood that the two claims were unpatentable and, thus, 
instituted inter partes review. 
The proceedings before the District Court and the Board progressed in parallel. In June 
2014, the District Court issued a claim-construction order. The order construed the 
challenged claims in a way that foreclosed Greene’s Energy's arguments about the prior 
art. But a few months later, the Board issued a final written decision concluding that the 
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claims were unpatentable. The Board acknowledged the District Court’s contrary 
decision, but nonetheless concluded that the claims were anticipated by the prior art. 
Oil States sought review in the Federal Circuit. In addition to its arguments about 
patentability, Oil States challenged the constitutionality of inter partes review. 
Specifically, it argued that actions to revoke a patent must be tried in an Article III court 
before a jury. . . . 
We granted certiorari to determine whether inter partes review violates Article III or 
the Seventh Amendment. We address each issue in turn. 
III 
Article III vests the judicial power of the United States “in one supreme Court, and in 
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” 
Consequently, Congress cannot “confer the Government's ‘judicial Power’ on entities 
outside Article III.” When determining whether a proceeding involves an exercise of 
Article III judicial power, this Court's precedents have distinguished between “public 
rights” and “private rights.” Those precedents have given Congress significant latitude to 
assign adjudication of public rights to entities other than Article III courts.  
. . . Our precedents have recognized that the [public-rights] doctrine covers matters 
“which arise between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection 
with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative 
departments.” In other words, the public-rights doctrine applies to matters “‘arising 
between the government and others, which from their nature do not require judicial 
determination and yet are susceptible of it.’” Inter partes review involves one such matter: 
reconsideration of the Government’s decision to grant a public franchise. 
A 
Inter partes review falls squarely within the public-rights doctrine. This Court has 
recognized, and the parties do not dispute, that the decision to grant a patent is a matter 
involving public rights—specifically, the grant of a public franchise. Inter partes review is 
simply a reconsideration of that grant, and Congress has permissibly reserved the PTO’s 
authority to conduct that reconsideration. Thus, the PTO can do so without violating 
Article III. 
1 
This Court has long recognized that the grant of a patent is a “‘matter involving public 
rights.’” It has the key features to fall within this Court’s longstanding formulation of the 
public-rights doctrine. 
 DESIGNS  
623 
Ab initio, the grant of a patent involves a matter “arising between the government and 
others.” As this Court has long recognized, the grant of a patent is a matter between “the 
public, who are the grantors, and . . . the patentee.” By “issuing patents,” the PTO “takes 
from the public rights of immense value, and bestows them upon the patentee.” 
Specifically, patents are “public franchises” that the Government grants “to the inventors 
of new and useful improvements.” The franchise gives the patent owner “the right to 
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout 
the United States.” 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1). That right “did not exist at common law.” Rather, 
it is a “creature of statute law.” 
Additionally, granting patents is one of “the constitutional functions” that can be 
carried out by “the executive or legislative departments” without “‘judicial 
determination.’” Article I gives Congress the power “to promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” § 8, cl. 8. Congress can grant patents 
itself by statute. And, from the founding to today, Congress has authorized the Executive 
Branch to grant patents that meet the statutory requirements for patentability. See 35 
U.S.C. §§ 2(a)(1), 151. When the PTO “adjudicates the patentability of inventions,” it is 
“exercising the executive power.” 
Accordingly, the determination to grant a patent is a “matter involving public rights.” 
It need not be adjudicated in Article III court. 
2 
Inter partes review involves the same basic matter as the grant of a patent. So it, too, 
falls on the public-rights side of the line. 
Inter partes review is “a second look at an earlier administrative grant of a patent.” 
Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016). The Board considers the 
same statutory requirements that the PTO considered when granting the patent. See 35 
U.S.C. § 311(b). Those statutory requirements prevent the “issuance of patents whose 
effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain.” Graham v. John Deere 
Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). So, like the PTO’s initial review, the Board’s inter 
partes review protects “the public’s paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies 
are kept within their legitimate scope,” Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144. Thus, inter partes review 
involves the same interests as the determination to grant a patent in the first instance. 
The primary distinction between inter partes review and the initial grant of a patent 
is that inter partes review occurs after the patent has issued. But that distinction does not 
make a difference here. Patent claims are granted subject to the qualification that the PTO 
has “the authority to reexamine—and perhaps cancel—a patent claim” in an inter partes 
 CHAPTER 12  
624 
review. See Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2137. Patents thus remain “subject to the Board’s 
authority” to cancel outside of an Article III court. 
This Court has recognized that franchises can be qualified in this manner. For 
example, Congress can grant a franchise that permits a company to erect a toll bridge, but 
qualify the grant by reserving its authority to revoke or amend the franchise. Even after 
the bridge is built, the Government can exercise its reserved authority through legislation 
or an administrative proceeding. The same is true for franchises that permit companies to 
build railroads or telegraph lines. 
Thus, the public-rights doctrine covers the matter resolved in inter partes review. The 
Constitution does not prohibit the Board from resolving it outside of an Article III court. 
B 
Oil States challenges this conclusion, citing three decisions that recognize patent rights 
as the “private property of the patentee.” United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 128 
U.S. 315, 370 (1888); see also McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 609 
(1898) (“A granted patent has become the property of the patentee”); Brown v. Duchesne, 
19 How. 183, 197 (1857) (“The rights of a party under a patent are his private property”). 
But those cases do not contradict our conclusion. 
Patents convey only a specific form of property right—a public franchise. And patents 
are “entitled to protection as any other property, consisting of a franchise.” As a public 
franchise, a patent can confer only the rights that “the statute prescribes.” It is noteworthy 
that one of the precedents cited by Oil States acknowledges that the patentee’s rights are 
“derived altogether” from statutes, “are to be regulated and measured by these laws, and 
cannot go beyond them.” Brown, 19 How. at 195.  
One such regulation is inter partes review. See Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2137. The Patent 
Act provides that, “subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes 
of personal property.” 35 U.S.C. § 261. This provision qualifies any property rights that a 
patent owner has in an issued patent, subjecting them to the express provisions of the 
Patent Act. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006). Those provisions 
include inter partes review. See §§ 311–319. 
Nor do the precedents that Oil States cites foreclose the kind of post-issuance 
administrative review that Congress has authorized here. To be sure, two of the cases 
make broad declarations that “the only authority competent to set a patent aside, or to 
annul it, or to correct it for any reason whatever, is vested in the courts of the United 
States, and not in the department which issued the patent.” But those cases were decided 
under the Patent Act of 1870. That version of the Patent Act did not include any provision 
for post-issuance administrative review. Those precedents, then, are best read as a 
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description of the statutory scheme that existed at that time. They do not resolve Congress’ 
authority under the Constitution to establish a different scheme.  
. . . 
E 
We emphasize the narrowness of our holding. We address the constitutionality of 
inter partes review only. We do not address whether other patent matters, such as 
infringement actions, can be heard in a non-Article III forum. And because the Patent Act 
provides for judicial review by the Federal Circuit, see 35 U.S.C. § 319, we need not 
consider whether inter partes review would be constitutional “without any sort of 
intervention by a court at any stage of the proceedings.” Moreover, we address only the 
precise constitutional challenges that Oil States raised here. Oil States does not challenge 
the retroactive application of inter partes review, even though that procedure was not in 
place when its patent issued. Nor has Oil States raised a due process challenge. Finally, 
our decision should not be misconstrued as suggesting that patents are not property for 
purposes of the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause. 
IV 
In addition to Article III, Oil States challenges inter partes review under the Seventh 
Amendment. The Seventh Amendment preserves the “right of trial by jury” in “Suits at 
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars.” This Court’s 
precedents establish that, when Congress properly assigns a matter to adjudication in a 
non-Article III tribunal, “the Seventh Amendment poses no independent bar to the 
adjudication of that action by a nonjury factfinder.” No party challenges or attempts to 
distinguish those precedents. Thus, our rejection of Oil States’ Article III challenge also 
resolves its Seventh Amendment challenge. Because inter partes review is a matter that 
Congress can properly assign to the PTO, a jury is not necessary in these proceedings. 
V 
Because inter partes review does not violate Article III or the Seventh Amendment, 
we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is so ordered. 
Justice BREYER, with whom Justice GINSBURG and Justice SOTOMAYOR join, 
concurring. 
I join the Court’s opinion in full. The conclusion that inter partes review is a matter 
involving public rights is sufficient to show that it violates neither Article III nor the 
Seventh Amendment. But the Court’s opinion should not be read to say that matters 
involving private rights may never be adjudicated other than by Article III courts, say, 
sometimes by agencies. Our precedent is to the contrary. 
 CHAPTER 12  
626 
Justice GORSUCH, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, dissenting. 
Today, the government invites us to retreat from the promise of judicial 
independence. Until recently, most everyone considered an issued patent a personal 
right—no less than a home or farm—that the federal government could revoke only with 
the concurrence of independent judges. But in the statute before us Congress has tapped 
an executive agency, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, for the job. Supporters say this is 
a good thing because the Patent Office issues too many low quality patents; allowing a 
subdivision of that office to clean up problems after the fact, they assure us, promises an 
efficient solution. And, no doubt, dispensing with constitutionally prescribed procedures 
is often expedient. . . . 
. . . 
. . . At the founding, the Court notes, the Executive could sometimes both dispense 
and revoke public franchises. And because, it says, invention patents are a species of 
public franchises, the Court argues the Executive should be allowed to dispense and 
revoke them too. But labels aside, by the time of the founding the law treated patents 
protected by the Patent Clause quite differently from ordinary public franchises. . . . 
Courts routinely applied to invention patents protected by the Patent Clause the “liberal 
common sense construction” that applies to other instruments creating private property 
rights, like land deeds. As Justice Story explained, invention patents protected by the 
Patent Clause were “not to be treated as mere monopolies odious in the eyes of the law, 
and therefore not to be favored.” . . . For precisely these reasons and as we’ve seen, the 
law traditionally treated patents issued under the Patent Clause very differently than 
monopoly franchises when it came to governmental invasions. Patents alone required 
independent judges. Nor can simply invoking a mismatched label obscure that fact. The 
people’s historic rights to have independent judges decide their disputes with the 
government should not be a “constitutional Maginot Line, easily circumvented” by such 
“simple maneuvers.” 
Today’s decision may not represent a rout but it at least signals a retreat from Article 
III’s guarantees. Ceding to the political branches ground they wish to take in the name of 
efficient government may seem like an act of judicial restraint. But enforcing Article III 
isn’t about protecting judicial authority for its own sake. It’s about ensuring the people 
today and tomorrow enjoy no fewer rights against governmental intrusion than those 
who came before. And the loss of the right to an independent judge is never a small thing. 
It’s for that reason Hamilton warned the judiciary to take “all possible care to defend itself 
against” intrusions by the other branches. The Federalist No. 78, at 466. It’s for that reason 
I respectfully dissent. 
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Context & Application 
1. In light of Oil States, it is pretty clear that patents owned by private entities can be 
constitutionally challenged by other private parties in IPRs. But what about patents 
owned by state institutions? States “typically enjoy immunity from lawsuits brought by 
private parties as a ‘fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before 
the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today.’” Regents of the Univ. of 
Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327, 1337 (2019). This “state sovereign immunity” is to a 
certain extent preserved by the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 
“applies not only to proceedings in an Article III forum but also to agency adjudications 
brought by private parties that are similar to court adjudications.” As a result, the 
University of Minnesota argued that, because IPRs challenging state-owned patents “are 
entirely disputes between private parties and states” and are run much like court 
proceedings, they should be barred by state sovereign immunity.  
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument. Following the Supreme Court’s logic in 
Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016), it “concluded that IPR 
proceedings are essentially agency reconsideration of a prior patent grant.” Regents of the 
Univ. of Minn., 926 F.3d at 1338. Thus, while this “second look” is initiated upon the 
petition of a private party and resembles civil litigation, such party involvement and the 
adversarial nature of the proceedings do not undermine their fundamental character as 
agency-initiated actions. Id. Supporting this, the court noted, was the fact that both ex 
parte reexamination and inter partes reexamination—which may be or were, respectively, 
initiated by third parties—were beyond the reach of state sovereign immunity.  
The Federal Circuit gave several reasons for its holding. It first noted that the Director 
of the USPTO, a “politically appointed executive branch official ultimately decides 
whether to proceed against the state sovereign” upon review of an appropriate petition, 
and that this decision is committed to the Director’s discretion. Next, it pointed out that 
the PTAB may issue a final written decision on the merits of an IPR, even if no petitioner 
remains a party to the proceeding, “reinforcing the view that IPR is an act by the agency 
in reconsidering its own grant of a public franchise.” Further informing its decision was 
the fact that there were several procedural differences between civil litigation and IPRs, 
such as the inapplicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the latter. As a result, 
the court concluded that “IPR is similar to an agency enforcement action instituted by the 
USPTO upon information supplied by a private party rather than civil litigation, so state 
sovereign immunity is not implicated.” The Federal Circuit similarly rebuffed arguments 
made in favor of tribal sovereign immunity barring IPR proceedings initiated against 
patents owned by Native American Tribes. See Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., 
Inc., 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019). 
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2. We have now discussed several questions relating to the scope of the PTAB’s 
adjudicatory authority, but other fundamental questions remain about the structure and 
composition of the PTAB. As noted earlier, the PTAB is comprised of a select few 
statutorily designated officials and a number of APJs; these APJs, according to the Patent 
Act, are appointed by the Secretary of Commerce “in consultation with the Director” of 
the USPTO. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a). The Federal Circuit has held that this appointment structure 
violates the Appointments Clause of Article II of the U.S. Constitution, Arthrex, Inc. v. 
Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320, 1325 (2019), which requires certain “principal officers” 
wielding significant governmental authority to be nominated by the President with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125–26, 133 (1976). The 
Federal Circuit concluded that APJs constituted principal officers who were 
unconstitutionally appointed, but that severance of “certain statutory limitations on the 
removal of APJs”—in particular, those limitations that permitted their removal only for 
cause under 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a)—would ultimately eliminate this constitutional defect. 
Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1338. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to a consolidated petition 
to resolve these issues in United States v. Arthrex Inc., No. 19-1434; oral argument was 
heard on March 1, 2021. The Supreme Court’s decision was still pending as of this writing. 
B. Post-Issuance Administrative Review Processes 
Post-grant proceedings are effectively a recognition that the USPTO is not infallible. 
Sometimes issued patents contain errors, or a claimed invention that does not meet the 
requirements for patentability receives a patent. There are processes for fixing these 
errors. Some of these proceedings, such as ex parte reexamination, have been around for 
decades. Others, such as inter partes review and post-grant review, are less than a decade 
old. Still others, such as inter partes reexamination and covered business method patent 
review, have been introduced and then cancelled or phased out. 
We will address the basics of many of these proceeding below. As you read, keep in 
mind that the outcomes can significantly affect not only the validity of an issued patent 
but also the scope of later litigation. Lawyers can—and have—built entire practices upon 
these types of administrative proceedings.  
1. Post-Grant Review 
PGR is the most temporally limited post-grant proceeding in nature. The proceeding 
was added by the AIA and can only be invoked in the first nine months following 
issuance, and only for patents issued from first-to-file applications filed on or after March 
16, 2013. 35 U.S.C. § 321 et seq. 
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The Patent Act authorizes “a person who is not the owner of a patent [to] file with the 
Office a petition to institute a post-grant review of [a] patent,” 35 U.S.C. § 321(a), through 
which the “petitioner . . . may request to cancel as unpatentable [one] or more claims of a 
patent on any ground that could be raised under paragraph (2) or (3) of section 282(b),” 
35 U.S.C. § 321(b). 
In other words, PGR permits a third party (i.e., not the patent owner) to file a petition 
with the Director of the USPTO to challenge the validity of and cancel one or more claims 
of a patent upon any ground that they could in a district court (including issues of patent 
eligibility, utility, novelty, obviousness, written description, and enablement but excluding 
compliance with the best mode requirement). PGR challenges can be supported with a 
wide variety of evidence, including printed publications, issued patents, evidence of on-
sale activities or public use, and prior-filed patent applications, among others. The 
challenges are generally handled by the PTAB (rather than the original patent examiner 
who handled the patent’s prosecution). The proceedings are similar litigation in district 
court, in that the parties can conduct discovery, deliver oral arguments, and arrange 
settlements, though these endeavors are subject to some limitations. Overall, PGR 
provides a third party significant opportunity to challenge the validity of a granted patent 
immediately after issuance in a litigation-like format. 
The timing requirements limit the use and popularity of PGR proceedings. A petition 
to institute PGR must be filed by a third party within nine (9) months of patent issuance, 
though PGR challenges can also be brought within nine months of issuance of a reissue 
patent, subject to a single caveat: any challenge to one or more claims in a reissue patent 
that are similar to or narrower than claims in the originally issued patent cannot be made 
unless brought within nine months of the original patent’s date of issuance.  
The entire proceeding is conducted according to a condensed timeline: Once a 
petitioner files their request, the patentee is generally given two months to respond, after 
which the Director of the USPTO has three months to decide whether to institute the 
proceeding. If the Director chooses to institute PGR and that proceeding is not later 
dismissed for one reason or another, the PTAB has one year from institution to issue a 
final determination—a deadline that may be extended for good cause by an additional six 
months. After a final determination is rendered, appeals by the petitioner or patent owner, 
under 35 U.S.C. § 329, may be taken to the Federal Circuit. 
When are PGR proceedings generally instituted? The standard for institution is set by 
35 U.S.C. § 324, which states that the Director of the USPTO may institute PGR 
proceedings if either “the information presented in the petition filed under section 321, if 
such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at 
least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable,” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), or 
“the petition raises a novel or unsettled legal question that is important to other patents 
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or patent applications,” 35 U.S.C. § 324(b). In other words, the Director can choose to 
institute PGR if they think that the petitioner would more likely than not succeed on the 
merits of their challenge to at least one claim of the patent based on the unrebutted 
contents of the petition, or, alternatively, that the petitioner has brought forth important 
questions of patent law that should be addressed because they are likely to affect a wide 
range of stakeholders in the patent system. The Director’s decision in this regard “shall be 
final and nonappealable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(e). This is the same standard for institution of  
IPR, challenged in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016), below. 
There are other limitations on PGR proceedings beyond the time constraints described 
above. For example, a would-be petitioner (or a real party in interest) cannot request 
institution of a PGR proceeding if they earlier filed a civil action (declaratory or otherwise) 
challenging the validity of the patent. Importantly, this limitation does not apply to 
defendants’ counterclaims of invalidity in patent infringement actions. In a similar vein, 
any civil action filed by a PGR petitioner after institution of PGR proceedings will 
ordinarily be stayed until those proceedings conclude; such a civil action will not be 
stayed if one of the following occurs: “the patent owner moves the court to lift the stay; 
. . . the patent owner files a civil action or counterclaim alleging that the petitioner or real 
party in interest has infringed the patent; or . . . the petitioner or real party in interest 
moves the court to dismiss the action.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(a)(2). The idea here is to promote 
efficiency and uniformity; avoiding parallel proceedings serves those goals. 
And finally, PGR carries with it one major risk. Section 325(e) explains that an issue 
may not be raised in any other proceeding before the USPTO, in federal court, or in the ITC 
if the PTAB rendered a final written decision and that issue was “raised or reasonably 
could have [been] raised” by the petitioner “during that post-grant review.” 35 U.S.C. § 
325(e)(1), (2). In other words, this provision broadly estops a PGR petitioner or a related 
real party in interest from bringing up claims that were or reasonably could have been 
brought during the PGR proceedings, whether they choose to do so in later USPTO 
administrative proceedings or in certain proceedings in federal court or before the ITC, if 
the PTAB issued a final written decision upon the merits of the PGR. As a result, a 
potential petitioner is strongly advised to consider the costs and benefits of submitting a 
PGR petition. While PGR is significantly less time-consuming than district court litigation 
and certainly much less expensive, it does come with the risk of estoppel. 
2. Inter Partes Review 
Inter partes review (IPR) is perhaps the most actively used administrative procedure 
in patent law today. Much of the case law covered in this chapter derives from IPR 
challenges to patent validity. This is quite astounding in view of its relatively short 
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history: originating with the AIA and outlined in 35 U.S.C. § 311 et seq., it was designed to 
replace an older procedure, inter partes reexamination, as late as September 16, 2012. 
However, unlike PGR, it can be used to challenge any issued patent, no matter its filing 
date. Justice Thomas, in his majority opinion in Oil States Energy Services v. Greene’s Energy 
Group, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018), provides an overview of the history and substance of 
IPR:  
The America Invents Act replaced inter partes reexamination with inter partes 
review. . . . Any person other than the patent owner can file a petition for inter 
partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a). The petition can request cancellation of “1 or 
more claims of a patent” on the grounds that the claim fails the novelty or 
nonobviousness standards for patentability. § 311(b). The challenges must be 
made “only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.” 
Ibid. If a petition is filed, the patent owner has the right to file a preliminary 
response explaining why inter partes review should not be instituted. § 313. 
Before he can institute inter partes review, the Director must determine “that there 
is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 
1 of the claims challenged.” § 314(a). The decision whether to institute inter partes 
review is committed to the Director's discretion. See Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC 
v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016). The Director’s decision is “final and 
nonappealable.” § 314(d).  
Once inter partes review is instituted, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board—an 
adjudicatory body within the PTO created to conduct inter partes review—
examines the patent's validity. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 6, 316(c). The Board sits in three-
member panels of administrative patent judges. See § 6(c). During the inter partes 
review, the petitioner and the patent owner are entitled to certain discovery, 
§ 316(a)(5); to file affidavits, declarations, and written memoranda, § 316(a)(8); and 
to receive an oral hearing before the Board, § 316(a)(10). The petitioner has the 
burden of proving unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence. § 316(e). 
The owner can file a motion to amend the patent by voluntarily canceling a claim 
or by “proposing a reasonable number of substitute claims.” § 316(d)(1)(B). The 
owner can also settle with the petitioner by filing a written agreement prior to the 
Board's final decision, which terminates the proceedings with respect to that 
petitioner. § 317. If the settlement results in no petitioner remaining in the inter 
partes review, the Board can terminate the proceeding or issue a final written 
decision. § 317(a). 
If the proceeding does not terminate, the Board must issue a final written decision 
no later than a year after it notices the institution of inter partes review, but that 
deadline can be extended up to six months for good cause. §§ 316(a)(11), 318(a). If 
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the Board's decision becomes final, the Director must “issue and publish a 
certificate.” § 318(b). The certificate cancels patent claims “finally determined to be 
unpatentable,” confirms patent claims “determined to be patentable,” and 
incorporates into the patent “any new or amended claim determined to be 
patentable.” Ibid. 
As Justice Thomas explains, a third party (i.e., not the patent owner) may file a petition to 
institute IPR proceedings on the basis of a challenge to the patent’s novelty or 
nonobviousness, as evidenced only by issued patents or printed publications. This means 
that IPR proceedings are substantially more limited in substantive scope than PGR. 
Note, too, that although the Director of the USPTO must decide whether to institute 
IPR proceedings within three months of the receipt of a patent owner’s preliminary 
response to the petition, institution of IPR proceedings is subject to a different standard. 
Instead of the PGR standard (which requires a determination of whether it is more likely 
than not that a petitioner would succeed on the merits of the claim or that there is involved 
in the dispute an important question of patent law), to institute an IPR, the Director must 
find that the petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail on the merits with respect to at least 
one of the challenged claims. This is a higher standard than the one set for PGR. 
Like PGR, however, IPR is also restricted temporally: an IPR petition cannot be filed 
until either after nine months from patent issuance, or, if PGR proceedings have already 
been instituted against the patent in question, the date those proceedings conclude. In 
other words, the USPTO uses temporal windows of opportunity to funnel would-be 
challengers into selecting either PGR or IPR to pursue their challenges. A potential IPR 
petitioner can file a petition to initiate IPR anytime after the IPR window opens except in 
one situation established under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b): where a petitioner or a related real 
party in interest has been served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent 
sought to be challenged, the petitioner must file to institute IPR proceedings within one 
year; otherwise, her remedy is to challenge the validity of the patent in court in connection 
with the litigated dispute. 
Further, as with PGR, civil actions (not including counterclaims asserted by 
defendants in patent infringement cases) initiated after an IPR has been instituted will be 
automatically stayed under 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(2), though proceedings brought before such 
institution will not. And finally, IPR proceedings are subject to an estoppel provision, 35 
U.S.C. § 315(e), that closely resembles the PGR estoppel section: it provides that, if the 
PTAB issues a final written decision upon the merits of the IPR, the IPR petitioner or a 
related real party in interest is estopped from asserting claims that were or reasonably 
could have been raised during the IPR proceedings in later USPTO administrative 
proceedings or in certain proceedings in federal court or before the ITC. 
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3. Covered Business Method Patent Review 
A third type of trial-like administrative proceeding conducted before the PTAB falls 
under the purview of the Transitional Program for Covered Business Methods (TPCBM), 
which was established on September 16, 2012, to streamline the review of validity 
challenges against a specific category of patents called “covered business method 
patents.” Covered business method (CBM) patents include those patents for methods or 
apparatuses pertaining to data processing within, or the operation, management, or 
administration of, a financial product or service that lack significant technological 
elements. In order to supplement this somewhat nebulous definition, the USPTO has 
issued guidance on what constitutes a qualifying CBM patent and a non-qualifying 
“technological invention” in Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents—
Definitions of Covered Business Method Patent and Technological Invention, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,734 
(Aug. 14, 2012). These TPCBM proceedings are conducted in much the same way that PGR 
proceedings are conducted, save a few, very particular exceptions: TPCBM proceedings 
may only be instituted against CBM patents that have not been the subject of PGR 
proceedings, and only when the petitioner or a related real party in interest has been either 
(1) sued for infringement of the patent sought to be challenged, or (2) “charged with 
infringement” of said patent in a manner sufficient to give rise to a “real and substantial 
controversy” upon which “the petitioner would have standing to bring a declaratory 
judgment action in Federal court.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a). After an eight-year lifespan, the 
TPCBM is currently phasing out almost as quickly as it came into being. Though the 
regulations pertaining to the program will continue to apply to those proceedings already 
in being before September 16, 2020, the USPTO will no longer consider petitions to 
institute TPCBM proceedings filed on or after that date. As a result, while you may 
encounter one or two of these cases in your future practice, they are fast becoming 
obsolete. 
4. Ex Parte Reexamination 
Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, PLC 
65 F.3d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
PLAGER, Circuit Judge. 
The question in this declaratory judgment action is whether amendments made 
during a prior reexamination proceeding impermissibly broadened the scope of the patent 
claims at issue in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 305 (1988), and, if so, the legal effect thereof. 
Defendant patentee Rodime PLC (Rodime) appeals . . . . In its decision, the district court 
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granted Quantum Corporation’s (Quantum) motion for summary judgment that Claims 
4, 6, 7, 9, 14 and 19–27 of U.S. Patent No. 4,638,383 (the reexamined ’383 patent) are invalid 
because they were impermissibly broadened during reexamination. We affirm. 
I 
A 
Rodime is the owner of the reexamined ’383 patent . . . . The reexamined ’383 patent is 
directed to a micro hard-disk drive system (3.5 inch drive) suitable for use in portable 
computers . . . . 
The claim limitation at issue in this appeal relates to the storage capability of the hard-
disk. The storage capability of a hard-disk is a function of the track density; the greater 
the track density, the more data that can be stored in a given area of the disk. Track density 
may be defined in terms of “tracks per inch” (tpi), calculated based on the number of 
concentric tracks present within an inch along the radius of the hard-disk. 
On November 19, 1985, James G. McGinley and Roderick M. Urquhart, two engineers 
at Rodime, filed a patent application for the invention described above. Claim 1 of this 
application recited, inter alia, a track density of “approximately 600” tpi. The examiner, in 
a first office action, rejected all the claims as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103. . . . 
. . . 
In a response dated May 23, 1986, applicants cancelled the original claims and inserted 
new claims some of which recited a track density of “at least 600” tpi. The examiner 
subsequently allowed these new claims, and the patent issued on January 20, 1987, as U.S. 
Patent No. 4,638,383 (the original ’383 patent). Claims 4, 6, 7, 9, and 14 of the original ’383 
patent all recited a track density of “at least 600 concentric tracks per inch.” 
On September 28, 1987, Rodime, the owner of the original ’383 patent pursuant to an 
assignment from the inventors, requested reexamination of its patent. Finding a 
substantial new question of patentability, see 35 U.S.C. § 303, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) granted Rodime’s request for reexamination of all 16 claims in 
the original ’383 patent. In an office action dated April 19, 1988, the examiner rejected all 
but two of the original claims. Rodime responded by cancelling certain claims, amending 
others, and adding dependent Claims 17–31. With respect to the claims at issue in this 
appeal, Rodime made substantial amendments including changing the track density 
limitation from “at least 600” tpi to “at least approximately 600” tpi. These claims were 
allowed, as amended, and the ’383 reexamined patent issued on November 29, 1988, as 
U.S. Patent No. B1 4,638,383. As issued, independent Claims 4, 6, 7, 9, and 14 of the 
reexamined ’383 patent all recite a track density of “at least approximately 600” tpi, and 
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the newly added dependent claims which are at issue in this appeal, i.e. Claims 19–27, 
either explicitly contain this limitation or incorporate it through their dependency.  
. . . 
II 
There are two issues in this case: first, whether Rodime broadened the scope of the 
claims at issue during reexamination in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 305 by changing the track 
density limitation from “at least 600 tpi” to “at least approximately 600 tpi,” and, second, 
assuming the claims were impermissibly broadened, the legal effect of violating 
section 305. . . . 
A 
35 U.S.C. § 305 states, in relevant part, that “no proposed amended or new claim 
enlarging the scope of a claim of the patent will be permitted in a reexamination 
proceeding.” An amended or new claim has been enlarged if it includes within its scope 
any subject matter that would not have infringed the original patent. “A claim that is 
broader in any respect is considered to be broader than the original claims even though it 
may be narrower in other respects.” . . . 
. . . 
Since the amended limitation includes subject matter not covered by the original 
claims, i.e. track densities below 600 tpi, we conclude that Rodime expanded the scope of 
their claims during reexamination in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 305. . . . 
. . . 
B 
But what are the consequences of such a broadening? Are the claims entirely invalid, 
or is invalidity limited only to the broadened aspects of the claims, so that the original 
scope of the claims remains available to the patentee? The district court’s analysis 
concluded when it determined that the reexamined claims were broader than the original 
claims in the ’383 patent, apparently believing that it necessarily followed that the claims 
at issue are therefore invalid. However, the Patent Act is silent regarding the proper 
remedy to be employed by a district court in a patent infringement suit when it determines 
that claims were improperly broadened during reexamination in violation of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 305. Neither the express words in section 305 nor its legislative history provide any 
guidance in this situation; they merely recite the prohibition against broadening during 
reexamination. 
. . . 
 CHAPTER 12  
636 
Our precedent does not address this issue either. . . . 
Despite the absence of specific statutory language or precedent of this court in support 
of the district court's judgment that the claims at issue are invalid, we conclude that, as a 
matter of law, the district court arrived at the correct result. The purpose of the 
reexamination process is to provide a mechanism for reaffirming or correcting the PTO’s 
action in issuing a patent by reexamining patents thought to be of doubtful validity. 
Consistent with this overall purpose, Congress enacted section 305 which, while allowing 
an applicant to amend his claims or add new claims to distinguish his invention over cited 
prior art, explicitly prohibits any broadening of claims during reexamination. If an 
applicant fails to claim as broadly as he or she could have, the proper recourse, if within 
two years of issuance of the patent, is to file a reissue application, see 35 U.S.C. § 251, not 
to remedy this problem in a reexamination proceeding. 
As with violations of other statutes in the Patent Act, claims that do not comply with 
section 305 cannot stand. Rodime agrees, but maintains that the proper recourse is for this 
court to exercise its inherent equitable powers by restricting the scope of the claims to 
their original terms, avoiding a holding of infringement against any devices that would 
not have been covered by any of the original claims as they existed prior to reexamination. 
We disagree. Although we construe claims, if possible, so as to sustain their validity, it is 
well settled that no matter how great the temptations of fairness or policy making, courts 
do not redraft claims. Moreover, even if we could consider equities, they do not favor 
Rodime; they broadened their claims during reexamination despite the explicit 
prohibition against doing so in section 305. 
Likewise, the district court cannot remand the case to the PTO to have the broadening 
language deleted from the claims. To conclude otherwise would discourage instead of 
encourage compliance with section 305. If the only penalty for violating section 305 is a 
remand to the PTO to have the reexamined claims narrowed to be commensurate in scope 
with what the applicant was only entitled to in the first place, then applicants will have 
an incentive to attempt to broaden their claims during reexamination, and, if successful, 
be able to enforce these broadened claims against their competitors. This result essentially 
renders the prohibition in section 305 meaningless. The likelihood that improperly 
broadened claims will be held invalid will discourage applicants from attempting to 
broaden their claims during reexamination. 
. . . 
Affirmed. 
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C. Institution of Post-Issuance Administrative Proceedings 
One area of post-grant proceedings that has been subject to a fair amount of litigation 
is the process for instituting review. The two cases below address the level of discretion 
granted to the Director—in Cuozzo v. Lee, to institute IPR, and in SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 
to determine which claims merit review. 
Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee 
136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016) 
Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 100 et seq., creates a process called 
“inter partes review.” That review process allows a third party to ask the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office to reexamine the claims in an already-issued patent and to cancel any 
claim that the agency finds to be unpatentable in light of prior art. See § 102 (requiring 
“novelty”); § 103 (disqualifying claims that are “obvious”). 
We consider two provisions of the Act. [Editors’ note: the Court’s discussion of the 
second provision can be found in Chapter 8.] The first says: 
“No Appeal.—The determination by the Director [of the Patent Office] whether to 
institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and non-
appealable.” § 314(d). 
Does this provision bar a court from considering whether the Patent Office wrongly 
“determined to institute an inter partes review,” when it did so on grounds not 
specifically mentioned in a third party’s review request?  
. . . 
We conclude that the first provision, though it may not bar consideration of a 
constitutional question, for example, does bar judicial review of the kind of mine-run 
claim at issue here, involving the Patent Office’s decision to institute inter partes review.  
I 
A 
In 2011, Congress enacted the statute before us. That statute modifies “inter partes 
reexamination,” which it now calls “inter partes review.” Like inter partes reexamination, 
any third party can ask the agency to initiate inter partes review of a patent claim. But the 
new statute has changed the standard that governs the Patent Office’s institution of the 
agency’s process. Instead of requiring that a request for reexamination raise a “substantial 
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new question of patentability,” it now requires that a petition show “a reasonable 
likelihood that” the challenger “would prevail.” And, the statute says that the agency's 
initial decision “whether to institute an inter partes review” is “final and nonappealable.” 
§ 314(d). 
B 
In 2002, Giuseppe A. Cuozzo applied for a patent covering a speedometer that will 
show a driver when he is driving above the speed limit. . . . 
In 2004, the Patent Office granted the patent. See U.S. Patent No. 6,778,074 (Cuozzo 
Patent). . . 
C 
Petitioner Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC (Cuozzo), now holds the rights to the 
Cuozzo Patent. In 2012, Garmin International, Inc., and Garmin USA, Inc., filed a petition 
seeking inter partes review of the Cuozzo Patent’s 20 claims. . . . 
The Board agreed to reexamine claim 17, as well as claims 10 and 14. The Board 
recognized that Garmin had not expressly challenged claim 10 and claim 14 on the same 
obviousness ground. But, believing that “claim 17 depends on claim 14 which depends on 
claim 10,” the Board reasoned that Garmin had “implicitly” challenged claims 10 and 14 
on the basis of the same prior inventions, and it consequently decided to review all three 
claims together.  
After proceedings before the Board, it concluded that claims 10, 14, and 17 of the 
Cuozzo Patent were obvious in light of the earlier patents to which Garmin had referred 
. . . . [and] ordered claims 10, 14, and 17 of the Cuozzo Patent canceled. 
Cuozzo appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Cuozzo 
argued that the Patent Office improperly instituted inter partes review, at least in respect 
to claims 10 and 14, because the agency found that Garmin had only implicitly challenged 
those two claims . . . while the statute required petitions to set forth the grounds for 
challenge “with particularity.” § 312(a)(3). [The Court of Appeals rejected the argument 
and certiorari was granted.] 
II 
Like the Court of Appeals, we believe that Cuozzo’s contention that the Patent Office 
unlawfully initiated its agency review is not appealable. For one thing, that is what 
§ 314(d) says. It states that the “determination by the Patent Office whether to institute an 
inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.”  
For another, the legal dispute at issue is an ordinary dispute about the application of 
certain relevant patent statutes concerning the Patent Office’s decision to institute inter 
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partes review. Cuozzo points to a related statutory section, § 312, which says that petitions 
must be pleaded “with particularity.” Those words, in its view, mean that the petition 
should have specifically said that claims 10 and 14 are also obvious in light of this same 
prior art. Garmin’s petition, the Government replies, need not have mentioned claims 10 
and 14 separately, for claims 10, 14, and 17 are all logically linked; the claims “rise and fall 
together,” and a petition need not simply repeat the same argument expressly when it is 
so obviously implied. In our view, the “No Appeal” provision’s language must, at the 
least, forbid an appeal that attacks a “determination . . . whether to institute” review by 
raising this kind of legal question and little more.  
Moreover, a contrary holding would undercut one important congressional objective, 
namely, giving the Patent Office significant power to revisit and revise earlier patent 
grants. We doubt that Congress would have granted the Patent Office this authority, 
including, for example, the ability to continue proceedings even after the original 
petitioner settles and drops out, § 317(a), if it had thought that the agency’s final decision 
could be unwound under some minor statutory technicality related to its preliminary 
decision to institute inter partes review. 
Further, the existence of similar provisions in this, and related, patent statutes 
reinforces our conclusion. See § 319 (limiting appellate review to the “final written 
decision”). 
. . . 
We recognize the “strong presumption” in favor of judicial review that we apply when 
we interpret statutes, including statutes that may limit or preclude review. This 
presumption, however, may be overcome by “‘clear and convincing’” indications, drawn 
from “specific language,” “specific legislative history,” and “inferences of intent drawn 
from the statutory scheme as a whole,” that Congress intended to bar review. That 
standard is met here. Congress has told the Patent Office to determine whether inter 
partes review should proceed, and it has made the agency's decision “final” and 
“nonappealable.”  Our conclusion that courts may not revisit this initial determination 
gives effect to this statutory command. . . . 
Nevertheless, in light of § 314(d)’s own text and the presumption favoring review, we 
emphasize that our interpretation applies where the grounds for attacking the decision to 
institute inter partes review consist of questions that are closely tied to the application and 
interpretation of statutes related to the Patent Office’s decision to initiate inter partes 
review. See § 314(d) (barring appeals of “determinations to initiate an inter partes review 
under this section.” This means that we need not, and do not, decide the precise effect of 
§ 314(d) on appeals that implicate constitutional questions, that depend on other less 
closely related statutes, or that present other questions of interpretation that reach, in 
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terms of scope and impact, well beyond “this section.” Thus, contrary to the dissent's 
suggestion, we do not categorically preclude review of a final decision where a petition 
fails to give “sufficient notice” such that there is a due process problem with the entire 
proceeding, nor does our interpretation enable the agency to act outside its statutory 
limits by, for example, canceling a patent claim for “indefiniteness under § 112” in inter 
partes review. Such “shenanigans” may be properly reviewable in the context of § 319 and 
under the Administrative Procedure Act, which enables reviewing courts to “set aside 
agency action” that is “contrary to constitutional right,” “in excess of statutory 
jurisdiction,” or “arbitrary and capricious.”  
By contrast, where a patent holder merely challenges the Patent Office’s 
“determination that the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a 
reasonable likelihood” of success “with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged,” 
§ 314(a), or where a patent holder grounds its claim in a statute closely related to that 
decision to institute inter partes review, § 314(d) bars judicial review. In this case, 
Cuozzo’s claim that Garmin’s petition was not pleaded “with particularity” under § 312 
is little more than a challenge to the Patent Office's conclusion, under § 314(a), that the 
“information presented in the petition” warranted review. We therefore conclude that 
§ 314(d) bars Cuozzo’s efforts to attack the Patent Office’s determination to institute inter 
partes review in this case. 
. . . 
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit. 
SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu 
138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018) 
Justice GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court. 
A few years ago Congress created “inter partes review.” The new procedure allows 
private parties to challenge previously issued patent claims in an adversarial process 
before the Patent Office that mimics civil litigation. Now we take up a question concerning 
the [inter partes review-implementing] statute’s operation. When the Patent Office 
initiates an inter partes review, must it resolve all of the claims in the case, or may it choose 
to limit its review to only some of them? The statute, we find, supplies a clear answer: the 
Patent Office must “issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any 
patent claim challenged by the petitioner.” 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). In this context, as in so many 
others, “any” means “every.” The agency cannot curate the claims at issue but must 
decide them all. 
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. . . 
Our case arose when SAS sought an inter partes review of ComplementSoft’s software 
patent. In its petition, SAS alleged that all 16 of the patent’s claims were unpatentable for 
various reasons. The Director (in truth the Board acting on the Director’s behalf) 
concluded that SAS was likely to succeed with respect to at least one of the claims and 
that an inter partes review was therefore warranted. But instead of instituting review on 
all of the claims challenged in the petition, the Director instituted review on only some 
(claims 1 and 3–10) and denied review on the rest. The Director did all this on the strength 
of a Patent Office regulation that purported to recognize a power of “partial institution,” 
claiming that “when instituting inter partes review, the Director may authorize the review 
to proceed on all or some of the challenged claims and on all or some or the grounds of 
unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). At the end of litigation, the 
Board issued a final written decision finding claims 1, 3, and 5–10 to be unpatentable while 
upholding claim 4. But the Board’s decision did not address the remaining claims on 
which the Director had refused review. 
That last fact led SAS to seek review in the Federal Circuit. There SAS argued that 35 
U.S.C. § 318(a) required the Board to decide the patentability of every claim SAS 
challenged in its petition, not just some. For its part, the Federal Circuit rejected SAS’s 
argument over a vigorous dissent by Judge Newman. We granted certiorari to decide the 
question ourselves. 
We find that the plain text of § 318(a) supplies a ready answer. It directs that “if an 
inter partes review is instituted and not dismissed under this chapter, the Board shall issue 
a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the 
petitioner . . . .” § 318(a). This directive is both mandatory and comprehensive. The word 
“shall” generally imposes a nondiscretionary duty. And the word “any” naturally carries 
“an expansive meaning.” When used (as here) with a “singular noun in affirmative 
contexts,” the word “any” ordinarily “refers to a member of a particular group or class 
without distinction or limitation” and in this way “implies every member of the class or 
group.” So when § 318(a) says the Board's final written decision “shall” resolve the 
patentability of “any patent claim challenged by the petitioner,” it means the Board must 
address every claim the petitioner has challenged. 
That would seem to make this an easy case. Where a statute’s language carries a plain 
meaning, the duty of an administrative agency is to follow its commands as written, not 
to supplant those commands with others it may prefer. Because SAS challenged all 16 
claims of ComplementSoft’s patent, the Board in its final written decision had to address 
the patentability of all 16 claims. Much as in the civil litigation system it mimics, in an 
inter partes review the petitioner is master of its complaint and normally entitled to 
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judgment on all of the claims it raises, not just those the decisionmaker might wish to 
address. 
The Director replies that things are not quite as simple as they seem. Maybe the Board 
has to decide every claim challenged by the petitioner in an inter partes review. But, he 
says, that doesn’t mean every challenged claim gains admission to the review process. In 
the Director’s view, he retains discretion to decide which claims make it into an inter 
partes review and which don’t. The trouble is, nothing in the statute says anything like 
that. The Director’s claimed “partial institution” power appears nowhere in the text of 
§ 318, or anywhere else in the statute for that matter. And what can be found in the 
statutory text and context strongly counsels against the Director’s view. 
Start where the statute does. In its very first provision, the statute says that a party 
may seek inter partes review by filing “a petition to institute an inter partes review.” 
§ 311(a). This language doesn’t authorize the Director to start proceedings on his own 
initiative. Nor does it contemplate a petition that asks the Director to initiate whatever 
kind of inter partes review he might choose. Instead, the statute envisions that a petitioner 
will seek an inter partes review of a particular kind—one guided by a petition describing 
“each claim challenged” and “the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based.” 
§ 312(a)(3). From the outset, we see that Congress chose to structure a process in which 
it's the petitioner, not the Director, who gets to define the contours of the proceeding. And 
“just as Congress’ choice of words is presumed to be deliberate” and deserving of judicial 
respect, “so too are its structural choices.” 
It’s telling, too, to compare this structure with what came before. In the ex parte 
reexamination statute, Congress embraced an inquisitorial approach, authorizing the 
Director to investigate a question of patentability “on his own initiative, and at any time.” 
§ 303(a). If Congress had wanted to give the Director similar authority over the institution 
of inter partes review, it knew exactly how to do so—it could have simply borrowed from 
the statute next door. But rather than create (another) agency-led, inquisitorial process for 
reconsidering patents, Congress opted for a party-directed, adversarial process. 
Congress’s choice to depart from the model of a closely related statute is a choice neither 
we nor the agency may disregard. 
More confirmation comes as we move to the point of institution. Here the statute says 
the Director must decide “whether to institute an inter partes review pursuant to a 
petition.” § 314(b). The Director, we see, is given only the choice “whether” to institute an 
inter partes review. That language indicates a binary choice—either institute review or 
don’t. And by using the term “pursuant to,” Congress told the Director what he must say 
yes or no to: an inter partes review that proceeds “in accordance with” or “in conformance 
to” the petition. Nothing suggests the Director enjoys a license to depart from the petition 
and institute a different inter partes review of his own design. 
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To this the Director replies by pointing to another part of § 314. Section 314(a) provides 
that the Director may not authorize an inter partes review unless he determines “there is 
a reasonable likelihood” the petitioner will prevail on “at least 1 of the claims challenged 
in the petition.” The Director argues that this language requires him to “evaluate claims 
individually” and so must allow him to institute review on a claim-by-claim basis as well. 
But this language, if anything, suggests just the opposite. Section 314(a) does not require 
the Director to evaluate every claim individually. Instead, it simply requires him to decide 
whether the petitioner is likely to succeed on “at least 1” claim. Once that single claim 
threshold is satisfied, it doesn’t matter whether the petitioner is likely to prevail on any 
additional claims; the Director need not even consider any other claim before instituting 
review. Rather than contemplate claim-by-claim institution, then, the language anticipates 
a regime where a reasonable prospect of success on a single claim justifies review of all. 
Here again we know that if Congress wanted to adopt the Director’s approach it knew 
exactly how to do so. The ex parte reexamination statute allows the Director to assess 
whether a request raises “a substantial new question of patentability affecting any claim” 
and (if so) to institute reexamination limited to “resolution of the question.” § 304. In other 
words, that statute allows the Director to institute proceedings on a claim-by-claim and 
ground-by-ground basis. But Congress didn’t choose to pursue that known and readily 
available approach here. And its choice to try something new must be given effect rather 
than disregarded in favor of the comfort of what came before.  
Faced with this difficulty, the Director tries another tack. He points to the fact that 
§ 314(a) doesn’t require him to institute an inter partes review even after he finds the 
“reasonable likelihood” threshold met with respect to one claim. Whether to institute 
proceedings upon such a finding, he says, remains a matter left to his discretion. See 
Cuozzo. But while § 314(a) invests the Director with discretion on the question whether to 
institute review, it doesn’t follow that the statute affords him discretion regarding what 
claims that review will encompass. The text says only that the Director can decide 
“whether” to institute the requested review—not “whether and to what extent” review 
should proceed. § 314(b). 
The rest of the statute confirms, too, that the petitioner’s petition, not the Director’s 
discretion, is supposed to guide the life of the litigation. For example, § 316(a)(8) tells the 
Director to adopt regulations ensuring that, “after an inter partes review has been 
instituted,” the patent owner will file “a response to the petition.” Surely it would have 
made little sense for Congress to insist on a response to the petition if, in truth, the Director 
enjoyed the discretion to limit the claims under review. What’s the point, after all, of 
answering claims that aren’t in the proceeding? If Congress had meant to afford the 
Director the power he asserts, we would have expected it to instruct him to adopt 
regulations requiring the patent owner to file a response to the Director's institution notice 
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or to the claims on which the Director instituted review. Yet we have nothing like that here. 
And then and again there is § 318(a). At the end of the proceeding, § 318(a) categorically 
commands the Board to address in its final written decision “any patent claim challenged 
by the petitioner.” In all these ways, the statute tells us that the petitioner’s contentions, 
not the Director’s discretion, define the scope of the litigation all the way from institution 
through to conclusion. 
The Director says we can find at least some hint of the discretion he seeks by 
comparing § 314(a) and § 318(a). He notes that, when addressing whether to institute 
review at the beginning of the litigation, § 314(a) says he must focus on the claims found 
“in the petition”; but when addressing what claims the Board must address at the end of 
the litigation, § 318(a) says it must resolve the claims challenged “by the petitioner.” 
According to the Director, this (slight) linguistic discrepancy means the claims the Board 
must address in its final decision are not necessarily the same as those identified in the 
petition. And the only possible explanation for this arrangement, the Director submits, is 
that he must enjoy the (admittedly implicit) power to institute an inter partes review that 
covers fewer than all of the claims challenged in the petition. 
We just don’t see it. Whatever differences they might display, § 314(a) and § 318(a) 
both focus on the petitioner’s contentions and, given that, it’s difficult to see how they 
might be read to give the Director power to decide what claims are at issue. Particularly 
when there’s a much simpler and sounder explanation for the statute’s wording. As we’ve 
seen, a patent owner may move to “cancel any challenged patent claim” during the course 
of an inter partes review, effectively conceding one part of a petitioner’s challenge. 
§ 316(d)(1)(A). Naturally, then, the claims challenged “in the petition” will not always 
survive to the end of the case; some may drop out thanks to the patent owner's actions. 
And in that light it is plain enough why Congress provided that only claims still 
challenged “by the petitioner” at the litigation’s end must be addressed in the Board's 
final written decision. The statute’s own winnowing mechanism fully explains why 
Congress adopted slightly different language in § 314(a) and § 318(a). We need not and 
will not invent an atextual explanation for Congress’s drafting choices when the statute’s 
own terms supply an answer. 
Moving past the statute’s text and context, the Director attempts a policy argument. 
He tells us that partial institution is efficient because it permits the Board to focus on the 
most promising challenges and avoid spending time and resources on others. SAS 
responds that all patent challenges usually end up being litigated somewhere, and that 
partial institution creates inefficiency by requiring the parties to litigate in two places 
instead of one—the Board for claims the Director chooses to entertain and a federal court 
for claims he refuses. Indeed, SAS notes, the government itself once took the same view, 
arguing that partial institution “undermines the Congressional efficiency goal” for this 
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very reason. Each side offers plausible reasons why its approach might make for the more 
efficient policy. But who should win that debate isn't our call to make. Policy arguments 
are properly addressed to Congress, not this Court. It is Congres’s job to enact policy and 
it is this Court’s job to follow the policy Congress has prescribed. And whatever its virtues 
or vices, Congress’s prescribed policy here is clear: the petitioner in an inter partes review 
is entitled to a decision on all the claims it has challenged.*  
* Justice GINSBURG suggests the Director might yet avoid this command by 
refusing to review a petition he thinks too broad while signaling his willingness to 
entertain one more tailored to his sympathies. We have no occasion today to 
consider whether this stratagem is consistent with the statute’s demands. See 
Cuozzo (noting that courts may invalidate “shenanigans” by the Director that are 
“outside his statutory limits”). But even assuming (without granting) the law 
would tolerate this tactic, it would show only that a lawful means exists for the 
Director to achieve his policy aims—not that he “should be allowed to improvise 
on the powers granted by Congress” by devising an extralegal path to the same 
goal. That an agency’s improvisation might be thought by some more expedient 
than what the law allows does nothing to commend it either, for lawful ends do 
not justify unlawful means. 
That leaves the Director to suggest that, however this Court might read the statute, he 
should win anyway because of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Even though the statute says nothing about his asserted “partial 
institution” power, the Director says the statute is at least ambiguous on the propriety of 
the practice and so we should leave the matter to his judgment. For its part, SAS replies 
that we might use this case as an opportunity to abandon Chevron and embrace the 
“‘impressive body’” of pre-Chevron law recognizing that “the meaning of a statutory 
term” is properly a matter for “judicial rather than administrative judgment.”  
But whether Chevron should remain is a question we may leave for another day. Even 
under Chevron, we owe an agency’s interpretation of the law no deference unless, after 
“employing traditional tools of statutory construction,” we find ourselves unable to 
discern Congress’s meaning. And after applying traditional tools of interpretation here, 
we are left with no uncertainty that could warrant deference. The statutory provisions 
before us deliver unmistakable commands. The statute hinges inter partes review on the 
filing of a petition challenging specific patent claims; it makes the petition the centerpiece 
of the proceeding both before and after institution; and it requires the Board’s final written 
decision to address every claim the petitioner presents for review. There is no room in this 
scheme for a wholly unmentioned “partial institution” power that lets the Director select 
only some challenged claims for decision. The Director may (today) think his approach 
makes for better policy, but policy considerations cannot create an ambiguity when the 
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words on the page are clear. Neither may we defer to an agency official's preferences 
because we imagine some “hypothetical reasonable legislator” would have favored that 
approach. Our duty is to give effect to the text that 535 actual legislators (plus one 
President) enacted into law. 
At this point, only one final question remains to resolve. Even if the statute forbids his 
partial institution practice, the Director suggests we lack the power to say so. By way of 
support, he points to § 314(d) and our decision in Cuozzo. Section 314(d) says that the 
“determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this 
section shall be final and nonappealable.” In Cuozzo, we held that this provision prevented 
courts from entertaining an argument that the Director erred in instituting an inter partes 
review of certain patent claims. The Director reads these authorities as foreclosing judicial 
review of any legal question bearing on the institution of inter partes review—including 
whether the statute permits his “partial institution” practice. 
But this reading overreads both the statute and our precedent. As Cuozzo recognized, 
we begin with “the ‘strong presumption’ in favor of judicial review.” To overcome that 
presumption, Cuozzo explained, this Court’s precedents require “clear and convincing 
indications” that Congress meant to foreclose review. Given the strength of this 
presumption and the statute’s text, Cuozzo concluded that § 314(d) precludes judicial 
review only of the Director's “initial determination” under § 314(a) that “there is a 
‘reasonable likelihood’ that the claims are unpatentable on the grounds asserted” and 
review is therefore justified. In fact, Cuozzo proceeded to emphasize that § 314(d) does not 
“enable the agency to act outside its statutory limits.” If a party believes the Patent Office 
has engaged in “‘shenanigans'” by exceeding its statutory bounds, judicial review remains 
available consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act, which directs courts to set 
aside agency action “not in accordance with law” or “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, 
authority, or limitations.” Ibid.; 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (C). 
And that, of course, is exactly the sort of question we are called upon to decide today. 
SAS does not seek to challenge the Director’s conclusion that it showed a “reasonable 
likelihood” of success sufficient to warrant “instituting an inter partes review.” 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 314(a), (d). No doubt SAS remains very pleased with the Director’s judgment on that 
score. Instead, SAS contends that the Director exceeded his statutory authority by limiting 
the review to fewer than all of the claims SAS challenged. And nothing in § 314(d) or 
Cuozzo withdraws our power to ensure that an inter partes review proceeds in accordance 
with the law’s demands. 
Because everything in the statute before us confirms that SAS is entitled to a final 
written decision addressing all of the claims it has challenged and nothing suggests we 
lack the power to say so, the judgment of the Federal Circuit is reversed and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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Justice GINSBURG, with whom Justice BREYER, Justice SOTOMAYOR, and Justice 
KAGAN join, dissenting. 
Given the Court’s wooden reading of 35 U.S.C. § 318(a), and with “no mandate to 
institute inter partes review” at all, Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 
2140, (2016), the Patent Trial and Appeal Board could simply deny a petition containing 
challenges having no “reasonable likelihood” of success, § 314(a). Simultaneously, the 
Board might note that one or more specified claims warrant reexamination, while others 
challenged in the petition do not. Petitioners would then be free to file new or amended 
petitions shorn of challenges the Board finds unworthy of inter partes review. Why should 
the statute be read to preclude the Board’s more rational way to weed out insubstantial 
challenges?  . . . [T]he Court’s opinion offers no persuasive answer to that question, and 
no cause to believe Congress wanted the Board to spend its time so uselessly. 
Justice BREYER, with whom Justice GINSBURG and Justice SOTOMAYOR join, and 
with whom Justice KAGAN joins except as to Part III–A, dissenting. 
This case requires us to engage in a typical judicial exercise, construing a statute that 
is technical, unclear, and constitutes a minor procedural part of a larger administrative 
scheme. I would follow an interpretive technique that judges often use in such cases. 
Initially, using “traditional tools of statutory construction,” I would look to see whether 
the relevant statutory phrase is ambiguous or leaves a gap that Congress implicitly 
delegated authority to the agency to fill. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–843 (1984). If so, I would look to see whether the agency’s 
interpretation is reasonable. Id. at 843.  
. . .  
Section 318(a) contains a gap just after the words “challenged by the petitioner.” 
Considerations of context, structure, and purpose do not close the gap. And under 
Chevron, “where a statute leaves a ‘gap’ or is ‘ambiguous,’ we typically interpret it as 
granting the agency leeway to enact rules that are reasonable in light of the text, nature, 
and purpose of the statute.” Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2142. 
. . . 
In addition, the agency filled the gap here through the exercise of rulemaking 
authority explicitly given it by Congress to issue regulations “setting forth the standards 
for the showing of sufficient grounds to institute a review” and “establishing and 
governing inter partes review.” §§ 316(a)(2), (4); Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct., at 2142-42. . . . [A]nd it 
filled the gap with a regulation that, for reasons I have stated, is a reasonable exercise of 
that authority. 
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I consequently would affirm the judgment of the Federal Circuit. And, with respect, I 
dissent from the Court’s contrary conclusion. 
D. Post-Issuance Review and Correction 
1. Certificates of Correction and Reissue 
Superior Fireplace Co. v. Majestic Products Co. 
270 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
LINN, Circuit Judge. 
Superior Fireplace Co. (“Superior”) appeals a final judgment from the United States 
District Court for the Central District of California. The district court determined, on 
summary judgment, that Superior’s certificate of correction for United States Patent No. 
5,678,534 (“’534 patent”) is invalid and that the uncorrected ’534 patent is not infringed by 
Majestic Products Co. and Vermont Castings, Inc. (collectively, “Majestic”). 
. . . 
The ’534 Patent 
The ’534 patent relates to gas fireplace technology. . . . 
. . . 
Claim 1 of the ’534 patent is the only claim at issue in this appeal and reads as follows: 
1. A gas log fireplace comprising in combination: 
a housing having a top wall, bottom wall, side walls and a rear wall; 
a firebox within the housing comprising a top wall, rear walls and side walls, said 
firebox forming a primary combustion chamber; 
a room air plenum comprising a top room air plenum between the top wall of the 
firebox and the top wall of the housing, a rear room air plenum between the rear 
wall of the firebox and the rear wall of the housing in communication with the top 
room air plenum; 
an inlet opening for allowing room air to enter the rear room air plenum; 
an outlet opening in communication with the top room air plenum for allowing 
room air and exhaust products in the top room air plenum to be exhausted into a 
room in which the fireplace is situated; 
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an intake opening into the firebox for receiving room air into the primary 
combustion chamber; 
a burner within the firebox, at least one artificial log within the firebox adjacent to 
said burner and means for supporting said at least one log within the firebox; 
means for delivering a source of combustible gas to the burner; 
an exhaust opening in the top wall of the firebox; 
a catalytic converter positioned in the exhaust opening of the firebox and forming 
a secondary combustion chamber; and 
whereby exhaust products from the primary combustion chamber are received by 
the catalytic converter wherein secondary combustion takes place and the exhaust 
products from the secondary combustion chamber are received by the top room 
air plenum and are mixed with room air received by the rear room air plenum and 
exhausted into the room in which the fireplace is situated. 
The dispute in this appeal focuses on the emphasized term “rear walls,” in the firebox 
limitation above. This plural term was changed to the singular term “rear wall” in 
Superior’s certificate of correction . . . . 
In the course of prosecuting the [original] patent application, Superior submitted an 
amendment adding a new claim that eventually issued as claim 1. This claim initially 
recited “rear wall” in the firebox limitation. 
. . . 
On March 6, 1997, the examiner and a representative for Superior followed up [an] 
earlier meeting with a telephonic interview. This interview was also memorialized with 
an “Examiner Interview Summary Record,” mailed on March 11, 1997, in which the 
examiner stated that the claim in question would be modified “as set forth in the attached 
examiner's amendment.” That amendment shows, among other changes, that “rear wall” 
was amended to “rear walls.” A “Notice of Allowability” was also mailed on March 11, 
1997, thus indicating that the amended claim—with the revised expression “rear walls”—
was allowable. 
The examiner’s amendment also reminded Superior that “should the changes and/or 
additions be unacceptable to applicant, an amendment may be filed.” Superior did submit 
an amendment under 37 C.F.R. § 1.312 (“section 312 amendment”) three months later, on 
June 11, 1997, . . . [but] did not amend the claim term “rear walls,” and Superior submitted 
no further amendment before issuance. Consequently, the ’534 patent issued with the 
term “rear walls” on October 21, 1997. After the patent issued, Superior identified another 
nine errors and, on August 28, 1998, submitted a “Make–of–Record Letter” noting these 
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errors. The “Make–of–Record Letter” did not list any amendments to the claim term “rear 
walls.” 
Procedural History of Litigation 
On March 12, 1998, Superior filed a complaint against Majestic for infringement of the 
’534 patent. At some time after this, Majestic pointed out that the second limitation of 
claim 1 recited “rear walls.” Superior then proceeded to apply for a certificate of correction 
from the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), seeking to change the claim term from 
“rear walls” to “rear wall.”  
. . . The PTO granted this request, issuing a certificate of correction on August 17, 1999. 
We note that both requests were filed and the certificate was granted less than two years 
after the ’534 patent issued. Accordingly, Superior was within the two-year window for 
broadening reissues under 35 U.S.C. § 251, had it elected to pursue that route. 
The parties filed summary judgment motions and the district court determined that 
the certificate of correction issued by the PTO was invalid. The district court found, and it 
is not disputed on appeal, that both parties agreed that the accused devices do not contain 
more than one rear wall and that there can be no literal infringement if the claim is 
construed to require two or more rear walls. . . . [Additionally], the district court 
determined that there was no infringement under the DOE. Neither of the 
noninfringement findings are directly challenged on appeal, nor is the construction of the 
uncorrected claim. Thus, if we affirm the district court’s decision that the certificate is 
invalid, then noninfringement must follow. 
Burden of Persuasion 
Challenges to the validity of claims, whether regularly issued, issued after a 
reexamination pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–307, or issued after a reissue pursuant to 35 
U.S.C. §§ 251–252, must meet the clear and convincing standard of persuasion. This 
requirement is based on the presumption of validity.1 
1 Additionally, this court has noted previously that the imposition of this standard 
is related to the presumption that the PTO does its job properly. We observe that 
the PTO is presumed to have done its job in this case with regard to Superior’s 
certificate of correction. 
As explained above, the present challenge is a challenge to the validity of the certificate of 
correction. But since the effect of that challenge in the present case is to challenge the 
validity of a claim, the clear and convincing standard applicable under our precedent to 
other validity challenges should also apply to the present challenge to the validity of the 
certificate of correction. 
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Review of a “Clerical or Typographical Nature” 
The phrase “clerical or typographical nature” is not explicitly defined in § 255, so we 
first look to the plain meaning and common understanding of the phrase. A standard 
dictionary defines “clerical” as relating to an office clerk or office work, and defines 
“typographical” as relating to the setting of type, printing with type, or the arrangement 
of matter printed from type. Thus, clerical or typographical mistakes are generally 
understood to include simple mistakes such as obvious misspellings that are immediately 
apparent. Upon viewing such a misspelling, there is no doubt that a mistake, indeed a 
clerical or typographical mistake, has occurred. 
The parties dispute whether a § 255 clerical or typographical mistake may ever 
encompass a mistake that, upon correction, would broaden a claim. The common 
understanding of a clerical or typographical mistake certainly includes mistakes that, 
upon correction, would either broaden or narrow a claim. Majestic suggests, however, 
that a claim may only be broadened under the reissue provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 251. We 
acknowledge that Congress dealt with broadening reissues in detail in § 251 and that our 
interpretation of § 255 must consider the entire statutory scheme, including § 251. 
Although § 255, unlike § 251, does not expressly deal with broadening corrections, the 
words of § 255 do not preclude broadening corrections. We are hesitant to impose so great 
a limitation without express indication from the statute. Accordingly, we interpret § 255 
to allow broadening corrections of clerical or typographical mistakes. 
The parties also dispute whether a § 255 clerical or typographical mistake, the 
correction of which would broaden a claim, must be evident from the public record. This 
question arises from the observation that not all clerical or typographical mistakes are 
immediately apparent, and even where the mistake is apparent, it may not be clear how 
the mistake should be corrected. This leads to a classification of these typographical 
mistakes into three categories. Some mistakes are immediately apparent and leave no 
doubt as to what the mistake is. Examples of such errors include misspellings that leave 
no doubt as to the word which was intended; “frane” instead of “frame,” for example. In 
contrast, a second category includes those typographical mistakes not apparent to the 
reader at all; for example, a mistake resulting in another word that is spelled correctly and 
that reads logically in the context of the sentence. A third category of mistakes includes 
those where it is apparent that a mistake has been made, but it is unclear what the mistake 
is. Examples of such mistakes are those that create inconsistent terms, but leave unclear 
which of the conflicting terms is in error. It is not evident to the reader of the public record 
how to appropriately correct mistakes of the second and third categories. 
To help resolve which, if any, of these three categories of mistakes may be corrected 
under § 255, we again “consider not only the bare meaning of the words of § 255 but also 
their placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.” The statutory scheme here 
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encompasses 35 U.S.C. §§ 251–256, which govern the amendment and correction of 
patents. . . . 
Section 251 addresses the correction of an “error” and it is understood that corrections 
under § 251 can result in the broadening of a claim. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (allowing correction 
of an error in which “the patentee claimed less than he had a right to claim”). The 
patentee’s right to broaden a claim is not absolute, however. First, § 251 requires that the 
broadened claim be supported by the original specification. Id. (allowing a reissue only 
“for the invention disclosed in the original patent”). Second, § 251 precludes a patentee 
from applying for a broadening reissue more than two years after a patent has issued. 35 
U.S.C. § 251 (“No reissued patent shall be granted enlarging the scope of the claims of the 
original patent unless applied for within two years from the grant of the original patent.”). 
Third, and most important for our analysis, Congress further protected the public by 
providing intervening rights for the public with respect to claims that were broadened 
under § 251. 35 U.S.C. § 252 (providing intervening rights). 
. . . 
Having already determined that broadening corrections are encompassed in § 255, at 
least in certain circumstances, it is here that we place the weight of § 251 and § 252. 
Sections 251 and 252 evince the clear intent of Congress to protect the public against the 
unanticipated broadening of a claim after the grant of the patent by the PTO. It would be 
inconsistent with that objective to interpret § 255 to allow a patentee to broaden a claim 
due to the correction of a clerical or typographical mistake that the public could not 
discern from the public file and for which the public therefore had no effective notice. 
Such a broadening correction would leave the public without effective notice, without the 
constraint of a two-year time bar, and without the hope of intervening rights. 
. . . Both the Supreme Court and this court have highlighted the importance of the 
notice function of patent claims. Warner–Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 
17, 29 (1997) (discussing the impact of the doctrine of equivalents on “the definitional and 
public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement”); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558, 575 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (stating that 
“the notice function of patent claims has become paramount”), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 915 
(2001). Placing due weight on the public notice function of patent claims suggests that we 
should interpret § 255 to allow a broadening correction of a typographical error only 
where it is clearly evident from the specification, drawings, and prosecution history how 
the error should appropriately be corrected. Such an interpretation of § 255 insures that 
the public is provided with notice as to the scope of the claims. . . . 
. . . 
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We now review the district court’s summary judgment decision that the alleged “rear 
walls” mistake was not of a clerical or typographical nature. Applying the clear and 
convincing evidence standard to this validity challenge, we must affirm the district court’s 
holding if we find the absence of a genuine issue that the appropriate correction of the 
alleged “rear walls” mistake was not clearly evident from the intrinsic record. The 
intrinsic record, that is, the public record, consists of the original and corrected claims, the 
written description and drawings, and the prosecution history. 
The claim language in question recites “a firebox within the housing comprising a top 
wall, rear walls and side walls.” There is no grammatical error that suggests a mistake. 
The next limitation in the claim, however, refers to “the rear wall of the firebox.” Because 
that limitation refers to rear wall in the singular, with the definite article “the,” it does not 
agree with the earlier reference to rear walls in the plural. One of these limitations contains 
a mistake, but the claim does not indicate which is mistaken. 
. . . 
. . . [T]he prosecution history provides compelling evidence that “rear walls” was the 
correct phrase. Thus, the requested correction of the alleged mistake was not apparent 
from the specification, drawings, and prosecution history. The alleged mistake is, 
therefore, not a clerical or typographical mistake correctable under § 255. . . . 
Review of “Minor Character” 
We begin by interpreting the § 255 phrase “minor character.” This phrase is not 
explicitly defined in the statute, and so we begin with the plain meaning of the phrase. 
“Minor” is commonly defined as “lesser in importance or seriousness.” The scope of a 
patent claim is its very essence, and that with which the patentee and any competitors are 
most concerned. A mistake that, if corrected, would broaden the scope of a claim must 
thus be viewed as highly important and thus cannot be a mistake of “minor character.” 
Accordingly, based on the plain meaning of the statutory language, we interpret “a 
mistake of minor character” to exclude mistakes that broaden a claim. 
In the relevant claim limitation, the corrected claim recites only “rear wall” (singular), 
whereas the uncorrected claim recited “rear walls” (plural). The district court held, and 
Superior does not dispute, that the corrected claim is broader than the uncorrected claim, 
if both are properly construed in accordance with our case law. . . . 
. . . 
. . . [Therefore,] we conclude as a matter of law that it was not correctable by a 
certificate of correction under 35 U.S.C. § 255. 
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Conclusion 
Because the correction of the alleged mistake under § 255 broadened a claim and was 
not clearly evident from the specification, drawings, and prosecution history, we affirm 
the district court's summary judgment that Superior’s certificate of correction is invalid. 
. . . 
DYK, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
I agree with the majority that the PTO’s action in granting the certificate of correction 
is entitled to a presumption of validity that must be overcome with clear and convincing 
evidence. I also agree that the PTO is authorized, under 35 U.S.C. § 255, to issue certificates 
of correction for typographical or clerical mistakes that broaden the scope of the patent, 
for I share the majority’s hesitancy to interpret section 255 to prohibit broadening 
corrections “without express indication from the statute.” However, I part company with 
the majority when it reads into the statute a requirement that the error be apparent from 
the prosecution history, a requirement which is equally lacking an “express indication” in 
the statute. I accordingly dissent from the majority’s holding that the certificate of 
correction is invalid and from the majority’s decision affirming the grant of summary 
judgment of non-infringement. 
Mentor Corp. v. Coloplast Inc. 
998 F.2d 992 (Fed. Cir. 1993) 
LOURIE, Circuit Judge. 
Following a March 1992 jury verdict, judgment was entered against Coloplast, Inc., 
holding, inter alia, that all the original and reissued claims of Mentor Corporation’s U.S. 
Patent Re. 33,206 were willfully infringed [and] that the ’206 patent was not invalid . . . . 
Coloplast appeals on the issues of validity and infringement. . . . . 
Background 
In July 1989, Mentor sued Coloplast for infringement of U.S. Patent 4,475,910, entitled 
“Male Condom Catheter Having Adhesive on Rolled Portion.” While the lawsuit was 
pending, it was reissued as the ’206 patent and Coloplast filed a separate suit for a 
declaration of invalidity, unenforceability, and noninfringement of that patent. Mentor 
amended its complaint in the original action to allege infringement of the ’206 patent and 
the two cases were consolidated. 
The claimed invention relates to a condom catheter which is used on male patients 
suffering from incontinence. Claims 1–4 of the ’206 patent recite a catheter having a 
pressure sensitive adhesive on a non-stick (release) layer located on the outer surface of a 
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condom sheath prior to it being rolled up, such that on rolling the sheath outwardly, the 
adhesive on the outer surface comes into contact with and sticks to the inner surface. 
When unrolled, the adhesive which was initially applied to the release layer on the outer 
surface is thereby transferred to the inner surface.  
. . . 
Claims 6–9, which were added during reissue, do not recite the transfer of adhesive 
from the outer to the inner surface of the catheter.  
. . . 
Coloplast sells the Coloplast Self Sealing Urosheath, which is made by applying 
adhesive directly to the inner surface, the outer surface being coated with a non-stick, 
release layer. Use of the Coloplast device does not involve the transfer of adhesive from 
the outer to the inner surface. . . .  
Discussion 
Coloplast argues that claims 6–9 of the reissue patent are invalid because they are not 
based on “error” within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 251 . . . . Coloplast argues that Mentor 
deliberately and intentionally amended its claims in response to a prior art rejection and 
that such conduct is not reissuable error. Thus, it asserts, the court erred as a matter of 
law. We agree. 
. . . 
Section 251 provides in pertinent part: 
Whenever any patent is, through error without any deceptive intention, deemed 
wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, by reason of a defective specification or 
drawing, or by reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he had a right to 
claim in the patent, the Commissioner shall . . . reissue the patent for the invention 
disclosed in the original patent, and in accordance with a new and amended 
application, for the unexpired part of the term of the original patent. 
Reissue “error” is generally liberally construed, and we have recognized that “an 
attorney’s failure to appreciate the full scope of the invention” is not an uncommon defect 
in claiming an invention. However, the reissue procedure does not give the patentee “a 
second opportunity to prosecute de novo his original application.” 
. . . 
If a patentee tries to recapture what he or she previously surrendered in order to 
obtain allowance of original patent claims, that “deliberate withdrawal or amendment 
cannot be said to involve the inadvertence or mistake contemplated by 35 U.S.C. § 251, 
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and is not an error of the kind which will justify the granting of a reissue patent which 
includes the matter withdrawn.” “The recapture rule bars the patentee from acquiring, 
through reissue, claims that are of the same or of broader scope than those claims that were 
cancelled from the original application.” The recapture rule does not apply where there is 
no evidence that amendment of the originally filed claims was in any sense an admission 
that the scope of that claim was not in fact patentable, but that is not the situation here. 
During prosecution of the original patent application, the examiner rejected claim 1 as 
unpatentable over U.S. Patent 4,187,851 to Hauser in view of U.S. Patent 2,389,831 to 
Welsh and U.S. Patent 3,403,682 to McDonell. According to the examiner, Hauser lacked 
the positioning of an adhesive means between the rolls, which was taught by Welsh and 
McDonell. Mentor responded by replacing claim 1, which did not require “transfer” of 
adhesive from an outer layer to an inner layer, with a new claim 7, which read in part as 
follows: 
A male condom catheter comprising a thin cylindrical sheath member having an 
outer surface and an inner surface and the outer surface of the sheath member 
having a layer of pressure sensitive adhesive over a substantial portion thereof 
with a release layer between said adhesive and the outer surface of the sheath 
member so that as the sheath member is unrolled the adhesive on the outer surface 
is transferred to the [portion] of the inner surface in engagement with the outer 
surface to cause the inner surface to adhere to the penis over which the sheath is 
placed. 
The claims were again rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over McDonell in 
view of Welsh. The examiner stated that McDonell disclosed a male catheter with a sheath 
having an outer surface with adhesive and a release layer, and that Welsh showed a sheath 
with adhesive, which when unrolled was transferred from the outer surface to the inner 
surface. In response, Mentor further amended claim 7 to recite that as the sheath member 
is “rolled up the pressure sensitive adhesive on the outer surface is in direct contact with 
the inner surface of an adjacent roll so that as the sheath member is unrolled, the adhesive 
on the outer surface is transferred without rolling the catheter inside out . . . .” Mentor argued 
that “none of the references relied upon actually showed the transfer of adhesive from the 
outer surface to the inner surface as the sheath is rolled up and then unrolled.” Mentor 
characterized the prior art references as disclosing the “transfer” of adhesive from the 
outer to the inner surface solely by turning the sheath inside out so that the outer surface 
becomes the inner surface and the adhesive always remains on the same surface. 
Amended claim 7 then issued as claim 1 as a result of Mentor’s amendments and 
argument. 
. . . 
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Coloplast correctly argues that reissue claim 6, which does not include the adhesive 
transfer limitation, impermissibly recaptures what Mentor deliberately surrendered in the 
original prosecution. Specifically, the reissue claims do not contain the limitation that, 
during rolling and unrolling, the adhesive be transferred from the outer to the inner 
surface of the catheter. 
Error under the reissue statute does not include a deliberate decision to surrender 
specific subject matter in order to overcome prior art, a decision which in light of 
subsequent developments in the marketplace might be regretted. It is precisely because 
the patentee amended his claims to overcome prior art that a member of the public is 
entitled to occupy the space abandoned by the patent applicant. Thus, the reissue statute 
cannot be construed in such a way that competitors, properly relying on prosecution 
history, become patent infringers when they do so. In this case, Mentor narrowed its 
claims for the purpose of obtaining allowance in the original prosecution and it is now 
precluded from recapturing what it earlier conceded. 
Mentor argues that the reissue claims do not recapture subject matter surrendered 
during the original prosecution. Mentor specifically alleges that recapture is avoided 
because newly-added reissue claims 6–9 are materially narrower in some respects, albeit 
broader in others. 
Reissue claims that are broader in certain respects and narrower in others may avoid 
the effect of the recapture rule. If a reissue claim is broader in a way that does not attempt 
to reclaim what was surrendered earlier, the recapture rule may not apply. However, in 
this case, the reissue claims are broader than the original patent claims in a manner 
directly pertinent to the subject matter surrendered during prosecution. Mentor thus 
attempted to reclaim what it earlier gave up. Moreover, the added limitations do not 
narrow the claims in any material respect compared with their broadening. 
The limitation in claim 6 that the catheter material be “flexible” did not materially 
narrow the claims, which already recited that the material be “resilient.” Likewise, the 
limitation that the catheter be rolled outward to form a “single” roll did not materially 
limit the claims; the catheter can only be rolled and applied from a single end to form a 
single roll when the other end is connected to a urine collection means. Further, the 
addition of the words “thereon,” referring to the location of the adhesive release layer on 
the outer surface prior to unrolling, and “only,” referring to the adhering of the adhesive 
to the inner surface after unrolling, did not materially narrow the claims. 
Additionally, claims 7–9, which depend from claim 6, do not avoid recapture because 
they do not add any limitations, material in relation to the impermissible broadening, that 
distinguish them over claim 6, which we have determined is not a proper subject for 
reissue. . . . 
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Thus, since none of reissue claims 6–9 meets the legal requirements for reissue, the 
court erred in denying the motion for judgment of invalidity as a matter of law. We 
therefore reverse that part of the court's judgment finding claims 6–9 not invalid. . . . 
Seattle Box Co., Inc. v. Industrial Crating & Packing, Inc. 
756 F.2d 1574 (1985) 
DAVIS, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal is from a decision, on remand from this court, of the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Washington, which declined to accord appellants any 
intervening rights under 35 U.S.C. § 252 as to certain infringing products. We . . . reverse 
[the denial of intervening rights]. 
I 
Seattle Box Company (Seattle Box) and Industrial Crating and Packing, Inc. 
(Industrial) both provide oil pipe bundling services to oil companies. Seattle Box initiated 
the present action against Industrial on July 2, 1980, alleging the infringement of U.S. 
Patent No. 4,099,617 (’617) entitled “Shipping Bundle for Numerous Pipe Lengths.” On 
August 19, 1980, Seattle Box was granted reissue of the ’617 patent in U.S. Patent No. Re 
30,373 (Re ’373). Consequently, on October 10, 1980, Seattle Box amended its complaint, 
alleging infringement of the Re ’373 patent. 
Briefly, the patented invention defines a system of stacking (“bundling”) tiers of pipes 
across parallel horizontal beams or sleepers. [These are separated by spacer blocks.] Claim 
1 of the ’617 patent required that a spacer block have a height “greater than the diameter 
of the pipe.” However, in the Re ’373 patent, claim 1 was amended to specify a spacer 
block “of a height substantially equal to or greater than the thickness of the tier of pipe 
length.” (Emphasis in the claim.) 
[Seattle Box sued Industrial, alleging that its production of two sets of bundles—one 
incorporating spacer blocks that were 1/16” shorter than the diameter of the pipes in 
question, and one incorporating spacer blocks that were ¼” shorter than said diameter—
infringed its patents.] . . . On the issues of validity and infringement, the district court held 
in favor of Seattle Box . . . . [On the initial appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the validity 
findings.] But the district court’s finding of liability for pipe bundling activities Industrial 
performed before the Re ’373 patent issued was reversed because under the first paragraph 
of 35 U.S.C. § 252 the reissue claims were not “identical” to the original claims, and 
therefore infringement could only be asserted for the Re ’373 patent and not the '617 
patent. . . . Lastly, we vacated the district court’s award of post-reissue damages for 
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infringement of the Re ’373 patent, holding that the defense of intervening rights under 
the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 252 was properly raised. . . .  
On June 12, 1984, the district court held a hearing on the matters remanded from this 
court. As to the 84 bundles made with spacer blocks ¼ inch less than the pipe diameter, 
the district court held that these bundles did not infringe the Re ’373 patent. Supporting 
its assertion that the doctrine of intervening rights applies to the post-reissue bundles 
(there are 919 bundles in issue), Industrial presented the affidavit testimony of Vernon 
Zier, Industrial’s in-house accountant, who summarized Industrial’s business records. 
Zier averred that on August 19, 1980 (the date of the Re ’373 patent), there were orders for 
114 bundles which were subsequently completed after that date. In addition, Industrial’s 
inventory of spacer blocks on August 19, 1980 was sufficient to make 224 bundles (this 
figure incorporates the orders for the 114 bundles). Seattle Box has not contested these 
facts. 
After considering Industrial’s argument . . . , the district court merely stated in its final 
order on July 19, 1982 that: 
The 224 bundles were made after the grant of plaintiff’s reissue patent. Defendant 
has failed to persuade the court that good and valid reasons exist for the court to 
exercise its discretionary powers in favor of the Defendant as to intervening rights. 
The Court therefore declines to exercise its discretion in according any intervening 
rights as to the 224 bundles. 
It is from this order and the ensuing judgment that Industrial appeals. 
III 
The doctrine of intervening rights finds its roots in the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 252:  
(1) No reissued patent shall abridge or affect the right of any person or his 
successors in business who made, purchased or used prior to the grant of a reissue 
anything patented by the reissued patent, to continue the use of, or to sell to others 
to be used or sold, the specific thing so made, purchased or used, unless the 
making, using or selling of such thing infringes a valid claim of the reissued patent 
which was in the original patent. (2) The court before which such matter is in 
question may provide for the continued manufacture, use or sale of the thing 
made, purchased or used as specified, or for the manufacture, use or sale of which 
substantial preparation was made before the grant of the reissue, and it may also provide 
for the continued practice of any process patented by the reissue, practiced, or for 
the practice of which substantial preparation was made, prior to the grant of the reissue, 
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to the extent and under such terms as the court deems equitable for the protection 
of investments made or business commenced before the grant of the reissue. 
This section provides that when certain conditions are present a reissue shall not abridge 
or affect certain rights of those who acted before the reissue was granted. Because of such 
pre-reissue activity, an infringer might enjoy a “personal intervening right” to continue 
what would otherwise be infringing activity after reissue. The underlying rationale for 
intervening rights is that the public has the right to use what is not specifically claimed in 
the original patent. Recapture through a reissue patent of what is dedicated to the public 
by omission in the original patent is permissible under specific conditions, but not at the 
expense of innocent parties. Therefore, one may be able to continue to infringe a reissue 
patent if the court decides that equity dictates such a result.  
As we said in our first opinion, once the doctrine of intervening rights is properly 
raised, the court must consider whether to use its broad equity powers to fashion an 
appropriate remedy. We also held that the second sentence of the second paragraph in 35 
U.S.C. § 252 was to be applied in this case in accordance with equity. Accordingly, the 
district court should have considered the relevant facts as applied to the portion of the 
statute which questions whether “substantial preparation was made by the infringer 
before the grant of the reissue.” Specifically, the district court’s inquiry should have 
been—and it is now our burden to decide—whether the post-reissue use of the 224 
bundles which were made from pre-reissue spacer blocks constituted “substantial 
preparation” to merit the protection afforded by intervening rights, so as to protect 
“investments made . . . before the grant of reissue.” We stress that all those spacer blocks 
were on hand when the reissue patent issued. 
Two sets of the district court’s factual findings weigh heavily in the present equitable 
determination of the application of intervening rights. First, in the district court’s initial 
findings in its first decision, it was established that, prior to the Re ’373 patent, Industrial 
and its patent attorney were fully aware of the ’617 patent. Second, the district court found 
that Industrial continued manufacturing after reissue on the advice of its patent counsel. 
This advice-of-counsel was given to Industrial in April 1980, while the ’617 patent was 
still extant, some 3 months before the Re ’373 patent issued (August 17, 1980), and over 
two months before Industrial’s patent counsel was even informed by Seattle Box’s patent 
counsel (July 9, 1980) of the reissue patent claims which had been allowed by the 
examiner. This pre-reissue advice, followed by Industrial, was to hold the concave block 
height to about 1/16 of an inch shorter than the pipe diameter. From these facts, it is 
apparent that Industrial was attempting to design its spacer blocks (including those it held 
on the date of the reissue patent) “around” the original ’617 patent claims which called 
for a spacer block with a height “greater than the diameter of the pipe.” It turned out that 
these blocks infringed the reissue patent (Re ’373), but they plainly did not literally 
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infringe the original ’617 patent (and probably did not infringe that patent under the 
doctrine of equivalents). 
To enable Seattle Box now to recapture (in the form of damages for post-reissue use of 
the 224 bundles made from pre-reissue spacer blocks) matter which Seattle Box had 
already dedicated to the public in the original patent, at the expense of Industrial which 
knew of the precise claims of that ’617 patent, could open the door to a “gross injustice.” 
In these circumstances, the new reissue claims in this case present a compelling case for 
the application of the doctrine of intervening rights because a person should be able to 
make business decisions secure in the knowledge that those actions which fall outside the 
original patent claims are protected. Here, the spacer blocks involved were made or 
acquired, before the reissue, so as not to infringe the then existing ’617 patent. 
Another fact which weighs heavily is that at the time of reissue Industrial had existing 
orders for 114 bundles. As we have noted, the remedy of intervening rights is calculated 
to protect an infringer’s preexisting investments and business. Prior business 
commitments, such as previously placed orders and contracts, are one such example. 
Another important factor courts have considered is whether non-infringing goods can 
be manufactured from the inventory used to manufacture the infringing product. The cost 
and ease of converting infringing items to non-infringing items is an important equitable 
consideration because the “infringer” can then avoid a total loss of his good faith 
investment. In this case, the district court did not make any finding of the cost of 
conversion or of possible non-infringing uses. In addition, Industrial has not asked for the 
continued use (without liability) of goods on hand at the time of ultimate judgment . . . . 
In fact, the part of the inventory at issue here had already been fully used before the 
district court issued its first opinion on May 4, 1982 passing on the issues of validity and 
infringement.  
After weighing the facts and factors, we conclude that Industrial should clearly have 
been allowed to dispose of old inventory remaining on hand at the time of reissue, without 
liability to Seattle Box. The district court’s conclusion to the contrary was an abuse of 
discretion. 
V 
We reverse the district court’s holding that intervening rights does not preclude 
damages as to the 224 bundles made from pre-reissue spacer blocks, and hold that the 
doctrine of intervening rights does bar such damages. . . . 
NICHOLS, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. 
Industrial had on hand on the reissue date orders for 114 bundles and inventory 
sufficient to make 224 bundles, with a total investment of $30,539.36. As a source of § 252 
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equitable considerations, however, nothing in the inventory but the peculiar concave 
blocks were so processed as to be dedicated to this infringing use alone. They were worth 
60 cents each, and being 12,100 in number, all were worth $7,260. They have a powerful 
leverage indeed as they reduce the liability by approximately $43,000, for the panel clears 
Industrial of infringement of all 224 bundles because of them. 
As Industrial went right on infringing after filling 114 orders and using up the 12,100 
blocks, and other items in its inventory on the reissue date, necessarily purchasing more 
as needed, it is apparent it never intended to exercise equitable intervening rights as such. 
It does not come into equity with clean hands. Its attitude was one of complete contempt 
for both the original patent and the reissue. In these circumstances, I do not think the 
district judge abused his discretion in not making any adjustment for the unfilled orders 
or the blocks or other inventory items. If he had done so, it would have been, I think, also 
within his discretion, but if he had given Industrial, as the panel does, a free pass for as 
many as 224 infringements, I would have thought that an abuse of his discretion. Our 
suggested possible options in the first opinion respecting application of § 252 were 
predicated . . . on Industrial’s making a far more impressive show of its equities than it 
did in fact make. The statute, too, seems to me to visualize equities more impressive than 
unfilled orders and the mere existence in Industrial’s inventory of so many 60 cent blocks, 
bought in face of the plainest warnings. . . . 
2. Disclaimer 
Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Manufacturing Co. 
819 F.2d 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
FRIEDMAN, Circuit Judge. 
This case involves claims 7, 8, 10, and 14 of U.S. Patent No. 3,486,495 for a bow, issued 
to H.W. Allen and owned by Allen Archery, Inc. The bow as depicted in the Allen patent 
is shown below: 
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The district court described the invention the Allen patent covers as follows: 
The Allen Patent relates to an archery bow known in the archery industry and to 
archers as a “compound bow.” The bow comprises a handle section and a pair of 
limbs secured to the handle section, a pair of eccentric pulley members being 
respectively mounted on the ends of the limbs. A bowstring is trained around the 
pulley members to present a central stretch and a pair of end stretches (three line 
lacing). The central stretch includes a nocking point for receiving the slotted tail or 
nock of an arrow. The pulley members may be either oval shaped or round, but in 
either case they are mounted off center. . . . 
. . . 
The Allen patent issued in December 1969. It contained 14 claims. 
B 
Allen Archery filed complaints against the appellants/cross-appellees Browning, 
Browning Manufacturing, Bingham Projects, Elmont L. Bingham, and Joyce M. Bingham 
(referred to individually and collectively as Browning), in November 1977. Allen Archery 
filed two suits that charge patent infringement and, in the suit against Browning 
Manufacturing Company, breach of a patent licensing agreement. Browning countered 
with a suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the Allen patent was invalid and 
unenforceable and that Browning had not infringed it. The district court consolidated the 
three cases. 
Prior to filing those complaints in the Utah District Court, Allen Archery in February 
1976 had filed a suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California 
charging Jennings Compound Bow, et alia, with infringing the Allen patent. With the 
agreement of the parties, the district court in the present case stayed proceedings until the 
Jennings case was decided. 
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In June 1974, prior to the initiation of the above suits, Allen Archery filed with the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office a voluntary disclaimer of claims 1, 2, and 11 
of the Allen patent. After trial, the district court in the Jennings case held that claims 3 
through 6, and 12 and 13 of the Allen patent were invalid as anticipated by, and obvious 
in view of, certain other patents. The court further held, however, that claims 7, 8, 10, and 
14 of the Allen patent were valid and infringed. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed. Claim 9 apparently was not involved in Jennings, and it is not at issue here. 
In June 1983, Allen Archery disclaimed the six claims that the California court had 
held invalid in Jennings. 
C 
The present case then proceeded to trial before the Utah district court. . . . 
. . . 
In an opinion accompanied by detailed findings of fact and brief conclusions of law, 
the court held that . . . claims 7, 8, 10, and 14 of the Allen patent were valid and enforceable 
. . . . 
III 
Browning contends that the Allen patent is unenforceable ... [because] Allen Archery 
improperly failed to disclaim certain claims of the Allen patent before [the Patent and 
Trademark] Office . . . . 
Browning contends that under Maytag Co. v. Hurley Machine Co., 307 U.S. 243 (1939), 
Allen Archery’s failure to disclaim claims 3 to 6, 12, and 13 at the same time it disclaimed 
claims 1, 2, and 11, made all the claims of the Allen patent unenforceable. The Jennings 
case in the Ninth Circuit rejected this contention on the ground that the Maytag rule did 
not survive the “repeal” in the 1952 Patent Act of the provisions of the earlier Patent Act 
upon which Maytag rested.  The district court in the present case agreed with Jennings, 
and so do we. 
In Maytag, the patentee had disclaimed claim 38 after a court of appeals had held it 
invalid. The Supreme Court held that because claim 39 was not “definitely 
distinguishable” from claim 38,  “the patent is void for failure to disclaim claim 39 along 
with 38.”  The decision rested upon the Court's interpretation of sections 65 and 71 of title 
35 as they then read. 
Section 65, titled “Disclaimer,” provided that if, “without any fraudulent or deceptive 
intention, a patentee has claimed more than that of which he was the original or first 
inventor or discoverer, his patent shall be valid for all that part which is truly and justly 
his own,  and any such patentee may make disclaimer of such parts of the thing patented 
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as he shall not choose to claim.” Section 71 authorized a patentee whose claim was too 
broad under section 65 to sue for infringement of any portion of the patent “which was 
bona fide his own, if it is a material and substantial part of the thing patented, and 
definitely distinguishable from the parts claimed without right.” Section 71 continued: 
But in every such case in which a judgment or decree shall be rendered for the 
plaintiff no costs shall be recovered unless the proper disclaimer has been entered 
at the Patent Office before the commencement of the suit. But no patentee shall be 
entitled to the benefits of this section if he has unreasonably neglected or delayed 
to enter a disclaimer. 
In the 1952 revision of the patent statute, sections 65 and 71 were replaced by new sections 
253 and 288, respectively: 
§ 253. Disclaimer. 
Whenever, without any deceptive intention, a claim of a patent is invalid, the 
remaining claims shall not thereby be rendered invalid. A patentee . . . may . . . 
make disclaimer of any complete claim . . . .. 
§ 288. Action for infringement of a patent containing an invalid claim. 
Whenever, without deceptive intention, a claim of a patent is invalid, an action 
may be maintained for the infringement of a claim of the patent which may be 
valid. The patentee shall recover no costs unless a disclaimer of the invalid claim 
has been entered at the Patent Office before the commencement of the suit. 
Those changes eliminated the provision in section 71 that a patentee could sue for 
infringement of claims definitely distinguishable from the invalid claims unless “he has 
unreasonably neglected or delayed to enter a disclaimer.” Under the new statute, 
disclaimer was required only before filing suit, and the sanction for failing thus to disclaim 
was not invalidity of the patent but merely the denial of costs. 
Although in making these changes Congress did not specifically state that it intended 
to abrogate Maytag, that was the necessary effect of what Congress did. Maytag was 
expressly based on the statutory language that Congress deleted in 1952. Nevertheless, 
Browning argues that the “without deceptive intent” language in section 253 of the 
present law should be construed as continuing the patentee’s duty to disclaim. This 
argument fails, however, because the legislative history shows that Congress intended to 
eliminate the prior provision that failure to disclaim additional invalid claims made the 
remaining valid claims unenforceable. . . . The Senate Report on the bill stated: 
This subject of disclaimers, in the present law, has resulted in a great deal of 
confusion and uncertainty in certain situations in the law which at times are almost 
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ridiculous. Consequently, the bill in two sections, 253 and 288, has introduced 
certain changes relating to disclaimers. . . . 
[One of these] change[s] relates to the situation when a patent has two or more 
claims and one of them may be discovered to be invalid. There is now a provision 
in the statute under which an invalid claim must be disclaimed without 
unreasonable delay in order to save the rest of the patent. What delay is 
unreasonable is presently quite confusing, and the present law does not, as a 
matter of fact, prevent the patentee from suing again on the invalid claim if he so 
wishes. 
The bill has eliminated that requirement. It has left the situation so that if one claim 
of a patent is invalid, the patentee may take it out. He may sue on the remaining 
claims which have whatever validity they may have on their own merits. That is, 
one bad claim does not affect the other claims, unless they are also bad for similar 
reasons. 
Section 288 is the companion section to the disclaimer section, 253. 
S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1952 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 
2394, 2401–03. 
As the Ninth Circuit pointed out in Jennings, the “without deceptive intent” language 
in section 253 of the present law therefore cannot properly be construed as continuing the 
patentee’s duty to disclaim under the earlier provisions that the Supreme Court applied 
in Maytag. The Ninth Circuit there stated: 
Viewed in the context of the legislative history described above, the statute 
appears not to require any duty to disclaim an invalid claim as a condition for 
patent enforcement of a valid claim. It is significant that the two former sections 
also contained language remarkably similar to the “deceptive intent” language, 
independent of the duty to disclaim provisions. In the former statutes, then, 
“deceptive intent” did not refer to intent in failing to disclaim. There is no reason 
to suppose that the 1952 express deletion of the duty to disclaim was intended to 
place a new construction on the remaining “deceptive intent” language. We are 
thus led to the conclusion that under present law a disclaimer is never a 
prerequisite for enforcement of valid patent claims. 
686 F.2d at 783 (footnote omitted). 
We therefore agree with and adopt the Ninth Circuit’s conclusions in Jennings that 
“the failure of a patentee to disclaim an invalid patent claim does not prevent the patentee 
from enforcing any remaining claims in the same patent which are otherwise valid.”  




Patent remedies can include the equitable remedy of injunctive relief and money 
damages to compensate for past infringement. Monetary awards can also, in certain cases, 
include attorney fees and enhancements beyond mere compensation. In design patent 
cases, a restitutionary remedy can lead to sizeable awards and complex legal questions.  
A. Injunctive Relief 
The Patent Act provides that: 
The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant 
injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of 
any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable. 
35 U.S C. § 283. The topic of when patentees are entitled to injunctions became the subject 
of much debate (and litigation) in the years leading to—and immediately following—the 
case that follows. 
eBay v. MercExchange 
547 U.S. 388 (2006) 
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the court. 
Ordinarily, a federal court considering whether to award permanent injunctive relief 
to a prevailing plaintiff applies the four-factor test historically employed by courts of 
equity. Petitioners eBay Inc. and Half.com, Inc., argue that this traditional test applies to 
disputes arising under the Patent Act. We agree and, accordingly, vacate the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
 I 
Petitioner eBay operates a popular Internet Web site that allows private sellers to list 
goods they wish to sell, either through an auction or at a fixed price. Petitioner Half.com, 
now a wholly owned subsidiary of eBay, operates a similar Web site. Respondent 
MercExchange, L.L.C., holds a number of patents, including a business method patent for 
an electronic market designed to facilitate the sale of goods between private individuals 
by establishing a central authority to promote trust among participants. See U.S. Patent 
No. 5,845,265. MercExchange sought to license its patent to eBay and Half.com . . . but the 
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parties failed to reach an agreement. MercExchange subsequently filed a patent 
infringement suit against eBay and Half.com . . . . A jury found that MercExchange’s 
patent was valid, that eBay and Half.com had infringed that patent, and that an award of 
damages was appropriate.  
Following the jury verdict, the District Court denied MercExchange’s motion for 
permanent injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, 
applying its “general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent 
infringement absent exceptional circumstances.” We granted certiorari to determine the 
appropriateness of this general rule. 
II 
 According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent 
injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff 
must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available 
at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, 
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in 
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a 
permanent injunction. The decision to grant or deny permanent injunctive relief is an act 
of equitable discretion by the district court, reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion.  
  These familiar principles apply with equal force to disputes arising under the Patent 
Act. As this Court has long recognized, “a major departure from the long tradition of 
equity practice should not be lightly implied.” Nothing in the Patent Act indicates that 
Congress intended such a departure. To the contrary, the Patent Act expressly provides 
that injunctions “may” issue “in accordance with the principles of equity.” 
To be sure, the Patent Act also declares that “patents shall have the attributes of 
personal property,” § 261, including “the right to exclude others from making, using, 
offering for sale, or selling the invention,” § 154(a)(1). According to the Court of Appeals, 
this statutory right to exclude alone justifies its general rule in favor of permanent 
injunctive relief. But the creation of a right is distinct from the provision of remedies for 
violations of that right. Indeed, the Patent Act itself indicates that patents shall have the 
attributes of personal property “subject to the provisions of this title,” including, 
presumably, the provision that injunctive relief “may” issue only “in accordance with the 
principles of equity,” § 283. 
This approach is consistent with our treatment of injunctions under the Copyright Act. 
Like a patent owner, a copyright holder possesses “the right to exclude others from using 
his property.” Like the Patent Act, the Copyright Act provides that courts “may” grant 
injunctive relief “on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain 
infringement of a copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 502(a). And as in our decision today, this Court 
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has consistently rejected invitations to replace traditional equitable considerations with a 
rule that an injunction automatically follows a determination that a copyright has been 
infringed. 
. . . Although the District Court recited the traditional four-factor test, it appeared to 
adopt certain expansive principles suggesting that injunctive relief could not issue in a 
broad swath of cases. . . . 
In reversing the District Court, the Court of Appeals . . . . articulated a “general rule,” 
unique to patent disputes, “that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and 
validity have been adjudged.” The court further indicated that injunctions should be 
denied only in the “unusual” case, under “exceptional circumstances” and “‘in rare 
instances to protect the public interest.’” Just as the District Court erred in its categorical 
denial of injunctive relief, the Court of Appeals erred in its categorical grant of such relief.   
Because we conclude that neither court below correctly applied the traditional four-
factor framework that governs the award of injunctive relief, we vacate the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals, so that the District Court may apply that framework in the first 
instance. In doing so, we take no position on whether permanent injunctive relief should 
or should not issue in this particular case, or indeed in any number of other disputes 
arising under the Patent Act. We hold only that the decision whether to grant or deny 
injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts, and that such 
discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity, in patent 
disputes no less than in other cases governed by such standards.  
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
It is so ordered. 
Chief Justice ROBERTS, with whom Justice SCALIA and Justice GINSBURG join, 
concurring. 
I agree with the Court’s holding that “the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive 
relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts, and that such discretion 
must be exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity, in patent disputes no 
less than in other cases governed by such standards,” and I join the opinion of the Court. 
That opinion rightly rests on the proposition that “a major departure from the long 
tradition of equity practice should not be lightly implied.”  
From at least the early 19th century, courts have granted injunctive relief upon a 
finding of infringement in the vast majority of patent cases. This “long tradition of equity 
practice” is not surprising, given the difficulty of protecting a right to exclude through 
monetary remedies that allow an infringer to use an invention against the patentee’s 
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wishes—a difficulty that often implicates the first two factors of the traditional four-factor 
test. This historical practice, as the Court holds, does not entitle a patentee to a permanent 
injunction or justify a general rule that such injunctions should issue. At the same time, 
there is a difference between exercising equitable discretion pursuant to the established 
four-factor test and writing on an entirely clean slate. “Discretion is not whim, and 
limiting discretion according to legal standards helps promote the basic principle of 
justice that like cases should be decided alike.” When it comes to discerning and applying 
those standards, in this area as others, “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.”  
Justice KENNEDY, with whom Justice STEVENS, Justice SOUTER, and Justice 
BREYER join, concurring. 
The Court is correct, in my view, to hold that courts should apply the well-established, 
four-factor test—without resort to categorical rules—in deciding whether to grant 
injunctive relief in patent cases. The Chief Justice is also correct that history may be 
instructive in applying this test. The traditional practice of issuing injunctions against 
patent infringers, however, does not seem to rest on “the difficulty of protecting a right to 
exclude through monetary remedies that allow an infringer to use an invention against 
the patentee’s wishes.” Both the terms of the Patent Act and the traditional view of 
injunctive relief accept that the existence of a right to exclude does not dictate the remedy 
for a violation of that right. To the extent earlier cases establish a pattern of granting an 
injunction against patent infringers almost as a matter of course, this pattern simply 
illustrates the result of the four-factor test in the contexts then prevalent. The lesson of the 
historical practice, therefore, is most helpful and instructive when the circumstances of a 
case bear substantial parallels to litigation the courts have confronted before.  
In cases now arising trial courts should bear in mind that in many instances the nature 
of the patent being enforced and the economic function of the patent holder present 
considerations quite unlike earlier cases. An industry has developed in which firms use 
patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining 
licensing fees. See FTC, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent 
Law and Policy, ch. 3, pp. 38–39 (Oct. 2003). For these firms, an injunction, and the 
potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as a bargaining 
tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent. 
See ibid. When the patented invention is but a small component of the product the 
companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue 
leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the 
infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest. In addition injunctive 
relief may have different consequences for the burgeoning number of patents over 
business methods, which were not of much economic and legal significance in earlier 
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times. The potential vagueness and suspect validity of some of these patents may affect 
the calculus under the four-factor test. 
The equitable discretion over injunctions, granted by the Patent Act, is well suited to 
allow courts to adapt to the rapid technological and legal developments in the patent 
system. For these reasons it should be recognized that district courts must determine 
whether past practice fits the circumstances of the cases before them. With these 
observations, I join the opinion of the Court. 
Context & Application 
1.  Do you think that MercExchange wanted eBay to stop conducting online auctions? 
If not, why did MercExchange seek an injunction? Do you think most patent owners want 
to stop accused infringers? Does your answer depend on the business model of the patent 
holder? What does it tell us about patent law remedies if the answer is that many patent 
owners do not want an injunction?  
2. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in eBay describes entities that “use patents not as a 
basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.” 
These types of firms are sometimes referred to as “non-practicing entities” (NPEs) or 
“patent assertion entities” (PAEs). Some PAEs are pejoratively referred to as “trolls,” 
based on their potential to extract settlements based on litigation costs rather than patent 
value. For a discussion that breaks down different business models that may all fit into 
the “troll” category and a call to address market distortions rather than “bad” actors, see 
Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2117 (2013).  
3. Following eBay v. MercExchange, courts have used the first two prongs of the test—
irreparable injury and adequacy of money damages—to address the types of concerns 
raised in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. Courts have continued to issue injunctions when 
patent holders show that they are competitors who have lost market share as a result of 
infringement. For a suggestion that the public interest factor should play a greater role in 
determining whether an injunction is appropriate, see Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Tailoring 
Remedies to Spur Innovation, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 733, 751 (2012) 
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B. Money Damages 
1. Section 284 
Section 284 damages are meant to provide compensatory relief. The statute provides: 
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages 
adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a 
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with 
interest and costs as fixed by the court. 
35 U.S.C. § 284. Damages begin to accrue when there is notice or constructive notice of 
infringement. Constructive notice may be satisfied by marking a product with “patent” 
or “pat.” and the patent number. 35 U.S.C. § 287; see Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 
F.3d 1437, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that damages under 35 U.S.C. § 289, like § 284 
damages, are subject to the marking requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 287). 
These compensatory damages usually take one of two forms: the patent holder’s lost 
profits attributable to the infringement or the amount of a reasonable royalty payment. 
When available, lost profits tend to be larger and therefore more desirable for patent 
holders who commercialize their own inventions. (Do you see why?) However, 
sometimes lost profits damages can be difficult to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence, because they require a factfinder to determine what profit the patentee would 
have made in the absence of the defendant’s infringement. Proving this counterfactual is 
often difficult to do without inappropriate speculation. When lost profits damages are not 
available, reasonable royalties set a floor on monetary relief. Section 284 pointedly says 
courts “shall award” damages “in no event less than a reasonable royalty.” The courts 
must then grapple with the question of what royalty the parties would have agreed to, 
had they agreed—another difficult counterfactual for parties embroiled in litigation. 
a. Lost Profits 
BIC Leisure Products, Inc. v. Windsurfing International, Inc. 
1 F.3d 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1993) 
RADER, Circuit Judge. 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York awarded 
Windsurfing International, Inc. lost profits for BIC Leisure Products, Inc.’s infringement 
of U.S. Reissue Patent No. 31,167. . . . Assuming BIC had not been in the market, 
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Windsurfing did not show that BIC’s customers would have purchased sailboards from 
Windsurfing and other manufacturers in proportion to their market shares. Therefore, this 
court reverses the award of lost profits based upon Windsurfing’s market share. 
Otherwise, this court affirms. 
Background 
BIC infringed Windsurfing’s Reissue Patent No. 31,167, which covers sailboards. 
Windsurfing seeks damages from BIC for the period from March 8, 1983 (the reissue date 
of Windsurfing’s patent) to September 30, 1985 (the date the district court enjoined BIC 
from further infringement). 
Windsurfing primarily manufactured and marketed sailboards embodying its 
patented invention for the “One–Design Class.” . . . 
Windsurfing licensed its patented technology extensively. Windsurfing licensed at 
least twelve companies in Europe. At least one of the European licensees granted 
sublicenses to other European manufacturers. Windsurfing also granted licenses in the 
United States. Eventually, Windsurfing licensed twelve companies in the United States. 
With few exceptions, Windsurfing charged 7.5% of net sales for the U.S. licenses. All of 
the U.S. licensees, as well as some of the European licensees, competed against 
Windsurfing in the United States. 
Windsurfing manufactured its boards using a rotomolding process. During the early 
1980s, many of Windsurfing’s competitors reduced their production costs with a new 
blowmolding process. Instead of switching to the more efficient blowmolding process, 
Windsurfing invested one million dollars in an unsuccessful attempt to improve its 
rotomolding process. Windsurfing controlled 29.2% of the sailboard market in 1983, 25.6% 
in 1984, and 13.6% in 1985. 
BIC began selling sailboards in 1981. BIC manufactured with the more efficient 
blowmolding process. BIC did not sell sailboards with the One Design hull form. Rather, 
BIC’s sailboards differed from Windsurfing’s products. BIC instead sold boards at the 
lower end of the market’s price spectrum, reflecting its decision to target the entry level 
segment of the sailboard market. 
In comparison, Windsurfing priced its sailboards at the upper end of the sailboard 
price spectrum. During the years covered by the damages period, U.S. sailboard dealers 
charged the following average prices: 
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The Patent and Trademark Office reissued Windsurfing’s patent on March 8, 1983. On 
that date, BIC had 5,245 sailboards in its inventory and another 5,625 on order. BIC 
confirmed its purchase of the boards on order with a February 10, 1983 telex. 
The district court applied the Panduit test to determine whether  Windsurfing lost 
profits. The district court required Windsurfing to show (1) a demand for the patented 
product, (2) the absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes, (3) its capacity to exploit 
the demand, and (4) the profits lost due to the infringement. The district court modified 
the Panduit test by presuming that Windsurfing would have captured a share of BIC’s 
sales in proportion to Windsurfing’s share of the sailboard market. Relying on  State 
Industries, Inc. v. Mor–Flo Industries, Inc., 883 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1989), the district court 
awarded Windsurfing lost profits based upon its pro rata percentage of BIC’s sales for 
each year of the damages period.  In addition, the district court awarded Windsurfing lost 
royalties for the boards its licensees would have sold absent BIC’s infringement. The court 
calculated the amount of lost royalties based upon a weighted average price of the boards 
sold by the licensees.  
Lost Profits 
Section 284 of title 35 provides: 
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages 
adequate to compensate for the infringement but in no event less than a reasonable 
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer. 
The finding of the amount of damages for patent infringement is a question of fact on 
which the patent owner bears the burden of proof. Where the district court fixes the 
amount of damages, this court reviews that finding under the clearly erroneous standard 
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). 
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 To recover lost profits as opposed to royalties, a patent owner must prove a causal 
relation between the infringement and its loss of profits. The patent owner must show that 
“but for” the infringement, it would have made the infringer’s sales.  An award of lost 
profits may not be speculative. Rather the patent owner must show a reasonable 
probability that, absent the infringement, it would have made the infringer’s sales.   
 The district court clearly erred by failing to apply the “but for” test before awarding 
lost profits. The record in this case does not evince a reasonable probability that 
Windsurfing would have made its pro rata share of BIC’s sales had BIC not been in the 
market. During the period in question, at least fourteen competitors vied for sales in the 
sailboard market with prices ranging from $234 to $837. BIC’s boards sold for $312 to $407; 
Windsurfing’s boards sold for $571 to $670—a difference of over $250 or about 60–80% 
above BIC’s selling range. Because Windsurfing concentrated on the One Design class hull 
form and BIC did not, Windsurfing’s boards differed fundamentally from BIC’s boards. 
The record contains uncontradicted evidence that demand for sailboards is relatively 
elastic. The record further contains uncontradicted evidence that the sailboard market’s 
entry level, in which BIC competed, is particularly sensitive to price disparity. By 
purchasing BIC sailboards, BIC’s customers demonstrated a preference for sailboards 
priced around $350, rather than One–Design boards priced around $600. Therefore, 
without BIC in the market, BIC’s customers would have likely sought boards in the same 
price range. 
Several manufacturers offered sailboards at prices much closer to BIC than to 
Windsurfing. At least two of Windsurfing’s licensees, O’Brien and HiFly, sold boards 
resembling BIC’s in the same distribution channels as BIC. On this record, Windsurfing 
did not show with reasonable probability that BIC’s customers would have purchased 
from Windsurfing in proportion with Windsurfing’s market share. The record shows 
rather that the vast majority of BIC’s customers would have purchased boards from 
O’Brien or HiFly if BIC’s boards had not been available. The district court erred in 
assuming that, without BIC in the market, its customers would have redistributed their 
purchases among all the remaining sailboards, including Windsurfing’s One Design 
boards at a price $200 to $300 more than BIC’s.  
Moreover, Windsurfing’s sales continued to decline after the district court enjoined 
BIC’s infringement. This aspect of the record shows as well that Windsurfing did not 
capture its market share of the sales replacing BIC’s market sales. According to the record, 
the principal beneficiary of BIC’s exit appears to be O’Brien. 
The district court applied the Panduit test for lost profits. Properly applied, the Panduit 
test is an acceptable, though not an exclusive, test for determining “but for” causation. 
The Panduit test, however, operates under an inherent assumption, not appropriate in this 
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case, that the patent owner and the infringer sell products sufficiently similar to compete 
against each other in the same market segment. If the patentee’s and the infringer’s 
products are not substitutes in a competitive market, Panduit‘s first two factors do not 
meet the “but for” test—a prerequisite for lost profits. 
The first Panduit factor—demand for the patented product—presupposes that 
demand for the infringer’s and patent owner’s products is interchangeable. Under this 
assumption, evidence of sales of the infringing product may suffice to show Panduit’s first 
factor, “demand for the patented product.” E.g., Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 
735 F.2d 549, 552 (Fed. Cir. 1984). This analysis assumes that the patent owner and the 
infringer sell substantially the same product. In Gyromat, for instance, the patent owner’s 
and the infringer’s products were similar in price and product characteristics. If the 
products are not sufficiently similar to compete in the same market for the same 
customers, the infringer’s customers would not necessarily transfer their demand to the 
patent owner’s product in the absence of the infringer’s product. In such circumstances, 
as in this case, the first Panduit factor does not operate to satisfy the elemental “but for” 
test. 
Similarly, the second Panduit factor—absence of acceptable, noninfringing 
alternatives—presupposes that the patentee and the infringer sell substantially similar 
products in the same market. To be acceptable to the infringer’s customers in an elastic 
market, the alleged alternative “must not have a disparately higher price than or possess 
characteristics significantly different from the patented product.”  Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, 
Inc., 926 F.2d 1136, 1142 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing Gyromat, 735 F.2d at 553). In Kaufman, for 
instance, the patent owner and the infringer sold substantially the same product. Thus 
Panduit‘s second factor, properly applied, ensures that any proffered alternative 
competes in the same market for the same customers as the infringer’s product.  
This court has held that a patent owner may satisfy the second Panduit element by 
substituting proof of its market share for proof of the absence of acceptable substitutes.  
This market share approach allows a patentee to recover lost profits, despite the presence 
of acceptable, noninfringing substitutes, because it nevertheless can prove with 
reasonable probability sales it would have made “but for” the infringement. Like Panduit‘s 
second prong, however, this market share test also assumes that the patent owner and the 
infringer compete in the same market. In State Industries, for instance, the patent owner, 
infringer, and the other manufacturers sold substantially similar products.  This similarity 
of products is necessary in order for market share proof to show correctly satisfaction of 
Panduit‘s second factor. 
The assumption underlying Panduit, Gyromat, and State Industries is not appropriate 
in this case. Instead, the record reveals that . . . the sailboard market was not a unitary 
market in which every competitor sold substantially the same product. Windsurfing and 
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BIC sold different types of sailboards at different prices to different customers. As noted, 
their sailboards differed significantly in terms of price, product characteristics, and 
marketing channels. On the facts of this case, Windsurfing did not show “but for” 
causation under a correct application of Panduit or otherwise. The district court erred in 
awarding lost profits. 
Moreover, Windsurfing itself set the value of its patent rights by licensing its 
technology to nearly every company supplying sailboards in the United States without 
competing itself in most sailboard submarkets. Windsurfing valued its patent in terms of 
licensing royalties, not in terms of profits it could make by excluding others from the 
market. Without evidence to support Windsurfing’s claim to lost profits, this court 
reverses the district court’s award. 
With regard to royalties, Windsurfing is entitled to receive lost royalties (on amounts 
Windsurfing’s licensees would have paid “but for” the infringement) and reasonable 
royalties (on amounts of any other BIC use, if any, of the patented invention). BIC 
challenges the methodology of the district court in calculating lost royalties per board, but 
this court concludes that the chosen methodology was within the court’s discretion. On 
remand, the trial court may award damages  based upon the lost royalties per board 
calculation. 
Price Erosion 
 The district court evaluated the documentary and testimonial evidence on price 
erosion and found it too speculative to support an award of price erosion lost profits. This 
court finds nothing clearly erroneous in the district court’s finding. 
The record shows that other market forces, not BIC, forced Windsurfing to lower its 
prices. The record is replete with evidence that funboards, wave boards, and other designs 
replaced One Design boards as the sailboard of choice for many practitioners. Besides 
reducing the demand for One Design boards, consumer choices also caused many 
companies to discount their stock of One Design boards to make room for the newer 
boards. 
Furthermore, Windsurfing licensed many competitors who produced boards at less 
cost. The more efficient blowmolding process allowed Windsurfing’s competitors to cut 
prices. Windsurfing’s own licensing policies exacerbated this problem. When the 
European market peaked in the early 1980s, Windsurfing’s European licensees sold their 
excess inventory in the United States. The influx of European boards increased the supply 
of sailboards and further reduced prices. In light of these facts, the district court correctly 
found that Windsurfing failed to meet its burden of proof. Simply put, Windsurfing did 
not prove that it could have sold its boards at higher prices “but for” BIC’s infringement. 
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Context & Application 
1. What types of evidence does the court look to when calculating lost profits? Do 
any of these types of evidence strike you as more or less reliable? 
2. In BIC, the court refers to the factors set forth in Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre 
Works: 
To obtain as damages the profits on sales he would have made absent the 
infringement, i.e., the sales made by the infringer, a patent owner must prove: 
(1) demand for the patented product, (2) absence of acceptable noninfringing 
substitutes, (3) his manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the demand, 
and (4) the amount of the profit he would have made. 
575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978). Must a party seeking an award of lost profits put forth 
evidence on all of these factors? Are all of these factors likely to be equally helpful or 
relevant in all cases?  
C. Reasonable Royalty 
When lost profits are not available, courts use a reasonable royalty as a measure of 
compensatory damages for patent infringement.  
Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc. 
580 F.3d 1301 (2009) 
MICHEL, Chief Judge. 
In December 1986, three computer engineers at AT&T filed a patent application, which 
eventually issued as U.S. Patent No. 4,763,356 (the “Day patent”), later assigned to Lucent. 
The patent “is generally directed to a method of entering information into fields on a 
computer screen without using a keyboard.” A user fills in the displayed fields by 
choosing concurrently displayed, predefined tools adapted to facilitate the inputting of 
the information in a particular field, wherein the predefined tools include an on-screen 
graphical keyboard, a menu, and a calculator. The system may display menus of 
information for filling in a particular field and may also be adapted to communicate with 
a host computer to obtain the information that is inserted into the fields. In addition, one 
of the displayed fields can be a bit-mapped graphics field, which the user fills in by writing 
on the touch screen using a stylus.  
. . .  
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At trial, Lucent charged infringement by Microsoft of claims 19 and 21, among others, 
of the Day patent. Lucent alleged indirect infringement of claim 19 based on the sales and 
use of Microsoft Money, Microsoft Outlook, and Windows Mobile. 
. . . 
Figure 5 of the Day patent, shown below, illustrates an embodiment of the invention 
in which a graphical calculator overlays the form having multiple fields, one of which—
“Quantity” (Qty 61)—is highlighted. 
 
IV 
Based on the evidence of record, Microsoft (and Dell) sold approximately 110 million 
units of the three software products capable of practicing the methods of the asserted 
claims. The total dollar value of the sales was approximately $8 billion. At trial, Lucent's 
theory of damages was based on 8% of sales revenue for the accused software products, 
and it asked the jury to award $561.9 million based on Microsoft's infringing sales. 
Microsoft countered that a lump-sum payment of $6.5 million would have been the correct 
amount for licensing the protected technology.  
Microsoft challenges the jury’s damages award on several bases. First, Microsoft 
argues that the jury should not have applied the entire market value rule to the value of 
its three software products. Microsoft’s second argument for reversing the damages 
award is that, for method claims, Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 
1263 (Fed. Cir. 2004), requires that damages be limited to the proven number of instances 
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of actual infringing use. Microsoft states that, “under Dynacore, Lucent had to tie its 
damages claim to demonstrated instances of direct infringement.” For the reasons stated 
below, we reject both arguments as presented by Microsoft. We agree, nevertheless, with 
Microsoft’s argument that substantial evidence does not support the jury's verdict of a 
lump-sum royalty payment of $357,693,056.18. Further, to the extent the jury relied on an 
entire market value calculation to arrive at the lump-sum damages amount, that award is 
not supported by substantial evidence and is against the clear weight of the evidence. 
Reasonable Royalty 
“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate 
to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the 
use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the 
court.” 35 U.S.C. § 284. As the Supreme Court has framed the general issue of determining 
damages, at least for competitors, a court must ask, “Had the Infringer not infringed, what 
would the Patent Holder have made?” In the Supreme Court’s words, awarding damages 
through litigation attempts to assess “the difference between the patentee’s pecuniary 
condition after the infringement, and what his condition would have been if the 
infringement had not occurred.” Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 552 (1886).  
. . . 
Litigants routinely adopt several approaches for calculating a reasonable royalty. The 
first, the analytical method, focuses on the infringer’s projections of profit for the 
infringing product. The second, more common approach, called the hypothetical 
negotiation or the “willing licensor-willing licensee” approach, attempts to ascertain the 
royalty upon which the parties would have agreed had they successfully negotiated an 
agreement just before infringement began. See Georgia–Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 
318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.1970). The hypothetical negotiation tries, as best as 
possible, to recreate the ex ante licensing negotiation scenario and to describe the resulting 
agreement. In other words, if infringement had not occurred, willing parties would have 
executed a license agreement specifying a certain royalty payment scheme. The 
hypothetical negotiation also assumes that the asserted patent claims are valid and 
infringed. 
In the present appeal, the parties, in offering the damages evidence, each adopted the 
hypothetical negotiation approach, without objection. We review the damages award 
within the Georgia–Pacific framework. 
Before the district court, Lucent asked for a damages award based only on a running 
royalty. Microsoft, on the other hand, told the jury that the damages should be a lump-
sum royalty payment of $6.5 million. Based on the verdict form, the jury decided on a 
lump-sum award, not a running royalty. The verdict form notes a lump-sum damages 
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amount and no amount (i.e., zero or “N/A”) on the lines for a running royalty. Faced with 
the jury's selection, our task is to determine whether substantial evidence supports a 
lump-sum, paid-in-full royalty of approximately $358 million for Microsoft’s indirect 
infringement of the Day patent. To do this, we must decide whether substantial evidence 
supports the jury's implicit finding that Microsoft would have agreed to, at the time of the 
hypothetical negotiation, a lump-sum, paid-in-full royalty of about $358 million. In 
performing this analysis, we focus mainly on the damages case as it applies to Microsoft 
Outlook, as infringement by the use of Outlook apparently constituted the vast majority 
of the award. We focus also on the relevant Georgia–Pacific factors, as presented to the jury 
through all the evidence and particularly the experts’ testimony. 
Factor 2 
The second Georgia–Pacific factor is “the rates paid by the licensee for the use of other 
patents comparable to the patent in suit.” This factor examines whether the licenses relied 
on by the patentee in proving damages are sufficiently comparable to the hypothetical 
license at issue in suit. Subsumed within this factor is the question of whether the licensor 
and licensee would have agreed to a lump-sum payment or instead to a running royalty 
based on ongoing sales or usage. 
Significant differences exist between a running royalty license and a lump-sum 
license. In a standard running royalty license, the amount of money payable by the 
licensee to the patentee is tied directly to how often the licensed invention is later used or 
incorporated into products by the licensee. A running royalty structure shifts many 
licensing risks to the licensor because he does not receive a guaranteed payment. Royalties 
are dependent on the level of sales or usage by the licensee, which the licensee can often 
control. 
Compared to a running royalty analysis, a lump-sum analysis involves different 
considerations. A lump-sum license “benefits the patentholder in that it enables the 
company to raise a substantial amount of cash quickly and benefits the target [i.e., the 
licensee] by capping its liability and giving it the ability, usually for the remainder of the 
patent term, to actually use the patented technology in its own products without any 
further expenditure.” RICHARD F. CAULEY, WINNING THE PATENT DAMAGES CASE 47 
(2009). The lump-sum license removes or shifts certain risks inherent in most arms-length 
agreements. A lump-sum license removes any risk that the licensee using the patented 
invention will underreport, e.g., engage in false reporting, and therefore underpay, as can 
occur with a running royalty agreement. Additionally, for both contracting parties, the 
lump-sum license generally avoids ongoing administrative burdens of monitoring usage 
of the invention. 
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A further, important consideration is that an upfront, paid-in-full royalty removes, as 
an option for the licensee, the ability to reevaluate the usefulness, and thus the value, of 
the patented technology as it is used and/or sold by the licensee. As generally employed, 
once a lump-sum license is duly executed, the licensee is obligated to pay the entire, 
agreed-upon amount for the licensed technology, regardless of whether the technology is 
commercially successful or even used. A licensee to a lump-sum agreement, under usual 
licensing terms, cannot later ask for a refund from the licensor based on a subsequent 
decision not to use the patented technology. There is no provision for buyer's remorse. 
The lump-sum structure also creates risks for both parties. The licensed technology 
may be wildly successful, and the licensee may have acquired the technology for far less 
than what later proved to be its economic value. The alternative risk, of course, is the 
licensee may have paid a lump-sum far in excess of what the patented invention is later 
shown to be worth in the marketplace. 
As noted, Lucent’s licensing expert, Roger Smith, argued for damages based solely on 
a running royalty rate. Smith emphasized his choice of a running royalty over a lump-
sum payment. 
Q:  Now, in each case, in the other patents in suit and then finally the Day 356 form 
entry patent, in each case you've selected a running royalty structure for your 
reasonable royalty; is that right? 
A:  I certainly did, yes. 
He also explained that “the running royalty in a hypothetical negotiation such as the one 
we're considering here would be appropriate, even though lump-sum does have the 
advantage that brings the money up front or at least some of it.” 
On appeal, however, Lucent defends the damages award, contending that substantial 
evidence supports the lump-sum award of about $358 million. This is problematic for 
several reasons. First, no evidence of record establishes the parties’ expectations about 
how often the patented method would be used by consumers. Second, the jury heard little 
factual testimony explaining how a license agreement structured as a running royalty 
agreement is probative of a lump-sum payment to which the parties would have agreed. 
Third, the license agreements for other groups of patents, invoked by Lucent, were created 
from events far different from a license negotiation to avoid infringement of the one patent 
here, the Day patent. 
Parties agreeing to a lump-sum royalty agreement may, during the license 
negotiation, consider the expected or estimated usage (or, for devices, production) of a 
given invention, assuming proof is presented to support the expectation, because the more 
frequently most inventions are used, the more valuable they generally are and therefore 
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the larger the lump-sum payment. Conversely, a minimally used feature, with all else 
being equal, will usually command a lower lump-sum payment. In this case, Lucent 
identifies no documentary evidence or testimony showing the parties’ expectations as to 
usage of the claimed method. Lucent submitted no evidence upon which a jury could 
reasonably conclude that Microsoft and Lucent would have estimated, at the time of the 
negotiation, that the patented date-picker feature would have been so frequently used or 
valued as to command a lump-sum payment that amounts to approximately 8% of the 
sale price of Outlook.  
Lucent’s expert Mr. Smith did try to explain how one would calculate what an 
acceptable lump-sum would be. 
Q: Well, when one is considering what the magnitude of a lump-sum payment 
might be, does one ever look at what the expected royalty—total royalty would be 
produced by a running royalty based on the available information at that time? 
A:  That generally is the way a lump sum would be determined, by looking at 
what the running royalty—what the value of each use of the patent might be and 
then speculating as to the extent of the future use. 
But an explanation urging jurors to rely on speculation, without more, is often insufficient. 
In short, Smith’s testimony could be interpreted as suggesting to the jury that it was 
proper to “speculate” as to the proper lump-sum damages amount even though he may 
have intended the word “speculate” to mean “estimate.” 
Despite this shortcoming in its evidence, Lucent relies on eight varied license 
agreements which purportedly support the jury’s lump-sum damages award. When we 
examine these license agreements, along with the relevant testimony, we are left with two 
strong conclusions. First, some of the license agreements are radically different from the 
hypothetical agreement under consideration for the Day patent. Second, with the other 
agreements, we are simply unable to ascertain from the evidence presented the subject 
matter of the agreements, and we therefore cannot understand how the jury could have 
adequately evaluated the probative value of those agreements. 
Only four of the eight agreements purport to be lump-sum agreements: (1) a 1993 
agreement between Dell and IBM for $290 million; (2) a 1996 agreement between 
Microsoft and Hewlett–Packard for $80 million; (3) a 1997 agreement between Microsoft 
and Apple Computer for $93 million; and (4) a 1999 agreement between Microsoft and 
Inprise for $100 million. … 
. . . 
Lucent had the burden to prove that the licenses were sufficiently comparable to 
support the lump-sum damages award. The law does not require an expert to convey all 
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his knowledge to the jury about each license agreement in evidence, but a lump-sum 
damages award cannot stand solely on evidence which amounts to little more than a 
recitation of royalty numbers, one of which is arguably in the ballpark of the jury’s award, 
particularly when it is doubtful that the technology of those license agreements is in any 
way similar to the technology being litigated here. 
Lucent also cites four running-royalty license agreements which purportedly provide 
substantial evidence supporting a lump-sum damages award of approximately $358 
million. A significant shortcoming of these agreements is their “running-royalty” nature, 
however. . . . For a jury to use a running-royalty agreement as a basis to award lump-sum 
damages, however, some basis for comparison must exist in the evidence presented to the 
jury. In the present case, the jury had almost no testimony with which to recalculate in a 
meaningful way the value of any of the running royalty agreements to arrive at the lump-
sum damages award. 
Additionally, in its brief before us, Lucent appears to misunderstand the nature of a 
per-unit royalty. Lucent appears to consider a per-unit royalty as being equivalent to a 
lump-sum royalty. What that statement ignores is the relationship between product 
revenues and per-unit running royalties. A per-unit running royalty is paid based on the 
number of units ultimately sold (or made, etc.), which is of course directly related to 
product revenues. As more units are sold, more revenue is earned and more royalties are 
paid. If the licensee chooses to omit the patented feature from its commercial product, the 
licensee will generally owe no per-unit royalty. Thus, a per-unit running royalty 
agreement differs from a lump-sum agreement in the same general ways a percentage-of-
price running royalty agreement differs from a lump-sum agreement.  
Furthermore, the running royalty agreements put into evidence, as with the lump-
sum agreements, differ substantially from the hypothetical negotiation scenario involving 
the Day patent. The four running royalty agreements upon which Lucent relies are 
agreements between itself and Vox Communications (“Vox agreement”); between itself 
and Kenwood (“Kenwood agreement”); between itself and Acer (“Acer agreement”); and 
between Microsoft and MPEG–LA (“MPEG agreement”). 
The Vox agreement covered five Lucent patents, which, as explained by Lucent's 
expert, are directed to PC graphics boards manufactured by Vox. In addition to a lump-
sum payment of $50,000, Vox agreed to pay a per-unit rate of $2.00 for each licensed 
product. But no testimony described how the patented technology of the Vox agreement 
relates to the licensed graphics boards. Lucent's expert never explained to the jury 
whether the patented technology is essential to the licensed product being sold, or 
whether the patented invention is only a small component or feature of the licensed 
product (as is the case here). The jury also had no information about the price of Vox’s PC 
graphics boards and thus was unable to assess the magnitude of the $2.00 rate, which 
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seems particularly relevant given Lucent's defense of an award amounting to about 8% of 
the market value of Outlook. In the absence of the price of graphics boards, the $2.00 value 
is difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate. The testimony of Lucent’s expert relating to the 
Vox agreement was confined essentially to the fact that the agreement is a cross-licensing 
agreement in which the rights granted to Lucent were royalty-free and that the royalty 
rate is structured as a commuted rate. 
The Kenwood agreement, covering two Lucent patents directed to DVD player 
products, is a hybrid lump-sum/running royalty cross-license agreement. Kenwood 
agreed to pay Lucent an up-front payment of $3 million along with a per-unit royalty of 
$1.50 for each product in excess of 300,000 units. Lucent’s expert told the jury that the 
Kenwood agreement was a cross-license, conveying rights to Lucent to practice 
Kenwood's patents, but the jury never learned anything about those patent rights and 
how valuable or essential those rights were. Even if we were to apply the $1.50 per unit 
rate of the Kenwood agreement to the number of infringing units that could be used to 
infringe in the present case, this would yield only about $165 million, substantially less 
than the $358 million awarded by the jury. 
The Acer agreement, executed in 1998, involved eight patents and various commercial 
products. Lucent refers to the Acer agreement as one involving PC-related patents. During 
his testimony, Lucent's expert focused almost exclusively on the per-unit royalty rate of 
$2.50 and the lump-sum payment of $14.5 million. But the jury again did not hear any 
explanation of the types of products covered by the agreement or the various royalty rates 
set forth in the agreement. Specifically, the agreement calls for different royalties for 
different products. For so-called “reportable products,” the rate is not a fixed dollar 
amount but set at 2%, while the royalty rates for “semiconductive devices” is in the range 
of 1%. Furthermore, Lucent did not explain how the fact that the Acer agreement involved 
eight patents affects how probative it is of the Microsoft–Lucent hypothetical negotiation 
over one patent. Nor is there any document or testimony upon which a jury could have 
considered how similar or dissimilar the patented technology of the Acer agreement is to 
the invention of using the date-picker. Nor is there any evidence or testimony about how 
the $2.50 per unit rate corresponds to a percentage of the cost of the “personal computers” 
sold under the license agreement. It is not implausible that the average price of the 
computers subject to the Acer agreement was close to $1000. Such an average price would 
mean the $2.50 per-unit rate of the Acer agreement equates to approximately one-quarter 
of one percent of the value of the computer, which is about one-thirtieth the constructive 
rate awarded to Lucent. 
Finally, the MPEG agreement on its face supports a higher royalty rate of $4 per unit. 
But, as with the other running royalty agreements, the structure of the MPEG agreement 
is more complicated, and the jury had little to no testimony explaining how such 
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complexity would have affected the hypothetical negotiation analysis. Specifically, the 31–
page agreement contains numerous provisions covering various MPEG-related products 
(e.g., decoding products, distribution encoding products, program stream products, etc.). 
Moreover, the various products appear to have different royalty rates, some as low as a 
penny per unit. 
We now consider what Microsoft advocated, namely that the hypothetical negotiation 
would have yielded a lump-sum licensing agreement for $6.5 million. For whatever 
reason, Microsoft urged the jury to accept its theory based on a proffer of a single license 
Microsoft had executed for a graphical user interface technology. Thus, at a minimum, a 
reasonable jury could have awarded $6.5 million, or some larger amount as permitted by 
the evidence.  
But we see little evidentiary basis under Georgia–Pacific Factor 2 for awarding roughly 
three to four times the average amount in the lump-sum agreements in evidence. Here the 
award was $358 million; there, the amounts were $80, 93, 100, and 290 million. That some 
licenses were cross-licenses or commuted-rate licenses—which may warrant a higher 
damages award—does not fill the evidentiary lacunae. Again, it was Lucent’s burden to 
prove that the licenses relied on were sufficiently comparable to sustain a lump-sum 
damages award of $358 million. This is not an instance in which the jury chose a damages 
award somewhere between maximum and minimum lump-sum amounts advocated by 
the opposing parties. For the reasons stated, Factor 2 weighs strongly against the jury's 
award. 
Factors 10 and 13 
Factor 10 is “the nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial 
embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those who 
have used the invention.” Georgia–Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120. Factor 13 is “the portion of 
the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished from non-
patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or 
improvements added by the infringer.” These two factors, at least as applied to the facts 
of this case, both aim to elucidate how the parties would have valued the patented feature 
during the hypothetical negotiation. 
The evidence can support only a finding that the infringing feature contained in 
Microsoft Outlook is but a tiny feature of one part of a much larger software program. 
Microsoft’s expert explained that Outlook’s e-mail component is “the part of Outlook 
that's most commonly used by our customers.” Microsoft’s witness also explained that, in 
addition to sending and receiving e-mails, a user can create electronic tasks and notes. 
Additionally, Outlook can be used as an electronic Rolodex™, storing contact 
information, such as phone numbers, addresses, and the like. It also has a fully functional 
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calendar system, in which a user can record appointments, meetings, and other items on 
one's schedule. As Lucent’s own expert testified, Outlook is a “personal organizer” that is 
“an integrated suite of abilities to do e-mail, to set up contacts, to arrange meetings, to 
maintain your personal calendar, et cetera.” In short, Outlook is an enormously complex 
software program comprising hundreds, if not thousands or even more, features. We find 
it inconceivable to conclude, based on the present record, that the use of one small feature, 
the date-picker, constitutes a substantial portion of the value of Outlook. 
The parties presented little evidence relating to Factor 13. Nonetheless, the only 
reasonable conclusion is that most of the realizable profit must be credited to non-
patented elements, such as “the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant 
features or improvements added by Microsoft.” As explained by Microsoft’s expert Mr. 
Kennedy, Outlook consists of millions of lines of code, only a tiny fraction of which 
encodes the date-picker feature. Although the weighing of Factor 13 cannot be reduced to 
a mere counting of lines of code, the glaring imbalance between infringing and non-
infringing features must impact the analysis of how much profit can properly be 
attributed to the use of the date-picker compared to non-patented elements and other 
features of Outlook. Here, numerous features other than the date-picker appear to account 
for the overwhelming majority of the consumer demand and therefore significant profit. 
The only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from this evidence is that the 
infringing use of Outlook’s date-picker feature is a minor aspect of a much larger software 
program and that the portion of the profit that can be credited to the infringing use of the 
date-picker tool is exceedingly small. For these reasons, Factors 10 and 13 of Georgia–
Pacific provide little support for the jury’s lump-sum damages award of $357,693,056.18. 
Factor 11 
Factor 11 is “the extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any 
evidence probative of the value of that use.” Georgia–Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120. As with 
Factors 10 and 13, the eleventh factor informs the court and jury about how the parties 
would have valued the patented feature during the hypothetical negotiation. In doing so, 
Factor 11 relies on evidence about how much the patented invention has been used. 
Implicit in this factor is the premise that an invention used frequently is generally more 
valuable than a comparable invention used infrequently. 
. . . 
Consideration of evidence of usage after infringement started can, under appropriate 
circumstances, be helpful to the jury and the court in assessing whether a royalty is 
reasonable. Usage (or similar) data may provide information that the parties would 
frequently have estimated during the negotiation. . . . Such data might, depending on the 
case, come from sales projections based on past sales, consumer surveys, focus group 
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testing, and other sources. Even though parties to a license negotiation will usually not 
have precise data about future usage, they often have rough estimates as to the expected 
frequency of use. This quantitative information, assuming it meets admissibility 
requirements, ought to be given its proper weight, as determined by the circumstances of 
each case. 
On the other hand, we have never laid down any rigid requirement that damages in 
all circumstances be limited to specific instances of infringement proven with direct 
evidence. Such a strict requirement could create a hypothetical negotiation far-removed 
from what parties regularly do during real-world licensing negotiations. As shown by the 
evidence in this case, companies in the high-tech computer industry often strike licensing 
deals in which the amount paid for a particular technology is not necessarily limited to 
the number of times a patented feature is used by a consumer. A company licensing a 
patented method often has strong reasons not to tie the royalty amount strictly to usage. 
The administrative cost of monitoring usage can be prohibitively expensive. . . . Thus, 
potential licensors and licensees routinely agree to royalty payments regardless of 
whether the invention is used frequently or infrequently by the consumer. 
With the foregoing in mind, we observe that the evidence of record is conspicuously 
devoid of any data about how often consumers use the patented date-picker invention.  
. . . As we noted above, substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict of indirect 
infringement by Microsoft. But all the circumstantial evidence supports is the jury's 
implicit finding that at least one person performed the patented method one time in the 
United States sometime during the relevant period. Beyond that finding, all the jury had 
was speculation. No evidence describes how many Microsoft Outlook users had ever 
performed the patented method or how many times. Lucent had the burden to prove that 
the extent to which the infringing method has been used supports the lump-sum damages 
award. 
Other Factors 
Other Georgia–Pacific factors applicable here include “the nature and scope of the 
license, as exclusive or nonexclusive” (Factor 3); “the licensor’s established policy and 
marketing program to maintain his patent monopoly” (Factor 4); “the commercial 
relationship between the licensor and the licensee” (Factor 5); “the established 
profitability of the product made under the patent” (Factor 8); “the utility and advantages 
of the patent property over the old modes or devices” (Factor 9); and “the portion of the 
profit or of the selling price that may be customary to allow for the use of the invention” 
(Factor 12). To the extent these factors are relevant, they appear somewhat to offset one 
another. 
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For instance, Factor 8, the profitability of the product made, supports a higher versus 
a lower reasonable royalty, given the unrebutted evidence that the products at issue are 
sold with an approximately 70–80% profit margin. Contrasting this evidence are Factors 
3 and 9. Non-exclusive licenses generally command lower royalties. And, from the 
evidence presented, the infringing use of the date-picker seems to have, at best, only a 
slight advantage over what is arguably the closest prior art. We are mindful, however, 
that a jury could have reasonably concluded otherwise with several of the factors 
mentioned here. Even so, such reasonable conclusions, in this case, cannot overcome the 
substantial infirmities in the evidence for the other factors detailed above. 
Conclusion on Lump-Sum Reasonable Royalty 
Having examined the relevant Georgia–Pacific factors, we are left with the 
unmistakable conclusion that the jury’s damages award is not supported by substantial 
evidence, but is based mainly on speculation or guesswork. When the evidence is viewed 
in toto, the jury’s award of a lump-sum payment of about $358 million does not rest on 
substantial evidence and is likewise against the clear weight of the evidence. The evidence 
does not sustain a finding that, at the time of infringement, Microsoft and Lucent would 
have agreed to a lump-sum royalty payment subsequently amounting to approximately 
8% of Microsoft’s revenues for the sale of Outlook (and necessarily a larger percentage of 
Outlook's profits). We need not identify any particular Georgia–Pacific factor as being 
dispositive. Rather, the flexible analysis of all applicable Georgia–Pacific factors provides a 
useful and legally-required framework for assessing the damages award in this case. 
Furthermore, we do not conclude that the aforementioned license agreements (or other 
evidence) cannot, as a matter of law, support the damages award in this case. Instead, the 
evidence as presented did not reach the “substantial evidence” threshold and therefore 
no reasonable jury could have found that Lucent carried its burden of proving that the 
evidence, under the relevant Georgia–Pacific factors, supported a lump-sum damages 
award of $357,693,056.18. 
. . . 
Creating a licensing agreement for patented technology is, at best, an inexact science. 
In actual licensing negotiations, willing parties negotiating at arms-length do not 
necessarily generate and analyze precise economic data concerning the perceived value 
of a patented invention. A complicated case this was, and the damages evidence of record 
was neither very powerful, nor presented very well by either party. Most jury damages 
awards reviewed on appeal have been held to be supported by substantial evidence. 
Nonetheless, on post-trial JMOL motions, district court judges must scrutinize the 
evidence carefully to ensure that the “substantial evidence” standard is satisfied, while 
keeping in mind that a reasonable royalty analysis “necessarily involves an element of 
approximation and uncertainty.”  
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Entire Market Value Analysis 
Microsoft argues that the damages award must be reversed because the jury 
erroneously applied the entire market value rule. Despite the jury’s indication on the 
verdict form that it was awarding a lump-sum reasonable royalty, Microsoft believes that 
the only way the jury could have calculated a figure of $357,693,056.18 was by applying a 
royalty percentage to a total sales figure of the infringing software products. Indeed, it is 
difficult to understand how the jury could have chosen its lump-sum figure down to the 
penny unless it used a running royalty calculation. Furthermore, as Microsoft explains in 
its brief, working the math backwards strongly suggests that the jury must have used 
some calculation of a rate applied to the entire market value of the software. . . . Assuming 
that the jury did apply the entire market value rule, such application would amount to 
legal error for two reasons. 
In one sense, our law on the entire market value rule is quite clear. For the entire 
market value rule to apply, the patentee must prove that “the patent-related feature is the 
basis for customer demand.” 
. . . 
The first flaw with any application of the entire market value rule in the present case 
is the lack of evidence demonstrating the patented method of the Day patent as the basis—
or even a substantial basis—of the consumer demand for Outlook. . . . [T]he infringing use 
of the date-picker tool in Outlook is but a very small component of a much larger software 
program. The vast majority of the features, when used, do not infringe. The date-picker 
tool’s minor role in the overall program is further confirmed when one considers the 
relative importance of certain other features, e.g., e-mail. Consistent with this description 
of Outlook, Lucent did not carry its evidentiary burden of proving that anyone purchased 
Outlook because of the patented method. . . . And when we consider the importance of 
the many features not covered by the Day patent compared to the one infringing feature 
in Outlook, we can only arrive at the unmistakable conclusion that the invention described 
in claim 19 of the Day patent is not the reason consumers purchase Outlook. Thus, Lucent 
did not satisfy its burden of proving the applicability of the entire market value rule.  
. . . Because the damages award based on the infringing date-picker feature of Outlook 
is not supported by substantial evidence and is contrary to the clear weight of the 
evidence, the damages award must be vacated. . . . 
. . . 
Furthermore, Lucent's expert admitted that there was no evidence that Microsoft had 
ever agreed to pay an 8% royalty on an analogous patent.  
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Although our law states certain mandatory conditions for applying the entire market 
value rule, courts must nevertheless be cognizant of a fundamental relationship between 
the entire market value rule and the calculation of a running royalty damages award. 
Simply put, the base used in a running royalty calculation can always be the value of the 
entire commercial embodiment, as long as the magnitude of the rate is within an 
acceptable range (as determined by the evidence). Indeed, “all running royalties have at 
least two variables: the royalty base and the royalty rate.” Microsoft surely would have 
little reason to complain about the supposed application of the entire market value rule 
had the jury applied a royalty rate of 0.1% (instead of 8%) to the market price of the 
infringing programs. Such a rate would have likely yielded a damages award of less than 
Microsoft's proposed $6.5 million. Thus, even when the patented invention is a small 
component of a much larger commercial product, awarding a reasonable royalty based 
on either sale price or number of units sold can be economically justified.  
. . . 
. . . . The evidence of record in the present dispute illustrates the importance the entire 
market value may have in reasonable royalty cases. The license agreements admitted into 
evidence (without objection from Microsoft, we note) highlight how sophisticated parties 
routinely enter into license agreements that base the value of the patented inventions as a 
percentage of the commercial products' sales price. There is nothing inherently wrong 
with using the market value of the entire product, especially when there is no established 
market value for the infringing component or feature, so long as the multiplier accounts 
for the proportion of the base represented by the infringing component or feature. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Microsoft’s JMOL 
motion for non-infringement. We reverse the district court's denial of Microsoft’s JMOL 
regarding the damages award, vacate the award, and remand for a new trial on damages. 
Context & Application 
1. In Lucent, the court refers to the “Georgia-Pacific factors.” In Georgia-Pacific, the 
district court said: 
A comprehensive list of evidentiary facts relevant . . . to the determination of the 
amount of a reasonable royalty for a patent license may be drawn from a 
conspectus of the leading cases. The following are some of the factors mutatis 
mutandis seemingly more pertinent to the issue herein: 
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit, 
proving or tending to prove an established royalty. 
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2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the 
patent in suit. 
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as 
restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the 
manufactured product may be sold. 
4. The licensor’s established policy and marketing program to maintain his 
patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting 
licenses under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly. 
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as, 
whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business; or 
whether they are inventor and promoter. 
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products 
of the licensee; that existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of 
sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed 
sales. 
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license. 
8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its 
commercial success; and its current popularity. 
9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or 
devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar results. 
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial 
embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those 
who have used the invention. 
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any 
evidence probative of the value of that use. 
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the 
particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the 
invention or analogous inventions. 
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as 
distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business 
risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer. 
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts. 
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the 
infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both 
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had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the 
amount which a prudent licensee—who desired, as a business proposition, to 
obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the 
patented invention—would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able 
to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a 
prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license. 
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Must a 
party seeking an award of lost profits put forth evidence on all of these factors? Are all of 
these factors likely to be equally helpful or relevant in all cases? 
1. Section 289 
The Patent Act provides an additional remedy for certain acts of design patent 
infringement: 
Whoever during the term of a patent for a design, without license of the owner, (1) 
applies the patented design, or any colorable imitation thereof, to any article of 
manufacture for the purpose of sale, or (2) sells or exposes for sale any article of 
manufacture to which such design or colorable imitation has been applied shall be 
liable to the owner to the extent of his total profit, but not less than $250, 
recoverable in any United States district court having jurisdiction of the parties. 
35 U.S.C. § 289. A design patent owner cannot recover damages under both § 289 and 
§ 284 for the same act of infringement; they have to pick one or the other. See, e.g., Catalina 
Lighting, Inc. v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 295 F.3d 1277, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  
Importantly, this “total profits” remedy is only available for the aforementioned acts 
of design patent infringement. So don’t ask a court for § 289 damages in a utility patent 
case. See Brown v. Generac Power Sys., Inc., No. 1:20-cv-22434, 2021 WL 1030229, at *11 (S.D. 
Fla. Feb. 27, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:20-cv-22434, 2021 WL 
1022872 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2021) (ruling that attorneys violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2) by 
requesting § 289 damages in a utility patent complaint). How can you tell if a patent is a 
design patent? Contemporary design patents say “Design Patent” on the first page and 
their patent numbers begin with a “D.” Also, remember that design patents can only have 
one claim. So if a patent has more than one claim, it’s not a design patent.  
x x x 
In the next case, Apple asserted various utility and design patents against Samsung. 
The jury found that three of the asserted design patents were not invalid and infringed. 
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The first, U.S. Patent No. D618,677 (“the D’677 patent”), claimed the configuration and 
coloring of the flat, black front face of the iPhone, excluding the home button: 
 
The second patent, U.S. Patent No. D593,087 (“the D’087 patent”), claimed a design 
for the configuration of the front, flat screen of the iPhone and the bezel: 
 
The third patent, U.S. Patent No. D604,305 (“the D’305 patent”), claimed this design 
for a screenshot from the iPhone’s graphical user interface: 
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As can be seen from these illustrations, none of the asserted phone patents claimed a 
design for the entire shape or surface ornamentation of a phone. Nonetheless, the jury 
awarded Apple all profits that Samsung made from every phone the jury found infringed 
any of the three design patents. Those design patent awards made up a significant amount 
of the original verdict, which totaled over a billion dollars.  
The Federal Circuit affirmed the design patent awards. As a matter of first impression, 
the court held that  § 289 required disgorgement of the “total profits” from the entire 
infringing product—i.e., the total profits from whatever the defendant “sold separately,” 
even if the patented design only covered part of that product. See Apple Inc. v. Samsung 
Elecs. Co., 786 F.3d 983, 1001-02 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc. 
137 S.Ct. 429 (2016) 
Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Section 289 of the Patent Act provides a damages remedy specific to design patent 
infringement. A person who manufactures or sells “any article of manufacture to which a 
patented design or colorable imitation has been applied shall be liable to the owner to the 
extent of his total profit.” 35 U.S.C. § 289. In the case of a design for a single-component 
product, such as a dinner plate, the product is the “article of manufacture” to which the 
design has been applied. In the case of a design for a multicomponent product, such as a 
kitchen oven, identifying the “article of manufacture” to which the design has been 
applied is a more difficult task. 
This case involves the infringement of designs for smartphones. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit identified the entire smartphone as the only 
permissible “article of manufacture” for the purpose of calculating § 289 damages because 
consumers could not separately purchase components of the smartphones. The question 
before us is whether that reading is consistent with § 289. We hold that it is not. 
I 
A 
The federal patent laws have long permitted those who invent designs for 
manufactured articles to patent their designs. See Patent Act of 1842, § 3, 5 Stat. 543–544. 
Patent protection is available for a “new, original and ornamental design for an article of 
manufacture.” 35 U.S.C. § 171(a). A patentable design “gives a peculiar or distinctive 
appearance to the manufacture, or article to which it may be applied, or to which it gives 
form.” Gorham Co. v. White, 14 Wall. 511, 525 (1872). This Court has explained that a design 
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patent is infringed “if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a 
purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same.”  
In 1885, this Court limited the damages available for design patent infringement. The 
statute in effect at the time allowed a holder of a design patent to recover “the actual 
damages sustained” from infringement. In Dobson v. Hartford Carpet Co., 114 U.S. 439 
(1885), the lower courts had awarded the holders of design patents on carpets damages in 
the amount of “the entire profit to the patent holders, per yard, in the manufacture and 
sale of carpets of the patented designs, and not merely the value which the designs 
contributed to the carpets.” This Court reversed the damages award and construed the 
statute to require proof that the profits were “due to” the design rather than other aspects 
of the carpets. Id., at 444; see also Dobson v. Dornan, 118 U.S. 10, 17 (1886). 
In 1887, in response to the Dobson cases, Congress enacted a specific damages remedy 
for design patent infringement. The new provision made it unlawful to manufacture or 
sell an article of manufacture to which a patented design or a colorable imitation thereof 
had been applied. It went on to make a design patent infringer “liable in the amount of” 
$250 or “the total profit made by him from the manufacture or sale of the article or articles 
to which the design, or colorable imitation thereof, has been applied.”  
The Patent Act of 1952 codified this provision in § 289.  
II 
Section 289 allows a patent holder to recover the total profit an infringer makes from 
the infringement. It does so by first prohibiting the unlicensed “application” of a 
“patented design, or any colorable imitation thereof, to any article of manufacture for the 
purpose of sale” or the unlicensed sale or exposure to sale of “any article of manufacture 
to which a patented design or colorable imitation has been applied.” 35 U.S.C. § 289. It 
then makes a person who violates that prohibition “liable to the owner to the extent of his 
total profit, but not less than $250.” “Total,” of course, means all. See AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY 1836 (5th ed. 2011) (“the whole amount of something; the entirety”). The 
“total profit” for which § 289 makes an infringer liable is thus all of the profit made from 
the prohibited conduct, that is, from the manufacture or sale of the “article of manufacture 
to which the patented design or colorable imitation has been applied.” 
Arriving at a damages award under § 289 thus involves two steps. First, identify the 
“article of manufacture” to which the infringed design has been applied. Second, calculate 
the infringer's total profit made on that article of manufacture. 
This case requires us to address a threshold matter: the scope of the term “article of 
manufacture.” The only question we resolve today is whether, in the case of a 
multicomponent product, the relevant “article of manufacture” must always be the end 
 REMEDIES  
697 
product sold to the consumer or whether it can also be a component of that product. 
Under the former interpretation, a patent holder will always be entitled to the infringer’s 
total profit from the end product. Under the latter interpretation, a patent holder will 
sometimes be entitled to the infringer’s total profit from a component of the end product. 
A 
The text resolves this case. The term “article of manufacture,” as used in § 289, 
encompasses both a product sold to a consumer and a component of that product. 
“Article of manufacture” has a broad meaning. An “article” is just “a particular thing.” 
J. STORMONTH, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 53 (1885) (Stormonth); see also 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, at 101 (“an individual thing or element of a class; a 
particular object or item”). And “manufacture” means “the conversion of raw materials 
by the hand, or by machinery, into articles suitable for the use of man” and “the articles 
so made.” STORMONTH 589; see also AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, at 1070 (“the act, 
craft, or process of manufacturing products, especially on a large scale” or “a product that 
is manufactured”). An article of manufacture, then, is simply a thing made by hand or 
machine. 
So understood, the term “article of manufacture” is broad enough to encompass both 
a product sold to a consumer as well as a component of that product. A component of a 
product, no less than the product itself, is a thing made by hand or machine. That a 
component may be integrated into a larger product, in other words, does not put it outside 
the category of articles of manufacture. 
B 
The Federal Circuit’s narrower reading of “article of manufacture” cannot be squared 
with the text of § 289. The Federal Circuit found that components of the infringing 
smartphones could not be the relevant article of manufacture because consumers could 
not purchase those components separately from the smartphones. But, for the reasons 
given above, the term “article of manufacture” is broad enough to embrace both a product 
sold to a consumer and a component of that product, whether sold separately or not. Thus, 
reading “article of manufacture” in § 289 to cover only an end product sold to a consumer 
gives too narrow a meaning to the phrase. 
The parties ask us to go further and resolve whether, for each of the design patents at 
issue here, the relevant article of manufacture is the smartphone, or a particular 
smartphone component. Doing so would require us to set out a test for identifying the 
relevant article of manufacture at the first step of the § 289 damages inquiry and to parse 
the record to apply that test in this case. The United States as amicus curiae suggested a 
test, but Samsung and Apple did not brief the issue. We decline to lay out a test for the 
 CHAPTER 14  
698 
first step of the § 289 damages inquiry in the absence of adequate briefing by the parties. 
Doing so is not necessary to resolve the question presented in this case, and the Federal 
Circuit may address any remaining issues on remand. 
III 
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is therefore 
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Context & Application 
1. In Samsung, the Federal Circuit insisted that the plain text of the § 289 compelled 
its interpretation. The Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Circuit’s interpretation was 
wrong, also pointing to the plain text of the statute. Which court (if any) got it right? For 
more on the “total profits” remedy, including a deep dive into the history of the text, see 
Sarah Burstein, The “Article of Manufacture” in 1887, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 1 (2017). 
2. In Samsung, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s “article of 
manufacture” test but refused to set forth a new test. To date, the Federal Circuit has not 
yet adopted a new test. How do you think the courts should handle this issue? For some 
suggestions, see Pamela Samuelson & Mark Gergen, The Disgorgement Remedy of Design 
Patent Law, 108 CAL. L. REV. 183, 184 (2020) and Sarah Burstein, The “Article of Manufacture” 
Today, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 781, 835 (2018).  
3. Today, disgorgement of profits is not available as a remedy for utility patent 
infringement. But that was not always the case. For many years, disgorgement was a 
remedy for utility patent infringement. But Congress amended the law in 1946 to 
eliminate the disgorgement remedy for utility patent owners. Why do you think Congress 
did that? Does it make sense to have disgorgement for design patents but not for utility 
patents? For more on the history of utility patents and disgorgement, see Caprice L. 
Roberts, The Case for Restitution and Unjust Enrichment Remedies in Patent Law, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 653 (2010). 
D. Enhanced Damages and Attorney Fees 
In certain situations, a patent holder may recover enhanced damages or attorneys fees 
in addition to compensatory damages. In addition to compensatory damages, 35 U.S.C. 
§ 284 provides that “the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount 
found or assessed.” Attorneys fees are provided for under 35 U.S.C. § 285: “The court in 
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” These 
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provisions are permissive, allowing trial courts to exercise discretion in determining when 
they are appropriate. The Supreme Court has recently addressed both types of damages. 
Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. 
572 U.S. 545 (2014) 
Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Section 285 of the Patent Act authorizes a district court to award attorney’s fees in 
patent litigation. It provides, in its entirety, that “the court in exceptional cases may award 
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” 35 U.S.C. § 285. In  Brooks Furniture Mfg., 
Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378 (2005), the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit held that “a case may be deemed exceptional” under § 285 only in two 
limited circumstances: “when there has been some material inappropriate conduct,” or 
when the litigation is both “brought in subjective bad faith” and “objectively baseless.” 
The question before us is whether the Brooks Furniture framework is consistent with the 
statutory text. We hold that it is not. 
I 
A 
Prior to 1946, the Patent Act did not authorize the awarding of attorney’s fees to the 
prevailing party in patent litigation. Rather, the “American Rule” governed: “Each litigant 
paid his own attorney’s fees, win or lose.” In 1946, Congress amended the Patent Act to 
add a discretionary fee-shifting provision, then codified in § 70, which stated that a court 
“may in its discretion award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party upon the 
entry of judgment in any patent case.” 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1946 ed.). 
Courts did not award fees under § 70 as a matter of course. They viewed the award of 
fees not “as a penalty for failure to win a patent infringement suit,” but as appropriate 
“only in extraordinary circumstances.” The provision enabled them to address 
“unfairness or bad faith in the conduct of the losing party, or some other equitable 
consideration of similar force,” which made a case so unusual as to warrant fee-shifting.  
Six years later, Congress amended the fee-shifting provision and recodified it as § 285. 
Whereas § 70 had specified that a district court could “in its discretion award reasonable 
attorney’s fees to the prevailing party,” the revised language of § 285 (which remains in 
force today) provides that “the court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney 
fees to the prevailing party.” We have observed, in interpreting the damages provision of 
the Patent Act, that the addition of the phrase “exceptional cases” to § 285 was “for 
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purposes of clarification only.”  And the parties agree that the recodification did not 
substantively alter the meaning of the statute. 
For three decades after the enactment of § 285, courts applied it—as they had applied 
§ 70—in a discretionary manner, assessing various factors to determine whether a given 
case was sufficiently “exceptional” to warrant a fee award. . . .  
[For years,] the Federal Circuit, like the regional circuits before it, instructed district 
courts to consider the totality of the circumstances when making fee determinations under 
§ 285.  
In 2005, however, the Federal Circuit abandoned that holistic, equitable approach in 
favor of a more rigid and mechanical formulation. In Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier 
Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378 (2005), the court held that a case is “exceptional” under § 285 only 
“when there has been some material inappropriate conduct related to the matter in 
litigation, such as willful infringement, fraud or inequitable conduct in procuring the 
patent, misconduct during litigation, vexatious or unjustified litigation, conduct that 
violates Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, or like infractions.” “Absent misconduct in conduct of the 
litigation or in securing the patent,” the Federal Circuit continued, fees “may be imposed 
against the patentee only if both (1) the litigation is brought in subjective bad faith, and 
(2) the litigation is objectively baseless.” The Federal Circuit subsequently clarified that 
litigation is objectively baseless only if it is “so unreasonable that no reasonable litigant 
could believe it would succeed,” and that litigation is brought in subjective bad faith only 
if the plaintiff “actually knows” that it is objectively baseless. 
Finally, Brooks Furniture held that because “there is a presumption that the assertion 
of infringement of a duly granted patent is made in good faith the underlying improper 
conduct and the characterization of the case as exceptional must be established by clear 
and convincing evidence.”   
B 
The parties to this litigation are manufacturers of exercise equipment. The respondent, 
ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., owns  U.S. Patent No. 6,019,710 (’710 patent), which discloses 
an elliptical exercise machine that allows for adjustments to fit the individual stride paths 
of users. . . . 
ICON sued Octane, alleging that the Q45 and Q47 infringed several claims of the ’710 
patent. The District Court granted Octane’s motion for summary judgment, concluding 
that Octane’s machines did not infringe  ICON’s patent. Octane then moved for attorney’s 
fees under § 285. Applying the Brooks Furniture standard, the District Court denied  
Octane’s motion. . . . As to objective baselessness, the District Court explained that 
although it had rejected ICON’s infringement arguments, they were neither “frivolous” 
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nor “objectively baseless.” The court also found no subjective bad faith on ICON’s part, 
dismissing as insufficient both “the fact that ICON is a bigger company which never 
commercialized the ’710 patent” and an e-mail exchange between two ICON sales 
executives, which Octane had offered as evidence that ICON had brought the 
infringement action “as a matter of commercial strategy.” 
ICON appealed the judgment of noninfringement, and Octane cross-appealed the 
denial of attorney’s fees. The Federal Circuit affirmed both orders. . . . We granted 
certiorari and now reverse. 
. . . 
II 
The framework established by the Federal Circuit in Brooks Furniture is unduly rigid, 
and it impermissibly encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to district courts. 
A 
Our analysis begins and ends with the text of § 285: “The court in exceptional cases 
may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” This text is patently clear. It 
imposes one and only one constraint on district courts’ discretion to award attorney’s fees 
in patent litigation: The power is reserved for “exceptional” cases. 
The Patent Act does not define “exceptional,” so we construe it “in accordance with 
[its] ordinary meaning.”  In 1952, when Congress used the word in § 285 (and today, for 
that matter), “exceptional” meant “uncommon,” “rare,” or “not ordinary.” WEBSTER’S 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 889 (2d ed. 1934); see also 3 OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 374 (1933) (defining “exceptional” as “out of the ordinary course,” 
“unusual,” or “special”); MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 435 (11th ed. 
2008) *554 (defining “exceptional” as “rare”). 
We hold, then, that an “exceptional” case is simply one that stands out from others 
with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position (considering both 
the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case 
was litigated. District courts may determine whether a case is “exceptional” in the case-
by-case exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances. As in the 
comparable context of the Copyright Act, “there is no precise rule or formula for making 
these determinations, but instead equitable discretion should be exercised ‘in light of the 
considerations we have identified.” 




The Federal Circuit’s formulation is overly rigid. Under the standard crafted in Brooks 
Furniture, a case is “exceptional” only if a district court either finds litigation-related 
misconduct of an independently sanctionable magnitude or determines that the litigation 
was both “brought in subjective bad faith” and “objectively baseless.” This formulation 
superimposes an inflexible framework onto statutory text that is inherently flexible. 
For one thing, the first category of cases in which the Federal Circuit allows fee 
awards—those involving litigation misconduct or certain other misconduct—appears to 
extend largely to independently sanctionable conduct. But sanctionable conduct is not the 
appropriate benchmark. Under the standard announced today, a district court may award 
fees in the rare case in which a party’s unreasonable conduct—while not necessarily 
independently sanctionable—is nonetheless so “exceptional” as to justify an award of 
fees. 
The second category of cases in which the Federal Circuit allows fee awards is also too 
restrictive. In order for a case to fall within this second category, a district court must 
determine both that the litigation is objectively baseless and that the plaintiff brought it in 
subjective bad faith. But a case presenting either subjective bad faith or exceptionally 
meritless claims may sufficiently set itself apart from mine-run cases to warrant a fee 
award. 
2 
 We reject Brooks Furniture for another reason: It is so demanding that it would appear 
to render § 285 largely superfluous. We have long recognized a common-law exception to 
the general “American rule” against fee-shifting—an exception, “inherent” in the “power 
of the courts” that applies for “willful disobedience of a court order” or “when the losing 
party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” . . .  
3 
 Finally, we reject the Federal Circuit’s requirement that patent litigants establish their 
entitlement to fees under § 285 by “clear and convincing evidence,”  Brooks Furniture, 393 
F.3d, at 1382. We have not interpreted comparable fee-shifting statutes to require proof of 
entitlement to fees by clear and convincing evidence. . . . And nothing in § 285 justifies 
such a high standard of proof. Section 285 demands a simple discretionary inquiry; it 
imposes no specific evidentiary burden, much less such a high one. Indeed, patent-
infringement litigation has always been governed by a preponderance of the evidence 
standard, and that is the “standard generally applicable in civil actions,” because it 
“allows both parties to share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion.”   
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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc. 
136 S.Ct. 1923 (2016) 
Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Section 284 of the Patent Act provides that, in a case of infringement, courts “may 
increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.” 35 U.S.C. § 284. In 
In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (2007) (en banc), the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit adopted a two-part test for determining when a district 
court may increase damages pursuant to § 284. Under Seagate, a patent owner must first 
“show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively 
high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.” Second, the 
patentee must demonstrate, again by clear and convincing evidence, that the risk of 
infringement “was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the 
accused infringer.” The question before us is whether this test is consistent with § 284. We 
hold that it is not. 
I 
A 
Enhanced damages are as old as U.S. patent law. The Patent Act of 1793 mandated 
treble damages in any successful infringement suit. In the Patent Act of 1836, however, 
Congress changed course and made enhanced damages discretionary, specifying that “it 
shall be in the power of the court to render judgment for any sum above the amount found 
by the verdict not exceeding three times the amount thereof, according to the 
circumstances of the case.” In construing that new provision, this Court explained that the 
change was prompted by the “injustice” of subjecting a “defendant who acted in 
ignorance or good faith” to the same treatment as the “wanton and malicious pirate.” 
Seymour v. McCormick, 16 How. 480, 488 (1854). There “is no good reason,” we observed, 
“why taking a man’s property in an invention should be trebly punished, while the 
measure of damages as to other property is single and actual damages.”  But “where the 
injury is wanton or malicious, a jury may inflict vindictive or exemplary damages, not to 
recompense the plaintiff, but to punish the defendant.”   
The Court followed the same approach in other decisions applying the 1836 Act, 
finding enhanced damages appropriate, for instance, “where the wrong had been done, 
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under aggravated circumstances,” but not where the defendant “appeared in truth to be 
ignorant of the existence of the patent right, and did not intend any infringement.”  
In 1870, Congress amended the Patent Act, but preserved district court discretion to 
award up to treble damages “according to the circumstances of the case.” We continued 
to describe enhanced damages as “vindictive or punitive,” which the court may “inflict” 
when “the circumstances of the case appear to require it.”  At the same time, we reiterated 
that there was no basis for increased damages where “there is no pretence of any wanton 
and wilful breach” and “nothing that suggests punitive damages, or that shows wherein 
the defendant was damnified other than by the loss of the profits which the plaintiff 
received.”   
Courts of Appeals likewise characterized enhanced damages as justified where the 
infringer acted deliberately or willfully. . . . 
Some early decisions did suggest that enhanced damages might serve to compensate 
patentees as well as to punish infringers. Such statements, however, were not for the ages, 
in part because the merger of law and equity removed certain procedural obstacles to full 
compensation absent enhancement. . . . In the main, moreover, the references to 
compensation concerned costs attendant to litigation. . . . That concern dissipated with the 
enactment in 1952 of 35 U.S.C. § 285, which authorized district courts to award reasonable 
attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in “exceptional cases” under the Patent Act. See Octane 
Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1749, 1755 (2014). 
It is against this backdrop that Congress, in the 1952 codification of the Patent Act, 
enacted § 284. “The stated purpose” of the 1952 revision “was merely reorganization in 
language to clarify the statement of the statutes.”  This Court accordingly described 
§ 284—consistent with the history of enhanced damages under the Patent Act—as 
providing that “punitive or ‘increased’ damages” could be recovered “in a case of willful 
or bad-faith infringement.”  
 B 
In 2007, the Federal Circuit decided Seagate and fashioned the test for enhanced 
damages now before us. Under Seagate, a plaintiff seeking enhanced damages must show 
that the infringement of his patent was “willful.” 497 F.3d, at 1368. The Federal Circuit 
announced a two-part test to establish such willfulness: First, “a patentee must show by 
clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high 
likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent,” without regard to 
“the state of mind of the accused infringer.” This objectively defined risk is to be 
“determined by the record developed in the infringement proceedings.” “Objective 
recklessness will not be found” at this first step if the accused infringer, during the 
infringement proceedings, “raises a ‘substantial question’ as to the validity or 
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noninfringement of the patent.” That categorical bar applies even if the defendant was 
unaware of the arguable defense when he acted.  
Second, after establishing objective recklessness, a patentee must show—again by 
clear and convincing evidence—that the risk of infringement “was either known or so 
obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer.” Only when both steps 
have been satisfied can the district court proceed to consider whether to exercise its 
discretion to award enhanced damages. 
C 
Petitioner Halo Electronics, Inc., and respondents Pulse Electronics, Inc., and Pulse 
Electronics Corporation (collectively, Pulse) supply electronic components.  . . .  
In 2007, Halo sued Pulse. The jury found that Pulse had infringed Halo’s patents, and 
that there was a high probability it had done so willfully. The District Court, however, 
declined to award enhanced damages under § 284, after determining that Pulse had at 
trial presented a defense that “was not objectively baseless, or a ‘sham.’” Thus, the court 
concluded, Halo had failed to show objective recklessness under the first step of Seagate. 
The Federal Circuit affirmed.  
. . . 
We granted certiorari . . . and now vacate and remand. 
II 
A 
 The pertinent text of § 284 provides simply that “the court may increase the damages 
up to three times the amount found or assessed.” 35 U.S.C. § 284. That language contains 
no explicit limit or condition, and we have emphasized that the “word ‘may’ clearly 
connotes discretion.”  
At the same time, “discretion is not whim.”  “In a system of laws discretion is rarely 
without limits,” even when the statute “does not specify any limits upon the district 
courts’ discretion.”  “A motion to a court’s discretion is a motion, not to its inclination, but 
to its judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal principles.” Thus, 
although there is “no precise rule or formula” for awarding damages under § 284, a 
district court’s “discretion should be exercised in light of the considerations” underlying 
the grant of that discretion. 
Awards of enhanced damages under the Patent Act over the past 180 years establish 
that they are not to be meted out in a typical infringement case, but are instead designed 
as a “punitive” or “vindictive” sanction for egregious infringement behavior. The sort of 
conduct warranting enhanced damages has been variously described in our cases as 
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willful, wanton, malicious, bad-faith, deliberate, consciously wrongful, flagrant, or—
indeed—characteristic of a pirate. District courts enjoy discretion in deciding whether to 
award enhanced damages, and in what amount. But through nearly two centuries of 
discretionary awards and review by appellate tribunals, “the channel of discretion has 
narrowed” so that such damages are generally reserved for egregious cases of culpable 
behavior. 
B 
The Seagate test reflects, in many respects, a sound recognition that enhanced damages 
are generally appropriate under § 284 only in egregious cases. That test, however, “is 
unduly rigid, and it impermissibly encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to district 
courts.” Octane Fitness, 134 S.Ct., at 1755 (construing § 285 of the Patent Act). In particular, 
it can have the effect of insulating some of the worst patent infringers from any liability 
for enhanced damages. 
1 
 The principal problem with Seagate’s two-part test is that it requires a finding of 
objective recklessness in every case before district courts may award enhanced damages. 
Such a threshold requirement excludes from discretionary punishment many of the most 
culpable offenders, such as the “wanton and malicious pirate” who intentionally infringes 
another’s patent—with no doubts about its validity or any notion of a defense—for no 
purpose other than to steal the patentee’s business.  Seymour, 16 How., at 488. Under 
Seagate, a district court may not even consider enhanced damages for such a pirate, unless 
the court first determines that his infringement was “objectively” reckless. In the context 
of such deliberate wrongdoing, however, it is not clear why an independent showing of 
objective recklessness—by clear and convincing evidence, no less—should be a 
prerequisite to enhanced damages. 
Our recent decision in Octane Fitness arose in a different context but points in the same 
direction. In that case . . . [we held that] a case presenting “subjective bad faith” alone 
could “sufficiently set itself apart from mine-run cases to warrant a fee award.” So too 
here. The subjective willfulness of a patent infringer, intentional or knowing, may warrant 
enhanced damages, without regard to whether his infringement was objectively reckless. 
The Seagate test aggravates the problem by making dispositive the ability of the 
infringer to muster a reasonable (even though unsuccessful) defense at the infringement 
trial. The existence of such a defense insulates the infringer from enhanced damages, even 
if he did not act on the basis of the defense or was even aware of it. Under that standard, 
someone who plunders a patent—infringing it without any reason to suppose his conduct 
is arguably defensible—can nevertheless escape any comeuppance under § 284 solely on 
the strength of his attorney’s ingenuity. 
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 But culpability is generally measured against the knowledge of the actor at the time 
of the challenged conduct. . . .  
 Section 284 allows district courts to punish the full range of culpable behavior. Yet 
none of this is to say that enhanced damages must follow a finding of egregious 
misconduct. As with any exercise of discretion, courts should continue to take into 
account the particular circumstances of each case in deciding whether to award damages, 
and in what amount. Section 284 permits district courts to exercise their discretion in a 
manner free from the inelastic constraints of the Seagate test. Consistent with nearly two 
centuries of enhanced damages under patent law, however, such punishment should 
generally be reserved for egregious cases typified by willful misconduct. 
2 
 The Seagate test is also inconsistent with § 284 because it requires clear and convincing 
evidence to prove recklessness. On this point Octane Fitness is again instructive. . . . Like 
§ 285, § 284 “imposes no specific evidentiary burden, much less such a high one.” And the 
fact that Congress expressly erected a higher standard of proof elsewhere in the Patent 
Act but not in § 284, is telling. Furthermore, nothing in historical practice supports a 
heightened standard. As we explained in Octane Fitness, “patent-infringement litigation 
has always been governed by a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Enhanced 
damages are no exception. 
III 
At the end of the day, respondents’ main argument for retaining the Seagate test comes 
down to a matter of policy. Respondents and their amici are concerned that allowing 
district courts unlimited discretion to award up to treble damages in infringement cases 
will impede innovation as companies steer well clear of any possible interference with 
patent rights. They also worry that the ready availability of such damages will embolden 
“trolls.” Trolls, in the patois of the patent community, are entities that hold patents for the 
primary purpose of enforcing them against alleged infringers, often exacting outsized 
licensing fees on threat of litigation. 
Respondents are correct that patent law reflects “a careful balance between the need 
to promote innovation” through patent protection, and the importance of facilitating the 
“imitation and refinement through imitation” that are “necessary to invention itself and 
the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.” Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 
489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989). That balance can indeed be disrupted if enhanced damages are 
awarded in garden-variety cases. As we have explained, however, they should not be. The 
seriousness of respondents’ policy concerns cannot justify imposing an artificial construct 
such as the Seagate test on the discretion conferred under § 284. 
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Section 284 gives district courts the discretion to award enhanced damages against 
those guilty of patent infringement. In applying this discretion, district courts are “to be 
guided by the sound legal principles” developed over nearly two centuries of application 
and interpretation of the Patent Act. Those principles channel the exercise of discretion, 
limiting the award of enhanced damages to egregious cases of misconduct beyond typical 
infringement. The Seagate test, in contrast, unduly confines the ability of district courts to 
exercise the discretion conferred on them. Because both cases before us were decided 
under the Seagate framework, we vacate the judgments of the Federal Circuit and remand 
the cases for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Context & Application 
1.  In Octane Fitness, the Court states that “[t]he Federal Circuit’s formulation is overly 
rigid.” Does this sound familiar from other recent Supreme Court cases? Are there some 
situations in which a flexible rule makes more sense and some in which it makes less sense 
for patent law? What are the characteristics of these different situations? 
2. Note that, unlike an award of damages made under § 284, an award of damages 
made under § 289 cannot be trebled. Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 824 
(Fed. Cir. 1992).  
